THREE DISCOURSES OF HAPPINESS, VIRTUE, AND LIBERTY.

Collected from the WORKS of the

Learn'd *GASSENDI*,

By Monsieur *Bernier*.

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THE PREFACE.

THE Epicurean Philoſophers placing the Happineſs of Man in the Satisfaction of the Mind, and Health of the Body, aſſure us that thoſe two are no otherwiſe to be procured than by a conſtant Practice of Virtue: And becauſe they have had the hard Fate to be miſrepreſented by moſt of the other Sects, as well Ancient as Modern, and their Principles traduced as favouring the moſt brutal Senſuality; the Learned Gaſſendi, *who had either examined their Doctrin with more Diligence, or interpreted their Sentiments with more Candour and Juſtice, thought he could not employ his Time better, than to vindicate the Morals of* Epicurus

and his Followers, from the Slanders of Miſtake and Malice, and to ſhew that their principal Deſign was, to lead Men by ſmooth and eaſie Paths to a juſt, ſober, wiſe and virtuous Behaviour, as the only way to true Happineſs. This he proved at large, and illuſtrated with the Sentiments of many great and excellent Men among the Greeks *and* Romans. *But becauſe theſe Things were diffuſed through the voluminous Works of that Great Man, Monſieur* Bernier, *whoſe Name is a ſufficient Commendation in the Common-wealth of Learning, took the Pains to put them together, and to form them into ſeveral intire Diſcourſes; which on account of their great importance to Mankind, are here preſented to the Publick.*

OF

OF

Moral Philoſophy

IN GENERAL

MAnkind having a natural Inclination to be happy, the main bent and deſign of all his Actions and Endeavours tend chiefly that way. It is therefore an undeniable Truth, that Happineſs, or a Life free from Pain and Miſery, are ſuch things as influence and direct all our Actions and Purpoſes to the obtaining of them. And tho' ſeveral Perſons, who neither want the Neceſſities nor Conveniences of Life, poſſeſſing great Riches, promoted to Dignites and Honours, bleſſed with a beautiful and hopeful Off-ſpring in a word, who want nothing, that may ſeem requiſite to compleat their preſent Happineſs; tho' I ſay, we find many, who have all theſe Advantages, yet they lead an anxious and uneaſy Life, diſquieted with Cares, Troubles and perpetual Diſturbances. From whence the wiſer ſort of Mankind have concluded, That the Source of this Evil proceeds from the Ignorance of the Cauſe, wherein our true Happineſs conſiſts, and of the laſt end, which every one ſhould propoſe to himſelf in all his Actions, which being neglected we are led blind-fold by our Paſſions, and forſake Honeſty, Vertue and good Manners, without which it is impoſſible to live happily. For this Reaſon they have therefore undertaken to inſtruct us wherein true

Happineſs conſiſts; and to propoſe ſuch uſeful Precepts for the due regulation of our Paſſions, whereby our Minds may be leſs liable to be diſturb'd. This Collection of Precepts, Reflections and Reaſonings, they name *The Art of Living*; or, *The Art of leading an happy Life.* And which they commonly call, *Moral Philoſophy*; becauſe it comprehends ſuch Doctrins as relate to the Manners of Men; that is to ſay, the accuſtomed and habitual Actions of Life.

From hence we may underſtand, That this part of Philoſophy is not only ſpeculative, and reſts in the bare Contemplation of its Object, but proceeds to Action, and that it is, as we uſually ſay, active and practical; for it directs and governs our Manners, rendring them regular, and agreeable with the Rules of Juſtice and Honeſty. So that in this reſpect, it may be ſaid to be *The Science*, or if this Term be ſcrupled at, we may call it, *The Art of doing well.* I only make this Suppoſition; for let it be ſtiled Art or Science, 'tis a difference only in Name, which depends upon the manner of underſtanding thoſe two Words, and therefore requires no further Scrutiny into the matter.

We will rather take notice, that *Democritus*, *Epicurus*, and divers others of no ſmall Eminency, have had ſo high an eſteem for *Moral Philoſophy*, that they have judged the *Natural* to be no further regarded, than only as it was found uſeful in freeing us from certain Errors and Miſtakes in our Underſtanding, which might diſturb the Repoſe and Tranquility of our Life, and wherein it might be ſerviceable to *Moral Philoſophy*, or to the better obtaining of that Knowledge, which teaches us to live happily and comfortably. I ſhall not mention the Followers of *Socrates*, *Ariſtippus*, *Anthiſtenes*, with the *Cyrenaicks* and *Cynicks*, who altogether neglecting the *Natural*, gave themſelves entirely over to the ſtudy of *Moral Philoſophy*, conſidering with *Socrates*, what might make

for

for the Good or Ill of Families, and what might contribute to the Grief and Diſturbance of Man's Life.

Quid ſiet in domibus fortaſſe malumve bonumve.

We may alſo here obſerve, That tho' *Socrates* is ſuppoſed to be the Inventer of *Moral Philoſophy*, this is only to be underſtood, ſo far as he did cultivate and improve a new and conſiderable part, not that he laid the firſt and Original Precepts of it; for it is certain that before him, *Pythagoras* had much improved this ſort of Knowledge. And 'tis well known, that he commonly aſſerted, *That the Diſcourſe of a Philoſopher, that cures not the Mind of ſome Paſſion, is vain and uſeleſs; as the Phyſick that drives not away the Diſtemper from the Body, is inſignificant.* It is likewiſe very certain, That the wiſe Men of *Greece*, who lived a little before *Pythagoras*, were named wiſe, only becauſe they addicted themſelves to the Study of Moral Wiſdom. Therefore at this preſent time, their famous Sentences, that relate to Mens Manners, are generally known all over the World. We might add, if we would make farther ſearch into the Antiquity of the Heroes, that we ſhall find *Orpheus*, by this ſame Study of *Moral Philoſophy*, drawing the Men of his time off from their barbarous and ſavage way of Living; which gave occaſion of that Saying of him, *That he tamed the Tygers and the Lions*, as *Horace* deſcribes;

Orpheus *inſpir'd by more than human Power,*
Did not (as Poets feign) tame ſavage Beaſts,
But Men as lawleſs and as wild as they,
And firſt diſſwaded them from Rage and Blood.
Thus when Amphion *built the* Theban *Wall,*
They feign'd the Stones obey'd his Magick Lute.

In a word, it was Morality that firſt ſet a Mark of Diſtinction between publick and private Good, ſetled our Rights and Authority, and gave Laws and Rules for regulating Societies; as the ſame Poet expreſſes:

——When Man yet new,
No Rule but uncorrupted Reaſon knew;
And with a native bent did Good purſue,
Unforc'd by Puniſhment, unaw'd by Fear,
His Words were ſimple, and his Soul ſincere.
No ſuppliant Crowds before the Judge appear'd,
No Court erected yet, no Cauſe was heard;
But all was ſafe, for Conſcience was their Guard.

However, we muſt acknowledge our ſelves much indebted to *Socrates*, as to *Moral Philoſophy*, ſince by his applying himſelf to the ſtudy thereof, it hath given us Opportunity of great Improvement, by reducing it to a more diſtinct and eaſy method than formerly; and we find, that the Diſciples of the great *Plato*, and of *Xenophon* alſo, have left behind them curious and excellent Monuments; nor have thoſe who ſucceeded them, as *Ariſtotle*, and the *Stoicks*, come ſhort of handling it more methodically, and at large.

THI

THE
First BOOK
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS

CHAP. I.

What Happineſs is.

THo' *Felicity* or *Happineſs* be properly the enjoyment of the Sovereign or Chief Good; and therefore the moſt bleſſed Eſtate that can be deſired; yet becauſe this Eſtate of Enjoyment comprehends this Sovereign Good, it is for that Reaſon called by this Name. It is alſo termed the Chief or the Ultimate Happineſs, the End of all Ends, or *The End*, for its Excellency, becauſe all other things are deſired and ſought after for it's ſake. And laſtly, that it is deſired alone for it's own ſake. To this purpoſe *Ariſtotle* tells us, *That amongſt the things that are deſirable, there muſt be*

ſomething at laſt which is moſt deſirable, that ſo we might avoid an Infinity. But here we may make two conſiderable Remarks.

The Firſt is, That we don't concern our ſelves here with that Happineſs mentioned by the Sacred Pen-Men, when they tell us how happy that Man is, who being aſſiſted with the Divine Influences, betakes himſelf entirely to the Service of God; and being filled with Faith and Hope, and inflamed with Charity, ſpends his Life in Peace and Tranquility. Nor ſhall we Treat of that which may be called Natural Happineſs, becauſe it may be obtained by the ſtrength of Nature, being ſuch as the ancient Philoſophers did not doubt but to enjoy here on Earth.

The Second is, That by this Natural Felicity that we here Treat of, is not to be underſtood ſuch a ſtate of Life as we can't imagin a better, a more pleaſant, and more deſirable; in the which we cannot apprehend any evil, nor think of any good thing which we ſhall not poſſeſs; nor of any thing that we have a deſire to do, but we ſhall be able to accompliſh it, and that it ſhall remain fix'd and unchangeable. But we underſtand ſuch a certain ſtate of Life, in which we may be as happy as is poſſible; in which there are abundance of good things, and very few of any ſort of evil; and in which conſequently we may lead as eaſie, quiet and undiſturbed a Life as the Condition of the Country, the Society we Converſe with, the Conſtitution of our Bodies, the manner of our Life, our Age and other Circumſtances will permit; For to propoſe to our ſelves more than this, or to affect during the Courſe of our Natural Life the higheſt Felicity, is not to acknowledge, but rather forget our ſelves to be Men; that is to ſay, weak and feeble Animals, who by the Laws of Nature are ſubject to an infinite number of Miſchiefs and Evils.

And

And in this ſenſe it is that we uſually ſay, a Wiſe Man, tho' tormented with exquiſite Pains, may nevertheleſs be happy; not in a perfect and compleat ſenſe, but he may attain to that degree that we call Human Happineſs, which the Wiſe Man always enjoys in that meaſure that the Circumſtances will permit, becauſe he don't increaſe his Miſery, either by Impatience, or Deſpair, but rather abates it by his Conſtancy. And by this means he is happier, or to ſpeak more properly, he is leſs miſerable than if he ſuffered himſelf to be dejected, as others in like Caſes, who bear not their Misfortunes with the ſame patience and conſtancy of Mind, and who beſides are not ſupplied with the ſame Encouragements from Wiſdom as he hath; ſuch I mean as an innocent Life, and a good Conſcience void of offence, which always afford great quiet and ſatisfaction to the Mind.

Wherefore 'tis improper to uſe this kind of Expreſſion; *That it is the ſame thing for a Wiſe Man to be burning in* Phalaris's *Bull, as to be ſolacing himſelf upon a Bed of Roſes*; for it is of ſuch things as Fire and Torments that he deſires to be exempt, and wiſhes much rather that they were not, or that he might not ſuffer by them; but when they come upon him, he conſiders them as unavoidable Evils, and ſuffers them with Courage; ſo that he may ſay, *Uror, ſed invictus*; I burn, it is true, and ſuffer, and ſometimes I ſigh and weep, but for all this I am not vanquiſh'd, nor overcome, nor do I ſuffer my ſelf to be tranſported with Deſpair, which would render my Condition much more miſerable,

Several Opinions concerning the efficient Cauſe of Happineſs.

AT our firſt entring upon this Diſcourſe, we may obſerve, that the efficient Cauſes of Happineſs being nothing elſe but the Goods of the Soul, of the Body, or of Fortune, ſome of the Philoſophers have highly extolled the firſt, ſome the ſecond, and others have included them all. Thoſe who chiefly recommend the Riches of the Mind, as *Anaxagoras*, propoſe for the obtaining of Happineſs, *A Contemplative Life, together with ſuch a kind of Freedom which proceeds from profound Knowledge.* Poſſidonius requires *Contemplation, with a Dominion over the irrational part of Man. Herillus*, generally and ſimply, *Learning*, or *Knowledge. Apollodorus* and *Lycus* generally, *the Pleaſures of the Mind.* Leuclnus *the Pleaſures that proceed from honeſt things.* The Stoicks, *Zenon, Cleanthes, Ariſtus*, and the reſt, require *Vertue.* Therefore theſe laſt proceeded ſo far as to ſay, *That if a Man poſſeſs'd Vertue, it matter'd not whether he were ſick or well.* All the reſt by common Conſent maintain'd, *that to live happily, was nothing elſe but to live a Vertuous Life*, or as they expreſs it, *according to Nature.*

As for thoſe who prefer the Riches and advantages of the Body, and who chiefly aim at ſenſual Pleaſures, they were for that Reaſon Named the Voluptuous, *Voluptuarii Philoſophi*, of whom we ſhall have occaſion to diſcourſe hereafter, when we ſhall compare them with *Epicurus.*

At preſent we ſhall only take notice that they have had *Ariſtippus* for their Leader, and with him the *Cyrenaicks*, of whom we ſhall make mention afterwards; and that the *Annicerians*, who proceed from the *Cyrenaicks*, aimed at no certain end of Life, but

at

at the Pleaſure of every particular Action, of what kind or Nature ſoever.

Laſtly, amongſt ſuch as prefer the Goods of Fortune, they are generally the vulgar ſort of People, who look with a greedy deſire, ſome upon Riches, ſome upon Honours, ſome upon other things: But amongſt the Philoſophers none are mention'd, but ſuch as joyn to theſe outward Advantages the perfections alſo both of the Mind and Body; for this hath given occaſion to the Poets to make theſe excellent repreſentations of Happineſs, which they have borrowed from ſeveral Opinions of the Philoſophers, ſuch as this, which requires that good Fortune might accompany Vertue.

Virtus colenda; Sors petenda a Diis bona:
Hæc quippe duo cui ſuppetunt, is vivere
Et vir beatus, & bonus ſimul poteſt.

Another deſires to enjoy perfect Health, and a ſound Conſtitution of Body, Riches purchaſed without Fraud, and in ſhort, to ſpend his Life amongſt his Friends.

Fragili viro optima res bene valere,
Atque indolem bonam eſſe ſortitum;
Tum & poſſidere opes dolo haud partas;
Tandem & cum amicis exigere vitam.

Another Deſcription we find in *Martial*, who among many other things, deſires to enjoy a Paternal Eſtate, acquir'd without Labour, to be free from the vexation of Law-Suits, *&c.*

Since Deareſt Friend 'tis your deſire to ſee
A true Receipt of Happineſs from me;
Theſe are the Chief Ingredients, if not all,
Take an Eſtate neither too great, nor ſmall,
Which Quantum ſufficit *the Doctors call.*

Let

Let this Eſtate from Parents Care deſcend,
The getting it too much of Life does ſpend.
Take ſuch a Ground, whoſe gratitude may be
A fair Encouragement for Induſtry:
Let conſtant Fires the Winter's Fury tame,
And let thy Kitchins be a Veſtal Flame:
Thee to the Town let never Suits at Law,
And rarely, very rarely Buſineſs draw;
Thy active Mind in equal Temper keep,
In undiſturbed Peace, yet not in ſleep;
Let Exerciſe a vigorous Health maintain,
Without which, all the Compoſition's vain:
In the ſame weight Prudence and Innocence take,
Ana *of each does the juſt Mixture make:*
But a few Friendſhips wear, and let them be
By Nature and by Fortune fit for thee:
Inſtead of Art and Luxury in Food,
Let Mirth and Freedom make thy Table good.
If any Cares into the Day-time creep,
At Night without Wine's Opium, let them ſleep.
Let Reſt, which Nature does to Darkneſs wed,
And not Luſt, recommend to thee thy Bed.
Be ſatisfied, and pleas'd with what thou art,
Act chearfully and well th' allotted Part:
Enjoy the preſent hour, be thankful for the paſt,
And neither fear nor wiſh th' approaches of the laſt.

Here we may firſt obſerve, as *Horace* according to *Ariſtotle* tells us, that many are often diſappointed in their ſearch after Happineſs, imagining that it conſiks chiefly in ſuch things as they want, and which they admire in others; as the Ignorant ſuppoſe it in Knowledge, the Poor in Riches, the Sick in Health; which *Horace* very well expreſſeth, ſpeaking of the Merchant, of the Soldier, and of the Husbandman; the one envies and admires the other's Condition.

O happy

O happy Seamen! cries th' Old Son of War,
With batter'd Limbs, and half his Face a Scar.
The reſtleſs Seaman, when inſulting Gales
Toſs the light Bark, and Conquer all his Sails:
(If fear allows one diſtant thought, or word,)
Trembling applauds the Brother of the Sword.
The Man of Law when pondring at the Door,
His wakeful Client knocks him up at four
Wou'd leave the Bar, to lie ſecurely warm,
And part with all his Practice for a Farm.
The clumſy Peaſant, if when Harveſt's done,
A kind Subpœna call's him up to Town;
'Tis odds, but raviſh'd with the gaudy Scene,
He ſells his Team, ſets up for Citizen.

Secondly, To admire nothing, as *Horace* again ſays, is almoſt the only thing capable of rendring a Man happy, and continuing him ſo.

Not to admire, as moſt are wont to do,
It is the only Method that I know,
To make Men happy, and to keep them ſo.

And this does not only ſhew the Tranquility of mind unto which he hath attained; who perceiving the Vanity of all Human things, does not admire nor any way ſeek after, but rather deſpiſes the Glory of Power, Honours, and Riches, which generally dazle Mens Eyes; but it alſo ſhews that other ſort of Tranquility, which he hath attained, who hath arrived to the knowledge of Natural Cauſes; ſo that he neither wonders, nor fears, nor is any way diſquieted, as the Vulgar uſually are.

Happy the Man who ſtudying Nature's Laws,
Thro' known Effects can trace the ſecret Cauſe;

His

His Mind poſſeſſing in a quiet State,
Fearleſs of Fortune, and reſign'd to Fate.

Thirdly, That the ſweet Repoſe and Quiet which we meet with in a retired ſtate, void of the Incumbrances of the World, contributes not a little to our Happineſs; for he that aſpires to the true Felicity of Life, which conſiſts chiefly in the Tranquility of Mind, muſt not, as *Democritus* tells us, incumber himſelf in much Buſineſs, either Private, or Publick. And it is generally known, that the Oracle eſteem'd not the Great King *Gyges* ſo Happy as the Old Father *Aglaus Pſophidius*, who in a little Corner of *Arcadia*, Husbanded a ſmall Eſtate, from which he reapt plentifully the Neceſſaries of Life, and never departing thence, ſpent his time comfortably, free from Ambition, and without the leaſt ſenſe of the Evils which torment the greateſt part of Mankind.

'Tis this ſweet Retirement that *Horace* hath ſo much commended in his Praiſe of a Country Life.

Happy the Man, whom bounteous Gods allow,
With his own hands Paternal Grounds to Plough!
Like the firſt Golden Mortal happy he
From Buſineſs and the Cares of Mony free!
No Human Storms break off at Land his Sleep,
No loud Alarms of Nature on the Deep.
From all the Cheats of Law, he lives ſecure,
Nor do's th' Affronts of Palaces endure.

The ſame ſtate *Virgil* deſcribes in his 2d *Georgic*.

O Happy (if his Happineſs he knows)
The Country Swain! on whom kind Heav'n beſtows,
At home all Riches, that wiſe Nature needs,
Whom the juſt Earth with Eaſe and Plenty feeds.
'Tis true, no Morning Tide of Clients comes,
And fills the Painted Channels of his Rooms;

Adoring

Adoring the rich Figures as they paſs;
In Tapeſtry wrought, or cut in living Braſs;
Nor is his Wool ſuperfluouſly dy'd
With the dear Poiſon of Aſſyrian *Pride;*
Nor do Arabian *Perfumes vainly ſpoil*
The native Uſe and Sweetneſs of his Oyl;
Inſtead of theſe his calm and harmleſs Life,
Free from th' Alarms of Fear and Storm of Striſe
Do's with ſubſtantial Bleſſedneſs abound,
And the ſoft Wings of Peace cover him round.
Through Artleſs Grates the murmuring Waters glide,
Thick Trees both againſt Heat and Cold provide,
From whence the Birds ſalute him, and his Ground
With lowing Herds and bleating Sheep do's ſound;
And all the Rivers and the Foreſts nigh,
Do Food and Game and Exerciſe ſupply.

As to *Epicurus* we ſhall ſpeak more at large, that he makes Happineſs to conſiſt in the Eaſe of the Body, and the Tranquility of the Mind, teaching at the ſame time, and maintaining, That the efficient Cauſes of this Felicity, are neither the delicious Wines, nor the delicate Meats, nor any ſuch thing; *but a ſound, juſt and enlightned Reaſon aſſiſted by Vertue, from which it is not to be ſeparated, and which duly weighs and examines the Cauſes and Motives that induce us, either to embrace or ſhun any thing.* Therefore deſigning to treat afterwards of Happineſs, he earneſtly exhorts, to conſider throughly of the things that conduce to it; and becauſe amongſt thoſe things the chief is, That the Mind may be diſengaged from certain Miſtakes, which cauſe continual Diſturbances and vain Fears, he mentions ſeveral Particulars, which he believes to be of that Importance, that when well examin'd, will ſettle the Mind, and procure to it a real and ſolid Happineſs.

Some

Some Particulars needful to be examin'd, and conſider'd, which will contribute very much to the Repoſe and Happineſs of the Mind.

THE Firſt Particular, is the Knowledge and Fear of God. And certainly this Philoſopher had good Reaſon to recommend to us in the firſt place, the right Ideas that we are to entertain of this Sovereign Being; becauſe he that hath a right Notion of him, is ſo much inflamed with Love and Affection for God, that he conſtantly endeavours to pleaſe him by an honeſt and a vertuous Life, always truſting in his infinite Goodneſs, and expecting all things from him, who is the Fountain of all good: By this means he ſpends his Life ſweetly, peaceably, and pleaſantly. We ſhall not concern our ſelves here to ſhew the Exiſtence of this Being, ſeeing we have already done it elſewhere: But ſhall only take notice, that tho' *Epicurus* delivers ſome Notions that are very juſt and reaſonable, yet he hath others that are not to be entertained by pious Men, tho' he interprets 'em after his own Faſhion; ſuch are to be look'd upon as impious; for he believes, That God hath a Being, as *Lucretius* makes him acknowledge in his firſt Book.

For whatſoe'er's Divine muſt live in Peace,
In undiſturb'd and everlaſting Eaſe;
Not care for us; from Fears and Dangers free,
Sufficient to it's own Felicity:
Nought here below, nought in our Power it needs,
Ne'er ſmiles at good, ne'er frowns at wicked deeds.

Now I ſay, to believe ſuch a ſupreme Being, that exiſts to all Eternity, is immortal and infinitely happy in it's own Nature, enjoying all things within it ſelf,

ſelf, and ſtands in no need of us, nor hath any Cauſe to fear; that is not ſubject to Pain, Anger, nor other Paſſions, are undeniable Truths, and an Opinion that is Praiſe-worthy, eſpecially in a Heathen Philoſopher; but when he denies Providence, as theſe Verſes do intimate, and when he thinks that it is not conſiſting with the higheſt Felicity, as if God had no particular Care of Men; That the Juſt are to expect nothing from his Goodneſs, nor the Wicked are not to dread his Juſtice, are ſuch Opinions, that our Reaſon and Religion will not permit us to entertain.

The ſecond Particular relates to *Death*. For as *Ariſtotle* obſerves, Death is look'd upon as the moſt dreadful Evil, becauſe none is exempted, being unavoidable. Therefore *Epicurus* judges, That we ought to accuſtom our ſelves to think upon it, that we might learn by that means as much as is poſſible to free our ſelves from ſuch Fears of Death, as might diſturb our Tranquility, and conſequently the Happineſs of our Life; and for that Reaſon, he endeavours to perſwade us, that it is ſo far from being the moſt dreadful of all Evils, that in it ſelf it is no Evil at all: And thus he argues; *Death*, ſaith he, *don't affect us, and by conſequence in reſpect of us, is not to be judged an Evil; for what affects us is attended by ſome but, now Death is the privation of Senſe.* He tells us alſo, with *Anaxagoras*, *That as before we were capable of Senſe, it was not grievous to us to have no Senſe; ſo likewiſe when we ſhall have loſt it, we ſhall not be troubled at the want of it. As when we are aſleep, we are not concerned, becauſe we are not awake: So when we ſhall be dead, it will not trouble us, that we are not living.* He concludes with *Archeſilas*, *That Death, which is ſaid to be an Evil, hath this belonging to it, that when it hath been preſent, it hath never troubled any body. And that it is through the Weakneſs of the Mind, and the diſmal Apprehenſions that we have of Death, that*

makes

makes it ſeem ſo terrible to us when abſent, inſomuch that ſome are ſtruck dead with the very Fear of dying.

We may very well acknowledge, That Death is the Privation of our External Senſe, or of Senſe, properly ſo called. And *Epicurus* hath very good Reaſon to ſay, That in Death there is nothing to be feared, that may injure the Sight, the Hearing, the Smell, the Taſt, or the Senſe of Feeling; for all theſe Senſes cannot be without the Body, and then the Body ceaſes to be, or is diſſolved. But that which we are not to allow is, what he affirms elſewhere, That Death is alſo the Privation or Extinction of the Spirit, or Underſtanding, which is an internal Senſe; a Senſe according to his Notion. Therefore, that we may not be hindred, by this Impiety, which has been ſufficiently refuted in treating of the Immortality of the Soul; let us proceed to give a Check to the extraordinary Apprehenſions of Death, and to thoſe Fears that frequently diſturb all the Peace and Quiet of our Life, and with a ſullen Blackneſs infect and poiſon all our moſt innocent Pleaſures, as *Lucretius* ſaith,

——————— *Thoſe idle Fears,*
That ſpoil our Lives with Jealouſies and Cares,
Diſturb our Joys with dread of Pains beneath,
And ſully them with the black Fears of Death.

Let us therefore in the firſt place, remember to give a Check to that fond Deſire of prolonging our days without bounds. Let us, I ſay, ſo remember this frail and infirm Condition of our Nature, as not to deſire any thing above it's Reach and Capacity. Let us calmly and quietly, without repining, enjoy this Gift of Life, whether it be beſtowed upon us for a longer or a ſhorter time. It is certain, that our Maker may deprive us of it without doing us any wrong. Let us thankfully acknowledge his Liberality, from whom

whom we have received it, and add this to the number of thoſe Benefits, which we daily draw from his Bounty.

Nature favours us for a while with the uſe of the Proſpect of thoſe Enjoyments: Be not angry, that we muſt withdraw when the time is expired; for we were admitted upon no other Terms, but to yield our places to others, as our Anceſtors have done to us. Our Bodies are naturally inclinable to Corruption, and the manner of our Nativity renders our Death unavoidable. *If to be Born is pleaſant, let not our Diſſolution be grievous to us*, to make uſe of *Seneca*'s Words. If the ſtriving againſt this Fatality could any ways advantage us, we ſhould then perhaps approve of the Endeavours that are made, but all our Strugglings are to no purpoſe, we do but add to our pain.

The number of our Days is ſo appointed, that the time of our Life ſlides away, and is not to be recovered; and we run our Race in ſuch a manner, that whether we will or not, we are brought at laſt to the end.

As many Days as we paſs over, ſo many are cut off from that Life that Nature hath alotted to us. So that Death being the Privation of Life, we are dying continually, as long as we live, and that by a Death that carries not all at once, but by degrees one ſtep after another, tho' the laſt is that unto which the Name of Death is aſſigned. So true it is, that the end of our Life depends upon the firſt Moment.

Let us therefore moderate our Deſires according to the Rule that Nature hath preſcribed; and if the Deſtinies (to ſpeak according to the ancient Poets) cannot be prevail'd upon, ſo that againſt our Wills, we are hurried away; let us at leaſt alleviate our Trouble by ſuffering our ſelves to be carried off willingly.

The beſt and only Remedy to paſs our Life free and void of Trouble, is to ſuit our ſelves to our Nature, to deſire nothing but what it requires, and to eſteem the laſt Moment of our Life as a free Gift of Providence, and to diſpoſe and prepare our ſelves in ſuch a manner, that when Death approaches, we may ſay, I have lived, and I have finiſhed the Race that Nature hath appointed me.

Vixi & quem dederas curſum Natura peregi.

She calls away, but I come of mine own accord. Nature requires of me what I am intruſted with, I yield it willingly: I am commanded to die, I expire without Regret. We might alſo very well make uſe of the Advice of *Lucretius*, and ſpeak thus to our ſelves. The greateſt and moſt mighty Monarchs of the World are dead; and *Scipio*, that Thunderbolt of War, and Terror of *Carthage*, hath left his Bones in the Earth, like as the vileſt Slave: *Anchiſes*, the moſt Religious of all men, and *Homer* the Prince of the Poets, are dead; and ſhall we murmur to die?

But more to comfort thee——
Conſider, Ancus *periſh'd long ago;*
Ancus, *a better Man by much than thou.*
Conſider, mighty Kings in pamper'd State
Fall, and inglorioufly ſubmit to Fate.
Scipio *that Scourge of* Carthage, *now the Grave*
Keeps Priſoner like the meaneſt common Slave;
Nay, the great Wits and Poets too, that give
Eternity to others, ceaſe to live.
Homer *their Prince, the Darling of the Nine*
(What Troy *would at a ſecond fall repine*
To be thus ſung?) is nothing now but Fame,
A laſting, far diffus'd, but empty Name.

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Let us ſay moreover, *Gaſſendus* himſelf is dead, and that great Man hath finiſhed his Courſe like other Mortals; he who in profound Learning and Wiſdom excell'd the reſt of Mankind, and who riſing like a Sun, darkned the Light of all the Stars.

Nay Great Gaſſendi's *Race of Life is run,*
That Man of Wit, who other Men out-ſhone,
As far as meaner Stars the mid-day Sun.

And can'ſt not thou, O Wretch, reſolve to die?

Then how dar'ſt thou repine to die and grieve,
Thou meaner Soul, thou dead ev'n whilſt alive?
That ſleep'ſt and dream'ſt the moſt of Life away,
Thy Night is full as rational as thy Day.
Still vext with Cares, who never underſtood
The Principles of ill, nor uſe of good,
Nor whence thy Cares proceed, but reel'ſt about,
In vain unſettled Thoughts, condemn'd to doubt.

Thou whoſe Life is as half dead; thou who ſpendeſt above half thy time in Sleep; who ſnoreſt, (as I may ſay) waking and feedeſt upon Fancies, and who liveſt in the midſt of Fears and continual Troubles. It is what our famous *Malherbe* had in his Thoughts, when he bewails the unhappy Fate of great Men, who are ſubject to the ſame Laws of Death as the meaneſt Beggars.

Yet theſe are turn'd to Duſt, and Fate
Rules with ſuch Arbitrary Sway,
So binds its Laws on every State,
That all their Equal's Doom Obey.
With none e'er yet Impartial Deſtiny
Of all it's num'rous Subjects wou'd diſpenſe,
Hear this ye Vulgar Souls, and hence
Unrepining Learn to Die.

But here ſome will object, we ſhall be depriv'd of all the Bleſſings of Life, as *Lucretius* Elegantly Expreſſes it, *Lib.* 3.

Ay, but he now is ſnatcht from all his Joys;
No more ſhall his Chaſt Wife, and Pratling Boys
Run to their Dad, with eager haſt, and ſtrive
Which ſhall have the firſt Kiſs, as when alive.
Ay, but he now no more from Wars ſhall come,
Bring Peace and Safety to his Friends at home;
Wretched, O Wretched Man! one Fatal Day
Has ſnatch'd the vaſt Delights of Life away.

It is true, that this is commonly objected, but they ſeldom Conſider that this ſuppoſed UnhappyMan ſhall then have no deſire at all for ſuch things; and that when he ſhall be really Dead, he ſhall not ſee any like himſelf ſtanding near his Tomb, beating the Breaſt, and languiſhing with Grief, as the ſame Author Deſcribes.

Thus they bewail, but go no further on,
And add, that his Deſires and Wants are gone.
But the fond Fool n'er thinks, that when kind Death
Shall cloſe his Eyes in Night, and ſtop his Breath;
Then nothing of this thinking thing remains,
To mourn his Fate, and feel ſharp Grief and Pains.

May not we likewiſe thus Argue, as *Plutarch* Obſerves, and which often occurs in our Thoughts? If our Life, which we eſteem very long, when it extends to an Hundred Years, were naturally but of one Days continuance, as ſome Animals mention'd by *Ariſtotle*, in the Kingdom of *Pontus* are; And if like them in the Morning we were in our Youth, at Noon in our Strength and full Growth, and at Night in our Old Age; It is certain, in this Caſe we ſhould be as well pleas'd to live one Day till Night, as we are now to live an hundred years. And on the contrary,

trary, if our Life did now extend to a thouſand years, as did that of our firſt Fathers, in that Caſe it would grieve us as much to Die at the end of ſix hundred years, as to depart now at the expiration of three-ſcore. It is the ſame in reſpect of thoſe, who firſt came into the World, if they had continued till this preſent time, it would trouble them as much to Die now, as it does us.

Theſe Conſiderations therefore ought to teach us, that our Life of what ſort ſoever, is to be computed, not by its length, but by the good Qualifications and Pleaſures that attend it. In the ſame manner (ſaith *Seneca*) *As the Perfection of a Circle ought to be computed, not by the Greatneſs, but by the exact Roundneſs of the Figure. O Vain and Indiſcreet Diligence*, ſaith *Pliny*, *Men compute the number of their Days, where they ſhould only ſeek their true Worth.*

Heu vana, & imprudens diligentia, numerus dierum
Computatur ubi quæritur pondus!

We don't Conſider, that as the Maſs of this Earth, and all the World beſide, and a thouſand other ſuch Worlds, if you pleaſe, are but as a Point, if compared with the vaſt extended ſpace of the Heavens: Thus the longeſt Life of Man, were it as long as that of the *Hamadryades*, or a thouſand thouſand times more, is but a Moment, if compared with Eternity. *This Life*, ſaith *Seneca*, is *but a Point, How can we extend this Point?*

In hoc punctum conjectus es,
Quod ut extendas, quouſque extendes?

Know, ſaith Lucretius, *That by the prolonging of our Days we diminiſh nothing from the time and long continuance of Death*; and that he who dies to day, ſhall not be dead a leſs time than he who died a thouſand years ago.

What tho' a thouſand years prolong thy breath,
How can this ſhorten the long ſtate of Death?
For tho' thy Life ſhall numerous Ages fill,
The State of Death ſhall be Eternal ſtill;
And he that dies to day, ſhall be no more,
As long as thoſe who periſh'd long before.

If Nature, ſaith he again, ſhould in anger ſpeak to us in this manner? 'What Cauſe haſt thou, O Mortal to Weep, and to Complain of Death? If thy former Life hath been eaſie and pleaſant, and if thou haſt known how to make uſe of the good things and delights that I have afforded thee, why doſt thou not as a Gueſt, depart when thou art full, and ſatisfied with Life? and why doſt thou not accept, fond Creature, of the agreeable Repoſe that is offered thee? But if otherwiſe, thy Life hath been to thee a burthen, and if thou haſt ſuffered my Bounties to periſh, why deſirſt thou more to miſpend them after the ſame manner? for I can give thee no new thing. And if thou ſhouldſt live thouſands of years, thou wilt but ſtill ſee the ſame things repeated over again. If Nature ſhould ſpeak to us in this Language, ſhould we not have reaſon to approve of this Diſcourſe, and own that it hath cauſe to Reproach us in this manner?

Fond Mortal, what's the matter thou doſt ſigh?
Why all theſe Tears, becauſe thou once muſt die,
And once ſubmit to ſtrong Neceſſity?
For if the Race thou haſt already run
Was pleaſant, if with joy thou ſaws't the Sun:
If all thy Pleaſures did not paſs thy Mind,
As thro' a Sieve, but left ſome Sweets behind;
Why doſt thou not then like a thankful Gueſt,
Riſe chearfully from Life's abundant Feaſt,
And with a quiet Mind go take thy Reſt?

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But if all thoſe Delights are loſt and gone,
Spent idly all, and Life a burthen grown;
Then why, fond Mortal, doſt thou ask for more?
Why ſtill deſire t'increaſe thy wretched ſtore?
And wiſh for what muſt waſt like thoſe before?
Not rather free thy ſelf from Pains and Fear,
And end thy Life, and neceſſary care?
My Pleaſures always in a Circle run,
The ſame returning with the yearly Sun:
And thus, tho' thou doſt ſtill enjoy thy Prime,
And tho' thy Limbs feel not the rage of Time;
Yet I can find no new, no freſh Delight,
The ſame dull Joys muſt vex thy Appetite:
Altho' thou coud'ſt prolong thy wretched Breath
For numerous Years; much more if free from Death.

At leaſt we muſt acknowledge that a Wiſe Man who hath lived long enough to conſider the World, ought of his own accord to ſubmit himſelf to the Courſe of Nature, when he perceives that his time is come, and cannot but ſuppoſe that his Race is Run, and that the Circle that he hath finiſh'd is compleat; and if this Circle is not to be compared to Eternity, it is however with the continuance of the World.

As to what relates to the whole Proſpect of Nature, he hath often beheld the Heavens, the Earth, and other things included in the World; He hath often ſeen the riſing and the ſetting of the Cœleſtial Bodies; He hath taken notice of ſeveral Eclipſes, and many other Phænomenas or unuſual Appearances in the Skye, the conſtant ſucceſſion of the Seaſons, and in a word, many particular Generations, many Corruptions and Tranſmutations. And as to thoſe things which relate to Mankind, he hath ſeen, or at leaſt hath heard and underſtood from Hiſtory the Tranſactions that have happen'd from the beginning; of Peace, and of War, of Faith kept, and violated; of a Polite Life, and of a rude and barbarous Behaviour;

viour; of Laws Eſtabliſh'd, and Aboliſh'd, of Kingdoms and Commonwealths in their firſt Birth and Declenſion, and generally all other things that he hath any knowledge of, or which have been told him, and with which he is in any wiſe acquainted, as if he had been preſent when they firſt happen'd. So that he ought to conſider, that all the time that is gone before him relates to him, as if his Life were begun with the things themſelves. And becauſe we muſt judge of the future by the time paſt, he ought alſo to think that all the ſubſequent time relates to him in the ſame manner; and that there ſhall be nothing hereafter, but what hath been already; that there is nothing but the Circumſtances of things that alter, and that all things in general ſteer the ſame common Courſe, and make the like appearances; ſo that Holy Writ hath reaſon to ſay, *The thing that hath been, it is that which ſhall be, and that which is done, is that which ſhall be done again, and there is no new thing under the Sun.* Is there any thing whereof it may be ſaid, ſee this is new? From whence we may conclude, that a Wiſe Man ought not to fancy his Life ſhort; for by caſting his eye upon the time paſt, and foreſeeing the time to come, he may extend it to as great a length as the duration of the Univerſe.

Moreover, tho' *Epicurus* had cauſe to ſay, *That it is ridiculous to aſſert that there is no evil in Death when it is preſent, and yet to dread it, and be troubled when it muſt come; as if there were any reaſon to be diſturbed for that which is abſent, which when preſent never gives us the leaſt ſorrow:* Nevertheleſs, becauſe other Conſiderations repreſent Death dreadful, as the Evils and Pains that Uſher it, and thoſe that we think will be its neceſſary Attendants; *Seneca* therefore makes it his buſineſs to recommend divers Conſiderations, wherein he ſhews, that tho' Death in it ſelf is no Evil, yet it appears ſo much in that Notion, that it ought not

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to be lookt upon as an indifferent thing; for as he expreſſeth himſelf; *Death is not indifferent in the ſame manner as it is indifferent whether the Hairs of my head be of one length, or not; for Death is to be reckon'd amongſt thoſe things, which tho' they be no real Evils, yet they appear to be ſo; for we love our ſelves; and naturally deſire to ſubſiſt and preſerve our ſelves, and we have an innate averſion from a diſſolution, becauſe it ſeems to deprive us of many advantages, and draws us away from that plenty of Enjoyments unto which we are accuſtomed.* There is yet one thing more which cauſeth us to dread Death. *We know the things preſent, but we are altogether Strangers to thoſe unto which we are a going; and therefore we fear that which is unknown. Beſides, we have a natural dread of Darkneſs, into which we imagin that Death is leading us: So that tho' Death is indifferent, yet it is not of the number of thoſe things that are eaſily to be deſpiſed; we ought to inure and harden our Minds by a long accuſtomed Habit, to enable us the more willingly to undergo and encounter with the diſmal approaches of Death.*

The Third Particular relates to the abominable Opinion of the Stoicks, who were perſwaded that in ſome Caſes Men had the liberty to kill themſelves; for thus you ſee *Seneca* repreſents them arguing. *It is certainly a great affliction to live in want; but there is nothing that obliges us abſolutely to continue in it; for which way ſoever we glance our eyes, we may ſee the end of our Sufferings, and our Deliverance, either in a Precipice, in a River, by a Dagger, by a Tree, by opening a Vein, or by Abſtinence. We ought to give God thanks that none of us is detained againſt his Will in this preſent Life. The Eternal Decree hath admirably well appointed that there ſhould be but one kind of entrance into the World, but many out of it. Death, ſay they, is to be met with in every place; God hath very wiſely contrived, that there is none but may take away*

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our Life, but no Man can take away our Death, tho' it hath a thouſand Paſſages open to it.

Ubique Mors eſt; optime hoc cavit Deus:
Eripere vitam nemo non homini poteſt;
At nemo mortem; mille ad hanc exitus patent.

He that knows how to die, can free himſelf, and he hath always the Door of his Priſon open. True it is, there is a Chain that holds us faſt, namely the Love of Life; and this Love, though we ought not abſolutely to reject it, yet we ſhould at leaſt mitigate it, that if ſometimes Accidents require, it may not keep us back, nor hinder us from being ready to perform at preſent, that which we muſt one day do or ſuffer. Theſe following Tenets proceed from the ſame School. *The Wiſe Man lives as long as he ought, tho' not ſo long as he may; He knows where he ought to live, with whom, and how, and what he ought to do. He conſiders the manner of his Life, and not the length. If he meets with Croſſes, and Misfortunes, he frees himſelf, and don't ſtay for the laſt neceſſity to ſet him at liberty; but as ſoon as Fortune begins to frown upon him, he ſeriouſly conſiders, if he ought not at that time to end his days. He believes that if he himſelf haſtens his end, or expects it from another hand, it is the ſame thing; or whether it be brought to paſs ſooner or later, it grieves him not. Nevertheleſs ſometimes though his Death is certain and appointed, and that he knows himſelf ſet apart for Execution, yet he won't lend his helping hand, nor will he be overwhelm'd with Sorrow. It is a folly to die for fear of Death. If he that is to kill thee is coming, wait for him, Why wilt thou prevent him? and why wilt thou undertake to execute upon thy ſelf another's Cruelty? Doſt thou covet the Office of an Executioner? or wilt thou ſave him*

him the labour? Socrates *ought to have ended his Days by Abſtinence, and die by Hunger, rather than by Poiſon, yet he continued thirty days in Priſon, in expectation of Death; not becauſe during this time he had hopes of a Reprieve, but to ſhew himſelf Obedient to the Laws, and to give his Friends the Pleaſure of enjoying the Converſation of* Socrates, *when he was ready to Die. When therefore an outward Violence threatens us with Death, we can't give any general or abſolute Directions, whether we are to prevent it, or to expect it with Patience, for there are many Circumſtances to be conſidered. But if there be two kinds of Death, the one full of grievous Torments, the other ſudden and eaſie, why may not we chuſe the latter?*

This was the Opinion of *Hyeronimus*, of all the Stoicks, and namely of *Pliny*, who ſtiles the Earth *a good Mother, becauſe it hath compaſſion of us, and hath appointed the Poiſons for our uſe.* It ſeems to be likewiſe the Opinion of *Plato*; for tho' *Cicero* makes him ſay, *That we ought to preſerve the Soul incloſed in the Body, and without the command of him who gave it, we muſt not depart out of this Life, that we might not thereby ſeem to deſpiſe this gift that God hath beſtowed upon Man:* Yet in his Book of Laws, he declares, *That he who kills himſelf is not to be blamed, but when he doth the act, without being thereunto forced by the Sentence of the Judge, or by ſome unſufferable and unavoidable accident of Fortune, or by Miſery and Publick ſhame.* Not to mention *Cicero*, who in a certain place commends the Opinion of *Pythagoras, becauſe he forbids to depart out of our Fortreſs, or to quit our Station of Life without the appointment of the General*, that is to ſay, of God. Yet elſewhere he teaches, *That in our Life we ought to obſerve the ſame Rule, that is in the Banquetings of the* Greeks, *that is to ſay, either to Drink, or to Depart; ſo that if we*

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can't bear the injuries and affronts of Fortune, we must undergo them, by flying from them. To ſpeak nothing of *Cato*, who ſeems not to have ſought Death ſo much to avoid the ſight of *Cæſar*, as to obey the Decrees, and follow the Dictates of the Stoicks, eſteeming it his Glory to obſerve them, and to leave his Name Famous to Poſterity, by ſome Great and Notable Action; for *Lactantius* ſaith, *Cato was during his Life a Follower of the Vanity of the Stoicks.*

What relates to *Democritus*, *Truly his Opinion*, as the ſame *Lactantius* informs us, *was different from that of the Stoicks; yet he ſuffered himſelf to die by abſtinence, when he found in his very great Age, that the ſtrength of his Body, and the abilities of his Mind began to fail.*

Sponte ſua letho Caput obvius obtulit ipſe.

Which we may ſay, is altogether Criminal; for if a Murderer is an Offender, becauſe he kills a Man, he that murders himſelf is guilty of the ſame Crime, becauſe he alſo kills a Man. It is very probable that this is the greateſt Crime, whereof the Vengeance is reſerved to God alone; for as we do not enter upon Life of our own accord, ſo neither are we to depart out of it of our own heads, but by his Order, who hath placed us in the Body to inhabit there. And if any violence or injury be done us, we muſt bear it patiently, becauſe the Life of a guitleſs Perſon that is deſtroyed, cannot be unrevenged; for we have a Powerful God, unto whom Vengeance always belongs.

Finally, As for *Epicurus*, it is thought that he was not of the ſame Judgment with the Stoicks; not only becauſe he ſaith, *That the Wiſe Man is eaſie under his Torments*, but alſo becauſe that he himſelf being grievouſly tormented with the Stone and Gravel, he never haſten'd his Death, but waited for it patiently. Beſides, *Seneca* aſſures us, *that* Epicurus *does as much*

blame

blame thoſe that deſire Death, as thoſe that fear it; and that there is a great indiſcretion, nay folly, in advancing our Death, for fear of Death.

Yet this happens very often, as *Lucretius* tells us, not only becauſe that the extraordinary fear that Death begets in us, caſts us ſometimes into a diſmal Melancholy, which renders all things uneaſie to us, and proceeds ſo far as to make Life it ſelf to become a troubleſome, incommodious, and an intolerable thing; and at laſt to ſeek out the ſtrangeſt means to deliver our ſelves from it, and to procure our Death:

Et ſæpe uſque adeo mortis formidine, vitæ
Percipit ingratos odium, luciſq; videndæ
Ut ſibi conciſcant mœrenti pectore lethum.

But this extraordinary Fear cauſeth by degrees a certain kind of Melancholy, which depreſſeth the Heart, enfeebles the Spirits, and obſtructs all the operations of Life. It ſtops Digeſtion, and draws upon us many Diſeaſes, that are the immediate Cauſes of Death.

However, the Opinion of the Stoicks is not only contrary to the Sacred Precepts of our Religion, but is alſo contrary to Nature, and right Reaſon. We muſt except ſome certain Perſons, who being directed by a Particular and Divine Inſtinct, have been inſtrumental in procuring their own Deaths, as *Samſon*, and others in the Old-Teſtament, and *Sophronia* and *Pelagia* ſince the New; for Nature furniſhes all ſorts of Animals with a Natural love of Life, and there is none beſides Man, let them be tormented with never ſo grievous pain, but labours to preſerve Life as much as they can, and to avoid Death. This is a ſign that none but Man doth by his miſtaken Opinions corrupt the Inſtitution of Nature, when he refuſeth the benefit of Life, and advanceth

vanceth his Death; he acts then by a wickedneſs peculiar to himſelf; for the true ſtate of Nature is to be conſider'd in the general body of the Creatures, and not in ſome few individuals of one ſingle Species, that haſten their own deſtruction, and caſt away themſelves before the time appointed by Nature. From hence we may conclude, that ſuch are injurious to God, and Nature, who being deſign'd and order'd to perform a certain Race, ſtop in the middle of their Courſe of their own accord, and who being appointed to watch, forſake and abandon their Poſt, without waiting for Orders from their Superiors.

Beſides, Reaſon forbids us to be Cruel againſt the Innocent, who never did us any harm; and by conſequence it don't allow that we ſhould act inhumanly upon our ſelves, from whom we never experienced any Hatred, but rather too much Love.

Moreover, upon what occaſion can our Vertue appear more conſpicuous, than in ſuffering Courageouſly the Evils that our hard Fortune impoſes upon us? *To die*, ſaith Ariſtotle, *becauſe of our Poverty, or for Love, or for ſome other miſchievous accident, is not the act of a Man of Spirit and Courage, but of a mean and timorous Soul, for it is the part of a weak Mind to ſhun and flye from things hard to be endured. Stout Men*, ſaith Curtius, *are wont to deſpiſe Death, rather than to hate Life. 'Tis the trouble and impatience of Suffering that carries the Cowards to baſe Actions, that makes them deſpiſed, and ſcorned. Vertue leaves nothing unattempted, and Death is the laſt thing with which we muſt Encounter, but not as timerous, lazy, and unwilling Souls.*

I ſhall not here ſtay to examin the Opinion of thoſe, *who imagining*, ſaith Lactantius, *that the Souls are Eternal, have therefore kill'd themſelves, as* Cleanthes, Chryſippus, *and* Zeno, *expecting to be tranſported at the ſame time to Heaven*; *or as* Empedocles, *who caſt himſelf in the Night into the Flames of* Mount-Ætna,

Ætna, *that by diſappearing ſo ſuddenly, the World might think that he was gone to the Gods*; *or, as* Cato, *who was during his Life-time a Follower of the vanity of the* Stoicks; *who before he kill'd himſelf, as it is Reported, had read* Plato's *Book of the Eternity of the Soul*; *or finally, as* Cleombrotus, *who after he had read the ſame Book, caſt himſelf down a Precipice.* This is a Curſed and Abominable Doctrin, that drives Men out of their Lives.

Neither ſhall I trouble my ſelf with that *Cyrenaick* of *Hegeſius, who Diſputed ſo Elegantly concerning the Miſeries of Life, and the Bleſſed Place of the Souls after Death, that King* Ptolomy *was forced to forbid him to ſpeak in Publick, becauſe ſo many of his Diſciples after they had heard him, deſtroyed themſelves*, as *Cicero* Reports, and ſome others. For the Evils that we indure in this Life may happen to be ſo great, and increaſe in ſuch a manner, that when the time of Death is come, the loſs of Life may not be unpleaſant, and that in ſuch a Caſe, Death may be eſteem'd as the Haven that ſhelters us from the Miſeries and Torments of Life. But to aggravate our Afflictions ſo far, as to beget in us a ſcorn and hatred of Life, is to be injurious and unthankful to Nature, as if the Gift of Life that hath been beſtowed upon us for our uſe, were to be raſhly caſt away; or as if we were not to accept of it any longer, nor honeſtly and quietly to enjoy it, as long as is poſſible.

'Tis true, what *Theognis* ſaid formerly, " That " it were much better for Men not to be Born, or " to Die as ſoon as they are Born, is a Celebrated " Saying.

Non naſci res eſt mortalibus optima longe,
Nec Solis radiis acre videre Jubar,
Aut natum Ditis quamprimum lumen adire.

This

This is confirmed by the Example of *Cleobis*, of *Biton*, of *Agamedes*, of *Pindarus*, and of ſome others, who having Petitioned the Gods to grant to them the thing which was beſt and moſt deſirable, were admitted to this great favour, *To die in a ſhort time.* Anſwerable to this is the Cuſtom of the *Thracians*, who wept at the Birth of their Children, but Congratulated the Happineſs of ſuch as Died. Not to mention *Menander*, who wiſh'd a young Man dead, becauſe he was well beloved by the Gods.

Quem diligunt Dii, Juvenis ipſe interit.

Nor to ſay any thing of that Famous Sentence;

Vitam nemo acciperet, ſi daretur ſcientibus,

That no body would accept of Life willingly, if it were given to them that knew what it were. But pray who will believe that *Theognis*, and the reſt, have ſpoken ſeriouſly, and without any Reſtriction? I ſay without any Reſtriction; for if they would have it, that it is better for ſuch only, who are to be miſerable all their Lives, that they had not been Born, or to have Died at the very moment of their Birth, the Saying might be tolerable, and allowable; but to ſpeak this in relation to all Men, is to affront Nature, the Miſtriſs both of our Life and Death, that hath ordered and appointed our Birth, and our Diſſolution, as ſhe hath all other things for the preſervation of the Univerſe. It were to expoſe our ſelves to be contradicted, if not by all, yet by the moſt part of Men, who are not weary of Life, but ſeek to preſerve it as carefully as they can. For Life, as we have already obſerved, hath ſomething in it very pleaſing and lovely; therefore he that ſpeaks in this manner, ſhall feel himſelf bound and held faſt; and I am apt to believe, that he may be like the Old Man in

in *Æſop*, who ſent Death back again, tho' he had often called for it before; or like another, who refuſed to make uſe of the Dagger that he had deſired to be brought, to free himſelf, as he pretended, from the Miſery that he could no longer endure. Certainly that Perſon was in jeſt, who ſaid, *That to Live, or to Die, were Acts of Indifferency.* And when one ask'd him, Why then don't you Die? his Anſwer was, *Becauſe it was indifferent to him.* But I am perſwaded, if any had aſſaulted him with a Naked Sword in his hand, he would have choſen rather to Live than to Die. Another anſwered more ingenuouſly, who when ſome Reproached him, that he having made profeſſion of Wiſdom, acted not accordingly, when he trembled at the approach of Danger, ſaid, *For your part you have no reaſon to be afraid, becauſe your Soul is of ſmall value; but I am afraid for the Precious Soul of Ariſtippus.* And another, when ſome told him, that he had no reaſon to have ſuch a deſire of living to be Old; *Well*, quoth he, *I but juſt now arriv'd to the Knowledge of Wiſdom, and I deſire therefore a little time to enjoy it; as they who enter into Matrimony well ſtricken in years wiſh for long Life to breed up their Children.* But there is nothing more remarkable than what *Cicero* relates of *Leontinus Gorgias*, who having attain'd to the Age of one hundred and ſeven years, without any interruption by his Labours, and ordinary Occupations, anſwered, to thoſe, who deſired to know from him why he had a mind to live ſo long?

Nihil habeo quod incuſem Senectutem.

I have, ſays he, no reaſon to complain of my Old Age.

The Fourth Particular relates to the time to come, and forbids either *impatiently to expect, or totally to deſpair*; that ſo we may not feed our ſelves with vain Hopes, nor depend upon that, which neither is, nor it may be ever ſhall happen. For Fortune being of it's own Nature changeable and inconſtant, nothing that is within her Power can be foreſeen, or relied upon with ſo much certainty, but it may often deceive him who expects it. So that it is much our ſurer way, not abſolutely to deſpair of the things that we foreſee, nor yet to be too much aſſured of them as Infallible; and in the mean while to prepare our ſelves in ſuch a manner for all Events, that in caſe it happens otherwiſe than we expect, we may not think our ſelves deprived of a thing which is of abſolute neceſſity to us. This kind of Sentence, *Ni trop eſperer, ni trop deſperer*, Neither too much Hope, nor too much Deſpair, tends to the ſame Purpoſe: For as to Hope and Expect with too great Reliance makes Men neglect other things, and the Mind wanders elſewhere; ſo to have no Hopes, cauſeth Men to be altogether careleſs, and to forſake all things. Whereas he that hath a Mind moderated in reſpect of both Paſſions, finds himſelf in an admirable Temper, and is not forced to Exclaim,

O Jupiter venerande, quale Spes malum eſt.

O what a miſerable thing is Hope!

'Tis what *Torquatus* expreſſeth very well in *Cicero*, when he ſaith, *That the Wiſe Man lives in expectation of Future Events, as if they might chance to be; but nevertheleſs he depends not upon them, becauſe it may ſo happen, that they may not be; in the mean while he enjoys the things preſent, and remembers*

bers with ſatisfaction the things paſt. 'Tis to the ſame purpoſe that he ſpeaks alſo in another place; *That we ought not raſhly to Deſpair in a mean, abject and cowardly manner, nor to be too confidently tranſported by an immoderate Deſire.* This is the Reaſon, that when *Epicurus* ſpeaks of a Fool, in oppoſition to a Wiſe Man, he ſaith, That the Life of the Fool is uneaſie, full of Fears, and altogether depending on the time to come.

Stulti vita ingrata eſt, trepida eſt, tota in futurum fertur.

A Fool's Life is troubleſome and uneaſie, always tranſported with the thoughts of what may happen hereafter.

The Fifth Particular is but a Diſgrace or Reproach to Mankind; for by deferring from Day to Day, their Life paſſeth away without any profit, always depending upon the time to come. *Conſider*, ſaith *Seneca*, according to *Epicurus*, *how pleaſant it is to deſire nothing, and what a greatneſs of Mind it is to be always full, and not to depend upon Fortune! Take hold of, and ſecure the preſent time, whereby you will have leſs occaſion of dependance on the future.* By deferring the enjoyment of Life our Life vaniſheth inſenſibly. *Dum differtur, vita tranſcurrit.* To the ſame purpoſe he ſays in *Plutarch*; *He that needs not to Morrow, nor wiſhes for it, comes to it inſenſibly*; as if he ſhould ſay, That the Wiſe Man ought ſo to reckon, as if he conſider'd every Day of his Life as the laſt, and as that which was to Compleat the Circle; for by this means he will not put off the Pleaſure of the Enjoyment 'till the Morrow; and if he arrives to To Morrow, that Day will be ſo much the more Pleaſant, it being the leſs expected, and being added as an overplus to

the reſt; it will be look'd upon as an Advantage, and eſteem'd as pure Gain.

Pacuvius, a Vice-Roy of *Syria*, having ſpent a whole Day in Feaſting, and Drinking, was wont when they carried him home from the Table to his Bed, to cauſe theſe words to be ſung to him, *Vixit*, *Vixit*; he hath Lived, he hath Lived. What this Glutton did, ſaith *Seneca*, out of a Spirit of Debauchery, let us Practiſe in Reality; and when we ſhall have Seriouſly and Virtuouſly ſpent the Day, and are retiring to our Reſt, let us ſay with Joy and Contentment,

Vixi, & quem dederas curſum Fortuna peregi.

I have Lived, and have accompliſh'd the Race that Providence hath appointed me; if God adds another Day, let us receive it with Joy and Thankfulneſs. He is certainly Happy, and enjoys himſelf moſt, who expects the Morrow without anxiety of thought. And whoſoever after this manner can ſay, I have Lived, arrives every Day to a new Advantage.

Horace gives almoſt the ſame Advice. *We muſt*, ſaith he, *ſuppoſe every Day to be the laſt of our Life.* Thus the time which we don't expect will become grateful to us.

Omnem crede diem tibi diluxiſſe ſupremum,
Grata ſuperveniet, quæ non ſperabitur hora.

Let us quietly make uſe of this preſent time, never reckoning upon that which is to come.

Be not inquiſitive what ſhall happen to Morrow; but as if you were to Die this very Day, look upon it as an advantage, if Providence grants you any longer continuance.

Quid

Quid ſit futurum cras fuge quærere, et
Quam Sors dierum cumque ferat, lucro
Appone ———

Accept with thankfulneſs the time that God beſtows on you, and do not deferr the Enjoyment of the Comforts and Pleaſures of Life 'till the next Year.

Tu, quamcunque Deus tibi fortunaverit horam,
Grata ſume manu, nec dulcia differ in annum.

The beſt of our Days are thoſe that paſt firſt.

Optima quæque Dies miſeris mortalibus ævi
Prima fugit ———

As if every Day we drew nearer to the Dregs of our Life. And as if the pureſt Pleaſures that we delay, could never be recover'd again, and thoſe that follow, were not to be compared with the Pleaſures that are paſt. From hence proceed the frequent Complaints of the time ill ſpent.

The Years I once have ſpent, could Heaven reſtore! And nevertheleſs, we don't endeavour ſo to Husband the preſent time, that if God did reſtore the former, we might ſay, *Now I underſtand how I might better employ it.* We fancy always that our time of living Happily is not yet come; that the good things we expect, are far above thoſe that we have already enjoy'd, or could enjoy. So that what is paſt we eſteem as nothing, but have always in our eye and thoughts the time to come, being now as deſirous of Life as ever.

Sed dum abeſt quod avemus, id exſuperare videtur
Cætera, poſt aliud cum contigit, illud avemus,
Et ſitis æqua tenet vitai ſemper hiantes.

As if we were not to reckon the Time paſt as any way acceptable or pleaſing, but at the ſame time to rejoyce, that it is as it were put out of danger; and the rather, becauſe many expect the ſame Fortune, and are deceived in their expectations. We muſt do this piece of Juſtice to *Epicurus*, ſaith *Seneca*, *That he continually complains of our being ungrateful for the time paſt, that we call not to mind the good things that we have enjoy'd, nor ſo much as reckon them amongſt the real Advantages and ſolid Pleaſures of Life, becauſe there is no Delight more certain than that, which we cannot be deprived of.* Præſentia bona nondum tota in ſolido ſunt, poteſt illa caſus aliquis incidere, futura pendent, & incerta ſunt; quod præteriit inter tuta ſepoſitum eſt.

Therefore *Plutarch* concludes, *That the Nature of Good conſiſts not only in ſhunning the Evil, but alſo in the Remembrance, and in pleaſing our ſelves with the thoughts that the thing is thus come to paſs.* But to inſtance once more in theſe ridiculous delays, and deferring of things 'till the Morrow.

'Tis a ſtrange thing, ſaith Epicurus, *that conſidering we are Born but once, that our Days are to have an end, and that the Morrow being out of our Power, nevertheleſs we always put off 'till the next day to Live: So that our Life is ſpent miſerably in theſe continual delays, and there are none but die buſied in ſuch Affairs as concern not their real Happineſs; for we occupy our ſelves in every thing elſe, but to Live.* From hence proceeds that other juſt Complaint of *Seneca*, *Amongſt other Evils, this alſo attends Folly, That it is always a beginning to Live.* And *Martial* ſaith,

Thou

Thou art for Living to Morrow: Alas! conſider, it is already late to Live to Day; he is a Wiſe Man who knew how to Live Yeſterday.

Cras vives? hodie jam vivere, Poſtume, ſerum eſt.
Ille ſapit quiſquis, Poſtume, vixit heri.

To the ſame purpoſe are thoſe Verſes of *Manilius*.

Quid tam ſollicitis vitam conſumimus annis,
Torquemurque metu, cæcaque cupidine rerum,
Æterniſque ſenes curis, dum quærimus ævum
Perdimus, & nullo votorum fine beati,
Victuros agimus ſemper, nec vivimus unquam?

Wherefore do we ſpend our Days in continual Cares and Troubles, tormented with vain Fears, and greedy Deſires? We grow old in endleſs Vexation, we loſe our Life in ſeeking it, and without enjoying the end of our Deſires; we are always labouring to Live, and never really Live.

The Sixth Particular relates to our Luſts or Deſires, the Knowledge whereof is of that importance, that our Skill ought chiefly to be employ'd in diſtinguiſhing between ſuch as are really to be termed Natural and Neceſſary, and ſuch as are Vain and Superfluous; for the Happineſs of Life depends upon the denial of the latter, and our being content with the enjoyment of the former. But as we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak of this in other places, we ſhall here reſt ſatisfied only to have mention'd 'em.

The laſt Particular that *Epicurus* recommends to our Conſideration, is properly an Exhortation to Study Philoſophy, it being the beſt Phyſick for the Soul; for Philoſophy, if we rightly conſider the Etymology of the word, is *The Study of Wiſdom*; and Wiſdom to the Mind, is not only as Phyſick,

by which our Health is procured and preſerved, but is as the very Health it ſelf. In truth, as the Health of the Body conſiſts in a convenient Temper and Diſpoſition of the Humours and Qualities, ſo the Health of the Mind conſiſts in a moderation of the Paſſions, We need but liſten to *Cicero* to underſtand the Reaſon of this Compariſon. *All Paſſions*, ſays he, *are adjudg'd by the Philoſophers the Diſtempers of the Mind*; *and they deny, that amongſt ſuch as are Fools, there are any that are exempt from theſe Diſtempers. Now ſuch as are Diſtemper'd*, ſaith he, *are not Healthy*; *therefore every one that is a Fool is really Sick.* For according to the Judgment of the Philoſophers, the Health of the Mind conſiſts in a certain Tranquility, and fix'd Conſtancy; and ſuch as are not in that Diſpoſition, they eſteem'd to be Sick, or Diſtemper'd. Now we muſt ſuppoſe with *Epicurus*, and the reſt, that uſually there is nothing dearer and more valuable than the Health of the Body, which plainly demonſtrates how dear and precious the Health of the Mind ought to be, ſeeing, as we ſhall take notice hereafter, that the Goods and Evils of the Mind are of far greater and more conſiderable value than thoſe of the Body, and conſequently the end of a Happy Life, conſiſting in the Tranquility of the Mind, and the Health of the Body (as ſhall hereafter be made appear) the former is much more valuable than the latter; for he that hath a ſedate Mind, compoſed according to the Rules of Wiſdom, earneſtly ſtudies Temperance and Sobriety, which are the moſt ſolid and beſt ſupporters of Bodily Health. *We muſt then*, quoth Epicurus, *act the part of a Philoſopher, not in appearance, or out of Oſtentation, but effectually, and ſeriouſly, becauſe it concerns us not only to ſeem to be in Health, but to be really ſo.* Old Men as well as Young muſt apply themſelves to this

Study,

Study, becauſe it is the intereſt of both to be ſound in Mind, as well as in Body. So that none may reproach us, with *Horace*, that if we have any thing in our Eye that hurts us, we are very earneſt to take it out quickly, nevertheleſs we ſpend many Years, and not once think of Curing our Minds.

Quæ lædunt oculos feſtinas demere, ſi quid,
Eſt Animum, differs curandi tempus in annum.

We ought to deal otherwiſe with Philoſophy, than *Thales* did with Marriage. When his Mother perſwaded him to Marry, he had ſtill ſome pretence to offer, that it was yet time enough, but afterwards, he ſaid it was too late. And as it is ridiculous to ſay that it is not yet time, or that the time to Heal or Cure the Body is over, ſo it is as ridiculous to ſay, that the time to play the Philoſopher, that is to heal the Mind, is not yet come, or that the time is paſt to be Happy. 'Tis ſtrange that we ſhould thus miſerably waſt and conſume our time, and ſhould not apply our ſelves to that which will be as uſeful to the Rich, as to the Poor, and which being neglected, is as prejudicial to the Young as to the Old. 'Tis a Reproach that *Horace* applies to himſelf.

——— Fluunt mihi tarda
——— Ingrataque tempora, quæ ſpem
Conſiliumque morantur agendi gnaviter id quod
Æque pauperibus prodeſt, locupletibus æque,
Æque neglectum pueris, ſenibuſque nocebit.

Take from hence, both Young and Old, take from hence with you the *Viaticum*, the Entertainment,

tainment, and the Conſolation of poor Old Age.

——— *Petite hinc*
Juveneſque, ſeneſque miſeris viatica canis,

For 'tis of the Study of Philoſophy that the Poet ſpeaks, according to *Biantes*, *Ariſtippus*, *Antiſthenes*, *Ariſtotle*, and other Philoſophers, ſtiling it the *Viaticum of Old Age*. But to mention that chiefly which ought to perſwade young Men to Study Philoſophy, is that there is nothing more Excellent and Commendable, than to accuſtom our ſelves betimes to good things, and to adorn the Beauty of Youth with the ſweetneſs of Wiſdom, which commonly is the Bleſſing of a more mature Age. Nor is there any thing more agreeable than to prepare and make our ſelves fit to meet and receive Old Age, which beſides it's proper Bleſſings of Maturity, may alſo ſhine forth with the luſtre of thoſe Vertues, which were Splendid and Remarkable in our Youth. So that by the frequent remembrance of the Vertuous Actions of our Youth, we may in our Elder Years ſeem to grow young again. Moreover, Wiſdom is not only a proper and true Ornament, but a very uſeful Prop and aſſiſtance againſt the Inconveniencies and Infirmities of Age. 'Tis that which animates Old Men with the ſame Vigour as it doth the young. Here we again ought to liſten to *Seneca*, who when he was very Old, was wont to hear the Leſſons of *Sextus* the Philoſopher. The ſame was practis'd in imitation of him, by the Emperor *Antoninus*. 'Behold, *ſays he*, this is the 'fifth Day that I frequent the Schools, and that I 'liſten to a Philoſopher, who Diſputes from Eight 'a Clock. You may perhaps ſay, 'tis time indeed 'to Study in our younger years. And why not in

'this

'this Age? Is there any thing more ridiculous 'than to refuſe Learning, becauſe we have not 'Learn'd a long while before? Shall I be aſham'd to 'go and meet a Philoſopher? We ought to Learn 'while we are Ignorant, and according to the Pro-'verb, As long as we Live. Go, *Lucillus*, and make 'haſt, for fear that it ſhould happen to you, as to 'me, to be oblig'd to Study in your declining years; 'and make what ſpeed you can, the rather becauſe 'you have undertaken that which you will ſcarce 'Learn when you come to be Decrepit. But what 'advantage ſhall I gather, may you ſay? As much 'as you will endeavour for: What do you expect? 'No Man becomes Wiſe by Chance. Riches may 'come to us of themſelves, Honours may be of-'fered to us, and we may be advanc'd to Employ-'ments and Dignities, but Vertue won't come and 'ſeek us; we muſt endeavour to find her, for ſhe ne-'ver beſtows her Bleſſings, but upon ſuch as take 'Labour and Pains. Theſe are the Particulars which the Ancient Philoſophers, and chiefly *Epicurus*, have recommended to our ſerious Conſideration, as the beſt means, not only to diſcover to us the ſureſt way to true Happineſs, but alſo to render it eaſie and pleaſant.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

What ſort of Pleaſure it is that Epicurus *Recommends as the End of a Happy Life.*

'TIS ſtrange that the Word *Pleaſure* ſhould have blaſted the Reputation of *Epicurus*, or, to make uſe of the Words of *Seneca*, *That it hath given occaſion for a Fiction*; for it is certain that this word comprehends the honeſt Pleaſures, as well as the looſe and debauch'd. I ſay it is certain; for *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and all the other Ancient Philoſophers, as well as their Diſciples, ſpeak in expreſs words, that amongſt the Pleaſures, ſome are Innocent, others Impure; ſome are of the Mind, others are of the Body; ſome true, others falſe. 'We Be-'lieve, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, that Pleaſure ought to ac-'company Happineſs. And as it is confeſs'd, that 'amongſt the operations that are agreeable with 'Vertue, ſuch as proceed from Wiſdom are more 'Pleaſant than the reſt, therefore Wiſdom ſeems 'to contain Pleaſures that are pure, admirable, and 'fix'd. There is a Delight, ſaith *Cicero*, in ſeek-'ing after great and hidden things, and when there 'appears ſomething of reſemblance, the Mind is 'fill'd with a ſweet Pleaſure. In the Diſcoveries of 'Nature there is an unſatiable Pleaſure, and thoſe 'who delight in purſuit hereof, neither regard oft-'times their Health, nor their Fortune; they ſuf-'fer all things, being Captivated with the love of 'Knowledge and Underſtanding, and with great 'labour they pay for the Pleaſure they acquire by 'Learning. We read alſo in the Holy Scriptures, 'that God himſelf in the beginning Planted a Gar-'den or Paradiſe of Pleaſure; that the Bleſſed ſhall

'be

'be filled with the Fatneſs of his Houſe, and drink 'of the Rivers of his Pleaſures. I mention this, only becauſe ſome imagin that this word *Pleaſure* cannot nor ought not to be taken but in an ill ſenſe. Therefore when *Epicurus* ſaith that Pleaſure is the chief End, they fancy that he cannot and ought not to be underſtood but of ſordid and forbidden Pleaſures. So that when we ſay, or when they read that there have been ſome Philoſophers who were called *Voluptuous*, they preſently take *Epicurus* for their Chieftain, or Leader.

But let us examine this Buſineſs from the bottom, and firſt let us begin with the Accuſation which they bring againſt him. And as amongſt thoſe who allow other Pleaſures than of the Body, there are ſome that will have what he ſaith to be underſtood only of Bodily Pleaſures; let us weigh his own words as they are found in *Laertius*, for there he expreſſeth his Mind, and declares plainly what that Pleaſure is which ought to be the End of our Life, and the Chief Good. *The End of an Happy Life*, ſaith he, *is nothing elſe but the Health of the Body, and the Tranquility of the Soul,* ἡ τῦ σώματος ὑγίεια καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξία. *Becauſe all our Actions aim and tend to this End, that we may be free from Pain and Trouble,* τέτε γὰρ χάριν ἅπαντα πράττομεν ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν. And becauſe this End he ſtiles by the Name of Pleaſure, ſome took occaſion from thence to ſcandalize him, ſaying, that hereby he underſtood the mean and ſordid Pleaſures of the Body. Therefore he makes his own Apology, and clears himſelf from this Calumny, by declaring plainly what kind of Pleaſure he means, and what not; for after having made it his main buſineſs to recommend a Sober Life, which is ſatisfied with plain Food, and eaſie to be got, you ſhall hear what he ſaith next. *When we ſay that*

Pleaſure

Pleaſure is the main End, we mean neither the Pleaſures of Debauchery, nor the other ſenſual Delights, which terminate in the very moment of enjoyment, and by which the Senſes are only gratified and pleaſed; as ſome ignorant Perſons, and who are not of our Opinion, or who being enviouſly bent againſt us do thus Interpret. But we only underſtand this μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν, *To feel no pain in the Body, and to have no trouble in the Soul; for 'tis not the Pleaſure of continual Eating and Drinking, nor the Pleaſure of Love, nor that of Rare Dainties, and delicious Bits of large and well-furniſh'd Tables, that make a Pleaſant Life; but a ſound Judgment, aſſiſted by Sobriety, and conſequently by a ſerenity and tranquility of Mind, which throughly enquires into the Cauſes why we ought to embrace or avoid any thing; and that drives away all miſtaken Opinions, or falſe Notions of things, which might raiſe much perplexity in the Soul.* I might add another Paſſage which I ſhall only mention, *Venereorum uſus nunquam prodeſt, præclareque agitur niſi etiam noceat.* That the Delights of *Venus* are not only unprofitable, but it is very rare if they be not miſchievous. But this ingenuous and plain Declaration of his meaning is ſufficient to juſtifie him from the ſlanderous Accuſations of his Enemies. Let us nevertheleſs take notice of the difference and contrariety, that *Laertius* puts between *Epicurus*, and *Ariſtippus*; for this difference or antitheſis ſhews clearly that *Epicurus* believed no other Pleaſure to be the End, but that which conſiſts in a conſtant Repoſe, namely a freedom from pain of Body, and trouble of Mind. But *Ariſtippus* would have it conſiſt in that Pleaſure of the Body, which is chiefly Communicated to us by action, or by which our Senſes are actually pleaſed and gratified. This contrariety, I ſay, diſcovers *Epicurus*'s Opinion to have been miſrepreſented, and

and taken in a wrong ſenſe, ſuch as *Ariſtippus*'s deſerved. So that all the Reproaches that were due to *Ariſtippus*, have been caſt by this miſtake upon *Epicurus*, and the other hath eſcap'd unblemiſh'd.

The Famous Diſpute of *Torquatus* in *Cicero*, plainly diſcovers this Truth; Hear his words. 'I will 'explain, ſaith *Torquatus*, what that Pleaſure is, 'that I may prevent all cauſe of miſtake in them, 'who underſtand not the matter, and that I may 'make them apprehend that this Doctrin which 'they fancy to be looſe and debauch'd, is Grave, 'Chaſt, and Regular. We do not purſue that 'Pleaſure, which gratifies Nature with a little 'ſeeming ſweetneſs, and that is reliſh'd by the 'Senſes with a haut-guſt. But we eſteem that to 'be the chief Pleaſure, that is taken without any 'ſenſe of Pain; for as Thirſt and Hunger are allayed by Eating and Drinking, this deliverance, 'freedom or privation from that, which is troubleſom and uneaſie, cauſeth Pleaſure; ſo in all other 'things a deliverance from Pain begets Pleaſure. '*Epicurus* therefore admits of no Medium between 'Pain and Pleaſure; for he maintained, that what 'appear'd to ſome to be a Medium, namely, the 'privation from all Pain, was not only a Pleaſure, 'but the chief Pleaſure. In truth, he that rightly 'underſtands himſelf, and knows what ails him, or 'what Condition he is in, he muſt needs be either 'in Pleaſure, or in Pain. Now *Epicurus* was of 'Opinion, that the chief Pleaſure conſiſted in a 'privation from all Pain, and by Conſequence, that 'Pleaſure may be diverſified and diſtinguiſhed, but 'not augmented, and encreas'd.

We might here produce ſome Witneſſes of this matter. Certainly *Seneca* may be heard and credited before all others, as being without doubt a Perſon

Perſon of great worth, unſpotted Reputation, of an Exemplary Life and Manners, and addicted to a Sect which had chiefly drawn upon *Epicurus* all the ſhame and diſgrace that is commonly caſt upon him inſtead of *Ariſtippus*, being thereunto encouraged by the evil ſenſe and meaning that they have given to his words. 'According to *Epicurus*, 'ſaith *Seneca*, there are two Advantages required 'to the compleating the Sovereign Good, or Chief 'Happineſs of Man. The Firſt is, That the Body 'may be without Pain. The Second, That the 'Mind may be calm and ſedate: Theſe advan-'tages don't increaſe, if they be compleat; for how 'can that which is full increaſe? When the Body 'is free from Pain, what can be added to that 'Freedom? when the Mind enjoys it ſelf, and is 'quiet, what may be added to this Tranquility? 'Like as the Serenity of the Heavens is perfect, 'and can't admit of any other new degrees of 'Light, when it is abſolutely clear, and without 'the leaſt ſhadow or miſt: Thus the Condition of 'Man is perfect, when he hath taken care of his 'Body and Soul, making his chief Happineſs to 'conſiſt in the advantages of both together in a 'Freedom from all trouble of Mind, and from all 'pain of Body; for we may then ſay, that ſuch a 'Man is arrived to the full accompliſhment of all 'his Deſires. And if beſide all this, there happens 'to him an additional Repoſe, it don't increaſe 'his chief Good, but it only ſeaſons it; for this 'compleat Happineſs, the perfection of the Human 'Nature, is comprehended in the quiet of the 'Body, and the Mind. In which words we may take notice, that *Seneca* expreſſeth clearly and plainly *Epicurus*'s Opinion, as it is related by *La-'ertius*.

Moreover,

Moreover, becauſe that *Epicurus* gave the Name of Chief Good, or Compleat Happineſs to a freedom from Bodily Pain, and a perfect Tranquility of Mind, the looſe and Debauched Perſons of his time took incouragement from thence, miſtaking the word *Pleaſure*, and boaſting, that they had a Philoſopher to countenance their Debaucheries. For this Reaſon *Seneca* argues with them in this manner in his Book of a Happy-Life. *'Tis not* Epicurus *that forces or perſwades them to Luxury and Debauchery, but being accuſtomed to theſe Vices, they endeavour to conceal their Vices under the Covert of Philoſophy, and they flock together when they hear Pleaſure mentioned with Praiſe.* Non ab Epicuro impulſi luxuriantur, ſed vitiis dediti luxuriam ſuam in Philoſophiæ ſinu abſcondunt, & eo concurrunt ubi audiunt laudari Voluptatem.

Without doubt it is not the Pleaſure of Epicurus *which is eſteem'd and ſought after; I know how ſober and innocent that Pleaſure is. But they skip at the Name of Pleaſure, ſeeking ſome protection and veil from their Laſciviouſneſs, and filthy Delights.* Nec æſtimatur Voluptas illa Epicuri (ita enim me Hercules ſentio quam ſobria ac ſicca ſit) ſed ad nomen ipſum advolant, quærentes libidinibus ſuis patrocinium aliquod ac velamentum. *My Opinion, ſaith he again, is, (for I will ſpeak it in deſpight of the Vulgar) The things that* Epicurus *teacheth are fair and juſt, and have ſomething of ſolid, and ſerious, if we conſider them exactly; for his Pleaſure is reduc'd to very few things. He preſcribes to it the very ſame Rules that we do to Vertue, and appoints it to be Obedient to Nature, which is eaſily contented.* Mea quidem ſententia (invitis hoc noſtris popularibus dicam) Sancta Epicurum & recta præcipere, & ſi propius acceſſeris, triſtia. Voluptatibus enim illa ad parvum &

exile revocatur, & quam nos Virtuti Legem dicimus, eam ille dicit Voluptati. Jubet illam parere Naturæ; Parum autem eſt Luxuriæ quod Naturæ ſatis eſt.

Will you then underſtand what it is? He that ſaith that the Happineſs of Life conſiſts in Idleneſs, in Good Cheer, in Eaſe and Wanton Pleaſures, and calls that Happineſs, ſeeks a good Excuſe to an evil Cauſe, and when he comes flattering himſelf with the ſoftneſs of the Name, he follows not that Pleaſure which he hears Praiſed, but that which he brings with him; and when once he begins to believe his Vices to be conſiſtent with the Doctrines profeſſed, he freely adheres to them, no longer diſguiſing and acting them in ſecret, but boldly and openly proclaiming them to the World.

Thus he concludes, *I don't ſay what many don't ſcruple to affirm; That the Sect of* Epicurus *is the encourager of infamous Crimes, and lewd Debaucheries. But this is what I ſay, it is ill ſpoken of I confeſs, but without Cauſe, and this cannot eaſily be diſcovered, but by more narrowly prying into the very firſt grounds of their Opinions. The meer name of Pleaſure occaſions the miſtake, and caſts an odium upon it.* Itaque non dico, quod plerique noſtrum, Sectam Epicuri flagitiorum Magiſtram eſſe, ſed illud dico, male audit, infamis eſt & immerito; neque hoc ſcire quiſquam poteſt niſi interius fuerit admiſſus; Frons ipſa dat locum Fabulæ, & ad malam ſpem invitat.

We may after the Teſtimony of *Seneca*, bring that of *Plutarch*, who tho' he was an Enemy of *Epicurus*, yet he hath done him ſo much right, as to ſay, *That the things that were objected againſt him rather proceeded from vulgar Miſtakes, than from the Truth of the matter.* Beſides, in another place he merrily cries out upon the Pleaſure of *Epicurus*, and his Diſciples, *O the vaſt Pleaſure and Felicity*

that

that there is in being inſenſible either of Sorrow or Pain! Elſewhere he ſaith, *Tho'* Epicurus *placeth the Sovereign Happineſs in a perfect Reſt, and as it were in a Center of Quiet,* &c. And in another place, *That young Perſons will learn from* Epicurus, *that Death doth not ſo much affect us, that the Riches of Nature are limited, that Felicity and a Happy-Life don't conſiſt in abundance of Silver, or in Large Poſſeſſions, in Dominion, or in Power, but in a freedom from Pain, in the Government of our Paſſions, and in that Diſpoſition of the Mind, which confines all things within the limits of Nature.* From hence it is evident that the chief Happineſs of *Epicurus* is not that Pleaſure which is in Motion, or in the pleaſing of our Senſes, but rather that which is and appears in Reſt, in a freedom from trouble.

We might here farther add the Teſtimonies of *Tertullian*, of St. *Gregory Nazianzen*, of *Ammonius*, of *Stobeus*, of *Suidas*, of *Lactantius*, and of many others amongſt the Ancients, who tho' being no entire Friends of *Epicurus*, yet ſome of them have declared, *that the Pleaſure that* Epicurus *recommends was nothing elſe, but a peaceable State agreeing with Nature, and not a mean and ſordid Pleaſure.* Others have ſaid, *That between* Epicurus *and* Ariſtippus *there was this difference; that* Ariſtippus *placed the chief Happineſs in the Pleaſure of the Body, but* Epicurus *in that of the Mind.* Others, *That the Pleaſure which the Diſciples of* Epicurus *propoſe to themſelves for their End, certainly is not a ſenſual and a Bodily Pleaſure, but a quiet Temper of the Soul, which is inſeparable from a Vertuous and an Honeſt Life.* Others, as *Lactantius*, after he had abated of the warmth of his Stile, he ſaith, *That* Epicurus *maintains the chief Happineſs to be in the Pleaſures of the Mind, and* Ariſtippus *in that of the Body.*

I ſpeak of the Ancients within theſe two hundred years; that is to ſay, towards the end of the ignorant Ages; we have amongſt others *John Gerſon*, and *Gemiſtus Pletho*, that ſpeak and verifie the ſame. The firſt having mentioned divers Opinions concerning Happineſs, declares, that ſome are of Opinion *that Man's Happineſs conſiſts in the Pleaſures of the Mind, or in a peaceable Tranquility of Spirit, ſuch as was that of* Epicurus, *mentioned often by* Seneca, *in his Epiſtles, with very much reſpect.* But, as to the other *Epicurus*, quoth he, *Ariſtippus*, *Sardanapalus*, and *Mahomet*, who placed it in the Pleaſures of the Body, they were no Philoſophers. Here we muſt pardon the ignorance of that Age, and the common vogue, if he hath imagined that there have been two of that Name. The ſecond Named *Gemiſtus Pletho*, Treating of the Delight of Contemplation, ſhews, *That* Ariſtotle, *never taught any other Doctrin than that of* Epicurus, *who placed the Chief Happineſs in the Pleaſures of the Mind.* Now it is not without Reaſon that I have inſinuated, that ſince theſe Men, there hath ſprung up an Happier and a more Learned Age, that have revived Learning, that lay almoſt Languiſhing; for ſince that time an infinite number of knowing Men are riſen up, who have entertained better thoughts of that Philoſopher, as *Philelphus*, *Alexander ab Alexandro*, *Volateranus*, *Johannes Franciſcus Picus*, and many more.

What ſhall we ſay then to thoſe who Charge him with a contrary Opinion? Nothing elſe but what hath been ſpoken in the Apology of his Life, namely, that the Stoicks who very much hated him for Reaſons there expreſſed at large, have not only miſunderſtood his Opinion, but they have alſo forged and publiſh'd in his Name ſcandalous Books, whereof they themſelves were the Authors, that they

they might the more eaſily gain credit to their Malicious Inſinuations, and faſten upon him their Calumnies without ſuſpicion. Now one of the Cauſes of their hatred againſt him was, that *Zenon* their Principal Leader was naturally melancholy, auſtere, rude, and ſevere, and his Diſciples following their Guide, affected the ſame Air, and a ſevere Meen. This hath cauſed the Vertue of the *Stoicks* or their Wiſdom to be repreſented as ſome very auſtere and reſerved thing; and in regard that cauſed them to be admired and reſpected by the Common-People, and that we ſuffer our ſelves willingly to be carried away to vain-glory, and to be puft up with Pride, if we don't take great heed to prevent it, they fancied themſelves to be the only poſſeſſors of Wiſdom; and therefore they boaſted that he alone was the Wiſeman, whoſe Soul was ſtrengthned and fortified with the Vertue of the *Stoicks*, that he alone was fit to be a King, a Captain, a Magiſtrate, a Citizen, (for ſuch were their Expreſſions) an Orator, a Friend, Beautiful, Noble, and Rich. And that ſuch a one never repents, is not touch'd with Remorſe, cannot receive Affronts, is ignorant of nothing, never doubts of any thing, is free from Paſſion, is always at Liberty, full of Joy and Content, like God himſelf, and ſeveral other qualities they aſcribe to him; which cauſed *Plutarch* to reproach them in theſe words. *The* Stoicks *have taught ſome things far more ridiculous than the Poets.* But *Epicurus* on the contrary was of a ſweeter and more candid Temper, and as he acted with ſincerity and plain-dealing, he could not endure this vanity and oſtentation. So that when he conſider'd beſides the weakneſs of our Human Nature, and what it was capable of undergoing, and what not, he quickly underſtood that all thoſe great boaſtings which made ſuch noiſe in the Schools of the *Stoicks*,

were but vain Fictions, when the Glory and the Pride of their words were removed; therefore he propoſed to himſelf a Vertue that he knew our Human Nature capable of. And becauſe he obſerv'd that Men in all their Proceedings were naturally carried to ſome Pleaſure, and after he had well inquired into all the ſeveral kinds of Pleaſure, there was none more Univerſal, more firm, more conſtant, and more deſirable, than *that which conſiſts in the Health of the Body, and the Tranquility of the Mind*; he therefore declared, that to be the chief End of all Delights, and that Vertue alone was the beſt means to obtain it, and conſequently, that a Wiſe or a Vertuous Man, did by his Sobriety and Chaſtity, that is to ſay, by the Vertue of Temperance, preſerve the health of his Body, as far as his Natural Conſtitution would permit; and that being aſſiſted by Moral Vertues, by which he appeaſeth the Paſſions of Luſt, Gluttony, Covetouſneſs, and Ambition, he endeavours chiefly to preſerve likewiſe as much as he is able the Tranquility of his Thoughts. At the ſame time he alſo maintain'd, that true Pleaſure was not to be found in the *Act*, or in the *Motion*, as *Ariſtippus* imagin'd, but in *ſtatu*, in a ſtate or manner of exiſting, *without Pain in the Body, and diſquiet in the Mind*, as we have already often declared heretofore. And this was his plain and ſimple manner of acting; he cared not to obtain the reputation of the Vulgar by a gloſſy Rhetorick, or by a Majeſtick Deportment, that expreſs'd a great deal of Vanity in Manners, as *Zenon* did, nor did he deceive the People, as the other did with a vain oſtentation of things, which takes much with them, tho' they neither underſtand them, nor can practiſe them.

Now *Zenon* and the Stoicks underſtanding this ſimplicity of Manners and Doctrin, and ſeeing that many

many Men of Parts were undeceived, and made no account of their great and glorious words and promiſes, conceived ſo great a prejudice againſt him, that they ſought always how to defame him, taking occaſion from the word *Pleaſure*, and affirming that he thereby underſtood ſenſual and debauch'd Pleaſure and Exceſs.

We are not therefore too eaſily to aſſent to what they ſay, nor too readily give credit to the Report of others, who being impoſed upon by their Miſtakes, have exclaim'd againſt him. But if ſome honeſt Men have been guilty of this Error, it is to be ſuppoſed, as *Seneca* obſerves, that they never knew the inſide of this Sect, but had only ſome forged Books, or believed the *Stoicks*, his Enemies; or perhaps tho' they underſtood his Opinion, they believ'd nevertheleſs that it was not eaſie to undeceive the People, as it was convenient to continue their Clamours againſt this Philoſopher, that they might declare thereby their hatred to Vice, and Senſual Pleaſures, by exclaiming againſt their ſuppoſed Protector and Incourager.

For the Holy Fathers of the Church as they deſign'd nothing but Piety and good Manners; they have furiouſly declaim'd not only againſt all filthy and bruitiſh Pleaſures, but alſo againſt their Patrons and Protectors. And becauſe the Report was already ſpread abroad, that *Epicurus* was the Chief, they have treated him according to the common miſtake. So that it is not their fault, that he has been Scandaliz'd, for he was ſo before, and what they did, was only, as we have already hinted, to give a greater abhorrence of Vice, and of ſordid and ſenſual Pleaſures. This is ſo certainly true, that ſome, ſuch as *Lactantius*, who being otherwiſe provok'd againſt *Epicurus*, have nevertheleſs retracted their former Opinion. And St. *Jerom* amongſt

the reſt, writing againſt *Jovinian*, places not *Epicurus* amongſt them, who commonly ſay, *Let us Eat and Drink, &c.* but looks upon him in another manner, than the common Report. *It is wonderful*, ſaith this great Saint, *that* Epicurus, *the great Patron of Pleaſure, fills his Books with nothing but Herbs and Fruits, affirming that the plaineſt Food is the beſt, becauſe Fleſh, and other dainty Diſhes require a great deal of care and trouble to be fitted for our uſe, and that there is more Pains in ſeeking them, than Pleaſure in abuſing them; that our Bodies have no need but of plain Meats and Drinks, that where there is Bread and Water, and ſuch like Neceſſaries, we may thereby eaſily ſatisfie Nature, but what is over and above is needleſs, and tends to gratify our Luſt; that our Eating and Drinking is not for Delight, but to expel Hunger and Thirſt; that Wiſdom is inconſiſtent with the laborious toil of procuring good Chear; that Nature's Deſires are ſoon ſatisfied, and that by moderate Diet and plain Apparel we expel Cold and Hunger.*

There is but one paſſage more that may ſeem to create ſome difficulty. It is that which *Cicero* objects, as being taken out of the Book wherein *Epicurus*'s Ends and Deſigns are deſcribed; for he makes him ſay, *That if we take away Bodily and Senſual Pleaſures, he knows no other good.* But why may we not eaſily ſuppoſe that the *Stoicks*, who have been ſo bold to forge whole Books, and make *Epicurus* their Author, have maliciouſly put this Paſſage in his Book, and it being thus abuſed and falſified, it is come into the hands of *Cicero*, and *Atheneus*? That which makes us ſuſpect this is, Firſt, That *Laertius*, who hath left us a Catalogue of *Epicurus*'s Books, and conſequently ought to know what was in them, when he relates a paſſage out of his Book of *The End*, and others of the ſame, ſaith, *That they are Fools that impoſe ſuch things upon* Epicurus,

for

for they are not to be found in the true Copies. And *Heſichius* aſſures us that they are groſs Lyars, that aſſert any ſuch thing of him. Secondly, *Epicurus* himſelf complains of their making him ſpeak thoſe words which were againſt his Judgment, and his Diſciples would never acknowledge that paſſage; but they have rather always complain'd of it, and exclaim'd againſt it. Thirdly, Theſe words are expreſly contrary to thoſe, which are known to be of *Epicurus*, *Res Venereæ nunquam proſunt, & multum eſt ni noceant*, as we have already obſerv'd. Fourthly, That *Cicero* amongſt theſe Objections that he makes, cannot but propoſe this Queſtion, as if Truth himſelf had forced him to it; *What, do you believe that* Epicurus *was of this Perſwaſion, and that his Opinions were diſhoneſt, ſenſual, and lewd?* For my part I can't *believe it; for I find, that he declares a great many excellent things, and very vertuous.* Fifthly, That *Cicero* acknowledges, as he was a very Popular Man, that he did not tie up himſelf to ſpeak according to the ſtrict Opinions of the Philoſophers, but agreeable with the Notions of the People. *Verum ego non quæro nunc quæ ſit Philoſophia veriſſima, ſed quæ Oratori conjuncta maxime:* Not to ſay that he could not bar himſelf from ſpeaking well of *Epicurus*, as being a Man without Malice, or rather a right honeſt Man. *Venit Epicurus Vir minime malus, vel potius Vir optimus.* And when he ſpeaks of the *Epicureans*, he ſaith, *that they are very good Men, that he hath never met with a ſort of Perſons leſs malicious; that the* Epicureans *complain of his endeavouring to ſpeak ill of* Epicurus; *that whole Crowds of* Epicureans *came frequently to viſit him, but that nevertheleſs he doth not deſpiſe them.* Quos tamen non aſpernor; *Theſe are his own words.*

Wherein

Wherein Epicurus, *and* Ariſtippus *differ.*

NOW that we may ſee exactly in what *Epicurus* differs from *Ariſtippus*, we need but Examin *Laertius*. *They differ*, ſaith he, *Firſt, in Relation to the word Pleaſure, in that* Epicurus *aſcribes it not only to that which proceeds from preſent action, and the immediate gratification of the Senſes, but likewiſe to that, which he ſaith is ſettled firm and abiding, and is found in that ſweet Repoſe which he Names* ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία, Tranquility, and a freedom from Pain; whereas *Ariſtippus* aſcribes it to that only which proceeds from action, laughing at that Tranquility, and Exemption from Pain of *Epicurus*, which is like the Condition of a Sleeping or a Dead Man. They differ therefore in this, that *Epicurus* hath placed the End or the Happineſs of Man in that Pleaſure that is in a continuing ſtate, *in ſtatu*, or in duration; but *Ariſtippus* in that which is in motion, *in motu*, tranſient. *Epicurus* places it in that of the Mind, but *Ariſtippus* in that of the Body. *Epicurus* amongſt our Pleaſures reckons the remembrance of paſt advantages, and the expectation of thoſe which are to come; but *Ariſtippus* values them as nothing. But as we have before mention'd, theſe Particulars, ſo we ſhall at preſent hint but two things to you. Firſt, That when *Atheneus* declares that not only *Ariſtippus*, but alſo *Epicurus* and his Diſciples declared for the Pleaſure that is tranſient and flitting; this relates to that Scandal, which hath cauſed ſome to believe that *Epicurus* was of the ſame Opinion as *Ariſtippus*, and which according to the Expreſſions of *Atheneus*, belong to *Ariſtippus* properly. Theſe are his words, *Ariſtippus*, ſaith he,

being

being wholly addicted to the Pleaſures of the Senſes, judges thoſe Pleaſures *to be the End and Happineſs of Life, and making no account of former Enjoyments, nor of the expectation of any to come; he knows no advantages, but ſuch as are preſent, as the moſt Debauched Perſons do; and as thoſe, who are immerged in Delights. And his Life was anſwerable to his Doctrin, for he ſpent it* wholly in Luxury, and the great expences that he was at for that purpoſe; he never diſſembled, nor offered to excuſe, but anſwer'd in a pleaſant manner jeſting, *I enjoy* Lais, *but ſhe don't enjoy me; I live Sumptuouſly, but if that were Criminal, it would not be ſo much practiſed in the Feſtivals of the Gods. I give fifty Drachms for a Partridge,* for which thou wouldſt not ſpare a Half-penny: *I buy a Dainty Bit dear, for which thou would'ſt grudge to beſtow three half-pence. I have not therefore ſo great a fancy for Pleaſure, as thou haſt for thy Mony.*

The Second thing that we muſt here take notice of, is, that theſe words of *Seneca, I ſhall never call an exemption from Pain Happineſs, which a Worm, a Bird, or a Flea enjoys, &c.* cannot nor ought to be underſtood of an exemption from Pain, or the Pleaſure that *Epicurus* places in a ſetled Reſt, for that thereby he never underſtood a Lazy Life, or a Reſt like that of a Drone, or of a Worm, but ſuch a Life as *Seneca* himſelf praiſeth, and highly eſteems, when he ſaith, *why may not that Reſt in which he will diſpoſe and ſettle the Ages to come, and will give Inſtructions to all Men, as well to them that are as ſhall be, be convenient for an Honeſt Man?* or when ſpeaking particularly of *Epicurus,* he ſaith, *Nor is that Perſon, of whom we are wont to ſpeak hardly, for maintaining a ſoft and idle Pleaſure, but for ſuch as is conſiſtent with Reaſon.* As if he ſhould deſcribe it like that which *Ariſtotle* repreſents proceeding from

from a Life of Contemplation, or that State of Reſt and Tranquility which is employ'd in Speculation, and Meditation, and therefore ought not to be call'd Idleneſs, and Lazineſs; for Contemplation is ſuch an action, which alone does compleat the Divine Felicity. Beſides, the ſame *Ariſtotle* declares, *action is not in motion, but that there is ſome in Repoſe, and that Pleaſure conſiſts rather in a Repoſe, than in Motion.*

And what *Seneca* aſſerts ſpeaking of Pleaſure, that it chiefly conſiſts in action is much to the purpoſe. *This Pleaſure*, ſaith he, *is extinguiſh'd when the Delight appears in its greateſt ſtrength; it is ſoon accompliſh'd, it ſoon paſſeth over, and becomes tedious after its firſt impreſs. Now that which comes and paſſeth away ſo ſpeedily, and periſheth in the uſe, and in the very act, hath neither ſubſtance, ſolidity, nor duration, but ceaſeth the ſame moment that it appears, and in the very beginning it looks to the end, and periſheth.*

'Tis true, what *Plato* ſpeaking of this Concern maintains, that it may as well be ſtiled Pain as Pleaſure, *becauſe as it is a Pleaſure to paſs from Pain to this; ſo it is Pain and Grief to fall from Pleaſure into the ſame.* Nor is it near ſo grievous, to ceaſe from the enjoyment of Pleaſure in caſe no Pain ſucceeds, as it is grateful to ceaſe from being tormented with Pain, tho' no Delight follows; therefore this State is reckon'd to be a State of Pleaſure, rather than of Grief. This is the meaning of *Torquatus* in *Cicero. I ſuppoſe that when Pleaſure is removed, nothing immediately ſucceeds that is uneaſie, unleſs by accident Pain follows after that Delight. On the contrary, we rejoyce to be deliver'd from Pain, tho' none of thoſe Pleaſures which gratifie the Senſes ſucceed; from whence we may inferr, what a great Pleaſure it is to be free from Pain.*

But

But let us liſten to *Seneca*, who eſteems this State of Life to be not only a Pleaſure, but even the chief Happineſs of Man.

The Condition and Satisfaction of a Wiſe Man, according to Epicurus's *Opinion.*

'THE Wiſe-Man, ſaith *Seneca*, is he, who 'like the Gods lives pleaſant and eaſie, with-'out trouble or diſcontent. Now examin your 'ſelves, if you are not often dejected, froward, 'and at ſome times tranſported with too violent 'Expectations, and earneſt Deſires, which render 'you uneaſie. If your Mind continues always Day 'and Night in the ſame even temper, equal in re-'ſpect of it ſelf, always exalted and content; If ſo, 'you may then ſay, that you are arrived to the 'moſt accompliſh'd pitch of Happineſs that Men 'are capable of. But if you are ſtill in purſuit of 'all ſorts of Pleaſures, and ſeek them every where, 'know that in ſuch a caſe you want as much Wiſ-'dom as content. You deſire to attain this Chief 'Happineſs, but you are deceived, if you expect to 'procure it by the means of Riches; if you ſeek 'Delight amongſt Honours, 'tis to ſeek it amongſt 'Cares and Troubles. That which you fancy will 'give you Pleaſure, is the Origin and Cauſe of a 'thouſand Torments. Pleaſure and Content are 'the Univerſal deſire of all Men; but they gene-'rally are ignorant of the Methods how to obtain 'ſuch Content as may be fix'd and permanent. 'Some ſeek it in Feaſtings and Luxury, others in 'Riches and Great Offices and Dominion; others 'in the Favors and Smiles of their *Dalilah*'s, others 'in a vain oſtentation of their Learning and Parts,

'which

'which oftentimes ſtand the Soul in little ſtead. 'Their ſhort-liv'd and deceitful Paſtimes delude 'them, ſuch as Ebriety, which for the ſeeming 'Pleaſure of an hour, cauſeth many Months of real 'Sorrow and Trouble: Or the Applauſes and Acclamations of the People, which we have already 'purchaſed by much unquietneſs, and which will 'not fail to draw upon us as much more. Remember therefore that a Wiſe-Man ought to procure 'to himſelf ſuch a ſatisfaction of Mind as is always 'firm, conſtant, and equal. His Soul ought to be 'like that part of the World above the Moon, 'where a continual Serenity reigns. You have 'reaſon therefore to endeavour to be Wiſe, ſeeing 'the Wiſe-Man is always full of Content. This 'ſatisfaction proceeds from his own Conſcience, 'and from his knowledge of being a vertuous Man. 'It is impoſſible to enjoy this quiet, unleſs we be 'Juſt, Magnanimous, and Temperate. But what, 'will you ſay, Don't Fools and Wicked Men rejoyce? No more than Lyons, when they have 'found a Prey. When ſuch have ſpent the Night 'in Debauchery, when they have gorged themſelves with Wine, and conſumed their ſtrength in 'the Converſe of Women, and that their Stomachs can no longer contain the quantity of Meats 'they have devoured, they may then well cry out, 'What miſerable Wretches are we? We now 'plainly perceive that this Night hath been ſpent in 'vain and deceitful Pleaſures.

Nâmq; ut ſupremam falſa inter gaudia noctem
Egerimus, noſti——

'The Joys and Pleaſures of the Gods, and of thoſe 'that imitate 'em, are never interrupted, and 'never

'never have an end. Their ſatisfaction would fail, 'if it came from without. That which Fortune ne-'ver gave, it can never take from us.

That the Pains and Pleaſures of the Mind are greater than thoſe of the Body.

THE laſt difference that *Laertius* puts between *Epicurus* and *Ariſtippus* is, that as *Ariſtippus* eſteems the Pains of the Body greater and more troubleſom than thoſe of the Mind, he ſuppoſes likewiſe the Pleaſures of the Body much greater and more conſiderable than thoſe of the Mind; whereas *Epicurus* is of a contrary Opinion. 'In the 'Body, *ſaith he*, we can feel only things preſent, 'but the Mind can be ſenſible of things paſt, and 'to come. 'Tis manifeſt, that a great degree of 'Pleaſure, or an extream Affliction of the Mind con-'tributes more to an happy or to an unhappy Life, 'than much Pleaſure, or much Pain of the Body. 'If the painful Diſeaſes of the Body imbitter the 'ſweetneſs of our Lives, thoſe of the Mind ought 'to render it much more unhappy. Now the Prin-'cipal Diſtempers of the Mind, are the greedy ex-'travagant Deſires of Riches, of Glory, of Domi-'nion, of Sordid and Unlawful Pleaſures: More-'over the Diſturbances, Gripings and Sorrows that 'overwhelm the Mind, thoſe anxious Cares that 'conſume it, *&c.*

This ſeems to be what *Ovid* thought, when he upbraids us, becauſe we can readily undergo the ſcorching heat of the Fire, the ſharpneſeſs of Iron, and the trouble of Thirſt, to free our ſelves from ſome Diſtempers of the Body, but to heal the Mind, which is of a far greater value, we ſcruple to ſuffer any thing.

Ut

Ut Corpus redimas, ferrum patieris & ignes,
Arida nec ſitiens ora lavabis aqua
Ut valeas Animo quicquam tolerare negabis;
At pretium pars hæc Corpore majus habet.

And I ſuppoſe *Horace* had the ſame Fancy in the forementioned Paſſage.

——*Nam cur*
Quæ feriant oculos feſtinas demere, ſi quid
Eſt animum differs curandi tempus in annum?

Truly as the Soul is infinitely more Noble than the Body, and according to the Opinion of *Ariſtotle, it alone makes up almoſt the entire Man*; it muſt therefore neceſſarily be much more ſuſceptible as well of the impreſſions of Good, of Pleaſure and Delight, as of Evil, Trouble, and Diſquietneſs. Beſides, the Diſeaſes of the Mind are ſo much the more dangerous than the Diſeaſes of the Body, becauſe theſe have ſigns to make us underſtand them, but the other are often concealed from us; for our Reaſon that ought to ponder them is diſturb'd, and cannot make a right eſtimation. Therefore ſuch as are Sick in Body ſeek a Remedy from Phyſick, but ſuch as are Diſtemper'd in Mind, from Philoſophy, yet will not obey its Directions. Again, amongſt the Diſeaſes of the Body, thoſe are the greateſt and the moſt dangerous of all, which caſt us into a ſlumber, and are not felt by the Patient, as a Lethargy, the Falling-Sickneſs, and that burning Fever which cauſeth a Dilirium. Now there is ſcarce any Diſtemper of the Mind, but ought to be reckon'd of as dangerous a Conſequence; and the rather, becauſe they are not known to be what they are, and oftimes are covered over with a fair

ſhew

ſhew and pretence of contrary Vertues; for Example, Fury and Wrath, are ſtiled Courage; Fear and Cowardiſe, uſurp the name of Prudence. In ſhort, Diſcontent, which is a grief of the Mind, and a Diſtemper which generally cauſeth the other Diſeaſes to be more unpleaſant, ſad and troubleſom, affects nothing more, than to ſeem to be taken and cauſed not without great Provocation and juſt Reſentments. Neither are we to pretend with *Ariſtippus*, That Criminals are commonly puniſhed with Pains and bodily Torments, as being more ſevere and uneaſy to be undergone. For as the Legiſlator or the Judge, hath not the ſame power over the Mind, as over the Body, ſo it is as true, that he cannot appoint, that the Offender ſhould be tortured in his Mind, but in his Body, that ſo a viſible Puniſhment might be inflicted upon the Offender, whereby the People might be kept in ſtricter awe from Offending: But it follows not from thence, that there is no greater pain than that, or, that the pain of the Mind may not be a more grievous Torment.

Beſides, when a Man is really under the actual ſufferings of the Body, or when he ſuppoſes that he ſhall ſhortly be ſo, he fancies in his Mind, that he ſhall be tied to the Rack, or perhaps, that his Head ſhall be cut off; that he ſhall be broken upon the Wheel, or burnt at the Stake; that he ſhall loſe his Life in ſight of the World with publick Shame, and be accounted a perpetual Ignominy and Reproach to his Family and deareſt Friends; and who cannot but be troubled at this? And can you imagin any torture of the Body (ſuppoſing it to be ſeparated from all this) that can ſtand in competition with this inward kind of Grief and cruel Vexation of the Mind? And for this reaſon it is, that I have aſſerted, that the Pains and Torments are not directly appointed by the Judge, but are thereby indi-

rectly deſigned, to the end they might increaſe the former, and render the puniſhment more grievous. To this purpoſe, have we not ſeen, that the Threats and terrible apprehenſions of Death, have changed the Hair of the Head into a hoary colour in one Night; have dried up the moiſture of the Body, and have Killed ſeveral? This plainly ſhews, that the laſt and greateſt Torment, is not that of the Body, but that of the Mind, *&c.*

I don't here recount the grief and diſturbance of Mind, which Envy, Ambition, and the remorſe of Conſcience cauſeth in an evil Man, a Tyrant, or ambitious Wretch; I will at preſent only inſert what *Juvenal*, *Horace*, and *Perſius* mention of it, as a greater Torment, than ever *Caditius*, or *Rhadamantus* ever invented.

Juv. *Sat.* XIII.

Not ſharp Revenge, nor Hell it ſelf can find
A fiercer Torment, than a guilty Mind,
Which day and night do's dreadfully accuſe,
Condemns the Wretch, and ſtill the Charge renews.

And *Horace*, Epiſt. 2. Lib. I.

The fierceſt Tyrants never yet could find
A greater Rack, than Envy to the Mind.

And Perſius, Sat. III.

Great Father of the Gods, when for our Crimes,
Thou ſend'ſt ſome heavy Judgment on the Times,
Some Tyrant King, the Terror of his Age,
The Type and true Vice-gerent of thy Rage;
Thus puniſh him; ſet Vertue in his ſight,
With all her Charms, adorn'd with all her Graces bright.
But ſet her diſtant, make her pale to ſee
His Gains ourvi'd by loſt Felicity.

And

And, tho ſome pretend, that a wicked Varlet by his repeated Crimes and long accuſtomed habit in Villany, may attain at laſt to ſuch an inſenſibility, as to have none of thoſe ordinary Remorſes, which rack the Minds of the cruelleſt Tyrant, and by that means may become Happy: And, beſides, that the freedom from Remorſe, makes not a Man Happy, I will farther add, That in the ordinary courſe of Life, this ſuppoſition is not only ſcarce to be found, as is eaſy to be proved, but altogether impoſſible; and, that there is no man, tho' never ſo much hardened in Wickedneſs, that can baniſh, or expel out of his Mind, this inward Executioner. Again, ſuch a Wretch cannot be reckoned in the number of Men, but of Monſters, that are to be Strangled; and not only ſo, but in the number of Fools, becauſe he hath loſt his Senſe and Reaſon, by brutiſhly expoſing himſelf to the Rage, if I may ſo ſay, and to the Fury of all Men, who abominate him, and look upon him as a Beaſt of Prey, or as a Tyrant, that deſerves to be cut off.

Wherein Epicurus *differs from the* Stoicks.

Laertius takes alſo notice, in what Particulars *Epicurus* differs in Opinion from the *Stoicks*, upon account of that irreconcilable hatred they bore him. He ſays, that *Epicurus* having declar'd, That Vertue is deſirable for Pleaſure's ſake, they took this pretence to exclaim againſt him, as if he had ſpoken of ſordid and ſenſual Pleaſures; ſaying, *That it is unworthily ſpoken, and ſcandalous to maintain, That Vertue was not to be ſought for it ſelf, but for this ſort of Pleaſure.* Amongſt others, there was one named *Cleanthes*, who to heighten the matter, and render *Epicurus* more Odious, made this Picture, which *Cicero* objects to *Torquatus*. 'Fancy to your ſelves, '(ſaid

'(ſaid he to his Diſciples) Pleaſure finely drawn, 'ſitting upon a Royal Throne, ſhining in very 'ſplendid and magnificent Attire, attended by all 'the Vertues, ſtanding about her as ſo many Ser-'vants, yet acting nothing elſe, nor performing any 'other Office, but to Adviſe and Whiſper her in 'the Ear; Take heed that you commit nothing im-'prudently, and that might offend the Minds of Men, 'or from whence ſome Reluctance and Diſpleaſure 'may proceed: We are the Vertues, born for to 'tender you this Service, and our Office is only to 'admoniſh you.

This is the Picture that the Envy and Jealouſie of *Cleanthes* made of *Epicurus*'s Pleaſure. There wanted but one thing more, the ſaying of a certain Perſon. 'That *Epicurus* had imitated *Paris*, who of the 'three Goddeſſes, ſelected *Venus*, upon whom he be-'ſtow'd the *Golden Apple*. That *Epicurus* by Plea-'ſure, had nothing elſe in proſpect but mean and 'low Pleaſures, ſuch as a beautiful Face, Hair looſly 'ſpread, with Perfumes, gaudy Attire, and a wan-'ton Carriage and Behaviour, tending to all Soft-'lineſs and Effiminacy, to Luſt, Laſciviouſneſs and 'Debauchery,

Altera Achæmenium ſpirabat vertice odorem,
Ambroſias diffuſa comas, & veſte refulgens
Oſtrum, quam fulvo Tyrium ſuffuderat auro;
Fronte decor quæſitus acu, laſcivaq; crebras
Ancipiti motu jaciebant lumina flammas.

Whereas, he ought to have imitated *Hercules*, who meeting with Pleaſure and Vertue together, gave the preference to the latter, tho' Vertue appear'd to him with an auſtere Countenance, in a careleſs Undreſs, making her approach with a Maſculine Aſpect, accompanied with a becoming Modeſty, as the Poet ſaith;

From

——— *Frons hirta, nec unquam*
Compoſita mutata coma, ſtans vultus & ore
Inceſſuq; viro propior, lætique pudoris.

That Vertue, (according to Epicurus*) is eſſentially related to Pleaſure, as it tends to the main end and deſign of an happy Life.*

BUt there is no need that we ſhould ſtop here to deface this Picture of *Cleanthes*, or buſy our ſelves in diſcovering what Malice and Detraction have invented. What hath been already ſpoken, may ſuffice for that purpoſe; and the rather, becauſe we have plainly made it appear, that the Pleaſure meant by *Epicurus*, is not that ſoft, ſenſual, and debauch'd Pleaſure repreſented in this Picture, but that which he intends, is quite contrary, Pure and Undefiled, *viz.* An Indolency of the Body, and the Tranquility of the Mind, but chiefly the latter. So that this kind of Pleaſure cannot hinder any from ſeeking after Vertue, ſeeing that it is in this only that Felicity or Happineſs of Life conſiſts; and that *Epicurus* propoſes no more than the *Stoicks* themſelves do, who affirm, *That Vertue is ſufficient to procure a pleaſant and a happy Life.*

And truly this Maxim alone does ſufficiently evince, That what Shift or Excuſe ſoever they may ſeem to frame, yet they ſuppoſe Vertue deſigned for no other end, but to *live well and happily.* So, that an happy Life is deſirable for it ſelf; but Vertue is not ſo much deſirable for itſelf, as for an happy Life. Now, when I mention this nice Diſtinction, I include *Seneca* himſelf, who makes Pleaſure an accidental Companion only, or ſomething that is caſually incident to Vertue; like as a ſmall Weed, which grows and flouriſheth amongſt Wheat. This

ſeems Popular and Taking. And we may truly compare Vertue to the Wheat; but as we ſeek and covet the Wheat, not ſimply for the ſake of Wheat, nor for that ſmall Weed that grows amongſt it, but for the uſes of Life that we expect from it: So Vertue is not ſought after ſimply for it ſelf, or for its own ſake, or for any ſlight thing that may intervene, but chiefly in order to Happineſs, or which amounts to the ſame, for this kind of Pleaſure that we now treat of. Therefore, when he adds, *Thou art miſtaken when thou askeſt, what that thing is which moveth us to ſeek after Vertue, for it is to ask for ſomething above that which is the higheſt of all; I ſeek and deſire Vertue it ſelf; I deſire it for it ſelf; there is nothing better; it carries with it a ſufficient Reward.* It is manifeſt, that this Queſtion is full and to the Purpoſe; and we may ſay, That when we deſire ſomething beyond Vertue, we don't deſire a trivial thing, but ſomething that is above the higheſt and Supream. It is true, that in order to all the means which are uſed to render Life happy, it is impoſſible to find any more conducive thereunto than Vertue. Nevertheleſs, we are to eſteem an happy Life above Vertue; for Vertue only relates to Happineſs, or an happy Life, as to its proper End.

And therefore *Ariſtotle* ſeems to be very exact in this point, when he ſpeaks of that Happineſs which Vertue above all things can procure. 'Is is, 'ſaith he, evident, That the recompence or reward 'of Vertue, is ſomething very Excellent, ſomething 'Divine and Happy. And elſewhere, That Feli-'city is not a thing that happens to us by a Divine 'appointment alone, but is to be obtain'd by Ver-'tue, or by Learning, or by our Endeavours; there 'is nothing can be more Excellent, nothing more 'Happy. Beſides, he makes this diſtinction with '*Plato* and *Architas*. There are ſome things ſaith he, 'That are deſirable for themſelves, and not for 'any

'any thing elſe, as Felicity; and others are deſired 'for ſomething elſe, and not for themſelves, as Riches; 'and other things, are deſired for themſelves, and 'for others, as Vertue. This I inſtance on purpoſe that one may ſee what ſort of Men may be oppoſed to *Seneca*, when he is ſo confident, that Vertue cannot nor ought not to be deſired for any thing elſe but it ſelf. By this Opinion, we offer no wrong to Vertue; for juſt as much as we value Pleaſure, Felicity, and the chief Good, ſo much do we praiſe and eſteem Vertue, which leads us to, and is the proper means of obtaining them.

But not to buſy our ſelves any longer about this matter, it ſufficeth to relate here what *Cicero* makes *Torquatus* ſpeak according to the Sentiments of *Epicurus*. The Text is long, but excellent, and it explains and decides, as I may ſay, the whole Matter. When therefore after a long Diſpute, it was concluded, That whatſoever is Right, Juſt, and Praiſe-worthy, tends to live Pleaſantly, and with Delight, *Torquatus* continues thus to ſpeak; 'In 'regard therefore that this is the chief and ſupream 'Good, which the *Greeks* have called by the name 'of *End*, becauſe it tends to no other thing, and 'that all things center in it; We ought to confeſs, 'that to live with delight and Pleaſure, is the chief 'Good or Happineſs. They who place it in Vertue 'alone, and whoſe Underſtandings are dazled with 'the glory of the Name, not rightly comprehending 'what Nature requires, may be freed from a groſs 'Miſtake, if they pleaſe to hearken to *Epicurus*; 'for to inſtance in all your laudable and excellent 'Vertues, and *Firſt*, of Wiſdom, Who can believe 'them to be Praiſe-worthy or deſirable, if they pro-'cured no Pleaſure? Truly, as we don't eſteem 'the Art of a Phyſician for the Art ſake, but for 'the Preſervation of Health; ſo we ſhould never

'desire Wisdom, which is the Art of Living, if it 'were Insignificant and Useless: But as it drives us 'in the search, and helps us in the obtaining true 'and real Pleasure, we earnestly desire and pursue 'after it. You understand now what Pleasure I 'speak of; and lest the ambiguous acceptation of 'words should render our Discourse untelligible or 'doubtful, I must explain my self, That it is Wis-'dom alone that banisheth Sorrow and all uneasi-'ness of Mind, that supports us under our anxious 'Fears, that curbs the fury of our Lusts and Ap-'petites, and causeth us to live Peaceably and Easy. 'These are the unsatiable Appetites, that ruin not 'only every particular Person, but also Families, and 'oft-times the whole Common-wealth. From these 'Appetites proceed Hatred, Quarrels, Discords, 'Seditions, Wars. And these Passions break not only 'outwardly upon other Persons with a blind Fury, but 'struggle inwardly, and War within themselves in 'our Minds. It is this that must needs cause our anxi-'ous and uneasy Life. So that the Wise Man alone 'having banish'd all boundless and irregular Desires, 'confines himself, and is satisfied within the limits 'of Nature, and by that means may spend his time 'without Grief, Sorrow, or Fear. If therefore we see 'all our Life disturb'd by Error and Ignorance, and 'that it is Wisdom only which delivers from the Af-'fronts of our vain Desires, and groundless Fears, 'and that adviseth us to bear with Patience the in-'juries of Fortune, and teaches the ways that lead 'to Rest and Tranquility, ought we not to say, that 'Wisdom is desirable, because of Pleasure; and 'that we are to shun Folly, because of the Mischief 'which attends it, by bringing Trouble and Di-'sturbance to our Minds?

'By the same Reason we will say, that *Tempe-'rance* is not desirable for it self, but because it

'brings

'brings Peace into our Minds; it ſweetens and pre-
'ſerves them in quiet. Becauſe 'tis Temperance
'that directs us to follow Reaſon, either in things
'that we ought to deſire and follow, or things that
'we are to ſhun and avoid; for it is not ſufficient
'to judge what ought to be, and what ought not
'to be, but we muſt likewiſe continue conſtant and
'reſolved, in what we have ſo judged. Now, there
'are many who cannot remain firm in what they
'have reſolved, but being overcome by a ſeeming
'and miſtaken Pleaſure, give themſelves over to
'the ſlavery of their Luſts, without foreſeeing what
'will from thence enſue; and from hence it hap-
'pens, that for a ſmall and trivial Pleaſure,
'which might be otherwiſe obtain'd, and which we
'might eaſily want without Pain, they fall into
'great Sickneſſes, into Loſs, into Shame, and incur
'many times the penalty of the Laws and Courts
'of Judicature. But ſuch as will ſo enjoy their
'Pleaſures, that no inconveniency nor trouble may
'thereby enſue, and who continue conſtant in
'their well-grounded Reſolutions, for fear of being
'overcome by falſe Pleaſures, and leſt they ſhould
'be perſwaded to do what they underſtand ought
'not to be done; ſuch I ſay, find a great pleaſure
'in denying themſelves theſe ſeeming Delights.
'They oftentimes eaſily undergo ſmall Pains and
'Troubles, leſt by ſhunning of theſe, they might
'fall into greater. From hence we may learn, that
'Debauchery is not to be ſhunn'd for its own ſake,
'nor Sobriety to be deſired becauſe it declines ſome
'Pleaſures, but becauſe it procureth greater and
'more ſubſtantial ones.

'We ſhall find the ſame Arguments for *Forti-*
'*tude*; for it is neither Labour, nor Pain, nor Pa-
'tience, nor Conſtancy, nor Induſtry, nor Courage,
'nor Watchfulneſs, that draw us of themſelves;

'but

'but we are perſwaded by theſe actions, that we 'may live without Trouble or Fear, and that we 'might free our ſelves as much as is poſſible from 'that which incommodes either the Mind or the 'Body; for oftentimes the Calm of our Life is di-'ſturb'd with the extraordinary fear of Death; and 'it is a miſerable thing to be oppreſs'd with Pain, 'and to bear it with a mean and feeble Courage; 'inſomuch, that by this weakneſs of Spirit, many 'have loſt their Parents, many their Friends, and 'many their Native Country, nay, have altogether 'loſt themſelves. But a generons, ſtout and coura-'gious Spirit, is free from ſuch Cares and Troubles, 'becauſe it deſpiſeth Death, and is ſo provided to 'receive Grief and Pain, that it knows the greateſt 'are cur'd by Death, and the leaſt have divers in-'tervals of Reſt; and that as for moderate Griefs, 'we are Maſters of them. Beſides, a noble Spirit 'conſiders, that if the Pains be not extraordinary, 'they are eaſily ſuffered; but if they be very grie-'vous, we ſhall then willingly ſurrender and quit 'our Life, which in ſuch a caſe, becomes unpleaſant 'to us; ſo that we leave it in the ſame manner as 'we go off a Theatre. From hence we may con-'clude, that Fear and Cowardiſe are not in them-'ſelves blame-worthy; neither do Courage and Pa-'tience of themſelves, merit Praiſe. But the firſt 'are ſlighted, becauſe they increaſe Pain and Sor-'row, and the other are deſired, becauſe they pro-'cure real Pleaſure.

'There remains nothing elſe to be examin'd but '*Juſtice*, of which we may almoſt ſay the ſame. 'For as I have already demonſtrated, that Wiſdom, 'Temperance and Fortitude, are ſo joyned with 'Pleaſure, that they cannot be ſeparated from it, 'we ought to ſay the ſame of Juſtice, which is not 'only inoffenſive to all Men, but does alſo conſtant-

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'ly bring with it ſuch advantages, as by the ſtrength 'of its own nature, does quiet and ſettle the 'Thoughts, by affording continual hopes of never 'wanting thoſe things which an honeſt Mind may 'deſire. And as Timerouſneſs, Covetouſneſs, and 'Cowardiſe do perpetually torment the Mind, and 'are continually vexing and diſturbing its quiet: 'So where Injuſtice bears ſway in the Soul, it be-'gets much Trouble and Vexation; and if it hath 'committed any evil action, tho' never ſo ſecretly, 'yet it can never be aſſured that it ſhall always re-'main undiſcover'd. Jealouſy and fear of being 'found out, do commonly attend evil Actions, and 'we ſuppoſe every one to be our Accuſer, and rea-'dy to Inform againſt us. Nay, ſome out of fear 'of being Diſcovered, have been their own Accu-'ſers. If ſome think their Riches a ſufficient ſhel-'ter, and capable of quieting their Conſcience, yet 'they have ſuch a dread of the Juſtice of God in 'puniſhing their Crimes, that upon a due reſent-'ment of this, their Thoughts labour under a per-'petual Agony and Diſturbance. Now, their wick-'ed Actions can never be able ſo much to leſſen 'the anxiety of their Life, as the gripings of a 'Wounded Conſcience, or the Laws of the Coun-'try, and the hatred of their Acquaintance, have to 'increaſe it. Nevertheleſs, ſuch is the unſatiable 'deſire of ſome Men after Riches, Luxury, Honour, 'Dominion, *&c.* that in the obtaining of them, they 'will ſtick at no indirect Means; ſo that nothing 'but a ſevere Puniſhment inflicted on them by the 'Laws, is able to ſtop their Career. True Reaſon 'therefore directs all Men of ſound Judgment to 'obſerve the Rules of Juſtice, Equity and Fidelity, 'which are the beſt means to procure to our ſelves the 'good Eſteem and Love of others, and which is abſo-lutely neceſſary to render our Lives Pleaſant and Se-

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'date: And the rather becauſe hereby we have no 'temptation to do what is ill, becauſe that the de- 'ſires which proceed from Nature may eaſily be 'appeaſed without doing wrong to any Perſon; 'and as for other vain Deſires, we are not to re- 'gard them; for they prompt us to nothing that is 'really worthy ſeeking after; and Injuſtice it ſelf 'brings a greater damage to us than the recompence 'it can be able to make us, by the ſeeming good 'things it brings along with it. Therefore we 'cannot ſay, That Juſtice is of it ſelf deſirable, but 'only becauſe it is attended with a great deal of 'Pleaſure and Content; for we are not a little pleaſed 'with the eſteem and good will of others, which 'renders our Life Comfortable and Pleaſant. Thus 'we don't believe that we ought to ſhun Vice only 'becauſe of the inconveniencies that fall upon the 'Wicked, but chiefly becauſe it never ſuffers the 'Mind to be at reſt, where it hath once taken poſ- 'ſeſſion.

I might here mention the Objections that are brought againſt this Opinion, but they relate to nothing but ſenſual and diſhoneſt Pleaſures, which *Epicurus* abhors in expreſs words. I will only take notice, that the Pleaſure that is here underſtood, is ſuch true real and natural Pleaſure, in which our Happineſs conſiſts. We therefore ſay, That Vertue is inſeparably accompanied with it, being the real and genuine cauſe of it; for where that is ſuppoſed, Happineſs immediately attends, and when that is removed, Pleaſure it ſelf muſt needs decay. In the ſame manner as the Sun is ſaid to be inſeparable from the Day, becauſe it alone is the true and neceſſary cauſe thereof; for as ſoon as the Sun appears over our Horizon, the Day muſt needs be, and when it withdraws, the Day diſ-appears. Now, the rea-

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ſon why *Epicurus* ſuppoſes Vertue to be the efficient cauſe of Happineſs, is becauſe he thinks that Prudence doth as it were contain all other Vertues; for all the reſt proceed from this, and have in a great meaſure a dependence upon her.

CHAP. III.

Wherein an Happy Life doth conſiſt.

WHat we have already diſcours'd of, tends to little elſe than to make a plain diſcovery of *Epicurus*'s Opinion. But now we muſt come cloſer to the Matter, and ſtrictly examin whether he had ſufficient ground to ſay, That Pleaſure is the main End.

Here we muſt weigh two of his chief Maxims, Firſt, That all Pleaſure is of it ſelf and of its own nature a real Good; and on the contrary, That all Grief and Pain, is an Evil. The Second is, That notwithſtanding ſometimes we muſt prefer ſome ſort of Pains before ſome ſort of Pleaſures.

Whether all Pleaſure be good of it ſelf?

IN reſpect of the firſt Maxim; It is not without ground, that *Epicurus* aſſerts, That all Pleaſure is of it ſelf good, tho' by accident it happens ſometimes otherwiſe, for all Creatures are of themſelves ſo inclinable to Pleaſure and Delight, that it is the firſt and chief thing that they naturally covet; nor do they willingly reject any Pleaſure that is offered them, unleſs it chance to be accompanied by ſome Evil that may after procure a Pain, and ſo cauſe us to repent of its firſt acceptance. And truly, as

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it is the nature of Good, to invite and perſwade the Appetite to love and embrace it, ſo we can give no Reaſon why all Pleaſure ſhould not be of it ſelf Lovely, and to be deſired, ſeeing there is none but in it ſelf is pleaſing and deſirable, and which does of it ſelf incline our Appetites. So that if we refuſe any, we refuſe them not as Pleaſures, but becauſe of ſome inconveniences that are annexed, and will infallibly attend them.

Now, to illuſtrate this more plainly by an Example, There is no Perſon but will allow Hony to be naturally ſweet; yet if Poyſon happens to mixed with it, whereby the Poyſon it ſelf doth alſo become ſweet, we ſhall then have a real averſion for the ſweetneſs of the Hony; but this is by accident; for the Hony of it ſelf is naturally ſweet and pleaſing to our Taſte. So that if we have any diſlike, we may ſay it is not really for the ſweetneſs of the Hony, but for the Poiſon that is mixt with it, and for the Miſchief that Poyſon will bring; for if it were ſeparated from the Hony, we ſhould then willingly taſte of it. Now, adjuſt any Pleaſure whatſoever to this Example, and you will eaſily perceive it to be never otherwiſe; for we ſhall always eſchew the Evil, but not the Pleaſure it ſelf, when diſtinct and ſeparated from the Evil: For either it is the thing from whence it is taken, or the action that is joined to it, or the damage that enſue either from the thing, or from the action, or the pain and grief that will attend it, which proceed from the Thing, from the Action, or from the Damage.

And to make the matter ſtill appear more obvious and intelligible. Suppoſe that the ſame Pleaſure is to be drawn from a Thing or Action, that neither Law nor Cuſtom, nor Honeſty prohibit; ſuppoſe that from this Action or thing, no damage or prejudice will happen, either to our Health, Reputation,

tion, or Eſtate: Suppoſe in a word, that no Puniſhment will attend it, nor Grief, nor Repentance, neither in this Life nor the next: And you will plainly underſtand that nothing can hinder it to be eſteem'd a real Good, and real Advantage; and if at preſent it is not ſo reputed, this proceeds not from the nature of the Thing, but from the Circumſtances that I have mentioned.

Ariſtotle alſo proves the thing by an Argument taken from Pain, which is oppoſite to Pleaſure: *All the World* (ſaith he) *are agreed, that Pain is an Evil, and to be avoided.* Now, that which is contrary to a thing that is to be avoided, and a real Evil, is good; therefore Pleaſure is a real Good. Now; to inlarge upon this Reaſon of *Ariſtotle*; Is it not manifeſt, That all Pain in general, is of it ſelf Evil and Hurtful, and by conſequence every Animal hath naturally an averſion againſt it? So that if at any time it is called Good, it is only by accident, in regard it hath ſome good thing that is joined to it, which obliges us to love and deſire it. But if you remove from Pain all hopes or expectation of obtaining any good thing, either Honeſt, Profitable, or Pleaſant, there is no Man ſo fooliſh as to wiſh for it, or ſeek after it. As this is undeniable, ſo it is apparent that if all Pain be of it ſelf Evil, and not good but by accident, all Pleaſure being contrary to Pain, is of it ſelf good and an evil by Accident.

Some object, That a Temperate Man flies from Pleaſures, and that he that is Wiſe, ſeeks rather a freedom from Pain. That there are ſome Pleaſures which are impediments to Wiſdom, and the rather becauſe they are Violent and Furious, as all Venereal Pleaſures generally are: That there are others which are not only hurtful, becauſe they dull the Underſtanding, beget Diſeaſes, and cauſe Poverty,

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but are alſo filthy and infamous. But, Firſt, The Temperate and Prudent Man, flies not from all Pleaſures; for it is plain, That he ſeeks after ſuch as are pure and honeſt; and if he avoids ſome, it is not becauſe they are only Pleaſures, but becauſe inſeparable from actions which are certainly attended with Deſtruction, which a Prudent Temperate Man ought not to be guilty of for the enjoyment of a preſent Pleaſure. In the ſame manner as we fly from Poiſon ſweetned, not becauſe it is ſweet, but becauſe it is deadly, and brings a Miſchief with it, which undoubtedly ought not to be bought at ſo dear a rate. Beſides, it is plain, That Pleaſures alone are no impediments of Wiſdom or Prudence, but rather the Actions that accompany them; ſuch actions I mean by which the Spirits are too much ſpent, whereby the ſtrength of the Mind is weakned, and the Judgment blinded. So, that when theſe Miſchiefs are charged upon Pleaſure, it is a Paralogiſm or deceitful way of Arguing, called by *Ariſtotle*, *Non cauſa ut cauſa*; when that which is not the Cauſe, is taken for the Cauſe; as if the Evil which ought to be aſcrib'd to the Poiſon, be attributed to the Hony, or to the Sweetneſs. Thus by conſequence, that which may be ſaid in reſpect of Diſeaſes and Poverty, and other inconveniences which commonly ſucceed, is that Pleaſure ſimply conſider'd as it is Pleaſure, is not the cauſe of theſe Evils, but rather Gluttony, or the exceſs of Wine and Meats prepared with Sawces, which tempt us to exceed the Bounds of Moderation, whence proceed Fevers and other grievous Diſtempers. So alſo from the exceſs of Venery proceed the Diſeaſe of the Gout and other ſhameful Maladies, accompanied with a numerous Train of other Miſchiefs. Thus the ſame may be ſaid in reſpect of the Infamy which we commonly aſcribe to Pleaſures;

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for it rather regards the actions that accompany them, which are of themſelves contrary to good Manners, and therefore are reputed Vicious and Diſhoneſt for this reaſon; for Inſtance, The Laws prohibit not the pleaſure in Adultery, but the action of Adultery it ſelf, which being forbidden and infamous in it ſelf, cauſeth the pleaſure that it procures, to be eſteem'd alſo filthy and infamous. But ſuppoſe in this caſe there were no prohibition, as in the Eſtate of pure Nature: Or, ſuppoſe that it happen'd, that the Wife of this Man, had been the Wife of the preſent Adulterer, here he had enjoyed the ſame Pleaſure, which in that caſe had not been reckoned of ill Repute, becauſe that action which accompanies it, had not been then forbidden nor diſhoneſt. From whence we may conclude, That Pleaſure is not blame-worthy in it ſelf, but for the Circumſtances that accompany it. Some anſwer, That tho' Pleaſure be no Evil, yet it is neceſſary to place it in the number of the Evils, becauſe of the Common People, who being inclin'd to Pleaſure, ought like crooked Trees to be bent a contrary way, and by that means to be made ſtrait. But *Ariſtotle* anſwers, That it is not convenient to entertain them with theſe kind of Diſcourſes, becauſe when it concerns us, as in the caſe of the Paſſions and Actions, we give not ſo much credit to the Words as to the Thing it ſelf. From whence it happens, that when the Words agree not with what the Senſes apprehend, they are deſpiſed; and tho' they comprehend ſomething that is good, yet they are thereby baffled. Therefore *Ariſtotle* ſeems to intimate, That it is more reaſonable not to place the Pleaſures amongſt the Evils, ſeeing the Senſes are of a contrary perſuaſion; and when they are barely look'd upon as Pleaſures, they approve of them, and judge them good; but it is more reaſonable to diſcover

and lay open the Evils that frequently accompany ſuch Pleaſures, which cauſe a prudent and conſidering Man to abſtain from them, leſt he being tempted thereby, ſhould be drawn into ſo great Miſchiefs.

If theſe Anſwers of *Ariſtotle* will not ſatisfie, nothing can hinder us from exclaiming againſt Pleaſure it ſelf, ſuppoſing thoſe to be Pleaſures which cauſe much more Evil, than they procure Good. For when it concerns us to perſuade, it is the ſame thing, to ſay, That Pleaſure, or the Action that accompanies the Pleaſure, is Wicked, to conclude that we are therefore to ſhun it, by reaſon of the Evils which infallibly attend and proceed from both.

Whether the Opinion of the Stoicks *in reſpect of Good and Evil, be Juſtifiable.*

WE might here enter into a large Field of Diſpute with the *Stoicks*, who pretend, That there is nothing Good, but that which is Honeſt; and nothing Evil, but that which is Diſhoneſt. But hereby we ſhould only trifle away our time in unneceſſary Diſputes; for in ſhort, it is manifeſt, that they have rais'd a Diſpute about the bare Name, when at the ſame time they have limited and confined the thing it ſelf, (*viz.* the Notion of Good) according to their own Fancy, which all Mankind beſides, take in a large Senſe: For whereas, other Men place ſeveral things beſides Vertues, in the number of good things, as Health, Pleaſure, Glory, Riches, Friends, *&c.* And beſides Vices, they reckon ſeveral other things amongſt Evils, as Sickneſs, Pain, Shame, Poverty, Enemies, *&c.* The *Stoicks* have rather named theſe things Indifferent, or neither Good nor Evil. But this ſeems very abſurd

ſurd and contradictory, to take Health and Sickneſs, Pleaſure and Pain, for the ſame things, *&c.* They have endeavoured to feign new Words, and call Health, Pleaſure, Glory, and other things προήγμενα, *Promota*, Aſſiſtants: As if they ſhould ſay, that they were not really Good, but ſuch things as did approach the neareſt to Vertue, and lead us to that which is the chief and only Good. The ſame Fancy they have had of Diſeaſes and Pain; they have named them ἀποπροηγμένα, *Abducta, remota:* As if they ſhould ſay, that they were things leſs Noble, and ſeparated from Vertue; for when it concerns us to make a Choice, thoſe are preferred, and theſe are forſaken. This is their way of Diſcourſe, which I think not worth Anſwering any otherwiſe than as *Cicero* doth, when he cries out, 'O the great 'ſtrength of Mind, and the brave Subject, to raiſe a 'new Doctrin! *O magnam vim ingenii cauſamq; juſtam cur nova exiſteret diſciplina!* The *Stoicks* argue, and with their weak Reaſonings, would maintain, That Pain is no Evil; *Concludunt ratiunculis Stoici cur dolor non ſit malum*, &c. As if Men were only troubled about the Word, and not the Thing. Wherefore muſt you *Zeno*, deceive me with your ſubtil Niceties, and new coin'd Words προήγμενα and ἀποπροηγμένα; for when you tell me that what looks grievous, is no Evil, you put me at a ſtand. I would deſire to know how that which ſeems to me moſt prejudicial and hurtful, is no Evil in it ſelf. Nothing is Evil, as you pretend, but that which is Diſhoneſt and Vicious. Theſe are but Words, neither can you hereby remove the difficulty. I underſtand very well, that Pain and Grief are not criminal Evils. You need not trouble your ſelf to tell me that; but ſhew me whether it be an indifferent thing to ſuffer Pain, or to be free from it. You ſay, That it is indifferent, as to the

Happineſs of Life, ſeeing that conſiſts in Vertue alone: But in the mean while, what you call Pain, is to be reckoned amongſt thoſe things that you are to avoid, and by conſequence is an Evil. When you pretend that Pain is no real Evil, but only ſomething uneaſie to be ſuffered, *&c.* It is to ſpeak at large what all the World beſides name in one word, Evil. And when you ſay, That *there is nothing Good, but what is Honeſt*, and *nothing Evil, but what is Diſhoneſt*, it is to vanquiſh in Words, but not in Senſe; it is to expreſs Deſires, and prove Nothing. Doubtleſs, this is an undeniable Truth; All that Nature hates, ought to be eſteem'd in the number of Evils; and all that is grateful to it, is to be reckoned on the contrary.

Whether at any time Pain ought to be preferr'd before Pleaſure.

THE Second thing to be Examin'd, before we conclude about *Epicurus*'s Opinion, is, Whether we ſhould ſometimes avoid Pleaſure to embrace Pain. This Queſtion depends very much upon the former; for if any Pleaſure offers it ſelf of that ſort which *Plato* calls *Pure, and diſengaged from any mixture of Grief and Trouble*; that is to ſay, ſuch as is never to be ſucceeded by any future Pain, neither in this Life, nor in that which is to come; or if any Pain offers it ſelf, ſuch as may be ſtiled Pure, and free from any Pleaſure, that is, ſuch as can never be ſuppoſed to yield any Satisfaction: No Man can give any reaſon why ſuch a Pleaſure ought not to be accepted, and ſuch a Pain avoided. But if any Pleaſure offer it ſelf, which might hinder us from obtaining a greater, or which will be attended by

by a Pain that may cauſe us to repent the ſuffering our ſelves to be drawn away to it; or if a Pain offers it ſelf, which may turn away a greater, or which may be followed by a Pleaſure very great, there is no Reaſon can perſuade us the ſhunning ſuch a Pleaſure, and embracing ſuch a Pain. Therefore *Ariſtotle* obſerves, That Pleaſure and Pain are the *Criteria* or diſtinguiſhing Marks by which we ought to judge, whether any thing is to be accepted or avoided. Now, any Wiſe Man will decline Pleaſure, and embrace Pain, if he ſees that Repentance will follow, or that by admitting a little Pain, he may avoid a greater. But *Torquatus* plainly clears the Doubt. And to the end we may eaſily ſee from whence the Miſtake ariſes among thoſe who accuſe Pleaſure, and approve of Pain, I will briefly tell you how it is, and expound unto you what that Author of Truth, and Encourager of an happy Life, hath ſaid. *No Man deſpiſes, hates, or ſhuns Pleaſure, becauſe it is Pleaſure, but becauſe that ſuch as know not how to purſue Pleaſure, and keep it within its due bounds, fall into great Miſchiefs. Nay, there is none that loves and ſeeks after Pain, becauſe it is Pain, but becauſe it happens ſometimes, that by Labour and Pain we procure to our ſelves ſome great Pleaſure: As to inſtance in ſome Particulars; Does ever any Man undertake any laborious Exerciſe or Task of the Body, unleſs he expects to reap ſome Advantage by it? Now, can any body reaſonably blame him who embraces a Pleaſure that is not accompanied with any Inconveniency, or him that flees from a Pain that can procure no Advantage? But we juſtly blame and condemn thoſe, who being enticed by the allurements of preſent Pleaſures, blinded by their Paſſions, foreſee not the Miſchiefs and Inconveniences that will from thence ariſe: And thoſe are in the like Error who are governed by a weakneſs of Mind, that is to ſay, for fear of Labour and Pain,*

abandon their Duty and Station. But it is no difficult matter herein to diſtinguiſh aright; for in a time of liberty, when it is in our power to chuſe, and that nothing hinders us from acting what pleaſeth us beſt, all Pleaſure is to be embrac'd, and all Pain to be avoided. But it happens, that at ſome times and upon certain junctures of Affairs, that we ought to decline Pleaſure, and accept of things that are Uneaſie. The Wiſe-Man therefore makes a prudent and diſcreet Determination in this Affair, *viz. To reject ſuch Pleaſures by the abſence of which, we may enjoy greater; and to ſuffer thoſe Ills, by undergoing of which, we may avoid more Miſchievous.*

Let us add to this, the general Conſent of *Plato*, *Socrates*, and *Ariſtotle*, who make uſe of the ſame Rule to diſtinguiſh by. Let us not forget the Opinion of *Cicero*, who would have us proceed as if all the Pleaſures, and all the Delights preſent and to come were ſet before us, and poiſed in a Balance, for ſaith he, *If you weigh the preſent Pleaſures with the future, we are always to chuſe the greateſt and the moſt numerous; but if we weigh Evils with Evils, we are to chuſe the leaſt and the feweſt. But if you weigh the preſent Pleaſures with the future Evils, or the preſent Evils with the future Pleaſures, in ſuch a caſe, you muſt chuſe the Pleaſures if they out ballance, but on the contrary, if they be Evils.*

Of the firſt Good that Nature has in it's View.

THat we may come at laſt to *Epicurus*'s Opinion, That *Pleaſure is our main End*, we muſt conſider, that the Reaſon that induc'd him to this Opinion was, That he conſider'd Pleaſure generally and ſimply in its own Nature, or elſe as it is manag'd

manag'd and directed by Prudence and Wiſdom: for it is in this manner alſo, that *Alexander* obſerves, That we are to diſtinguiſh the Matter, when he ſaith, That *Pleaſure according to the Judgment of* Epicurus, *is the firſt Good that Nature purſues, or the firſt Good unto which we are Naturally bent and inclin'd; but afterwards this Pleaſure is regulated and directed by Wiſdom and Prudence.* Eſſe quidem Voluptatem ex mente *Epicuri* primum familiare, primum, & congenitum bonum, primum aptum accomodatumque Naturæ; verum deinceps quaſi in ordinem redigi talem Voluptatem. Wherefore, as we ſhall ſpeak hereafter of this laſt, which with *Epicurus*, is nothing elſe but a *freedom from Pain, and a Tranquility of Mind*, let us at preſent ſay ſomething of the Firſt, and let us examin if this Pleaſure underſtood in a general ſenſe be really this *Primum Naturæ familiare*, or the firſt and chief Good that Nature goes in queſt of; for, it remains a great Queſtion among the Philoſophers. And it ſeems as in the order of good things that are deſirable, there is one thing that is the ultimate and chief, ſo ought there to be one thing firſt, which may be the beginning of all our Deſires. Some, ſaith *Cicero*, *Conceive Pleaſure or Delight, to be the firſt Good, others an exemption, or a freedom from Pain; for as ſoon as any Creature is born, it naturally deſires and labours after an indolence or freedom from Pain.* Others place the firſt good things of Nature, amongſt thoſe which they call our Being, Life, Perfection, the preſervation of all our Members intire and in Health, our Senſes, Strength, Beauty, and ſuch like.

Now, among theſe Opinions, the firſt and ſecond is included in that of *Epicurus*, for he places our exemption from Pain among thoſe things we call Pleaſure. The third Opinion being that of the *Stoicks*, is leſs probable; for tho' we may ſay, that

every Creature desires to have its Being, Life, Health, Perfection and Preservation of its several Parts, *&c.* Nevertheless, we must observe, that all these things are desired, because it is pleasant to enjoy them. And therefore, if these things are desirable for being Pleasant, doubtless Pleasure is the first good thing, or holds the chief place among those things that are desired. And this is probably what *Aristotle* meant when he said, That *Pleasure is common to all living Creatures, and the inseparable Companion of our free and voluntary Actions; for we perceive, that what is Honest, is Pleasurable, as well as what is Useful. Besides, Pleasure is born and bred up with us from our very Cradle. Therefore it is to no purpose to endeavour to wean our selves from this Inclination, with which our Natures are naturally tinctured.* This plainly discovers to us two things; First, That tho' we commonly reckon three sorts of good things, *viz.* The Honest, the Profitable, and the Pleasant: The Pleasant or Pleasurable, which is nothing else but Pleasure it self, is so intermixt with the rest, that it don't seem to be a distinct Species of it self, but part of the common Stock, which renders the others Good and Desirable; as if that which is Honest and Useful, were only to be desired because it is Pleasing and agreeable. Secondly, That Pleasure being common unto all sensible Creatures, and so fixt and setled in our very first Desires, that we have not a liberty of refusing it, seems verily that this should be the first Good that we wish for or desire, *Primum expetibile, primum familiare*; for these are the ordinary Terms, *Primum expetitum accomodatumq; Naturæ.*

Epicurus therefore seems to have dealt more candidly and sincerely, than all the rest, when he declared, That Pleasure, *Est primum Naturæ accomodatum*; and that it is that, *In quam tandem desinimus,*

mus, quatenus Animalia omnia ſimul ac nata ſunt, ſponte ipſa Natura & citra ullum ratiocinium ipſam complectantur & dolorem refugiant. Let us but hearken to *Torquatus* in *Cicero*. *Epicurus*, ſaith he, teacheth, That *every Animal as ſoon as it is born, deſires Pleaſure, as its chief Good, and delights in the enjoyment of it, but hates Pain, as its great Evil; ſhuns it, and flees from it as much as it is able; this it practiſeth while it is not corrupted, then Nature judgeth aright and without miſtake.* There is no need of Reaſoning and Diſputing in theſe Caſes, or to ſeek for Cauſes, why Pleaſure is deſirable, and Pain to be avoided, we our ſelves can as eaſily judge of this matter, as of the Fire, that it is Hot, the Snow White, and the Hony Sweet.

Maximus of *Tyre* teacheth the ſame Doctrin; *Pleaſure*, ſays he, *more ancient than Reaſon or Art, goes before Experience, and ſtays not for Time. But that violent deſire we have for it, and which is coæval with our Bodies, is as the foundation of the Creature's well-being; ſo that if we renounce it, all that ſhall be born, muſt immediately Periſh. Man after he comes to years, may by Experience and Induſtry, arrive to a competent degree of Knowledge, Reaſon, and Underſtanding, (which is ſo much Extoll'd) naturally and of his own accord; but from his Infancy he loves Pleaſure, and avoids Pain, without any help or Inſtruction, for it is Pleaſure that delighst him, and Pain that annoys him.* If Pleaſure were a thing of no value, we ſhould not bring it ſo early into the World with us, nor would it be the firſt thing neceſſary for our Preſervation. But it is not neceſſary, from what we have here ſaid, that you ſhould conclude, That Pleaſure is Man's chief Good or Happineſs; for as *Eudoxius* ſays in *Ariſtotle*, *As in all things, that which is deſired, is Good, ſo that which is chiefly deſired, ought to be the chief Good, or that which every thing deſires,*

deſires, is chiefly deſirable; therefore what every thing deſires, muſt be the chief Good; but that is Pleaſure; therefore Pleaſure is that chief Good. Let us here now admire the Wiſdom and Fore-ſight of the Great Creator and Author of Nature, That in regard all our Actions and Operations are of themſelves painful and troubleſom, and theſe alſo, as *Ariſtotle* terms them, being *Natural*, as Seeing, Hearing, *&c.* He hath cauſed them all to be ſweetned with Pleaſure; and the more neceſſary theſe Operations are for the preſervation of our Species, the greater Pleaſure Nature hath allotted them; otherwiſe all Creatures would neglect or forget not only the act of Generation, but even Eating and Drinking it ſelf, if there were not certain natural Inſtigations that ſtir and move us, and by cauſing ſome kind of Pain and Uneaſineſs, minds us of the Action, which the Pleaſure that ought to appeaſe this Pain and Uneaſineſs, doth promote and encourage, which is a manifeſt Proof, that theſe ſorts of Pleaſures, are not of themſelves Evil, tho' Men abuſe them afterwards by Intemperance, contrary to other Animals.

Neither is it requiſite here to hint again, that by the name of Pleaſure, we don't mean thoſe groſs ſenſual Pleaſures of Luxury, Effeminacy, delicious Meats, Revellings, and the Debauchery of Women: In ſhort, ſuch as the Sages, as (*Maximus* obſerves) exclaimed againſt, ſtyling them, *Sardanapali ſcilicet Luxus, Medica mollities, Ionicæ deliciæ, Siculæ menſæ, Sybaritica ſaltationes, Corinthiæ meretrices*, &c. but generally all that we can call and is generally ſtiled by the name of Joy, Pleaſure, Contentment, Satisfaction, Delight, Sweetneſs, Pleaſantneſs, a peacable State, Quietude of Thought, ſecure Tranquility, *&c.* which are nothing elſe but ſynonymous Names for Pleaſure. We muſt only here remember, That what

what we have already obſerved, is one of *Ariſtotle*'s Principles; That *whatſoever we make choice of, is always accompanied whith Pleaſure*: And ſeeing there are three ſorts of things named Good, according to Vulgar Diſtinction, the Honeſt, the Uſeful, and the Pleaſant; The latter is common to the reſt, for the Honeſt and the Uſeful ſeem to be alſo Pleaſant and Grateful. From hence therefore we may infer, that Good and Pleaſant, are but different Names for the ſame thing; and that Good is Good, and deſcribed to be what all Creatures deſire, only becauſe it is grateful and pleaſing; and by conſequence that that Good which is pleaſing, is deſired for the Pleaſure it affords. It remains, that we next prove, That the good things which are Honeſt and Uſeful, are alſo deſired for the Pleaſure they yield.

That things Profitable and Uſeful, are ſought after for the ſake of Pleaſure.

NOw, there is no difficulty to prove that things Profitable and Uſeful, relate to what is grateful, or to the Pleaſure which we receive from them. For it is manifeſt, That things Uſeful are not deſired meerly becauſe they are Uſeful, but for ſomething elſe, which is either Pleaſure it ſelf, or which relates to Pleaſure. As firſt in reſpect to Eating or Drinking, ſoft Muſick, or ſweet Perfumes, and the like, it is plain that we value them in reſpect of the Pleaſure that attends them, which may likewiſe be underſtood of divers Arts and Sciences, as of Cookery, Hunting, Painting, Phyſick, Chirurgery, *&c.* which tend to free us from ſeveral Diſtempers, from which to be delivered, is very pleaſing. The ſame thing may be ſaid of Navigation, of Merchandiſe,

diſe, of War; all which center in the getting of Mony, or ſomething like, whereby we may attain to ſome Pleaſure that we promiſe to our ſelves. So when any one by hard Labour has acquired ſufficient to purchaſe an Habitation, Cloaths, Medicines, Books, and the like Conveniences, does not he promiſe to himſelf the Pleaſure he ſhall enjoy when he ſhall have obtain'd theſe things, and ſhall be able to ſubſiſt in Eaſe and Quiet for the future, without any further Pains or Trouble; to eat when he ſhall be an Hungred, and drink when he is Thirſty, or warm himſelf when Cold, to be at leiſure, and ſatisfie his Curioſity when he ſhall deſire it; in ſhort, when he ſhall be in a condition to ſpend his days Comfortably, Securely, Honeſtly, Honourably? This is generally the aim of all the World, of the Husband-man, of the cheating Tradeſman, (as *Horace* ſtiles him) of the Soldier, Merchant and Seaman.

The Soldier Fights, the buſy Tradeſman Cheats,
And finds a thouſand Tricks and choice Deceits:
The heavy Plough contents the labouring Hind,
The Merchant ſtrives with ev'ry Tide and Wind;
And all this Toil to get vaſt heaps of Gold,
That they may live at Eaſe when they are Old.

This is the deſign of the Courtiers, and of ſuch as buſy themſelves in obtaining great Employments and high Offices; they undergo many Labours, make great Courtſhips, ſuffer many Hardſhips, and all for no other purpoſe, but that they might at laſt, as they pretend, retreat in Peace, and ſpend the remainder of their Lives to their own Content, quietly and peaceably. The moſt ſordid and moſt covetous Miſers, propoſe to themſelves the pleaſure

ſure to look upon their Coffers full of Gold and Silver.

A ſordid Churl, the Jeſt of all the Place,
Thus comforted himſelf for his Diſgrace:
The Lowſy Rabble Hiſs me at the Play,
And Grin and make the greateſt Farce of me.
But what care I, when I can hug at home
My ſtrutting Bags, and give my ſelf an Humm.

Not to mention thoſe, who not underſtanding, That Nature is ſatisfied with a little, delight in Debauchery and Exceſs, who by Rapine and all indirect means, ſtrive to acquire Riches, that they might have the pleaſure of waſting them in Prodigality, Rioting and Luxury. This hath given occaſion to *Manilius* too juſtly to Complain;

For Heaven is kind, with bounteous hand it grants
A fit ſupply for Nature's ſober Wants.
She asks not much, yet Men preſs blindly on,
And heap up more, to be the more Undone:
By Luxury they Rapine's force maintain,
What that ſcrapes up, flows out in Luxury again,
And to be Squander'd, or to raiſe Debate,
Is the great Only uſe of an Eſtate.

That thoſe good things which we call Honeſt, have the neareſt relation to Pleaſure.

THis ſeems a little more difficult to be made out: *Bonum honeſtum*, or honeſt Good, ſeems to carry its own intrinſick worth, and to be deſir'd only for it ſelf. *Cicero* amongſt others, appears very much incens'd againſt *Epicurus*, after he had propoſed a Form

Form of Honeſty, ſuch an one as he would have us underſtand; he applies himſelf to *Torquatus*. *Thy* Epicurus *ſaith, That he knows not what they mean who compute Man's chief Happineſs only by Honeſty; who ſay, that all things are to be referr'd to that, and that there is nothing of Pleaſure to be intermix'd with it. Theſe are idle Diſcourſes which he can't underſtand, and that he cannot conceive what they mean by this word* Honeſty; *for to ſpeak according to the uſual Dialect, we ſtile that Honeſt, which the People by their general Vogue, term* Glorious and Honourable. *And tho' that*, ſaith he, *be oftentimes more pleaſing than divers other Pleaſures, ſtill it is deſired for Pleaſure ſake. See here*, ſaith he, *this great Diſpute! A famous Philoſopher, who hath made ſo much noiſe in the World, and hath ſpread his Fame not only over* Greece *and* Italy, *but over the* Barbarous Nations, *ſaith*, That *he* underſtands not what that Honeſty means that is ſo much talk'd of, if there be no Pleaſure intermixt with it. In this manner *Cicero* propoſeth the Opinion of *Epicurus*, in relation to theſe remarkable Words, That *nothing is called Honeſt, but what the General Vogue of Men recommend. Ariſtotle* explains the Matter in theſe Terms, Μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἢ ἅπερ τὸ ἔνδοξον, Either that there is nothing Honeſt, or it is that which is ſo eſteem'd in the Opinion of Men.

Now, to ſpeak firſt, as in reference to the Notion or deſcription of Honeſty, What harm is there if we conſider it with a reſpect to Man, from whom it receives Praiſe and Recommendation? The word *Honeſt* amongſt the *Latins*, is ſaid to be ſo from the Honour that Action deſerves, and amongſt the *Greeks*, τὸ καλὸν, ſeems to have no other Signification; for if you pleaſe, you may interpret it not only *Honeſt*, but alſo *Beautiful*, *Honourable*, and *Praiſe-worthy*, &c. And you will find, that it is not ſo in reſpect of it ſelf, but in reſpect of Men, who allow

allow of it to be ſo, and conſequently it appears to them Beautiful and Honourable, and of whom it is, and ought to be Praiſed. The ſame ought to be underſtood of the word αἰσχρὸν, which is contrary to καλὸν: for when we interpret it Ignoble, Shameful, and Deteſtable, we mean always in reference to Men, to whom it ſeems to be ſo. And that it is really ſo, we will appeal to *Cicero* himſelf, who gives this deſcription of Honeſty; That *when it is diveſted of all Profit and Applauſe, it ſtill remains deſirable and commendable for its own ſake, without any regard to a Reward.* Now, as I ſay, is it not true, that in this ſenſe, Honeſty is that which may be approved of and deſired, which ſhews a relation to them, who Praiſe it, or as *Epicurus* ſaith, *To the common Eſteem of the People*? But by this word People or Multitude, who can think, that *Epicurus* hath a deſign to exclude Men of Wiſdom and Underſtanding; and that he means not generally all the Men that make up a City or People? It were Ridiculous and Fooliſh to have ſuch a Fancy. Now, in reference to what *Cicero* ſaith, That *all Profit is removed*, *Epicurus* will agree with him; That *Honeſt Men don't propoſe to themſelves any Profit or Advantage, ſuch as Mony and the like low, mean things; but they propoſe to themſelves ſome other Benefits, as Praiſe, Glory, Honour, Renown*, &c. which *Cicero* himſelf Acknowledges; for in his Oration for *Milo*, having ſuppoſed, That there are divers Recompences offered to Men of Honour, he ſaith, *That of all the Rewards of Vertue, Glory is the greateſt.* And in another Place he declares, That *Vertue deſires no other recompence for all its Labours and Dangers, but Praiſe and Glory; which being removed*, ſaith he, *what is there in the courſe of this Life of ſo ſhort a continuance, for which we ought to be at ſo much Labour?*

Epicurus

Epicurus therefore ſeems to have given a good deſcription of what is Honeſt, *viz.* That which is *Glorious and Honourable, by the Vogue and univerſal Conſent of all Mankind.* For if at any time People account that to be Commendable and Glorious, which is eſteem'd Mean and Diſhonourable amongſt ſome People or Nations, who have different Laws and Cuſtoms, according to which, the Notion of Honeſt and Diſhoneſt differs, but not in reſpect of the ſame People, amongſt whom that thing may be eſteem'd Honeſt and agreeable with their Laws and Cuſtoms. For this Reaſon therefore, *Cicero* ſometimes gives this general deſcription of Honour; *A reward of Vertue, granted to ſome Body by the Judgment and Approbation of his Fellow Citizens,* Præmium Virtutis judicio ſtudioq; Civium delatum ad aliquem. As if he ſhould ſay, That Honour and by conſequence Honeſty, or that which is Glorious and Honourable by Reputation, depends upon the Judgment of the Citizens, or of the People who make uſe of their own Laws and Cuſtoms.

But in concluſion, to ſpeak one word to the Purpoſe in reference to that Honeſty which relates to Pleaſure, we muſt obſerve, That this Relation hinders not, but that Honeſty in one ſenſe, may be ſaid to be deſired for it ſelf, or for its own ſake, becauſe it is deſired *nulla contingente ſive ſuperveniente re,* as *Ariſtotle* Teaches; that is to ſay, as *Cicero* Interprets it, *All Profit being laid aſide, and without any Reward, Recompence, or Advantage, ſuch as Mony and the like can produce.* For ſome may deſire, Honour, Learning and Vertue, not becauſe they may thereby advance Gain, or increaſe Wealth, but for the Renown and Satisfaction that will ariſe from the enjoyment of a clear and enlightned Underſtanding, whereby we may the better rule and Govern our Paſſions, and all this nevertheleſs, becauſe it is pleaſant

ſant to be Honoured, Learned and Vertuous, and to enjoy a Soul Calm and Serene.

Whether the deſire of Honour be Blame-worthy.

WE muſt here obſerve, that tho a too eager and violent purſuit of Honour, under a colour of Vertue, be not to be allowed, yet we muſt not totally condemn the Deſire of it, as ſome have done, eſpecially if we ſeek after it with a juſt and lawful Moderation. It is not without Reaſon, that this Deſire is Judg'd to be Natural, for we may ſee it appear very early in Children; and the very Bruits themſelves are governed by it: Nay, tho' ſome may ſeem to neglect and deſpiſe, yet there is no body that can abſolutely and altogether free themſelves from the deſire of it. 'Tis alſo very requiſite, that it ſhould be ſo highly eſteem'd, for it is commonly propoſed as the reward of Vertue; and that there is neither Kingdom nor Commonwealth, but encourages their Subjects to Noble Actions, by the expectation of it. There is likewiſe this difference between a Noble Generous Mind, and a baſe and mean Spirit; that whereas the latter ſeeks nothing but Gain and Profit in the Undertakings; the former deſires nothing but Glory and Renown. Beſides, Experience teacheth us, and all Ages can Witneſs, That where we remove from the minds of Men, the deſire of Honour and Glory, there is never any mention made of thoſe great Exploits by which Kingdoms are obtain'd. Now this being ſuppoſed, we may here take notice of two ſorts of Pleaſure, for which Honour is deſirable. The Firſt, is that extraordinary Satisfaction that a Man expects to receive when his Fame ſhall

be ſpread abroad, and he ſhall become Renowned in the World. The Story of *Damocles*, is not unknown, and the hopes that he propoſed to himſelf of an unexpreſſible Joy for the Royal Honours they would beſtow upon him. And that of *Demoſthenes* is no leſs Remarkable. This Great Man confeſſeth ingenuouſly, That *he was well pleaſed to hear a mean Woman coming from a Fountain, whiſper ſoftly to her Friend*, There is *Demoſthenes*, pointing at him with her Finger. And we may without any wrong to Vertue, believe the ſame of other Illuſtrious Men, when in their Walks they hear themſelves named, and the People ſay of them publickly, *There is* Chappellus, *the fineſt Wit of the Kingdom. Here is* Deſpreaux, *the* Horace *of our Age, the everlaſting ſpeaker of Truths. There is that famous* Racinus, *who by the charming efficacy of his Verſes, knows, when he Pleaſes, how to force us to Weep. Here is the Learned and unparallel'd Lady*, Sabbiere. How pleaſant is it to be thus taken Notice of in the World for ſome Perfection, and pointed at by eminent Perſons!

At pulchrum eſt digito monſtrari & dicier hic eſt.

And we know what is reported of *Themiſtocles*, when after a notable Victory, he obſerved, That all the Spectators neglecting the publick Pomp, had their Eyes wholly fixed upon him, which tranſported him with ſo great Joy, that he could not forbear thus to expreſs himſelf: *This day*, ſays he, *I receive ſufficient recompence for all the Toils that I have undergone for* Greece.

The other ſort of Pleaſure that carries Men to the deſire of Honour, is that great Security that attends us; the enjoyment of which is ſo pleaſant, and the rather, becauſe he that lives in a perfect and entire Security,

Security, finds himſelf in power to act what ſeemeth him good, and to enjoy all the Pleaſures that he fancies without any controll. Now, we eaſily believe, that Security is obtained by Honour, becauſe Honour is beſtowed for Vertue's ſake, or becauſe of Offices and Performances that ſuppoſe Vertue to be there. If it be for Vertue's ſake, then it is certainly free from Contempt, and the Reverenced Perſon can by no means ſink into that Eſtate which is expoſed to Injuries and Affronts. If it be for the ſake of Offices or Dignities, and conſequently for ſome Advantage expected, or ſome Evil that we dread, even for that cauſe, we look upon them commonly as a great and ſtrong Support. But herein we may find this difference, That the Honour that is rendred for the ſake of Dignities, is more Splendid and taking with the Common People; therefore we ſee a great many very deſirous of Dignities and noble Employments, and very few look after Vertue. As if thoſe who are promoted to Dignities, had wherewith they may Injure ſome, and Pleaſure others; and therefore can ſecure themſelves from the Power of ſome by Hope, and of others by Fear.

CHAP. IV.

What Advantage Moral Vertue procures.

NOw to mention ſomething of Vertue it ſelf. *Ariſtotle* and *Cicero* declare Wonders about the delights and pleaſures of Knowledge and Learning, which make the firſt part of Moral Vertue. *Nature*, ſaith Ariſtotle, *the common Parent, ſtirs up and gives unſpeakable Pleaſures to ſuch as can attain to underſtand the Cauſes of things, and ſtudy Philoſophy truly and to purpoſe. If we cannot without Delight, look upon the bare Images of Nature, becauſe in caſting our Eyes upon them, we behold the ingenuity and skill of the Painter or the Graver that made them; How much more ought the Contemplation of Nature it ſelf, and of its admirable Wiſdom and Contrivances, to fill our Minds with Joy and Satisfaction?* *Cicero* alſo ſpeaks of it to no leſs Advantage. *The Conſideration*, ſaith he, *and Contemplation of Nature, is the real and natural Food of the Soul: It is that which raiſeth and elevates our Thoughts; for when we think upon the Cœleſtial things, which are ſo Great, Large and of ſuch a vaſt Extent, we deſpiſe theſe here below, as Mean and of no Value.* *Seneca's* Expreſſions are no leſs Remarkable; *O! how Contemptible is Man*, ſaith he, *if he raiſeth not himſelf above Human things! We may ſay, That then the Spirit of Man hath attain'd to its greateſt Happineſs that its Nature is capable of, when it hath trampled upon all Vice, and raiſeth it ſelf to ſublime Matters, and ſearches into the Secrets of Nature. 'Tis then, that walking among the Cœleſtial Orbs, it diſdains the green Fields, and all the Gold that the Earth produces for our covetous Poſterity. There are above us, ſpacious Heavens, which our Souls take then Poſſeſſion of. When it*

is

is there arrived, it is nouriſh'd and increaſes, and being free'd from its Earthly Priſon, it returns to its firſt Principle; for, it is a certain ſign of its being of a Divine Nature, that the Divine Objects are pleaſing to it, which it looks upon not as belonging to others, but as its own.

Here it will not be amiſs to mention the Pleaſures and Tranſports of Joy that the Mathematical Sciences cauſe. *Plutarch* relates, That *Eudoxius would have been willing to have been Burnt as* Phaeton *was, if he could firſt have been admitted to approach ſo near the Sun, as to have a full inſpection of its Figure, Greatneſs and Beauty.* The ſame Author tells us, That *Pythagoras* was ſo raviſh'd with Joy when he had found that famous *Theorem*, (which is the Forty ſeventh of *Euclid*'s Book) that immediately he offered a ſolemn Sacrifice. He writes alſo of *Archimedes*, That many times they have been forced to divert him from his deep Contemplations: Nay, ſo great a Pleaſure he found in them, that his exceſs of Joy, was like to have coſt him his Life, when by laborious and tedious Study, he had arrived to diſcover, how much Braſs might be mingled in that Crown of Gold which the King had Dedicated to the *Gods*. He thereupon (as he was going out of the Bath) tranſporred with Joy, cried out, Εὕρηκα, Εὕρηκα. *There is nothing*, ſaith *Cicero*, *more Pleaſant, than the ſweet repoſe of a Learned Old Age. We ſee* Gallus, *your Father's Friend, dying for Joy, in the Speculation of the Stars, and meaſuring the Heavens and the Earth. How many times hath he Surpriz'd him from Morning, until the Evening, when he had undertaken to deſcribe ſomething of the Stars? And how many a Night hath he found him in the Evening, when he had begun from the Morning? O what Pleaſure did he take to foretell the Eclipſes of the Sun and Moon?*

For the other Liberal Arts, it is known what Recreation the Knowledg of *History* and *Antiquity*, the Beauty of *Poetry*, and the Grace of *Rhetorick* give. *These Studies*, ſaith *Cicero*, *are delightful Employments for Youth, are pleaſing to Old Age, are Ornaments in Proſperity, and a grateful ſecurity in Adverſity.* Hæc ſtudia Adoleſcentiam alunt, Senectutem oblectant, ſecundas res ornant, adverſis perfugium & ſolatium præbent; delectant domi, non impudiunt foris, pernoctant nobiſcum, peregrinantur, ruſticantur. *They afford Pleaſure at Home; they are not Troubleſom to us Abroad; they continue with us Sleeping; they accompany us in our Travels; they go along with us in the Fields. How mean are the delights of Banquetting, of Plays, of Women, when compared with theſe Pleaſures? Men freely ſpend whole days and nights in purſuit of Learning, and think no pains too great to be beſtowed in obtaining it; ſo great and exquiſit is the Pleaſure thereof, when acquired.* Omnia prepetiuntur ipſa cognitione & ſcientia capti, & cum maximis curis, & laboribus compenſant eam quam ex diſcendo capiunt voluptatem.

For the other part of Vertue, which is commonly called *Moral Vertue*, we ſhall be obliged hereafter to treat of it more at large, where we ſhall ſpeak of its four Kinds, *viz. Prudence*, *Fortitude*, *Temperance* and *Juſtice*. Only ſuppoſing at preſent, that 'tis an undoubted Truth, That there is nothing more Pleaſant, than to lead a Life not liable to Reproach; a Life that's Innocent and void of Offence, free from the Checks and Remorſes of a guilty Conſcience; and ſo to govern all our Actions according to the Rules of Honeſty and Prudence, as not to fail in any of the Duties of Life; to wrong no Body; to do good to every one as much as is poſſible. Suppoſe I ſay, ſuch Maxims

to

to be True, which we ſhall have hereafter occaſion to mention; I ſhall here take notice of three things. Firſt; That it is not without great Reaſon, that we compare Vertue to a Plant, whoſe Root is Bitter, but the Fruit very Sweet; and that *Plato*, *Xenophon*, and ſeveral others, have highly commended thoſe Verſes of *Heſiod*, that inform us, That Vertue is not to be attain'd without Labour and Sweat; and that the way that leads to it, is truly Long and Difficult, and of an uneaſie acceſs in the beginning, but when e'er mounted to the top, there is nothing Sweeter, nor more Pleaſant.

The Gods through Sweat and Pains to Vertue lead,
But long and arduous is the Path we tread:
Rugged and ſteep when firſt you venture on,
But at the top arriv'd, with eaſy ſpeed you run.

Unto which we ought to add that Sentence of *Epicharmus*, That *the Gods afford to us no good things, but for our Labours and Pains.*

Labore nobis cuncta,
Dii vendunt bona.

Which gives us to underſtand, that we ought freely to endure the Labours that occur in the way to Vertue, becauſe they are attended with wonderful Pleaſure and Satisfaction.

Nor is that Story without Ground; Where *Pleaſure* and *Vertue* are ſuppoſed to meet in a double Way, and each of them to uſe the ſtrongeſt Motives to encline *Hercules* to follow them in their different Paths; for that confirms the truth of thoſe Rules that are before alledged, when we took notice, That we ought to ſhun that Pleaſure which is attended with a greater Miſchief; as we ought to

embrace thoſe Labours and Toils which will procure us greater Advantages and Delights. I know very well how they have repreſented *Hercules* rejecting Pleaſure, that is to ſay, an eaſie and Effeminate Life, to purſue Vertue, which is a Life full of Labour and Difficulty. Nevertheleſs, *Maximus* of *Tyre*, ſaith very well; That *when he was under the greateſt Labours, he felt, or had a proſpect of wonderful Pleaſures. You ſee*, ſaith he, *in* Hercules *extraordinary Labours, but you ſee not the incredible Pleaſures that either attend or ſucceed them.* Whoſoever takes away Pleaſure from Vertue, takes from it all Strength and Efficacy; for were it not for Pleaſure, Men would never undertake any great Matter: And he who out of Zeal for Vertue, willingly undergoes any Trouble, this is purely for the ſake of ſome Pleaſure he feels or expects: For as in hoarding up of Treaſure, no Man will prefer a Pebble before a Ruby, nor Braſs before Gold, unleſs he be utterly deſtitute of all Reaſon and Underſtanding: So in reſpect of Labour and Trouble, no Man labours meerly and purely for Labour's ſake; this would turn to a very ſorry account; but we willingly exchange the preſent Labours for Vertue; that is, in plain Engliſh, as the *Stoicks* term it, for Pleaſure; for, who ſpeaks of Vertue, ſpeaks of Delight; and Vertue it ſelf would be much neglected, if at the ſame time it were not attended with Delight. For my part, I muſt declare, that I run quite counter to the common Vogue, for I look upon Pleaſure to be the moſt Beautiful, the moſt Deſirable thing in the World, and that which we ought the moſt ſtrictly to purſue; and for its ſake it is, I believe, that Men ſo frequently expoſe themſelves to all Hazards and Dangers, and even encounter Death it ſelf; for tho' we are apt to give divers Names to the Cauſe that firſt moves us

to

to undertake ſuch great things; as for Inſtance, That which put *Achilles* upon dying voluntarily for *Patrocles*, we call Friendſhip; that which enclined *Agamemnon* to enter into and carry on a War with ſo much Care and Fatigue, was the care of preſerving his Kingdom; that of *Hector*'s ſo frequent Encamping and defeating his Enemies, was the deſire to preſerve his Country. All theſe ſeveral Terms are but other Names for Pleaſure. And as in the Diſtempers of the Body, the Patient for want of Health, not only freely ſubmits himſelf to Hunger and Thirſt, but alſo willingly undergoes the moſt virulent Pains and Torments of Surgeons Inſtruments; but if it were not for this hope, he would never endure ſuch Tortures. So in the actions of Life, there is a compenſation for the Troubles that we undergo with Pleaſure, which you truly term Vertue, and which I allow ſo to be. But at the ſame time I demand, Whether your Mind does embrace Vertue, without any love for it? And if you yield to this, that you have ſuch a Love, ought you not to agree alſo that you have a Pleaſure in it? Vary the Terms as much as you pleaſe, call it neither Pleaſure nor Delight, but Joy or Satisfaction, I ſhall not differ about Names; I look only to the thing it ſelf, and I find that Pleaſure or Satisfaction, put *Hercules* on Action.

The ſecond Obſervation that I make, is, That the Philoſophers themſelves who have declared open War with Pleaſure, whereby to advance their Vertue, and ſo to become more Remarkable, don't differ ſo much from *Epicurus* in the thing, as in the Term. I might here with *Lucian*, mention their Ways and Manners, who tell them, That if they had the Ring of *Gyges*, and the Helmet of *Pluto*, ſo that they might become inviſible to the World, they would ſoon forſake their beloved Labours, their

their Pains and Toils, and hunt after thoſe Pleaſures and Delights that they ſeem to ſlight and condemn. *Maximus* of *Tyre*, compares them with *Æſop*'s Sheperd, who being ask'd by a Lion in purſuit of a Buck, whether he had ſeen it; anſwered *No*, but with his Finger pointed at the Place where it fled. Thus theſe pretenders to Vertue, when they diſclaim againſt Pleaſure, 'tis only in Word and in Shew. But to paſs by their Manners, which don't any ways correſpond with their Words, 'tis ſufficient to let you know, That *Epicurus* as well as they, embraces and eſteems Vertue very highly, and that when they ſtorm ſo much againſt him, 'tis becauſe he maintains, That Vertue is only a means very proper to attain our End or chief Good; whereas, they aſſert, That Vertue it ſelf is the laſt End and chief Good. So that in effect, they declare the very ſame thing as he doth, tho' in different Words.

And truly theſe are their own Expreſſions, ſo often celebrated among them; That *Vertue is ſufficient of it ſelf to make us Happy*. Or as *Cicero* ſays, That to *live happily, we need only be Vertuous*. Now, if we rightly underſtand this Maxim, we muſt neceſſarily perceive thereby that Vertue it ſelf is not the chief Good, but a means that contributes in ſuch a manner to obtain it, that it is alone ſufficient for that purpoſe, without having need of the aſſiſtance of any thing elſe; And conſequently we may thereby perceive, that a happy Life, or true Felicity, which is obtained by Vertue, is the chief *Good*, or the laſt *End*, becauſe this Good, or this End, is for it ſelf, and tends not to obtain afterwards any thing elſe.

And, now to live Happily, is nothing elſe, but to live agreeably, contentedly, and with Delight; and if we may be permitted, to add the other Word, which

which offends ſo much, with *Pleaſure*. Certainly tho' the *Stoicks* deal not ſo plainly as *Ariſtotle*, who holds, That *Pleaſure is mixed with Happineſs*, and that *by Pleaſure, the contemplation or operation of Happineſs is increaſed*: Yet I doubt not but if an happy Life could be fancied to be really void of Delight and Pleaſure, they would render it ſo barren and deſolate, that in aſcending their ſteep and craggy Mountain of Vertue, they would never endure ſo many Hardſhips and Dangers, if they were not encouraged with the hopes of Happineſs, when they arrive at the top. And *Socrates* himſelf, whoſe Reſolutions and Courage they deſire; Hath he not plainly deſcribed Happineſs to be a Pleaſure which is not attended with Repentance? And *Antiſthenes*, the Father of the *Cynicks*, and the Author of that famous Maxim of the *Stoicks*; That *he would rather become an Ideot, than ſeek after Pleaſure*. Doth he not yield to this in the Writings of *Stobeus? Venandas eſſe eas voluptates, non quæ labores aut moleſtias præcedunt, ſed quæ conſequuntur*. That we ought not to ſeek after thoſe Pleaſures which go before our Labours and Difficulties, but ſuch as follow.

But to ſhew ſtill more plainly how Pleaſure accompanies a *Cynical* Life, which the *Stoicks* themſelves, tho' they look upon it as Auſtere and Grievous, yet nevertheleſs Happy: We need but hearken once more to *Maximus* of *Tyre*, who the beſt of any, hath repreſented this Life, ſpeaking of *Diogenes*: *What*, ſaith he, *made* Diogenes *to retire into his Tub? Was it not Pleaſure?* For tho' it was alſo Vertue that made him abide there, Why muſt we ſeparate his Pleaſure from his Reaſon? *Diogenes* was as well pleaſed in his Tub, as *Xerxes* in the City of *Babylon*; and in feeding upon his boiled Barley and dried Bread, as *Smindrides* upon his dainty Diſhes and exquiſit Fare. He was as well

well ſatisfied in the Sun, as *Sardanapalus* was in the Purple Garments; with his Staff in his hand, as *Alexander* with his Lance; with his Wallet at his Back, as *Creſus* in the midſt of his Treaſures. And if you pleaſe to compare the Pleaſures of the one with thoſe of the others, you ſhall find the Pleaſures of *Diogenes* to be prefer'd; becauſe Pain and Trouble have always from every ſide, come to diſturb the Pleaſures of thoſe Men who ſeem'd to be Happy. When *Xerxes* was Overcome, he Wept; *Cambiſes* being Wounded, fell into Sorrow; *Sardanapalus* groaned in the Flames. When *Smyndrides* was Baniſhed, he was Troubled. When *Cræſus* was Priſoner, he ſhed Tears: And *Alexander* being ſtopt in his Wars, Complains. But the Pleaſures of *Diogenes* were free from Complaints, Cries, Tears and Diſpleaſure. You may call Labours and troubleſom Actions, thoſe ſort of Pleaſures, if you ſhould put your ſelf in *Diogenes*'s Place: But this is not fair; for if you ſhould do what he did, you might be Grieved with what *Diogenes* made his Pleaſure. And yet I dare affirm, That never any Man had a more earneſt deſire for Pleaſure than *Diogenes* had. He had no Houſe; the care of a Family is Troubleſom: He was never concerned in the Government; it is an Employment full of Sorrows: He ſhun'd Matrimony, for he had hear'd the Fame of *Xantippe*: He never brought up Children; He underſtood well the Difficulties. But having baniſh'd from himſelf all Sorrow, being altogether Free, void of Care, Fear, or Grief; He alone among Men, enjoyed all the Earth as a ſingle and common Houſe, fully poſſeſſing the Pleaſures which are not to be circumſcribed, and which are free and open to all the World, and which are to be found plentifully in every Place. *Verum depulſa omni moleſtia, plenus libertate, expers ſolicitudinis, abſque metu,*

metu, citra dolorem habebat unus hominum univerſam rerum quaſi unam domum, voluptatibus paſſim fruens incuſtoditis, patentibus, copioſis.

The third Obſervation is, That notwithſtanding ſome do ſo much talk and glory of acting by Principles out of love to Vertue, yet upon a ſtrict Enquiry, we we ſhall find, that Pleaſure is their chief Motive; for they that expoſe themſelves to Hazards and Dangers for the ſake of a Friend, or for the deliverance of their Country, and that defy even Death it ſelf, which they know to be unavoidable, do all this in Expectation of ſome Pleaſure or Satisfaction, which they ſhall enjoy after Death: But ſtill it is preſent Pleaſure which excites and animates them, when they think that the Actions which they are going about, ſhall procure Liberty to their Relations, Friends, or Countrymen, or perpetuate their Memory, and make their Generations Famous in after Ages: It is, I ſay, the thoughts of being rendered Famous to Poſterity, that thus Animates and Tranſports them.

This is to be underſtood of him who goes to a certain Death; for when there remains any hopes of Eſcaping, we need but ſee what *Torquatus* relates of one of his Predeceſſors. *It is true*, ſaith he, *that he wreſted the Lance out of his Enemies hands, but he endeavour'd as much as was able, to ſecure himſelf from being Kill'd. He run a great hazard, but it was in the view of the whole Army. What Advantage did he receive? The Praiſes and Love of all the World, which are very ſtrong Supports to us to bear our Dangers without fear.* See likewiſe what *Seneca* ſaith, *Upon the performance of any great and glorious Action, there immediately ariſes an extraordinary Joy and Delight; and tho' we reap no Advantage after Death, yet the very thoughts of the Action that we are about to commit, pleaſe us; for when a generous*

nerous Man repreſents to himſelf the reward of his Death, namely, the Liberty of his Country, the deliverance of thoſe for whom he ſacrifices his Life, he receives from thence a great deal of Pleaſure, and enjoys the recompence of the Hazard: And he who feels that Joy, which happens at the laſt moment of the Action, runs on to Death without any Demur, content and ſatisfied in the Goodneſs, Piety and Holineſs of the Action.

The ſame may be ſaid of thoſe ſevere Fathers, who have puniſhed with Death their own Children, tho' they ſeem to deprive themſelves of great Pleaſures. 'Tis what *Cicero* continues to object to the ſame *Torquatus*, who by giving a blow with his Ax to his Son, prefer'd the Right of the Empire, to that of Nature and Fatherly Affection; for thoſe who proceed to that Extremity, underſtand the temper of their Children to be ſuch, that it is better for themſelves and for their Children, rather to Die than Live, becauſe they are likely to receive nothing from them, but continual Sorrows, and that their perpetual Shame would retort upon them. Therefore when they conſider that it is more grateful and deſirable to them to prevent their future diſſatisfaction and infamy, by a preſent Grief, and to expiate (if I may ſo ſay) that Diſgrace that hath been committed, by ſome Noble and illuſtrious Action, rather than to ſink themſelves by a mean Baſeneſs, and a deceitful Weakneſs, into an Abyſs of Calamity. This is the Pleaſure which ſuch reliſh, who deſire to free themſelves from this Abyſs. Take notice alſo what the ſame *Torquatus* Anſwers; *He condemned his Son to Death; but if it be without Cauſe, I would not deſire to be the Son of ſuch an unnatural Father. If he did it to ſecure and eſtabliſh the Military Diſcipline, to keep the Army within the bounds of their Duty, by the fear*

fear of puniſhment, during a moſt dangerous War, had an eye to the Preſervation of his Country-men, in whoſe Safety his own was included and comprehended.

Of Self-Love.

But that which is generally ſpoken of Vertue may be alſo ſaid of Piety towards God, ſeeing that it is not likely, that there can be any ſincere Piety if God be not purely and intirely lov'd for himſelf, or becauſe he is infinitely Good, or becauſe he is infinitely Excellent. So that he who loves and honours God, hath no reſpect to himſelf, neither doth he conſider his own Profit or Pleaſure. For my part, God forbid, that I ſhould undervalue the Piety of any Perſon. As there are ſome who don't only perſuade that we ought to love God in this manner, and conſequently don't only ſuppoſe, that this is poſſible, but to give Authority to this Doctrin, and prevent the Objection, boaſt and believe they perform all this: Truly I don't envy, nor ſhall I contradict them; but far from that, I approve and applaud their Happineſs, and that ſpecial favour of Heaven, granted to them; for we muſt believe, that it is a Gift of God and Supernatural, that any Man can prevail upon himſelf to love and honour God in ſuch a manner. But we are treating here of Piety, and generally of Vertue, which is ſutable to Nature, according to which, Man performs all that he doth with ſome reſpect to himſelf. May not we therefore ſay, that God hath in ſuch a manner complied with the infirmity of our Nature; That as there is ſcarce any Paſſage in Holy Writ that allows or expreſſeth their Doctrin, there are a great many that approve of loving God greatly, becauſe he hath pardoned them their many Sins; or becauſe

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he hath granted them many Favours; or of loving him for the hopes of the promiſes of Heaven; and who perform divers offices of Charity, ſuffer Perſecution, keep the Faith, *&c.* becauſe of that Kingdom prepared for them from the beginning of the World, becauſe of the extraordinary Rewards that wait for them in Heaven, becauſe of the Crown of Righteouſneſs, which God hath promiſed to them that love him? May we not, I ſay, be of this Opinion, and conclude from theſe Paſſages, That there is nothing to hinder us from having in view thoſe everlaſting Delights which ſuch are to enjoy who have loved and honoured God? I will not appeal to the Conſciences of any Perſon, nor do I ask what they would do, if after God had been Honoured and Loved, if he took no care of thoſe who had loved and honoured him; and if in ſuch a caſe, he neither granted them any Advantage, nor gave them hopes of any to be expected to all Eternity: I do not ask them, I ſay, What they would do? Whether they would Love or Honour him leſs? I only deſire them to take in good part this Queſtion, Whether they don't Love and Honour him, becauſe it is very pleaſant to Love and ſerve him in this manner? And whether they believe it not conſequently very Pleaſant and very Grateful to be thus diſpoſed towards God, purely and abſolutely for his ſake, and without any regard to our ſelves? Seeing he tells us, That his *Yoak is eaſie*, whereby to encline us to love him with all our Heart, with all our Soul, with all our Underſtanding, and all our Strength; certainly he excludes not this Sweetneſs and Pleaſure. But let this be hinted by the by, the better to ſtrengthen and confirm the Reaſon by which we prove, according to the Judgment of *Epicurus*, That *Pleaſure is the chief Good*, or the *laſt End*, being deſired in ſuch a manner for it ſelf; that

that all other things are desirable for its sake. Let us now say something of that other Reason, which is deriv'd from a Comparison between Pleasure and Pain, which is its contrary. *Let us suppose*, saith Torquatus, *a Man enjoying many great and continued Pleasures both of Body and Mind, without any interruption or disturbance by any Grief, either present or to come, What State, in short, can we say is better and more desirable than that? Is it not certain, that a Man in that condition, is in an unshaken Tranquility of Mind; That he will not foolishly and childishly fret at the sight of Death, but will consider, that it is unavoidable? On the contrary, Suppose another Man tormented with the most exquisite Tortures both of Body and of Mind, that a Human Nature is capable of, without any hopes of Relief, or ease, or of any Pleasure either present or to come, How can we represent any more Unhappy than such a one? Now, if a Life full of Pain, is chiefly to be avoided, and consequently to live in Pain, is without any question, the chief of Evils, it follows by the Rule of Contraries, That to live in Pleasure, is the chief* Good; *for there is nothing beyond it, where our Mind stops and rests satisfied, as there is nothing beyond the pain either of the Body, or of the Mind, which can shake our Nature, or undermine her Settlement. I dare not declare*, saith Cicero, *whom I should prefer to your pretended Happy Man; Vertue shall decide the Controversy, and will, no doubt, prefer* Marcus Regulus *before him, who of his own accord, without any Constraint, and contrary to the Faith that he had given to the Enemy, returned back to his own Country to* Carthage. *Vertue, I say, shall prefer this famous Man; and when he shall be tired and tormented with Watchings and Hunger, it will declare, that he is happier than* Thorius, *who was drinking deliciously, and stretching himself upon a Bed of Roses. Regulus had wag'd great War; he had been twice*

Conſul, and carried in Triumph. Yet he looked not upon all this ſo Great and Glorious, As this laſt Enterpriſe, to which his Faith and Conſtancy oblig'd him. This condition when we hear it deſcrib'd, ſeems to be Miſerable to us, but to him it was a State of Pleaſure and Happineſs; for it is not always Pleaſure, Delight, Laughter and Sports that cauſe Happineſs, but oft times Reſolution and Conſtancy, render thoſe Perſons Happy who are in the midſt of Sufferings and Sorrow.

Of the deceitful Vertue and deceitful Happineſs of Regulus.

But to ſpeak a word of the Examples inſtanc'd by way of Compariſon, before we yield to the Eloquence of *Cicero*. Tho we ought not in all reſpects to approve of *Thorius*, and of his too delicious manner of Living, which *Epicurus* himſelf would never have allowed; Nevertheleſs, it is not eaſy to conceive, how *Regulus* was really happier than *Thorius*. In truth, I perceive a ſpecious Shew and a fine ſound of Words, by which it is uſual to extol this ſo famous Vertue of *Regulus*; yet, if we will ſeriouſly examin his Story, and weigh ſincerely the ſeveral Circumſtances, we ſhall not find it ſo Plauſible. *Polybius* informs us, That *Regulus* having fortunately Commanded in the War againſt the *Carthaginians*, and fearing leſt another Conſul being ſent from *Rome* in his ſtead, ſhould bear away the honour of his brave Exploits, he adviſed the *Carthaginians* to a Peace. But the Conditions that he propoſed to their Deputies, were ſo hard, that they reſolved rather to hazard all. They therefore chuſing for their General *Xantippus* the *Lacedemonian*, Encounter'd with *Regulus* in a Battel, got the Victory,

ctory, and took him Priſoner with Five Hundred more, with whom he was Flying. *An undoubted Sign*, ſaith the ſame *Polybius*, *of Fortune's Inconſtancy, and of the little truſt we are to put in her flattering Smiles, ſeeing that he, who but a little before, could not be moved to Pity, and had no Compaſſion of the Afflicted, was ſoon after oblig'd to caſt himſelf at their Feet, and to beg his Life.* *Polyænus* adds further; That *Regulus* Swore to the *Carthaginians*, That if they would ſuffer him to depart, he would perſuade the *Romans* to make Peace with them, and if he could not, he would return back to *Carthage*. But that he advis'd the Senate to the Contrary, diſcovering the Weakneſs of the Enemy, the Means whereby they might Deſtroy them; and that the Priſoners of the *Carthaginians*, were Young, and ſtout Captains, whereas, he was Decrepid and Old. *This he Whiſper'd*, ſaith *Appian*, *to the Chief of the* Romans. *His Opinion*, ſaith *Cicero*, *ſo much prevailed, that they kept back the Priſoners; there was no Peace made, and he returned to* Carthage. 'Tis true, that his Departure was attended with Mournful Circumſtances; for *Horace* tells us; That at his Return, he fix'd his Eyes upon the Ground, like a Criminal, with a dejected Countenance, rudely putting aſide his Wife and Children, as they were approaching to embrace him with Tears.

His Wife's chaſt Kiſs, his prattling Boys,
The former Partners of his Joys:
Now grown a Slave, thrown down by Fate,
And leſſen'd from his former State;
He ſhunn'd with manly Modeſty,
And on the Earth he caſt his ſtubborn Eye:
Whilſt thus by ſtrange Advice, he ſought
And fix'd the wavering Senate's Vote.

Then through his Weeping Friends he ran
In haſte, a glorious Baniſh'd Man.
What Cords and Wheels, what Racks and Chains,
What lingring Tortures for his Pains,
The barbarous Hang-men made, he knew,
And hightning Fame told more than true.
Yet he his Wife and Boys remov'd,
His hindring Friends, and all he Lov'd,
And through the Crowd he made his way,
That wept and begg'd a longer ſtay,
As free as if when Term was done
And Suit's at end, he left the Town;
And did from Buſineſs and Cares retreat,
To the cool Pleaſures of a Country Seat.

Nevertheleſs, we muſt obſerve what *Tuditanus* Relates, That when he adviſ'd 'em to make no Exchange of the Priſoners, he inform'd 'em, That the *Carthaginians* had given him ſuch a ſlow Poiſon, that he could only live until the Exchange was made, afterwards he was to pine away and Die.

We may alſo take notice of that which is to be found among the Fragments of *Diodorus Siculus*. *Now, Who will not diſapprove the Pride and Vain-glory of* Attilius Regulus, *who not being able to ſupport himſelf under ſo great Proſperity, which ſeem'd to him as an heavy Burthen, deprived himſelf of the advantage of a general Applauſe, and brought his own Country into eminent Danger? For, when he might have concluded an Honourable and Advantageous Peace to the People of* Rome, *and obtain'd the Glory of a remarkable Clemency and Renown, he proudly inſulted over the Afflicted, and required ſuch harſh and unreaſonable Terms of Peace, that he not only drew upon himſelf God's Diſpleaſure, but mov'd the Conquered to ſuch an implacable Hatred, whereby to renew their Courage, and venture to fight afreſh. By his fault, the Affairs were chang'd*

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in ſuch a manner, that he and his whole Army were Routed; Thirty Thouſand of 'em being ſlain in the Field, and Fifteen Thouſand taken Priſoners with him, &c.

From whence we may ſurmiſe, That when *Regulus* conſidered, he could never make ſufficient amends for the Fault he had committed, and that he would be always look'd upon in *Rome* as a Raſh and Proud Man, he choſe rather to return to *Carthage*, and prefer'd an apparent Danger (tho' he thought it not to be ſo great, becauſe of the *Carthaginian* Priſoners in the hands of the *Romans*) to an undoubted Infamy, and to a Life which he ſaw was Languiſhing and very ſhort, becauſe of the Poiſon which the *Carthaginians* had given him.

However, when *Regulus* had done nothing at *Rome*, but having return'd back to *Carthage*, that he kept his Word, doubtleſs he cannot be too much eſteem'd and applauded. But when he diſſuaded the Senate from what he had promiſed to perſuade them to, How can that be judg'd as a commendable thing, ſeeing it was a manifeſt Perjury? If he had contented himſelf with the plain delivery of his Meſſage, without perſuading or diſſuading any thing, his proceeding might then admit of ſome colourable Excuſe: But thus openly to violate the Sacred Laws of Oaths, how can this be Palliated? *And when he did it in Secret, for fear* ſaith *Appian, leſt the Ambaſſadors that came along with him, might come to underſtand it, that alſo increaſeth the Suſpicion, and aggravates the Crime. Pretend not the Welfare and Glory of his Country to excuſe him. Truly, our Country is to be ſecured by good Advice, by Strength and Courage, but not by wicked Artifices, and by perfidious Dealing: And we ought not to approve our ſelves Citizens, whereby to become good Men.*

You may perhaps alledge what we find in *Euripides*, That he ſwore with the Tongue, but not with the Heart. *Illum juraſſe Lingua, Mentem geſſiſſe injuratam.* But this is only to ſeek a Cloak for Perjury; for as *Cicero* ſaith, *'Tis not Perjury to Swear falſly, but not to perform what the Oath ſignifies, according to the common intention of the Words.*

Truly, if it were lawful without wounding the Conſcience, to mean one thing and ſpeak another, it were to permit Lying in reality, and to deceive him who hears us ſpeak, and with whom we converſe. This would cauſe the Faith of every one to be ſuſpected, and conſequently would introduce a great Confuſion in the Tranſactions and Affairs of Mankind. You may alſo ſay, that this was lawful, becauſe the *Carthaginians* themſelves had broke the Faith they had given him. But if you be a Wicked Perſon, I ought not therefore to be leſs Honeſt; otherwiſe, What difference would there be between you and me? We ought to deal with perfidious Perſons, either with a great deal of Precaution or with open Force; but it is not lawful upon any account whatever, to violate our Faith. It is an old Maxim, *That either we ought not to Promiſe at all, or elſe to keep it.* But it ſeems, the *Carthaginians* put him to grievous Tortures, for no other end, but becauſe contrary to the Faith he had given them, he had diſſuaded the *Romans* from concluding a Peace, and the Exchange of the Priſoners. It is true, as *Tubero* ſaith, That *the Nobleſt Priſoners were delivered into the hands of* Regulus's *Children, who put 'em to Death with the ſame Torments that* Regulus *ſuffered.* But pray conſider, whether *Regulus* had any reaſon to prefer the Deſtruction of thoſe Priſoners, to the Lives of five Hundred *Roman* Soldiers, who had been taken with him, and who for

for the ſake of his Vertue, cruelly periſhed in the ſame manner with him at *Carthage*.

But to return to our preſent purpoſe in relation to Happineſs; I would fain be reſolved, how the Happineſs of *Regulus* was greater than that of *Thorius*, when he was Tortured in the manner that the forementioned *Tubero* relates? *They kept him a long time*, ſays he, *in diſmal dark Dungeons; then they cut off his Eyelids, and when the Sun ſhone brighteſt, they brought him forth and expoſed him to the Sun-beams, forcing him to hold his Eyes that way, knowing it was not poſſible for him to ſhut them.* *Cicero* informs us, that he was bound in an Engin, and that after they had cut off his Eyelids, they deſtroyed him by Watching. *Seneca* terms this Engin a Tub ſtuck through with Nails, in which he was Incloſed. *Sylvius* preſents us with this Deſcription.

With deſp'rate Rows they arm'd the ſloping Wood,
And tor'ring Nails at equal diſtance ſtood:
Thus robb'd of Sleep, by never ſleeping pain,
He grows his own Tormentor, and in vain
Attempts his Limbs, by turning to relieve,
While only varied Wounds the varied Poſtures give.

But poſſibly you'll ſay, That *Thorius* embrac'd Pleaſure in an Effminate manner, whereas, *Regulus*, for the good of his Country, prefer'd theſe Tortures, and ſuffer'd them Courageouſly. Firſt, *Thorius* was not ſo ſoft and Effeminate, but that when the Well-fare of his Country required, he did not decline the Wars, but at laſt died fighting in defence of it, as *Cicero* himſelf teſtifies.

And tho' it be a great ſupport in the midſt of our Sufferings, to preſerve our Conſcience Pure and Unſtained, conſidering that we ſuffer in an honeſt Cauſe, and for the Well-fare of many, yet it don't

thereby appear, that we are therefore more Happy, than we ſhould be by living Vertuouſly, Wronging no body, but endeavouring to do all the good we can, and every way diſcharging the Duty of a good Man, and an honeſt Subject, ſpending our lives in this manner in a great deal of Pleaſure, and little Pain.

In ſhort, ſuppoſe a Man of the greateſt Reſolution and Courage, who would not upon a good account, be daunted at the greateſt Difficulties or Dangers; I ſay, if it were offered to ſuch a one, without any prejudice either to his Duty or Reputation, to take his choice of the two kinds of Life mentioned by *Torquatus*, Where is the Man, I beſeech you, among all thoſe, that thus exclaim againſt Pleaſure, and extol Vertue and Sufferings, that would give the preference to the latter, and willingly embrace it?

But to confirm what hath been ſaid before, That *Pain is the greateſt Evil*; for that hath been as the Antecedent, from whence we may conclude, by the Rule of Contraries, That *Pleaſure is the chief Good.* By the ſame Reaſon by which we have proved, That Pleaſure is the ſovereign Good, which Naturally we ſeek, *Primum familiare ſeu accommodatum.* And conſequently the chief Good; By the ſame Reaſon, it hath been proved, That Pain is the chief Evil, which Naturally we avoid. *Primum alienum ſe incommodans*, And conſequently the chief Evil. For Nature hath not only given to all Creatures a natural love for Pleaſure, but hath alſo fix'd in 'em a natural hatred of Pain. Let us now take notice of two or three Particulars. Firſt, By the word Pain, we are not to underſtand only thoſe that we call the Pains of the Body, but alſo thoſe which we term the Pains or Inquietudes of the Mind, and which are far more anxious and inſupportable, than

than thoſe of the Body, as we have already ſaid. Secondly, That as we have before obſerv'd, Vertue and Goodneſs have ſomething within them which naturally afford Pleaſure and Delight; ſo likewiſe we may now affirm, that Vice, or that which is Infamous and Diſhoneſt, hath that in it which cauſes great Pain and Uneaſineſs. From whence it is, that as Vertue and Goodneſs is attended by many and great Advantages, ſo Vice or Wickedneſs, is ſucceeded by many and great Evils. So, that in ſhort, among the things which are to be deſired, in order to obtaining our chief Good, Vertue is that which we are chiefly to aim at; and among the things that we are to ſhun, in order the better to avoid the greateſt Evils, Vice and Wickedneſs, is that which we are chiefly to fly from. Laſtly, This Doctrin ſeems to be very conformable to the Sacred Rules of Faith: By which, as we believe that our chief Good or Happineſs, conſiſts in enjoying the everlaſting Delights and Joys in Heaven: So we believe, That our greateſt Unhappineſs or Miſery, conſiſts in being tormented in *Hell*, with uſpeakable Tortures in everlaſting Flames.

CHAP.

CHAP V.

That a Wiſe Man is only capable of enjoying Moral Vertue.

WE have hitherto treated of Pleaſure, as it is generally underſtood: We ſhall now ſpeak of that particular ſpecifick Pleaſure unto which a Wiſe Man confines himſelf, as being in its own Nature not only very eaſie to be obtain'd, but alſo moſt laſting and free from Repentance. In a word, that Pleaſure that we before called the Tranquility of the Mind, and the exemption of the Body from Pain, now we have great Reaſon to call it moſt Natural; for at this ſort of Pleaſure Nature ſeems chiefly to aim, as not having regard to other Pleaſures, which are always ſhifting and in a conſtant Motion, any otherwiſe than to make them uſeful in the obtaining this; as for Inſtance; It hath appointed the Pleaſure of Taſting, to make the action of Eating more grateful, and by that means to oblige us to the Act, whereby to ſatisfie our Hunger, which is that pain we feel, and cauſed by the cravings of an empty Stomach. But in reference to the ſatisfaction and tranquility of Mind which we enjoy when Hunger is appeas'd. This Nature hath reſerv'd as her laſt End, and deſigned it as her chief Good: We have great reaſon to ſay, that it is very eaſie to be obtain'd, becauſe it is in every one's Power to moderate his Deſires, by ſupplying himſelf with things neceſſary for his Body, whereby to free it from Pain, and thereby render his Mind calm and eaſy. I ſay, That it is very laſting, becauſe other Pleaſures paſs away in a Moment, and flee

free from us, whereas this continues the ſame, unleſs it be interrupted and periſh by our own Miſcarriages. Laſtly, I deſcribe it to be very free from Repentance; for all other Pleaſures may be attended by ſome Evil, whereas, this is altogether innocent, and draws upon us no ſuch Miſchief.

I know that *Cicero* at firſt quarrels very much with *Epicurus*, becauſe he gives the Term of Pleaſure, to this Tranquility and freedom from Pain, which he pretends to be proper to nothing but that which conſiſts in Motion, or to thoſe things which pleaſe the Senſes. But methinks *Cicero* ſhould not differ with him about a bare Word; for ſuppoſe according to common Cuſtom, we did not call this Tranquility of Mind and freedom from Bodily Pain, *Pleaſure*, Why ſhould we hinder *Epicurus* the giving it that Name, and eſteeming it ſo great a Pleaſure, that among all others that bear that name, none is to be compared with it? This hath been, and always will be allowed in caſes of Opinion, eſpecially here, where Pleaſure and that which is Good and Deſirable, are the ſame thing. Therefore this State or Condition of Life, which of all other ſeems moſt deſirable, may be very well eſteem'd and called Pleaſure. Beſides, we may not only bring *Ariſtotle* here to controll him in expreſs words, That *there is a greater Pleaſure in Repoſe, than in Action*; but alſo St. *Chryſoſtom*, who thus expreſſeth himſelf, *For what is Pleaſure, but to be free from Inquietude, Trouble, Fear, and Deſpair, and generally to be exempt from ſuch kind of Paſſions*? Pray, which of theſe two may be ſaid truly to enjoy Pleaſure, He who is furiouſly diſtracted by Paſſions, and ſo continually overcome with vicious Luſts, that he hath no command of himſelf; or He who is free from all theſe Diſturbances, and reſts in Philoſophy as a quiet Haven? I may truly call that Pleaſure, when the Soul

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is in such a State, that it is in no wise disquieted nor disturbed by any bodily Passion. That which *Cicero* objects concerning Children and Brutes, which are as the Looking-glasses of uncorrupted Nature, and yet desire not that Pleasure which is in Rest, of which we have been speaking, but only that which is in Motion, seems to make most against us. But let his Judgment of the Brutes, and the Nature of Animals, be what it will, tho' they came into the World uncorrupted, and are well instructed for the obtaining their End, after they have satisfied their Pain, which is caused by some Want, naturally they tend to Rest; contrary to several Men, who being corrupted in their Imagination, constantly cut out and make to themselves Work, by provoking the Appetite; and never stop at any thing. Whatever be the case of the Beasts, we shall speak only of Men, of whom it is certain, whatever is Objected, is easily Answer'd, by what we have already mentioned. For in the first Place, Nature hath appointed a fix'd Pleasure for the chief End. And tho' Action be design'd as a necessary Means to obtain it, it makes use of the Pleasure which is in Motion, that the Action might pass with more Delight and Satisfaction. From whence it happens, That tho' Man, or any other Creature, seems to be more apparently and expressly stir'd up and inclin'd to active Pleasure, nevertheless, this hinders not, but at the same time he really and secretly tends to that which is stable, and that by the Instinct or Bent of Nature, who looks upon it as her chief Aim and principal End. Besides, because Man's Understanding in process of time is corrupted, vitiated, apt to make divers gross Mistakes, and as we commonly say, τὸ παρεργον ἔργον, to make that Principal, which is but Accessory, he sets up a fleeting moving Pleasure for his

principal

principal Mark, and by abuſing this Pleaſure by his Intemperance, he draws upon himſelf a Miſchief, when he loſeth that Pleaſure which is more fix'd and ſolid, and which Nature hath made the Firſt and Principal; and this is ſucceeded by Sorrow and Repentance. For this cauſe it is, that *Epicurus* adviſeth, That *Wiſdom ſhould interpoſe, which teacheth Man to govern his Pleaſure*; that is to ſay, to conſider and look upon the Aſſiſtant as Aſſiſtant, and the Principal, as Principal.

In the mean while, we need not concern our ſelves much about what the *Cyrenaicks* Object in *Cicero*; That *this Pleaſure of* Epicurus, *is like the condition of a ſleeping Perſon*: For he hath declared, That his Tranquility and freedom from Pain, is not to be Stupified, but to be in ſuch a State, that all the actions of our Life might be done calmly and ſedately, as we have already ſaid. As he allows not that the Life of a Wiſe Man ſhould be as a Torrent, ſo he don't approve that it ſhould be like a ſtill and ſtinking Pool, but rather like the Water of a River, that glides along quietly and without Noiſe. This is one of his Maxims; That *when Pain is removed, Pleaſure is not increas'd, but only diverſified and altered.* As if he would have ſaid, That when we have attain'd to this quiet State, free from Pain, there is truly nothing to be deſired greater, or to be compared to it; but in the mean while, there remain ſeveral pure and innocent Pleaſures, wherewith this State, if not abuſed, is Embelliſhed in the manner of a Field, which becoming Fruitful, affords divers Fruits; or in the manner of a Meadow, which we ſee covered over with an admirable diverſity of Flowers, when the Earth is brought to be in a good Temper: For this State is like a Spring, out of which all the Pleaſures that are Pure and Sincere, are drawn. For this cauſe therefore,

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it ought to be eſteem'd as the chief Pleaſure, in regard it is an univerſal Reliſh, by which all the Actions of our Life are ſeaſoned, and by which conſequently all our Pleaſures are ſweetned, and become grateful. And to ſpeak all in a Word, Without which, no Pleaſure can be Pleaſure.

In reality, What Satisfaction can there be, if the Mind be troubled or the Body tormented with Pain? It is a Proverb, That *if the Veſſel be not clean, it Sowers whatever is put into it.*

Sincerum eſt niſi vas, quodcumq; infundis aceſcit.

Whoever therefore is deſirous of pure ſincere Pleaſures, he muſt prepare himſelf to receive them without any Mixture or Alloy; that is, By attaining as much as is poſſible to this State of Reſt and Tranquility that we have deſcribed. I add the words as much as is poſſible; for, As we have obſerved already, The frailty of our human Nature, wont ſuffer us to be abſolutely and perfectly Happy; for ſo compleat a Felicity, altogether free from Trouble and Pain, and crowned with all manner of Delights, belongs to God alone, and to them whom he calls to a better Life. So that in this preſent World, ſome have a greater, ſome a leſs ſhare of Afflictions and Pains. He that will deal wiſely, ought to endeavour as much as the weakneſs of his Nature will permit, to ſettle himſelf in that condition in which he may be as little ſenſible of Grief and Pain as is poſſible; for by this means he will obtain theſe two Advantages, which chiefly contribute to his preſent Happineſs, and which Wiſe Men have acknowledged, to be almoſt the only ſolid and deſirable Advantages of Life, The Health of the Body and of the Mind.

Sunt Sanitas & Mens gemina vitæ bona.
Optandum eſt ut ſit Mens ſana in Corpore ſano.

And that *Epicurus* never deſigned that his Pleaſure ſhould extend to a Sottiſhneſs, or a privation of Senſe and Action, may be proved by what he was pleaſed with in his Retirements, either in Meditating, or in Teaching, or in taking care of his Friends. But let it ſuffice us here to ſay, That from that ſtate and condition of Life, did ariſe certain Thoughts, which of all things in the World, were the moſt pleaſing and delightful: Namely, when any ſhall call to mind the Storms that he hath couragiouſly weather'd, in which ſome are yet toſſed up and down; he fancies himſelf as it were in a ſafe Haven, poſſeſſing a calm and a ſerene Tranquility; which *Lucretius* in his Second Book pleaſantly ſets forth.

'Tis pleaſant when the Seas are rough, to ſtand
And view another's Danger ſafe at Land;
Not 'cauſe he's Troubled, but 'tis ſweet to ſee
Thoſe Cares and Fears, from which our ſelves are free.

He tells us alſo, That it is very pleaſant to look from a high Tower upon two great Armies drawn up in Battel, without being concerned in the Danger.

'Tis alſo Pleaſant to behold from far
How Troops Engage, ſecure our ſelves from War.

But there is nothing ſo pleaſant, as to ſee our ſelves by the help of Learning and Knowledge, advanc'd to the Top of Wiſdom's Temple, from whence, as from an high Station, ſerene and quiet,

we

we may ſee Men involved in a thouſand Miſeries, without being concern'd.

But above all, 'Tis pleaſanteſt to get
The top of high Philoſophy, and ſit
On the calm peaceful flouriſhing Head of it:
Whence we may view, deep, wond'rous deep below,
How poor forſaken Mortals Wandring go,
Seeking the path to Happineſs; ſome aim
At Learning, Wit, Nobility, or Fame.
Others with Cares and Dangers vex each Hour,
To reach the Top of Wealth and Sovereign Power;
Whilſt frugal Nature ſeeks for only Eaſe,
A Body free from Pains, free from Diſeaſe,
A Mind from Cares and Jealouſies at Peace.

Of the Tranquility of the Mind in particular.

BUt to ſay ſomething more particularly of the Tranquility of the Mind; let us again repeat, That by this Expreſſion, we don't underſtand a ſlow and lazy Temper, nor a ſluggiſh and languiſhing Idleneſs. But as *Cicero* Explains it out of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*; *Placida quietaq; conſtantia in animi parte rationis principe*: A ſweet and peaceable Conſtacy of Mind. Or as *Democritus* ſays; *An excellent equal and ſweet Conſtitution and Temper of Mind*; which makes the Man ſettl'd and unſhaken in ſuch a manner, and to ſuch a degree, that whether he be Employed or at Leiſure; whether Proſperity favour him, or Adverſity frowns upon him, he continues always Equal, always like Himſelf, and will not ſuffer himſelf to be Tranſported by an exceſs of Joy, nor dejected by Grief and Sorrow. In a Word, he is at no time diſturbed by ſuch-like Paſſions: Therefore this Tranquility of Mind was called,

called ἀπαθεία, which ſignifies freedom from Trouble and Diſquietneſs, for in the ſame manner as a Ship is ſaid to be in quiet not only when it is becalm'd in the middle of the Sea, but likewiſe chiefly when it is driven by a favourable Gale, which indeed cauſeth it to ſail ſwift, but nevertheleſs quietly and ſteddily: Thus the Mind is ſaid to be in Tranquility, not only when it is at reſt, but more eſpecially when it undertakes great and excellent Things without being diſturb'd inwardly, and without loſing any part of its Steddineſs. On the contrary, as a Ship is ſaid to be diſturb'd not only when it is carried away with the contrary Winds, but when it is beaten by thoſe that riſe out of the very Waters; thus the Mind is ſaid to be diſquieted, not only when in its proceedings it is carried away with divers Paſſions, but likewiſe when in the midſt of Reſt, Care Grief and Fear are continually gnawing and fretting it, and rendring it uneaſy. Theſe therefore, and ſuch like, are the Paſſions which by diſturbing our Tranquility, interrupt the Happineſs of our Lives. *Cicero* Speaks of them in this manner, *The turbulent Motions and the Diſquietneſs of the Mind, which proceed from an unconſiderate raſhneſs, and oppoſe all Reaſon, leave no room for an happy Life; For how can it poſſibly be but that he who always ſtands in fear of Death or Pain, the one being often at Hand, the other always threatned, muſt needs be miſerable? Thus in the ſame manner, if he dreads Poverty, Shame or Infamy, if he apprehends Infirmity or Blindneſs; in a Word, if he fears that which may happen, not only to every Perſon in particular, but alſo to the moſt powerful People, I mean Slavery, Can ſuch a one be happy who is continually fearing ſuch Things? Can he enjoy the leaſt ſhadow of Happineſs? In what unhappy condition is that Mind, that not only dreads Calamities, Baniſhment, the loſs of Goods, the Death of Children, but foreſeing and apprehending them*

as already preſent, Dies overwhelmed with Grief and Sorrow? Can we ſuppoſe that he who ſuffers himſelf to be born down by ſo many tragical Thoughts and Apprehenſions, can be any otherwiſe than unſpeakably Miſerable? Again, when you ſee a Man furiouſly tranſported with a violent Paſſion, coveting every thing with a greedy and immoderate Deſire, and ſtill as he arrives to a higher and fuller degree of enjoyment of Pleaſure, the more eagerly he hunts after and purſues 'em: Have you not great Reaſon to judg this Man very Miſerable? What think ye likewiſe of another, who is always fluctuating, and ſuffers himſelf to be tranſported by a fooliſh and immoderate Joy? Dont ſuch a one appear to you the more Miſerable the more he thinks himſelf Happy? As ſuch therefore are Miſerable, theſe are on the contrary Happy, who are not frighted with Fears, who ſuffer not themſelves to be overcome with Sadneſs, who are not inflamed with Luſts, nor moved by immoderate Joys; and on whom the powerful Charms and Allurements of theſe ſoft and effeminate Pleaſures have no powerful Influences. Hearken to *Torquatus: Epicurus*, whom you ſay, was too much addicted to his Pleaſures, declares, *That it is impoſſible to live Pleaſantly, if we live not Wiſely, Honeſtly and Juſtly; and that we cannot live Wiſely, Honeſtly and Juſtly, but we muſt of neceſſity live with Delight: For as the Inhabitants of a City cannot be eaſy during a Storm, nor a Family when the Maſters are at odds, much leſs can a Soul be happy when it agrees not with it ſelf, or is hurried about by divers contrary Paſſions. It is not capable of any pure and free Pleaſure, and ſees nothing but in a hurry and in a confuſion. If the Diſtempers of the Body interrupt the felicity of Life, how much more do the Diſeaſes of the Mind? Now the Diſeaſes of the Mind are the vain and immoderate Deſires of Riches, Glory, Dominion, and of mean and ſordid Pleaſures. You may add to theſe, Diſcontent, Fretfulneſs and Frowardneſs, which gall and fret the Minds*

of

of Men, who will not conſider that we ſhould not afflict our ſelves for that which cauſeth no preſent Pain to the Body, nor it may be never will. You may add Death, which threatens us continually, and hangs always over our Heads, as the Rock did over that of Tantalus: *You may add Superſtition, which never ſuffers the Perſon to be at quiet who is infected with it. Such never think upon the good Things paſt, they enjoy not the preſent, and when they conſider that what they are in expectation of, is uncertain, Grief and Deſpair afflict them: But they are exceedingly tormented when they think that they have begun too late to ſeek after great Offices, Riches and Glory; finding themſelves deprived of thoſe Pleaſures which they had hopes of enjoying, and for which they have undergone ſo much Pain and Trouble. Others have mean and low Spirits, always in deſpair of every thing; others Dream of nothing, but how to do Miſchief, are Envious, Fretful, Penſive, Slanderers and Angry; others are unconſtant and changeable in their Love; others are Haſty, Cowards, Impudent, Intemperate, Wavering, never continuing in the ſame Mind. This is the Cauſe, that during their Lives, their Paſſions are in a continual Warfare without Ceſſation.*

And therefore we cannot but mention the ſincere Pleaſure and Delight which he muſt needs enjoy, who being freed from theſe Paſſions that tormented him, underſtands his own happy State, and finds himſelf, as we have ſaid before, in Reſt in a ſafe Haven, after he has been toſt and beaten with the Winds and Waves of the Sea. But we ſhall have another occaſion to ſpeak of this particular Pleaſure, when we ſhall treat of the Vertues that are fit to calm the Paſſions, and by that means to cauſe a ſedate and peceable Temper of Mind: Beſides, that Sweetneſs and Pleaſure may eaſily be underſtood by that eſteem which ſuch a one hath, who longs for it when he finds himſelf in Trouble or in actual

Diſturbance. Like as that Perſon who is in the midſt of a Tempeſt at Sea, longs for a Calm, and a favourable Gale; or as he that is ſeized with a violent Diſtemper, wiſhes earneſtly for Health; for none knows ſo well how to value theſe things, as he who looks upon them in a contrary State, and hath the Impreſſions ſtill remaining: Therefore I ſhall the rather ſpeak a Word of that which I have already mentioned, That we may the better preſerve this Tranquility of Mind, and by that means live Happily, not only when at reſt and out of the incumbrance of Buſineſs, but alſo in the midſt of the greateſt and moſt important Employments.

Of Life, and of Active Felicity.

AS this ſuppoſes that there are two kinds of Life, and likewiſe two kinds of Felicities, the one in Contemplation, the other in Action, wiſe Men have ſtill preferred a contemplative before an active Life: However, this does not hinder thoſe whom either their Birth, Genius or neceſſity of Affairs have ingaged in Buſineſs, from being altogether incapable of enjoying a Tranquility of Mind; for whoſoever undertakes this, goes not Blindfold to Work, but after he hath for ſome time ſeriouſly conſider'd, and taken a due proſpect of the ſtate of human Affairs, not as from the midſt of the Crowd, but as from a higher Station; and underſtands, that in the active courſe of Life there may happen many Accidents, that all the Wiſdom of Man cannot foreſee; provides, if not againſt each particular, yet againſt the general Difficulties that may occur: Such a one is always upon his Guard, ready to take Advice upon all ſuddain Emergencies; he knows that he can command what is in himſelf, but cannot govern what depends not upon his free Will; he acts

acts according to his Power, and does what becomes the Duty of an honeſt Man; and afterwards, whatever happens, he thinks that he ought to be Content and Satisfied; he dont flatter himſelf with the certainty of a happy ſucceſs of all his Undertakings, but thinks that matters may ſometimes happen contrary to his Deſires and Endeavours, and therefore prepares himſelf in ſuch a manner, that tho he may experience Adverſity, he may nevertheleſs bear it with Conſtancy and Patience. Such a one, I ſay, thus reſolved and prepared, if he be ingaged in a buſy Life, may govern himſelf, that in the midſt of the hurry and incumbrance of Affairs he may maintain in himſelf an inward repoſe and calmneſs of Mind: 'Tis what *Claudian* ſo truly relates of *Theodoſius* the Great, and which we, without Flattery, may duly apply to our preſent Monarch, the true Model of a wiſe Prince.

——— *Nec Te tot limina rerum,*
Aut tantum turbavit onus, ſed ut altus Olympi
Vertex qui ſpatio Ventos, Hyemeſq;, relinquit
Perpetuum nulla temeratus Nube ſerenum,
Celſior exſurgit pluviis, auditque ruentes
Sub pedibus nimbos, & rauca tonitrua calcat;
Sic patiens Animus per tanta negotia liber
Emergit, ſimiliſque ſui, &c.

Neither the projecting Thoughts of deep Deſigns, nor the heavy Burthen of the Kingdom, which he ſupports, can diſturb the Peace of his Mind; but like the high top of Mount *Olympus*, his Soul is always clear and ſerene, hovering above the miſty Clouds and ſtorms of Thunder, and always free and undiſturb'd like it ſelf.

Servat inoffenſam Divina modeſtia vocem,
Temperiem ſervant oculi, nec lumina fervor
Aſperat, aut rabidas diffundit ſanguine venas.
Quinetiam ſontes expulsa corrigis ira,
Et placidus delicta domas, nec dentibus unquam
Inſtrepis horrendum, fremitu nec verbera poſcis.

A divine Modeſty graces his Voice, no offenſive Words drop from his Lips, his Eyes are never ſeen to ſparkle with Anger, nor his Veins diſtended with boyling Blood; he knows how to Reprove without being Tranſported, and calmly to correct the Failings of others.

Nile ſoftly glides along without vaunting of its Strength or breaking its Bounds, and yet it is one of the moſt uſeful of all the Rivers of the World: The *Danube*, which is yet larger and more rapid, keeps within its Banks, moving without Noiſe: Yea, the *Ganges*, that vaſt River, paſſes along ſilently, rowling its Waves into the Depths of the Ocean.

Lente fluit Nilus, ſed cunctis Amnibus extat
Utilior, nullas confeſſus murmure vires.
Acrior at rapidus tacitas pratermeat ingens
Danubius ripas: Eadem clementia ſævi
Gurgitis immenſum deducit ad oſtia Gangen.

Let the Torrents roar among the Rocks, let them threaten and overturn Bridges, and purſuing their Rage, let them overwhelm or carry before 'em whole Foreſts; 'tis Peace and Tranquility that have a commanding Power and Effect, far greater than Violence and Fury, to force Obedience.

Torrentes immane fremant, lapsiſque minentur
Pontibus, involvant ſpumoſo vortice Sylvas;

Pax

Pax majora decet; peragit tranquilla poteſtas
Quod violenta nequit, mandataque fortius urget
Imperioſa quies——

Beſides, when things are over and accompliſh'd, a wiſe Man doth not Vaunt and Applaud himſelf if they ſucceed well, nor is he diſturb'd or dejected if they happen amiſs: He doth not repent of the Meaſures he hath taken, becauſe every thing being well examined and duly conſidered, it was moſt probable they ſhould ſucceed; and therefore he would take the ſame Courſe if the ſame Circumſtances did again occur. The Anſwer of *Photion* is remarkable, who when he had diſſuaded them from a War, which nevertheleſs afterward proved very ſucceſsful: *Tho' I am very glad*, ſaid he, *that the Event happen'd ſo Proſperous; yet I don't at all repent of the Advice I have given.* It comes very near that of *Cicero*'s. *It becomes a wiſe Man*, ſaith he, *to do nothing againſt his Will, or what may cauſe him to Repent; to do all things ſedately and deliberately, with a grave Steddineſs and conſtancy of Mind, neither ſuppoſing things to happen by an unforeſeen Neceſſity, nor to admire any thing as new and unexpected, but to abide firm and ſtedfaſt in his Judgment.* A wiſe Man ought not to deſpiſe the Advices of other Men, and to truſt too raſhly to his own Opinion; but having well weighed Matters, he ought not, out of too mean Apprehenſions or Diffidence of himſelf, to ſuffer the Opinion of the Vulgar to ſway with him. For this Reaſon, that Roman Temporizer deſerves to be applauded, who preferr'd the Safety of his Country before the Exclamations of the Populace. *Photion* was of the ſame Temper; who becauſe he could not be prevail'd upon to rely on the Strength of his Soldiers and their Courage, and head them on to Battle, they accuſed him of Cowardiſe. But he

made them this prudent Anſwer; *My brave Companions, you cannot make me Courageous, and I will not make you Cowards; it is ſufficient that every one ſhould underſtand his own Buſineſs.*

Whether a Contemplative Happineſs is to be preferr'd before an Active.

But after all that can be ſaid in Commendation of an Active Felicity; *Ariſtotle* had Reaſon to prefer a Speculative: For Contemplation exerts the moſt Excellent and Divine Part of our Selves; and beſides, this ſort of Action is the moſt noble, innocent, and laſting, and the moſt eaſily ſet on Work. We ſhall not here repeat what hath been before ſaid upon the firſt Part of Vertue, to ſhew wherein the Happineſs of a wiſe Man conſiſts, or the Satisfaction he receives in a Contemplative Life; it will be ſufficient to recite what *Cicero* very learnedly obſerves: *What Pleaſures*, ſaith he, *don't a thinking Mind enjoy, who is employ'd Night and Day in Contemplation and Study? What extraordinary Delight is it to obſerve the Motions and Circumference of the World, the infinite number of Stars that ſhine in the Heavens; thoſe ſeven Planets, which being more or leſs diſtant the one from the other, according as they are higher or lower, wandering and uncertain in their Motions, and yet never fail to fulfill their Courſe in their appointed time?* The Sight and Conſideration of ſo many excellent Things, perſuaded the antient Philoſophers to proceed to new Inquiries, to examine into the cauſe and beginning of the World, from whence all things proceed, from whence they are engender'd, what differing Qualities are crept into their Compoſition, from whence Life and Death happen, how the Alterations and Changes of one thing

thing into another came to paſs, by what weight the Earth is ſupported, and how ballanc'd, into what Concavities the Waters are confin'd, and how every thing preſs'd by its own weight, naturally tends to its own Center. Thus by diſcerning and continually meditating on theſe wonderful Things, we at laſt arrive to that Knowledge which God heretofore recommended to *Delphos*, namely, That the pure Soul having ſhaken off all Vice, ſhould know it ſelf, and find it ſelf united to the Divine Underſtanding or Being. This procures it an everlaſting and unſpeakable Delight; for the Contemplations upon the Power and Nature of the Gods, cauſe it to have a ſtrong Inclination for Eternity; and when it once perceives the neceſſary Conſequence of Cauſes guided and govern'd by an eternal Wiſdom, it believes not it ſelf confin'd to the narrow Limits of this Life: Therefore it conſiders human Affairs with a wonderful Tranquility, it inclines to the Practice of Vertue, it inquires wherein conſiſts the chief Good, and the chief Evil, whither all our Actions ought to tend, and what is the Rule of Life we ought to ſteer by.

Moreover, he who ſhall have conſider'd the ſtrong Revolutions of Things ſince the beginning of the World, the Riſe, Progreſs, Conſiſtency, Declenſion and Over-throw of Kingdoms, Commonwealths, Religions, Opinions, Laws, Cuſtoms, Manners, and the preſent Ways and Methods of Living, now in Vogue, which our Fore-fathers would have rejected, ſuch as our Anceſtors ſeriouſly followed, and which we now laugh at, and ſuch poſſibly as will hereafter pleaſe our Poſterity, yet could we but at preſent ſee them, we ſhould laugh at and deride: Theſe Faſhions and Cuſtoms tho' they change in ſome particular things, may in general be ſaid to be the ſame, and are only a Sign of the Frailty,

Frailty, Lightneſs, and Inconſtancy of Mankind. And thus it always happens, that Men by their Lightneſs live continually miſerable, being carried away by Ambition or Covetouſneſs, or ſome other Paſſion: They don't ſee how much it is their Concern to free themſelves from ſuch Cares, to be content with little, to live within themſelves, and to ſpend their Life peaceably, without ſo much noiſe. He, I ſay, who ſhall have employ'd his Mind in ſuch Contemplations, will, doubtleſs, feel extraordinary Delight, and will be very happy in his Thoughts, eſpecially if he conſiders all things as from that high and ſacred Tower, from whence, as we ſaid, Vertue looks down upon the ſeveral Actions and Affairs of Men, their Ambition, their Pride, their Vanity, their ſordid Covetouſneſs, and the reſt before hinted.

Of Freedom from Pain in particular.

NOw to ſpeak ſomething concerning Freedom from Pain: It ſeems not ſo much in our Power to free our ſelves from Pain in our Bodies, as to eaſe our ſelves of Troubles in our Minds; for tho' it is difficult to ſtop the Paſſions in their full Career, and check their exorbitant Motions, yet if we except ſuch as have a Conjunction with Pain, ſuch as are, particularly, Hunger and Thirſt, which create a deſire of Eating and Drinking, it ſeems in reſpect of the others, as they ariſe in us from Opinion; ſo they may, (if we keep our ſelves from the Influence of that Opinion,) be check'd and curb'd. But in relation to the Pains of the Body, tho' we may take care not to draw them upon our ſelves outwardly, nor ſtir them up inwardly; yet it often happens that the Temper which we derive from

from our Mother's Womb is ſuch, that upon that very account we are liable to many Pains during the courſe of our Lives. 'Tis not without Reaſon therefore, that *Eſop* feigned, that when *Prometheus* was to temper the Clay, with which he was to make Man, made uſe of no Water but of Tears; for by that he had a deſign to teach us that the Nature of our Bodies is ſuch, that it is partly ſubject to outward, and partly to inward Miſchiefs; and ſeeing it is impoſſible but ſome will often befal us, of neceſſity we muſt ſuffer ſome Pain. I ſhould be endleſs to enumerate the Particulars of this kind, that may befal us, either from Tyrants, from Fools, from all ſorts of Animals, from Heat, from Cold, from Fevers, Gout, Deſluctions, *&c.* I ſhall only obſerve, that ſuch who have been ſometimes tormented with them, may tell with what earneſtneſs they wiſhed to be freed, and how much they would have given to be delivered. Certainly there is no Perſon that labours under an acute Diſtemper, and is grievouſly tormented with Pain, but when he conſiders ſuch as are in Health, eſteems them very happy, and wonders that they don't acknowledge the greatneſs of the Advantage they enjoy, it being ſo conſiderable, that no worldly Enjoyments can ſtand in competition with, or be accounted a valuable Exchange for Health. Wherefore in all Ages, Men have highly extoll'd it. But as every Book is full of its own Praiſes, I ſhall only take notice what an antient Poet ſaith, *That the greateſt Benefit that can befall frail Man, is to enjoy Health.*

Fragili viro optima res bene valere.

And

And as another ſays, *Nothing can be more advantageous to us, than to be free from Pain and Diſeaſes.*

Si ventri bene eſt, ſi lateri eſt, pedibuſque tuis, nil
Divitiæ poterunt Regales addere majus.

Now what I have here obſerv'd is to prove, that it is not without ground what I have aſſerted, That to be free from Sickneſs or bodily Pain, is part of our Happineſs. Truly, tho' light Pains and ſuch as are of a ſhort continuance may be eaſily ſupported; and tho' we willingly undergo great ones, when they are in order either to avoid greater Evils, or for the obtaining of greater Pleaſures; yet there is no Man ſo fond of Pain for Pain's ſake, but would willingly be quit of it, if it were not in order to the obtaining ſomething better, which could not be acquir'd without it.

Men commonly extol *Zenon* and *Anaxarcas*, for the conſtancy they expreſs'd againſt the Tyrants in their greateſt Tortures: And *Calanus* alſo and *Peregrinus* are much celebrated for freely offering themſelves to the Flames. But ſuppoſing it had been in their Power to have purchaſed as much Glory by any other Means, I refer it to your ſelf, whether they would have made this Choice. *Cicero* likewiſe very much extolleth *Poſſidonius*, for that being grievouſly tormented with the Gout, when *Pompey* viſited him at *Rhodes*, he told him, That he was very ſorry that he could not hear him; to which *Poſſidonius* anſwer'd, *You may if you pleaſe, and I will not ſuffer ſo great a Perſon to come to me in vain.* He tells us that he began to diſcourſe to him excellently, *viz. That there is nothing Good, but that which is honeſt.* And when his Pains aſſaulted

aſſaulted him often during the Interview, he as often ſaid, *Thou wilt never prevail upon me, O Pain, tho' never ſo grievous, to make me confeſs thee to be an Evil.* But tho' *Poſſidonius* patiently endured the Pains that he could not avoid; yet you can't but imagine that he would rather have been free from 'em, and been able to diſcourſe without 'em.

We may here add, That if, as we have already ſaid, Pain is the chief Evil; it neceſſarily follows, that a freedom from Pain ſhould be the chief Good; and the rather, becauſe Nature ſeems to have beſtowed upon us an inclination for nothing elſe, but for this freedom: For when any Pain happens to us, whether by Hunger, or by any other Deſire, we are naturally carried to that Action, by which we may remove that Pain; and if any Pleaſure intervenes, we have obſerved that Nature adds it as an Encouragement to the Action needful to obtain that freedom from Pain: And probably we may conſequently add, by what Means we may obtain ſo great an Advantage. But, beſides the divers Remedies which may be taken from the convenient Precautions, and from the Medicinal Art, which relate not to Moral Philoſophy, we may ſay, That the moſt general and eaſie Means to procure this freedom from Pain, is Temperance and an exquiſite Sobriety: For by this Means we may, if not altogether remove, at leaſt very much correct the hereditary Diſeaſes, avoid ſuch as we contract by our own Miſcarriages, and free our ſelves from ſuch as are already contracted. Let us obſerve only, That he who enjoys a freedom from Pain, may without any bitterneſs poſſeſs the different kinds of Pleaſures, as well thoſe of the Body, as of the Mind and Health. As *Plutarch* very well compares Health to the Tranquility of the Sea, in regard the Sea gives an Opportunity

portunity to its Inhabitants to breed, and conveniently to bring up their young; ſo Health affords to all Men a Means to perform all the Functions of Life conveniently, and without Pain. Therefore, ſaith he, tho' *Prodicus* maintains, and hath elegantly deſcrib'd, *That Fire is the greateſt Seaſoning of our Life:* Nevertheleſs, ſome may correct his Fancy, and inlarge upon it by ſaying, *That Health gives a ſupernatural Reliſh, ſeeing that neither boiled nor roſt nor any other Meat, whatever* Haut Gouſt *they have, can give any Reliſh to ſuch as are ſick, or to ſuch whom ſome diſtemper hath put out of order; whereas in a healthful Conſtitution, every Morſel is pleaſant and grateful to the Appetite.* Now the ſame may be ſaid of the Pleaſures, that relate to the other Senſes; for to a ſick Body, the Delights which otherwiſe are lawful and honeſt, diſpleaſe; the Smelling is not refreſh'd with Sweet Odours, the Ear cares not for Muſick, nor does the Sight rejoyce in beautiful Objects. Nay, our Entertainments, Publick Shews, our Recreations in Walking, Hunting, and other ſuch like Divertiſements cannot pleaſe, and are of no ſervice for want of this Seaſoning; and without which, Pleaſure it ſelf, as we have ſaid, is no Pleaſure: As all this is moſt certain, in regard of theſe Pleaſures of the Body, it is doubtleſs much more in reſpect of that of the Mind; for it is apparent, that neither in Sickneſs, or under any grievous Pain, no Man can ſtudy, read or meditate; for while the Soul is united to this craſy and mortal Body, there is ſuch a Union between theſe two Parties, that the Body cannot ſuffer, but the Soul muſt feel it, and be drawn, tho' againſt its will, from its moſt pleaſing Objects; for the afflicting Pain employs all the Thoughts and Attention of the Mind.

Happy

Happy therefore are they who by their natural Conſtitution enjoy a ſound Health, free from Pain, and conſequently more capable in taking Pleaſure in the ſtudy of Wiſdom. Happy are likewiſe ſuch, who tho they have an infirm Body, yet govern it with ſo much Prudence, and correct it with that Temperance, that if they dont altogether avoid all Pain, yet they make it ſo light and eaſy to be born, that it proves a ſmall Impediment to the full enjoyment of the Pleaſures of the Mind. Therefore the Firſt ought to take heed, how they diſturb or by their Intemperance weaken the ſound Conſtitution of their Bodies, and the other ought to amend theirs, and to bring it as much as is poſſible to this State of Indolency. And both of 'em, ſhould take care of their Bodies, if it were only for the ſake of the Soul, which cannot be well while the Body is ſick: Here we muſt truly acknowledg, that tho the chief part of Happineſs conſiſts in the Tranquility of the Mind, yet we muſt not deſpiſe the other part, which conſiſts in the freedom from bodily Pain.

I confeſs there be ſome who believe, that it is a crime, when it concerns the chief good or the buſineſs of Man, to joyn the advantages of the Body to them of the Mind; and conſequently believe, That it is an unworthy Deed to joyn that freedom from bodily Pain, with the Tranquility of the Mind. But as theſe are Stoicks, or ſuch as affect to follow them, I cannot but mention here, what *Cicero* himſelf ſays againſt them, when addreſſing himſelf to *Cato*, he begins with this Principle of the Stoicks; 'That we are recommended to our ſelves, and that 'the firſt Inclination, that Nature hath beſtowed 'on us, is Self-preſervation; that we may pre'ſerve our ſelves ſuch as we ought to be; that we 'are Men made up of Soul and Body; and there'fore, according to our original and natural Incli-

'nation,

'nation, we muſt love theſe Things, and make 'them the end of that chief Happineſs, which con-'ſiſts in the acquiſition of ſuch Things as are accord-'ing to Nature. Now, *ſaith he*, ſeeing theſe are 'our Opinions, and that you aſſign that to be the 'End, to live according to Nature, ſhew us now, 'how you can maintain, That to live honeſtly is bare-'ly and abſolutely the chief Good? How have you 'ſo ſoon forſaken the Body and all thoſe Things, 'that are according to Nature? If we ſought for 'the chief Happineſs, not of Man, but of ſome 'other Creature, which were all Spirit, that End 'that you ſpeak of would not be the only End of 'that Spirit, for it would deſire Health, and to 'be free from Pain; it would deſire alſo its own 'Preſervation, and whatſoever might tend to it; 'and it would propoſe to it ſelf to live according 'to Nature, which is, as we have ſaid, to poſſeſs 'all things agreable with Nature, at leaſt in ſome 'meaſure, if not in the moſt conſiderable part. 'Vertue alone, ſay they, is ſufficient to render us 'happy, and the Goods of the Body are but as it 'were ſmall Appendages, which are not capable 'of rendring Life more happy. But truly a 'Man in grievous Pain would be very much obliged 'to him, who would free him from it. And if a 'wiſe Man were condemned by ſome Tyrant to en-'counter with Pain, his mortal Foe, he would 'muſter up all his rational Faculties to aſſiſt and 'ſupport him in ſo difficult and dangerous a Com-'bat. *And then goes on*, Every Creature of what-'ſoever Nature, loves it ſelf, for where is that 'Creature, which forſakes it ſelf, or any part of 'it ſelf, or the uſe of that part, or any of the 'things, which are according to Nature, and its 'ſtate and frame? Certainly no Perſon hath for-'gotten his firſt Conſtitution, but retains his firſt

'Faculty

'Faculty from the beginning to the end. How can 'it therefore be, that only Man's Nature ſhould 'ſuffer Man to forget his Body, and ſhould place his 'chief Happineſs, not in the whole, but in one 'part of himſelf? Wiſdom hath not begot Man, 'but hath found him begun by Nature. If there 'were nothing to be perfected in Man, but ſome 'Motions of the Soul, that is to ſay, of Reaſon; 'Wiſdom ought to have no other aim but Vertue, 'which is the perfection of Reaſon. So alſo if there 'were nothing to be perfected but the Body, its 'chief end would be Health, a freedom from Pain, 'Beauty, *&c.* But here is a Queſtion concerning 'the chief good of Man, who is compoſed of Soul 'and Body; Why dont we therefore ſeek his chief 'good, in relation to his whole Nature? They 'who place it in one or t'other part, act in the 'ſame manner as if they had only a great care of 'the right Hand and neglected the Left: Becauſe 'Vertue, as all the World acknowledges, holds the 'firſt and chief Place in Man, and we eſteem thoſe 'who are Wiſe to have attain'd a great degree of 'Perfection; will you admire nothing but Vertue, 'dazle your Eyes only with its Splendor and Glory? 'Truly Vertue is the beſt and moſt excellent thing 'in Man, but you dont ſeem to conſider your ſelf 'enough; we dont deſire that Vertue ſhould for-'ſake Nature, but that it ſhould keep and preſerve 'it. But according to your direction, it preſerves 'one part, and leaves the other. If the firſt Inſti-'tution of Man could ſpeak, it would tell us, that 'the firſt beginnings of its Deſire, were to preſerve 'it ſelf in that State, that it appear'd in at the be-'ginning, *&c.*

Beſides we are not ignorant of what we are wont to ſay, when we declaim againſt Pleaſure, That it is the capital Plague of Man, the mortal Enemy of

Reaſon, that it puts out the Eyes of the Underſtanding, and that it hath no correſpondency with Vertue, that it is the ſource of Treaſons, the ruine of Common-wealths, the origin of all Crimes, that it waſts our paternal Eſtates, blaſteth our Reputation, weakens the Body and makes it ſubject to Diſeaſes, and that in ſhort it haſtens old Age and Death.

Not Heaven's high Rage, nor Swords or Flames com-
(bind;
Can bring ſuch Plagues as Pleaſure to the Mind:
On's mad with Dice, one melts in vicious Love,
But when the knotty Gout forbids his Joynts to move;
How ſweet an evil Luxury appears,
Which drown'd in Fleſh, and deaf to Heavenly Cares,
The ſluggiſh Senſes of their Force diſarms,
And worſe transforms the Limbs than Circe's *Charms,*
Without it chears the Man, within deſtroys,
Bears Serpents in its Gold, and Torments in its Joys.

But as we have often explain'd our ſelves concerning Pleaſure, and as often declar'd, that when we ſay Pleaſure is the End, the Happineſs and the chief Good, we mean not hereby brutiſh and ſordid Pleaſures, but only a calm and ſedate Temper of the Mind, and the freedom of the Body from Pain. It is plain therefore, that theſe Objections do not affect us.

CHAP.

CHAP VI.

What Vertue and Advantage accrues by being contented with a little.

IT is not without Cauſe, that we have already declared, That the true and moſt general means to obtain and preſerve that Pleaſure which makes an happy Life, is to incourage Temperance, by which we may ſo moderate our Deſires, as to reſiſt and cut off all unneceſſary and uſeleſs Things, and may reduce our ſelves only to ſuch as are needful and natural, whereby we may accuſtom our ſelves to be content with a little; for by this means, we may preſerve that Tranquility of Mind, which makes up the principal part of our Happineſs; there being no need that he who hath reduced himſelf only to the things neceſſary for Nature, ſhould diſquiet and torment himſelf ſo much as is uſual; for ſuch things are to be found every where, and are eaſily to be obtain'd. Whereas the cares and diſturbances of the Mind torment only ſuch as are not content with things neceſſary, but are always ſo eager in the purſuit of things ſuperfluous, that if they meet with Diſappointment in obtaining of 'em, they are very much diſquieted: If they have acquir'd 'em, they fear loſing 'em: When they loſe 'em, they pine away with Grief; and if they continue with them, they are ſtill diſſatisfied. So that they deal with their Mind, as with the Tunn of the *Danaids*, they never give it any reſt, but being provoked by ſome freſh Appetite, as by ſome kind of Fury, they always ſeem to undertake new Labour.

This is alſo the ſure way of obtaining and preſerving that grateful Repoſe, which makes up the ſecond part of our Happineſs; for he who is content with things neceſſary, will never trouble himſelf with thoſe unneceſſary Pains and Fatigues, which ſuch are obliged to undergo, who eagerly, tho vainly, purſue Things ſuperfluous; he acts nothing to undermine his Health, he draws not upon himſelf thoſe incumbrances, which uſually attend a voluptuous Life; for ſuch as live Frugally and on plain Diet, are rarely ſubject to Diſtempers, but rather ſuch who either Eat to exceſs, or elſe feed upon Meats, which are not natural, or elſe corrupted by provoking Sauces or other Artifices of the Cooks. *Epicurus*, no doubt, had a true Senſe of the neceſſity and excellency of this Vertue of Moderation, when he cried out; *That the way to be truly Rich, is to be ſatisfied with Things neceſſary. That Poverty, proportioned to the Law of Nature, is a great Fund or Treaſury of Riches. Now if you would be rightly inform'd what thoſe juſt Bounds and Limits are, which this Law of Nature preſcribes, they are theſe*, viz. *Not to Hunger, not to Thirſt, not to be Cold*; *Non Eſurire, non Sitire, non Algere*: 'Tis what he had experienced in himſelf, if we will refer our ſelves to the Teſtimony of *Juvenal*.

If any ask me what would ſatisfy,
To make Life eaſy, thus I would reply;
As much as keeps out Hunger, Thirſt and Cold;
As much as made wiſe Epicurus *bleſs't,*
Who in ſmall Gardens ſpacious Realms poſſeſs't.

This is a commendable Thing, ſaith he in *Seneca*, viz. *a pleaſant and contented Poverty; but if it be Pleaſant 'tis not Poverty, for whoſoever is ſatisfied with Poverty, is Rich; for he is not Poor, who enjoys but little, but he who*

who deſires more. In ſhort, as Riches are to be valued for the ſake of their End, which is nothing elſe but Contentment and Pleaſure; ſo on the contrary, Poverty appears by the want of this End. It is certain, that a pleaſant Poverty is no Poverty, but great Riches; and ſorrowful Riches, are not Riches but great Poverty. The Traveller, who ſings on the Road, is in effect Rich, and he really Poor, who being loaden with Wealth, dreads the Piſtol or the Sword, and ſhakes for fear at the meer ſhadow of a Reed, which he perceives to move in a moon-ſhiny Night. The Tradeſman, while he is without Mony, yet pleaſeth his Neighbourhood with his muſical Ditties; but ſtumbling on a Purſe of Gold, at the ſame time that he becomes Rich he becomes dumb, being poſſeſs'd with the fear of loſing it. In ſhort, I pray tell me which of theſe two dies the Richer, who depart this World at the ſame time; he who never had thoſe things, which we uſually term Riches, and nevertheleſs hath lived very contentedly; or he who being loaden with 'em, hath led a life full of Vexation and Diſcontent?

Cicero ſeems to be much delighted with this Vertue and Moderation of Temper, which obliges us to live and be content with little; for after he had inſtanced, in the Examples of *Socrates* and *Diogenes*, That the Burden of Poverty may be made more eaſie, he alludes to the Words of *Epicurus*; *O, what a little doth Nature deſire, what a ſmall matter ſuffices it!* And Aſſerts, *That Wiſdom is often diſcover'd under mean Apparel.* Nay, as if he had undertaken to write the Praiſes of this Philoſopher, he continues his Diſcourſe in this manner, 'What 'then? Thoſe glorious Orators are they more 'Couragious and more Generous than *Epicurus* in 'encountering Poverty, which troubles Mankind

'ſo much? Other Philoſophers ſeem to be as well 'prepared as he was againſt all Evils, yet there is 'none whom Poverty does not terrify; but for his 'part, a very little ſatisfies him, and none hath ever 'better treated of Frugality than he: For as he was 'altogether averſe from whatever might cauſe the 'deſire either of Riches, of Luſt, Ambition, of 'ſumptuous Expences or Delights, *&c.* Why 'ſhould he take care to obtain 'em, or be eager 'in the purſuit of 'em? What! ſhall *Anacharſis* 'the *Scythian* be able to deſpiſe Riches, *&c.* and 'ſhall not our Philoſophers be able to do the like? See here the Contents of one of this *Scythian*'s Letters.

Anacharſis *to* Hanno, *Health*,

'INſtead of rich and glorious Apparel, I uſe the 'ſimple Habit of our Country; for Shoes, the 'bottoms of my Feet well hardened. The Ground 'is my Bed; Hunger is my Sawce. I live upon 'Milk, Cheeſe and Fleſh. Therefore if you come 'to ſee me, you will find a Man very quiet; and as 'for the Preſents which you have been pleaſed to 'honour me, give them to your Fellow-Citizens, 'or offer them to the immortal Gods.

'All the Philoſophers of what Sect ſoever, ex-'cepting thoſe, whom a vicious Nature hath turn-'ed aſide from right Reaſon, have been of this 'Perſuaſion. When *Socrates*, at a publick Re-'joycing, ſaw much Gold and Silver carried about, 'and expoſed to publick View; cried aloud, How 'many things are there, which I don't at all de-'ſire? When *Xenocrates* underſtood, that the Em-'baſſadors of *Alexander* had brought him fifty Ta-'lents, which was a conſiderable Sum of Mony at

'that

'that time in *Athens*, he invited the Embaſſadors 'to Supper in the Academy, and caus'd 'em to be 'entertain'd with things moderate and conve-'nient, free from Luxury and Exceſs. The next 'day they deſired him to tell them on whom they 'ſhould beſtow that Mony they had brought to 'him? What, ſaid he, did you not take notice 'yeſterday by the Supper that I gave you, that I 'have no need of Mony? But when he perceived 'that his Refuſal gave them Offence, he accepted 'of Thirty *Minæ*; that he might not ſeem to de-'ſpiſe the King's Liberality. As for *Diogenes* the 'Cynick, he treated him more freely; for when '*Alexander* ask'd him, what he ſtood in need of? 'anſwer'd, At preſent I need nothing, but that 'you would not interpoſe between me and the Sun-'ſhine. This Cynick was wont to prefer his own 'Happineſs to that of the King of *Perſia*; and 'to boaſt how much his Life and his Fortune was 'more bleſſed than this Monarchs; he for his part 'wanting nothing, whereas the other could never 'have enough: That he deſired none of thoſe Plea-'ſures, of which the King could never be ſatisfied, 'but that he was content with his own, which the 'King could never be.

This that I have mentioned concerning *Diogenes*, minds me, what *Seneca* and *Maximus* of *Tyre* have written; for the firſt having ſhewn, 'That 'great Eſtates are often troubleſome and the cauſe 'of Sorrow and Miſchief; That the Rich ſuffer not 'more eaſily the loſs of Goods than the Poor; 'That it is far more tolerable not to acquire than 'to loſe. So that thoſe whom Fortune never fa-'voured ſeem to be more happy, than thoſe whom 'it hath forſaken. After he had manifeſted this at large, thus he proceeds: 'This is what *Diogenes*, 'that great Soul, underſtood, when he put himſelf

'into that Condition, that nothing could be taken 'from him. 'Call this Poverty, Want, or give 'whatever diſdainful Title you pleaſe to this 'Tranquility, I ſhall believe that *Diogenes* is not 'happy, if you can find any body elſe, from whom 'nothing can be taken. Truly if any queſtion the 'Felicity of *Diogenes*, he may as well queſtion the 'Condition of the immortal Gods, and whether 'they are leſs happy, becauſe they have not Poſ-'ſeſſions ſubject to the capricious Changes of For-'tune, and which can be taken away.

As for *Maximus* of *Tyre*, he ſpeaks to us in this manner, upon a ſubject of Diſpute, that happened about the Cynical Life, whether it was to be preferr'd to any other. '*Diogenes*, ſaith he, was nei-'ther an Attick nor a Dorian, nor tutor'd in the 'Schools of *Salon* or *Lycurgus*, for neither Places 'nor Laws communicate Vertue; but he was born 'in the Town of *Synope*, in the botton of *Pontus* '*Euxinus*. When he had conſulted *Apollo*, he for-'ſook all the Occaſions of Grief and Trouble, he 'delivered himſelf from his Fetters, and like a 'wiſe and free Bird, paſs'd thro' the World with-'out fearing the Tyrants, without binding him-'ſelf to any particular Laws, without applying 'himſelf to the Adminiſtration of publick Affairs, 'without being troubled in the Education of Chil-'dren, without being clogg'd by Matrimony, with-'out turmoiling himſelf in the Manuring of the 'Ground, without ingaging himſelf in the Manage-'ment of War, without Trafficking by Sea or 'Land; for he laught at all theſe ſorts of Men, and 'at their ſeveral ſtations of Life. As we common-'ly laugh at thoſe Children, which we ſee ſo in-'tent to play with Trifles, till they often fall to-'gether by the Ears, and hurt one another. He 'led the Life of an Independent, being free from

'Fears

Fears and Diſquietudes. In Winter Seaſons he did not by long fatiguing Journies approach the *Babylonians*, nor in the Summer the *Medes*; but his uſual Stages were from *Attica* to the *Iſthmus*, according to the Seaſon, and from the *Iſthmus* to *Attica* again. His Royal Palaces were the Temples, the Colleges, and the ſacred Woods: His Riches very large and ſecure, and which not being circumſcrib'd, were not eaſily to be ſurprized by Ambuſhes, being the whole Earth with all the Fruits it bore, and the Fountains that it affords, more excellent than the Wines of *Leſbos* and *Chios*. He uſed himſelf alſo to every ſort of Air as the Lions do, and would not avoid the changings of the Seaſons, appointed by *Jupiter*; neither did he ſtudy any Contrivance to ſecure himſelf from them; but accuſtomed himſelf in ſuch a manner to all Seaſons, by this kind of Living, that he ſecured his Health and Strength, without any aſſiſtance from Phyſick, without experiencing the ſharpneſs of the Iron, or the Fire; without imploring the Help of *Chiron*, or of *Eſculapius* or *Aſclepiades*, and without ſubmitting to the Predictions of Soothſayers, or to magical and ſuperſtitious Purifications, or to the Vanity of Conjurations: At the ſame time that all *Greece* was in Arms and Uproar, and all the neighbouring Nations were in War one againſt another, he alone enjoys as it were a Truce with all the Earth, and as having ſubdued Fighting, was without Arms in the midſt of armed Men. Nay, even the baſeſt of Men, the Tyrants, and his very Slanderers had a Reſpect for him, and would not in the leaſt hurt him, tho' he reproved them, objecting and repreſenting before their Eyes their own Actions, which is a very ſafe and very convenient

'venient way of Reproving, proper to re-call the 'Minds of Men to Peace and Reaſon.

We may upon this occaſion mention *Seneca*'s Expreſſion, as proceeding from the School of *Epicurus*. 'That thoſe Perſons live the moſt agreeable 'and pleaſant Lives, who make Pleaſure the leaſt 'of their Care. And they enjoy the greateſt 'Riches, who ſtand leaſt in need of 'em. For a magnificent way of Living conſiſts chiefly in the oſtentation of Riches; he who thinks, that he doth not ſtand in need of 'em, and therefore fears not the loſs of 'em, may without 'em make a very pleaſant Uſe of 'em; and the rather becauſe he, who ſuppoſes he cannot live happily without 'em, fears the loſs of 'em, and while that Fear poſſeſſes him, he cannot quietly enjoy 'em; it being impoſſible to enjoy any thing we call Good, which brings Trouble and Diſquietude along with it. 'The miſera-'rable Wretch, ſaith he immediately after, paſ-'ſionately deſires to increaſe his Stores more and 'more, and while he is blinded with that Paſſion, 'he forgets to enjoy 'em; he examins his Receipts, 'makes up his Accounts, goes to the Exchange, 'turns over his Kalendar, and of a rich Man he 'becomes a Factor. We ſhall be Rich with much 'greater Satisfaction, when we ſhall underſtand, 'that to be Poor is not ſo miſchievous as we ſup-'poſe. But let us reſt ſatisfied with this Inſtance at preſent. As it was a pleaſant Remark of *Socrates*, when ſeeing the great quantity and variety of the Wares that were expos'd to Sale, to be able to ſay, *How many things are there, that I have no occaſion for?* So likewiſe if any Perſon perhaps ſees himſelf in Poſſeſſion of all thoſe things, and at the ſame time, when he conſiders his Houſes, his Moveables, his Attendants, his Table, his Cloathing, and all other his Enjoyments, he finds himſelf in-

inwardly in a Temper and Ability to ſay, *I have, indeed, all theſe things, but I can live very well without 'em. I have not an abſolute need of 'em, I could live at eaſe in a Houſe leſs Magnificent, and meanlier furniſhed; I could well be without that great number of Attendants, theſe rare and exquiſite Diſhes, this rich Attire.* If any, I ſay, is in that happy Diſpoſition of Mind, he may doubtleſs enjoy with pleaſure his Plenty and Glory: For he will underſtand, that he may with eaſe want a great number of things, for which, when we have a too earneſt love and longing, they do rather diſturb the Peace of our Lives. And by this means he will be the more ready patiently to bear the loſs of 'em, upon any Misfortune hapning; and the rather becauſe he will find that they are not abſolutely neceſſary for him. Neither will he take ſo much Pains nor undergo ſo many Fatigues and Troubles, as is uſual to increaſe 'em, when he ſhall conſider that he can enjoy more of true and ſolid Pleaſure in a larger Meaſure, than he now poſſeſſeth, when he enjoys leſs. That what he may gather up more, will not be for his own advantage, but either for his Heirs, or it may be for ſome ungrateful Wretches, or for Prodigals, or for Flatterers, or for Thieves, and nevertheleſs that he muſt diſturb his Quiet, and caſt himſelf into a Sea of Trouble, Pain and Sorrow, to procure 'em for them.

And here we may alſo obſerve that *Seneca* had very good Reaſon to make uſe of this Sentence of *Epicurus*, *That if any Man having all the Neceſſaries requiſite for Life, and thinks himſelf not Rich enough, tho' he were the Lord of all the World, he would ſtill be miſerable.* For if any Man who is in a moderate State, fancies that he cannot live as happily as others, who are in a higher and more eminent

eminent Station, truly tho' this Man ſhould not only equal, but out-do them in their Splendour and Grandeur, he would not hereby become more happy, but would ſtill remain miſerable, and never be ſatisfied; becauſe of the reſtleſs Nature of his Paſſions, which when they have once paſs'd the Bounds appointed by Nature, keep no meaſures and can never be ſatiated. As for that other celebrated Maxim, *That whatſoever is neceſſary for Nature, may eaſily be obtained*, and, *that what is hard to be got, is not needful.* This is a Sentence that *Stobeus* and others have borrowed out of *Epicurus*; and which they mention in other Terms: *Let Thanks be returned to kind Nature, which hath ſo ordered every thing, that what is needful is eaſie to be obtained, and what is difficult, is not of neceſſity.* *Cicero* is of the ſame Opinion, when he makes *Epicurus* ſay; *That he judged, that Nature alone was ſufficient to make a wiſe Man Rich, and that natural Riches are eaſie to be got, for Nature is content with little.* And *Seneca* ſaith, *That according to the Opinion of* Epicurus, *Not Hunger, not Thirſt, not to feel Cold, are the Limits that Nature preſcribes to it ſelf; That to ſatisfy Hunger and Thirſt, there is no need of dwelling in ſumptuous Palaces, nor to lay any Reſtraint upon our ſelves, with that ſupercilious and ſullen Gravity; nor to venture on the Ocean, nor to follow Armies. That which Nature requires is eaſily to be obtain'd, and obvious to all the World. That Sweat is the Price of Superfluities, ſuch as make the Magiſtrates attend the Courts, the Captains their Tents, and the Pilots their Ships in the midſt of the dangerous and tempeſtuous Seas.*

'Tis the greateſt Wealth to live content,
With little, ſuch the greateſt Joy reſent;

And

And bounteous Fortune ſtill affords ſupply,
Sufficient for a thrifty Luxury.

I confeſs, through the Tyranny and Cruelty of ſome Men, innocent Perſons may ſometimes want the neceſſities of Life, and others by Accident, or by their own Folly, may fall into that Condition, that things needful may be wanting to them. But as for Dame Nature, certainly ſhe is no niggard to Men, ſhe who is the common Nurſe of all Creatures: If ſhe hath made them ſubject to Hunger, ſhe hath likewiſe beſtowed upon 'em her Fruits, her Corn and her Herbs, to appeaſe it. If ſhe ſuffers them to Thirſt, ſhe affords them plenty of Springs in every Place. If the Air be either Cold or Hot, Nature allows them a Skin thick and hard enough to bear theſe Inconveniences, as it is experienced in the Skin of the Face; and if the other parts of the Body are more tender and ſenſible, it affords us the Shades of the Trees, of the Caves, and other cool Places, or the Warmth of the Sun-ſhine, the Fire, the Sheeps Wool, to preſerve and defend us againſt other Enormities.

It hath alſo given us as much Foreſight and Caution as the Ants, to provide things needful for the time to come; tho' many times we deſpiſe the Providence of that little Creature, that after the Winters approach, never ventures out of its private retreat, but in a prudent and wiſe manner, enjoys quietly in Winter, what it induſtriouſly gathered in Summer, as *Horace* obſerves.

Quæ ſimul inverſum contriſtat Aquarius annum,
Non uſquam prorepit, et illis utitur ante,
Quæſitis Sapiens——

For

For when we behold the greateſt part of Mankind labouring continually to gain Riches, one would think, that we had forgot to uſe them, and that we were born and deſigned for no other end, but to heap 'em up.

And if we conſider Men in a Civil Society; you will ſcarce find any who uſes never ſo little Care and Induſtry, but is able to find enough to ſatisfy his Hunger and Thirſt, and to ſecure himſelf from the Inconveniences and Miſchiefs of the open Air. And if he hath a plentiful Table, delicious Wines, rich Cloathing, a glorious Palace, Servants well cloathed, and ſo of the reſt; theſe are Things, for which we are not to return thanks to kind Nature, as being abſolutely neceſſary. The uſe of thoſe Things that are eaſily to be obtained, is certainly no leſs pleaſing than of thoſe that are difficultly come at; and it is a miſtake to think, that none but rich Men can truly reliſh Joy and Pleaſure.

Nam neque divitibus contingunt gaudia ſolis.

But we ſhall ſpeak of this hereafter; it will be ſufficient in the mean while to take notice of that excellent Paſſage of *Seneca*, which makes very much for this purpoſe.

'Whatſoever is ſubſervient to our good, God, 'ſaith he, the common Father of Mankind hath 'put it into our Hands. He hath not expected, 'that we ſhould deſire it, he hath freely beſtowed 'it upon us, and of his own accord; and the things 'that are able to hurt as, he hath hid away far 'from us: So that we can complain of none but 'our ſelves, becauſe in ſpight of Nature, we are 'endeavouring to fetch them out of the very Bowels of the Earth. We have caſt our ſelves blindfold into ſenſual Pleaſures, which are the ſource 'of all Evils: We have ſuffered our ſelves to be

'carried

'carried away with Ambition, Glory and Vanity. 'What Advice therefore can I now give you? No-'thing new; for they be not new only, for which 'we ſeek a Remedy. The firſt thing that we ſhould 'do, is to look into our ſelves, and to diſtinguiſh 'well between Things neceſſary, and Things ſuper-'fluous. Neceſſary offer themſelves in every place, 'there is nothing but what is Superfluous, which 'gives Trouble and Vexation in the procuring it. 'Dont think that you have any great cauſe to value 'your ſelves, if you have deſpiſed ſoft Couches, 'rich Jewels and coſtly and ſtately Furniture. You 'will wonder at your ſelves, when you ſhall have 'contemned things neceſſary. It is no great mat-'ter to be able to ſubſiſt, without this great and 'Royal State, without being repaſted with the 'Brains of Peacocks, or the Wings of Phea-'ſants, nor for the other extravagancies of Luxu-'ry, which put us upon chuſing ſome certain Mem-'bers of Animals, and deſpiſing the reſt. I ſhall 'value you when you will not deſpiſe a piece of 'dry Bread, when you ſhall be perſuaded, That 'the Herbs grow not only in time of need, for the 'benefit of the Beaſts, but for Men alſo; and when 'you ſhall have learned, That the Fruits of the 'Trees are ſufficient to ſatisfy you.

O the miſerable blindneſs of Mankind, ſays *Lucretius!* Dont we ſee plainly, that Nature adviſeth us nothing but that we our ſelves ſhould aim at, a freedom from Pain and a Tranquility of Mind; That we ſhould be content with little, and that without theſe needleſs Dainties, we ſhould ſpend our Lives quietly and pleaſantly.

O Miſeras Hominum mentes, &c.
Qualibus in tenebris vitæ quantiſq; periclis,
Degitur hoc ævi, quodcumque'ſt. Nonne videre

Nil

Nil aliud ſibi Naturam latrare, niſi ut, cum
Corpore ſejunctus dolor abſit, mente fruatur,
Jucundo ſenſu cura ſemota metuq;
Ergo corpoream ad naturam pauca videmus,
Eſſe opus omnino, quæ demant quemq; dolorem,
Delicias quoque uti nullus ſubſternere poſſint,
Gratius interdum neque Natura ipſa requirit.

'That Diet, ſaith *Epicurus*, in *Cicero*, which is 'the moſt Natural, ſuch as Broth, Bread, Cheeſe, 'pure Water, affords as much Pleaſure, and more 'Health to the Body, than the moſt coſtly Diſhes, 'and richeſt Wines.' And in *Stobæus* he ſpeaks in 'this manner; 'My Body is abundantly delighted 'with Bread and Water, and I renounce the Plea-'ſures, that proceed from magnificent Tables. *Elian* ſaith, 'If I may have wholſome Bread and 'clear Water, I think my ſelf as happy as *Jupiter* 'himſelf.' And in *Seneca*, he ſpeaks thus, 'We 'muſt return to the Law of Nature; her Riches are 'ready provided, and offered to all the World; 'for whatſoever we ſtand in need of, is either free-'ly expoſed, or very eaſily obtain'd. Nature re-'quires Bread and Water, no Perſon becomes here-'by the poorer, and he who confines his Deſires 'within theſe Limits, may ſecure his own Happi-'neſs. Look to the true Riches, learn to be ſatiſ-'fied with little, and ſpeak out courageouſly: Let 'us have Water, let us have Bread, which are the 'neceſſary ſupports of Life, and then we may vye 'with the Gods for Happineſs.

If in your Night Revels your Chambers are not adorn'd and perfum'd, nor entertain'd with ſoft charming Muſick, yet you may upon the brink of a purling Stream, under a ſhady Grove ſweetly repoſe your ſelf upon the Graſs, and without all this Noiſe, there take your ſmall Repaſt, pleaſantly diverting

verting your ſelves, with what variety Nature hath deckt the Earth.

Si non aurea ſunt juvenum ſimulacra per ædes,
Lampadas igniferas manibus retinentia dextris,
Lumina nocturnis epulis, ut ſuppeditentur;
Nec domus argento fulget, auroq; renidet,
Nec citharis reboant laqueata, auritaq; Templa:
Attamen inter ſe proſtrati in gramine molli,
Propter aquæ rivum ſub ramis arboris altæ,
Non magnis opibus jucunde corpora curant;
Præſertim cum tempeſtas arridet, & anni
Tempora conſpergunt viridantes floribus herbas.

Are you ſooner cur'd of a Fever by repoſing your ſelf on a Down-Bed, in a Chamber curiouſly Painted over, and richly Gilt, than by lying on a plain Bed, with a convenient Coverlid?

Truly we muſt take heed of entertaining any ſuch Fancy, That an *Apricius* takes more Pleaſure in his rare and exquiſite Dainties, than a labouring Man in his plain and ordinary Fair; for ſuch a one being always full, finds his Appetite continually pall'd, whereas the Labourer daily renews his Appetite, and reliſhes the ſweetneſs of every thing that he Eats: So that when the former deſpiſes his Pheaſant and his Mullet, the latter finds a ſavourineſs in his Nuts and his Onions. Truly, he ſcarce ſeems to have well experienced Hunger and Thirſt, who can't be perſuaded, that an ordinary Perſon may eat with as much Pleaſure and Delight as a Prince, only that he defers to ſit at his little plain Table an Hour later, than the Prince at his magnificent Entertainment. If men could but once underſtand theſe Truths, they would quickly perceive that there is no need to endeavour ſo much to get great and exceſſive Riches, to indulge their Gluttony; ſeeing

that they may without ſo much Toil obtain the ſame Pleaſures, and that theſe Pleaſures are more Pure and Innocent. It ſeems the Poet had this Fancy, when he adviſes to ſhun Grandeur; for it is certain, That one may live more contentedly in a ſmall Cottage, than Kings and Princes in their Royal Pallaces.

——*fuge magna, licet ſub paupere tecto*
Reges, & Regum vita præcurrere Amicos.

But let us underſtand from *Porphyry*, how far *Epicurus* hath advanc'd a plain and abſtemious Life, even ſo far as to ſuppoſe it to extend to a total abſtinence from Fleſh. Thus he ſays,

We have found what the common People will not believe, that the Epicureans themſelves, who hold Pleaſure to be the End, for the moſt part are content ſince the Days of their Chieftain, with Fruits, Pulſe and Broth; and that the chief of their Diſcourſes tend to Teach nothing more, but that Nature is ſatisfied with a little; that the plaineſt Food and the eaſieſt attain'd to, ſatisfies plentifully our Wants, and that what is over and above is only to gratify our unſatiated Appetites, which is neither in it ſelf needful, nor can be occaſioned by the uſefulneſs of that, which being wanting, might cauſe the ruin of the whole, but that it proceeds from vain and fooliſh Miſtakes, with which we are prejudiced.

They ſay alſo, That a Philoſopher ought to have this Perſuaſion, That nothing ſhall be wanting to him the remainder of his Days. Now there is nothing better able to beget that Opinion in him, than to believe, by his own Experience, that he hath need but of very little, and that theſe things are common and eaſy to be got; and what is over and above is needleſs, relating to nothing but Luxury and Exceſs; and that ſuch things are acquired with a great deal of Pains and Difficulty. So that all the Benefit

Benefit and Pleaſure that might redound from thence' don't compenſate the Labour and Toil we muſt undergo in the obtaining of 'em, and our continual Care to preſerve 'em. Beſides, when the Thoughts of Death approach, we eaſily forſake little things, or ſuch as are of a mean value and common.

They ſay moreover, That the uſe of Fleſh prejudices our Health, more than it benefits; becauſe our Health is preſerved by thoſe very things, by which it is recovered, when we have loſt it. Now it is recovered by a light Diet, and abſtinence from Fleſh; it is therefore preſerved by the ſame means. But it is no wonder if the Vulgar believe, That the uſe of Fleſh is neceſſary for our Health, for they are perſuaded that all the Pleaſures which are in Motion and Flattering, are aſſiſting to it; the Pleaſures of Love not excepted, which are never good for any thing, but commonly very miſchievous.

Horace alſo ſeems to have underſtood the Advantages, that a frugal and ſober Life procures, when he tell us; That there is nothing that contributes ſo much to our Health as to Eat and Drink ſparingly, and to be content with the plaineſt Diet; and that to be perſuaded of theſe Truths, we need but remember a little ſober and frugal Meal that we have formerly made; whereas when we glut our ſelves with all manner of Varieties, part turns into Choler, Flegm and Humours, which cauſeth Flatus's and Indigeſtion in the Stomach.

Acippe nunc victus tenuis quæ quantaque ſecum
Afferat ———
——— *imprimis valeas bene; nam varia res*
Ut noceant homini, credas memor illius eſcæ
Quæ ſimplex olim tibi ceſſerit: At ſimul aſſis
Miſcueris elixa, ſimul conchylia turdis;
Dulcia ſe in bilem vertent, ſtomachoque tumultum
Lenta feret pituita. Vides ut pallidus omnis
Cœna deſurgat dubia ———

Truly we have cauſe to wonder, that Men who in all other actions are Rational and Diſcreet, have ſo little regard to the manner of their Eating and Drinking, heeding this the leaſt of all other Things.

For Firſt, we ought to ſtay for the moſt neceſſary or convenient time of Eating, for the which we need nothing but an Appetite to direct us; and as Hunger is the moſt innocent, ſo it is the moſt reliſhing and pleaſant Sawce.

Secondly, a plain and frugal Meal recovers the Strength of the Body, and adds Vigour to the Spirits, which ſeldom happens when we are accoſted with great plenty and variety of Meals, which we generally meet with at rich Mens Tables: And theſe Perſons who thus indulge their ſenſual Appetites, their Pleaſures are commonly but of a ſhort continuance, they thereby dulling their Spirits and weakning their Bodies; and if at the ſame moment no Fevers, Gouts, or other Diſtempers attend them, yet the Seeds of theſe Miſchiefs are hereby laid in the Body, and afterwards conveyed to the ſeveral Members by a corrupted Maſs of Blood, firſt occaſion'd by a ſuperfluous indigeſted Diet.

Thirdly, That when our Hunger is ſatisfied, and the Table withdrawn, there remains to him who hath Eaten and Drunk moderately, this pleaſant Thought, That he hath done nothing to prejudice his Health, his Moderation being his Preſervative and Safeguard. Neither is he diſſatisfied not to have enjoyed that Pleaſure, wherewith a Glutton ſeems delighted, becauſe ſuch Pleaſure is of ſhort continuance, leaving nothing behind, but cauſe for Repentance, unto which he is not ſo ſubject as he who thus gormandizes and overcharges his Stomach with variety of rich Dainties. Such a one repents ſoon, or thinks he ſhall ere long have cauſe to repent; nay, he is ſure at laſt to pay dear for his Debauchery.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, That it is a great piece of Wiſdom to take heed, how and what we ſwallow, for the ſake of a little ſhort-liv'd Pleaſure, the Cauſes of ſo many Diſeaſes, ſo cruel and ſo tedious; which Cauſes we cannot be afterwards freed from, but by nauſeus Potions and a tedious continued Courſe of Phyſick, which weakens the Body, and might eaſily be prevented meerly by Abſtinence. So that we ſhould not be oblig'd to ſay as *Lyſimachus* did, after he had ſurrendred himſelf into the Hands of the *Getæ*, to allay the Thirſt that troubled him and his whole Army, *O ye Gods! what a great Advantage have I now loſt for a little Pleaſure of a ſhort continuance?*

Fifthly, If we except ſome few hereditary Diſtempers, and which may, if not be perfectly cured, at leaſt much alleviated, the Grounds of all other Diſeaſes are frequently occaſion'd by Irregularities, or Exceſs in our Eating or Drinking: For tho' violent Exerciſe, Heats, Colds, and other ſuch things, may incline us to Diſeaſes, yet this commonly happens, becauſe they ſet afloat the ſuperfluous Humours which were before ingendred in our Bodies by exceſs of Wine and good Chear.

Therefore it was obſerved during that great Plague, that ſpread all over *Attica*, that none but *Socrates* by his extraordinary Sobriety eſcaped the Infection: And we are not unacquainted with one in our days, who by the like Method was ſecured from a great Peſtilence. I might mention alſo a Perſon of great Eminency, who was ſeverely tormented with the Gout, but by my Advice, yielding to live one Year very abſtemiouſly, and ſcarce to Eat any Fleſh (according to the Cuſtom of the *Indians*, who nevertheleſs are very healthy and ſtrong, and are rarely troubled with ſuch Diſtempers) was perfectly cured. Thus it happened hereto-

fore to the Senator *Rogatianus*, mentioned by *Porphyry*, in the Life of *Plotinus*. So real a truth it is, that Sobriety is an excellent Remedy to avoid and free us from Diſeaſes.

Sixthly, That for one Perſon who is ſick by Faſting, there are twenty Diſtempers occaſion'd by too much Eating. So that *Theognides* had Reaſon to ſay, *That Gluttony deſtroys many more than Hunger.*

Perplures quam dira fames, ſatias male perdit,
Qui juſto cupiunt amplius eſſe ſibi.

And *Horace*, according to *Epicurus*, tells us, *That a ſober Man who Eats and Drinks but little, is always ſtrong and ready to perform the Duties of his Function; whereas Wine makes the Body heavy, and clouds the Underſtanding, and ſinks down the Soul, that part of the Divine Being, to the very Earth.*

——quin corpus onuſtum
Heſternis vitiis, animum quoque prægravat una,
Atque affigit humo divinæ particulam auræ:
Alter ubi dicto citius curata ſopori
Membra dedit, vegetus præſcripta ad munera ſurgit.

Beſides, we might add this Conſideration, That he who endeavours to indulge his Palate in the midſt of good Cheer, loſes that very Pleaſure he would promote, which is eaſilier obtain'd by a plain and ſober Diet for a conſtancy; ſometimes, tho' rarely, admitting of a more plentiful Repaſt, which at particular times may be allowed by the beſt of Men, when as the Poet ſaith, a ſolemn Feſtival invites us to chear our Spirits, and repair weak Nature, decay'd too much by Abſtinence or Old Age.

Sive

Sive diem feſtum rediens advexerit annus,
Sive recreare volet tenuatum Corpus; ubique
Accedent anni, & tractari mollius ætas
Imbecilla volet——

In ſuch Caſes we are not to make the pleaſing of our Palates our main Buſineſs, but only by the By; for we ſhall find that a ſober and frugal Life, is better to moſt Purpoſes. Beſides, it is moſt certain, that a wiſe Man ought rather, as much as his State and Condition of life may permit him, always to obſerve the ſame Manner, Rule and Courſe of Living; I ſay, as much as the State and Condition of his Life will allow him: For tho' the manner of Living, in which we are ingaged, may ſometimes ſo intangle us, as that it is no eaſie Task to keep exactly to the Rule and Manner of Living, that we have preſcribed; yet there is no difficulty to keep pretty near to this Rule, if a Man hath ſo much Conſtancy and Reſolution of Mind, as a truly wiſe and vertuous Man ought to have. But if he be ſo weak and fickle, as at the firſt Temptation to ſuffer himſelf to be overcome by his irregular Appetite, it is apparent that Wiſdom and Vertue have not taken Root deep enough in his Soul.

If we are perhaps ſometimes obliged to be at well ſpread Tables, where we may ſeem to be ſome-what uncivil in not complying with the earneſt Intreaties and Sollicitations that we meet with; 'tis at this time chiefly that we muſt ſhew our Reſolution and Conſtancy; and if a Civil and Modeſt Excuſe will not ſuffice, we muſt free our ſelves from that *Duſopia*, or childiſh Baſhfulneſs ſo much condemned among the Greeks, and according to *Plutarch*'s Advice, ſpeak plainly and boldly to any

Friend, what *Creon* ſaith in one of his Tragedies; It is better that you ſhould be now angry with me, than that I ſhould be to morrow diſtemper'd, for having complied with you.

Te præſtat infeſum, Hoſpes, eſſe nunc mihi,
Quam ſi obſequutus deinde graviter ingemam.

For to caſt our ſelves, ſaith he, *into a Fit of the Colick, or into ſome extream Agony, meerly to avoid being look'd upon as a Clown, or Uncivil, is to become both a Clown and a mad Man, and not to underſtand how we are to behave our ſelves with Men, in relation to Eating and Drinking.*

We muſt not here forget that excellent Expreſſion of *Epicurus*; *That a ſober and frugal Life, unto which we have by long uſe habituated our ſelves, makes us undaunted againſt the Aſſaults of Fortune.* For as *Horace* elſewhere ſays, Which of the two may better truſt to himſelf and to his own ſtrength, in relation to the Caſualties and Miſchances that may happen, He who hath indulg'd his Mind with vaſt Deſires, and us'd his Body to a ſoft and rich Attire; Or, he who being content with a little, and fore-ſeeing the time to come, ſhall in a time of Peace, as a wiſe Man ought, make Proviſion of ſuch things as are needful for War? Let Fortune vex ſuch a one, and take from him all that ſhe can, how much can ſhe diminiſh of that which is neceſſary?

——*Uter-ne*
Ad caſus dubios fidet ſibi certius, hic qui
Pluribus aſſuerit mentem, corpuſque ſuperbum,
An qui contentus parvo, metuenſque futuri,
In pace, ut Sapiens aptarit idonea bello?

Sæviat,

Sœviat, atque novos moveat fortunna tumultus,
Quantum hesinc imminuet? &c.

Nor are we to forget what *Epicurus* boasts of; *That his daily Food did not quite amount to one pound, and that of* Metrodorus *weighed but just a pound.* Nor must we omit that excellent Advice which *Seneca* hath so well deliver'd; *Thou dost not perhaps believe,* saith he, *that in a spare quantity of Food there is sufficient to satisfy Nature? There is, and to spare; for there is Pleasure, not a light and transitory Pleasure, which we must recruit every Moment, but a more fixt and lasting Pleasure without Interruption: For a Draught of Water and a Piece of Barley Bread, are things not very pleasant to the Gust; but then it is a great Pleasure that we can confine our selves to that, which an adverse Fortune cannot deprive us of. The Allowance of a Prison is more Sumptuous and Plentiful, and a Malefactor who is kept in Chains, condemned to Death, subsists with a small Pittance. What an honour is it to condescend of our own accord to that, which is not to be feared by them, who are reduc'd to the lowest State? By this means we shall prevent the Treachery of Fortune, and stop all her Avenues: For what Power can Fortune have over him, who reckons not as his own, that which she glories in giving and taking away, and is satisfied with that which depends not upon her, thinking it too mean to stoop to her proud Empire?*

I'le here cite what *Xenophon* tells us of *Socrates*; *That he lived upon so small a Pittance, that there was no Handicraftsman, if he took never so little Pains, but might get more than was needful to nourish him.* That which hath been already said of *Anacharsis, That he sent back the Mony offer'd him, because he needed it not to supply his slender Expences.* And it is reported of *Epaminondas*, that he sent back the King's

King's Embaſſadors with the Gold they had brought; and when he had entertain'd them at a plain Dinner, he told them, *Go and give an account to your Maſter of this Dinner, that he may underſtand that a Man content with this, is not to be bought with Mony.* I might mention theſe and other Inſtances of the like nature, to ſhew that he who is ſufficed with ſo little, that even Poverty it ſelf will afford, hath no cauſe to fear the Frowns of Fortune, or the Neceſſities of Want. But the better to prevent the dread of Poverty, let us take care of what *Bion* ſaith in the Writings of *Theletes* the Pythagorian. Theſe are his Expreſſions; *If things could diſcourſe as we do, would they not, as I may ſo ſay, accoſt us to this purpoſe? Why doſt thou diſpute againſt me, O Man? Art thou for my ſake deprived of any advantage of Temperance, of Juſtice, of Fortitude? Art thou afraid that things needful will be wanting to thee? What, are not the High-ways full of Herbs, and the Fountains running over with Water? Don't I afford thee all over the Earth Beds to lie down upon, and Leaves to cover thee? What, can'ſt thou not rejoyce with me? See'ſt thou not* Gradiaphyrtus *a Beggar, Singing pleaſantly, when he takes his Repaſt? Have not I provided Sawce for thee without the leaſt Expence or Care, namely, Hunger? And doth not he who is hungry reliſh his Meal ſavourly without the help of any Artificial Provocation, juſt as he who is thirſty drinks large draughts of pure Water with great Deſire and Pleaſure? Think'ſt thou that Men are hungry for a Cake or thirſty for Snow? And are not theſe the things, that the Luxury and the Debaucheries of corrupt Men require?*

A De-

A Deſcription of the Indian *Diogenes.*

IN relation to this Topick, I think I ought not here to omit, what I know concerning the manner of the Eaſtern *Indians* Living, if it were only to ſhew that all theſe fine things that we have ſpoken of, are not only bare Philoſophical Speculations, but that there are whole Nations, who lead as ſparing a Life, and are ſatisfied with as little, either for Eating or Drinking, or for Cloathing, as all the Cynicks, Stoicks, or Epicureans ever were. In *India* there be many *Fakirs*, or Religious Idolaters, who as well as *Diogenes* walk all Naked, and have no other Shooes to their Feet, but their brawny Soles, no other Covering for their Heads but their long Hair, oiled, treſſed up, and wreathed upon the top of their Heads, no other Ornaments to their Fingers but long Nails, turned like Claws, and ſometimes as long as half the little Finger; their Houſes are the Galleries of their Temples, their Beds are three Inches thick of Aſhes, and when they go in Pilgrimage, they have the Skin of a Tyger, of a Lion, or of a Leopard, dried in the Sun, which they ſpread upon the Ground only to ſit upon; their Drink is pure Water, and their Food, when they are ſupplied by way of Alms, a pound of *Kichery*, which is a certain mixture of Rice, with two or three ſorts of Lentills, all boiled together in Water, with Salt, upon which they put a little ſorry Butter.

The manner of Living of the *Brahmens*, or *Brâgmanes*, differs in nothing from that of the *Fakirs*, either in Quantity or Quality; for their chief and moſt ſubſtantial Eating, is always *Kichery*, never any

any Fleſh; never any Drink but Water. The moſt part of the Merchants, whom we name *Banyans*, if they be never ſo Rich, live in the ſame manner. Their Food is neither more Plentiful, nor more Delicious than that of the *Brahmens*, and nevertheleſs they live as contented, as quiet, and pleaſant as we do, and far more Healthy, at leaſt full as ſtrong and luſty as we are.

THE

THE Second BOOK OF VIRTUE IN GENERAL.

CHAP. I.

Of Virtue in General.

IN the firſt Place we muſt take notice, that *Ariſtotle*, *Plutarch*, and others, have obſerv'd three things in the Mind or Soul of Man, Faculties, Actions, and Habits: The Faculties are the Abilities, from whence proceed the Actions; as of Anger, for example, or Pity: The Actions are the Deeds or Acts themſelves, as to be actually Angry, to be actually Afflicted, or to have an actual Compaſſion: The Habits, or the Facility of the

the Soul to produce ſuch Acts, or the natural Inclination or Tendency of the Soul to that purpoſe.

Secondly, As there are ſome Actions which are Vicious and Evil, as when we are exceſſively Angry; ſome Juſt and Good, as when we keep within the Bounds of Moderation; ſo likewiſe there are ſome Habits which are Vicious, and ſome Good.

Thirdly, That Virtue is neither a Faculty nor a bare Act, but an Habit, *viz.* a virtuous Habit, that inclines and directs us to juſt and honourable Things.

Fourthly, As *Ariſtotle* divides the Soul into two Parts, *viz.* the one the Reaſonable, which we term the Underſtanding, the other the Senſitive Appetite, which we call the Will; ſo he admitteth in the one and the other Part, Faculties, Actions, and Habits, that both being capable of Habits, might alſo be capable of Virtues.

Fifthly, That there is this difference between the firſt and the ſecond Part, that the Virtues of the firſt relate to what is true, or propoſes Truth for their End; but the Virtues of the Appetite or Will, look upon what is Good, or have Goodneſs for their End.

Sixthly, That the Virtues of the firſt Part are five, Prudence, Wiſdom, Underſtanding, Science, and Art; and of the ſecond three, Fortitude, Temperance, and Juſtice.

Seventhly, And becauſe ſome may not think it ſtrange that *Ariſtotle* ſhould rank Virtue in the ſecond Part; to obviate their Objection, he ſays, That this part indeed hath no Reaſon, yet it may be ſaid to have it, becauſe it hearkens to it, and is in reſpect of the Reaſonable part, as a Son in reſpect of his Father, who governs him by his Inſtructions.

Eighthly,

Eighthly, That the Virtues which are in the reaſonable Part being named Intellectual, becauſe they relate to the Mind; but the others which are in the Will, being ſtiled Moral, in reſpect of the Manners of Men; we are not to be concerned preciſely with the firſt, but with the latter; I ſay preciſely, whereby to ſeparate Prudence, which is the Guide of all Moral Virtues, and which is ſo interwoven with our Manners, that it is not only reckoned among the Moral Virtues, but the Firſt and Chief of all the reſt: For *Ariſtotle* ſaith very judiciouſly, That as Sagacity (he means that Faculty of Ability dextrouſly to find out the means whereby to come to the End we propoſe) is accompliſh'd by Prudence. So natural Virtue, that is to ſay, a natural Propenſity or Diſpoſition to Virtue, is made perfect by Wiſdom or by right Reaſon, which cannot be without Prudence. Therefore he terms all Virtues Prudence, not properly, but becauſe they cannot be attain'd without Prudence: For that Reaſon alſo when the Philoſophers give the Definition of Virtue, they ſay it is an Habit conformable to right Reaſon, or rather that it is aſſiſted by right Reaſon; now right Reaſon is guided by Prudence, or it is indeed Prudence it ſelf. And therefore the Definition that *Ariſtotle* gives of Virtue, comprehends in it right Reaſon or Prudence; for he ſaith, that Virtue is an elective Habit which conſiſts in a certain Mediocrity, directed by Reaſon or Prudence; *Virtus eſt habitus electivus in mediocritate quæ ad nos eſt conſiſtens, ratione definitus, aut prout vir prudens definierit.*

Upon which we may obſerve, That all the Philoſophers agree very well with *Ariſtotle*, That Virtue is an Habit preſcrib'd or regulated by Reaſon or by Prudence. Therefore *Cicero* calls it a conſtant and even Temper of Mind, which makes them

them deſervedly praiſed in whom it abides, or rather a conſtant and regular Reaſon. Seeing that a Man is accounted virtuous, or ſaid to be adorned with Virtue, not when caſually, or out of Diſſimulation, or unwillingly and contrary to his Inclination, he does an Action worthy of Praiſe, but when he is diſpoſed in ſuch a manner, that what he does proceeds from a ſtrong Inclination and conſtant Reſolution of doing well, grounded upon ſerious deliberation, and continued with a Delight and Satisfaction. They agree alſo, that we ſhould name it an elective Habit, becauſe hereby it is diſtinguiſhed from the Habits of the Underſtanding, which don't require that the Acts ſhould be produced by the choice of the Appetite, as the moral Habits do, which indeed would not be moral if our Acts were not in our choice, and done freely. But as to what they ſay, That Virtue conſiſts in a Medium, this hath given occaſion to ſeveral, and chiefly to the Stoicks, to contend and exclaim that he hath leſſen'd Virtue, by placing it in the middle between Two contrary Vices, and by making it in that manner to partake of both Extremes. And tho we have already mentioned this matter, yet it is of that great Importance, that it deſerves to be treated of more at large.

In what ſenſe Virtue is ſaid to conſiſt in a Medium, or to be placed in a Mediocrity.

Ariſtotle obſerves, That in the object of Virtue one may diſtinguiſh two Mediums, one he names the Medium of the Thing, *Medium rei*, which is from one ſide to the other, equally diſtant from the Extremes; and this is the ſame in the Judgment of all Men; as for Example, the number of Six between Two and Ten; for it is diſtant from one

one and the other five Unites; therefore he calls that a middle in Arithmetick, which is termed an Arithmetical Proportion. The other he ſtiles a Medium in reſpect of our ſelves, *Medium quoad nos*, or which is neither above nor beneath what is convenient for us: From hence it is, that it cannot be the ſame in reſpect of all Men, becauſe the ſame thing is not equally convenient to all; for Example, if to Eat ſix Pounds weight is too much, and Two too little, the Rule therefore of the *Athletes* preſcribes not ſix Pounds to all, for it is too little for a *Milo* and too much for a *Tiro*. Wherefore this Middle or *Medium* is commonly ſtiled, the Middle according to Reaſon, *Medium Rationis*, becauſe it is appointed by right Reaſon, and becauſe it conſiſts in that Reaſon or Proportion, which *Ariſtotle* ought to have named of Geometry, and which belongs only to the wiſe Man to underſtand.

Ariſtotle therefore ſhews, that Virtue conſiſts not in the Medium of the Thing, but in the Medium in reſpect of us, Geometrically conſider'd, with relation to Reaſon; for as Virtue hath the Paſſions and Actions for Objects, for Example, ſuch as are theſe, to Fear, to be Confident, to Deſire, to have an Averſion, to be Angry, to have Pity, and in ſhort, to be affected with Pleaſure or Grief; I ſay, Virtue having for its Object the Paſſions and Actions, in which there may happen to be Exceſs, Deficiency, or a due Medium between both; here it belongs to Virtue to point out a Middle, which may be moſt proper and convenient, both in reſpect of Time, Perſon and Place, or any other Circumſtance that may attend us.

He farther demonſtrates, That whereas Virtue conſiſts in preſcribing a Middle between two Extremes, it is it ſelf that Medium or middle Habit between two vicious Extremes, the one inclining

to Exceſs, and the other defective, either in the thing or in the Object. So that Virtue in its Eſſence and Nature, in that it preſcribes a Middle, is really it ſelf alſo a kind of Medium; but in relation to Excellency and Perfection, it is ſomething elevated above all. This cauſeth them to make this common Diſtinction, The Middle in reſpect of the Object, and the Middle in reſpect of the Eſſence; becauſe the Middle in relation to the Object, is nothing elſe but the Middle in relation to our ſelves, or in reſpect to Reaſon, and which is placed or conſidered between two Extremes: According to what *Horace* ſays, when he tells us, That there is a juſt Mediocrity to be kept in things, and that there are due Limits and Bounds which we muſt neither come ſhort of nor exceed.

Eſt modus in rebus, ſunt certi denique fines,
Quos ultra citraq; nequit conſiſtere rectum.

The Medium, in reſpect of the Eſſence, is nothing elſe but Virtue it ſelf between two Vices; or as the ſame Author expreſſes it, the Middle of two Vices, in reſpect of both Ends.

Virtus eſt medium vitiorum et utrinq; reductum.

He does afterward illuſtrate and prove the Matter; for Fortitude is a Middle between Cowardiſe and Preſumption; Temperance, between Intemperance and a total Neglect; Liberality, between Prodigality and Covetouſneſs; Magnificence, between Niggardlineſs and Gaudineſs; Magnanimity, between Puſilanimity and a fooliſh Oſtentation; Modeſty, between having a due regard to our Honour and Ambition; Clemency and an eaſy and tractable Converſation

verſation, between a baſe Compliance and a cholerick Temper; Truth and Veracity, between Diſſimulation and vain Boaſting; a pleaſant Humour, between Ruſticity or a clowniſh Temper; Amity, between Flattery and a thwarting Temper; Moderation, between Stupidity and Impudence; a juſt Indignation, between Envy and Jealouſy, and Malevolence or Ill-will; Prudence, between Folly or Stupidity, and cunning Craft or Knavery. For Juſtice, though it is not properly between two Extremes, becauſe there is nothing oppoſite to it but Injuſtice; nevertheleſs, it ſeems to acknowledge a Medium in its Object, becauſe Juſtice being a Virtue that relates to others, or is between two Perſons, it belongs to it ſo to reduce the thing to Equity or Equality, that the one may not have more, nor the other leſs than is due; ſo that Injuſtice ſtands in ſtead of Exceſs in reſpect of one, and of Defect in reſpect of the other.

He maintains alſo, That there are certain Vices that will not admit of any Mediums, as Adultery, Theft and Murder, becauſe there is always a Sin in the very Act, and no Virtue can be found in it: For Example, to preſcribe with what Woman, at what time and how Adultery ought to be committed; for to ſeek for a Medium there, is the ſame as to ſeek for one in Debauchery, in Cowardiſe, and in the extremities of other Vices.

Laſtly, he affirms, That the Extremities are not only contrary to one another, but alſo to the Mediums; inſomuch, that the Valiant and Courageous appears to the Coward Bold and Preſumptuous, and to the Audacious Mean and Cowardly; The Liberal ſeems to be Prodigal to the Covetous Wretch, and to the Prodigal Covetous, and ſo of the reſt. Nevertheleſs, there are ſome Extremes that ſeem to be more contrary and oppoſite to the middle than

the other, and for that reaſon ſometimes one Virtue ſeems to incline more to Exceſs than to Defect, as Fortitude ſeems to be more like Audacity than Cowardiſe, and ſometimes nearer to Defect than Exceſs, as Temperance ſeems to incline more to a privation from Pleaſure than to Intemperance. From hence he concludes, That there is a difficulty to become truly Virtuous, becauſe it is hard to find the Medium that might be convenient in all reſpects; and therefore he adviſes them who propoſe that Medium, to avoid chiefly that extremity, which is moſt contrary, and to take heed of that Vice unto which we have moſt tendency, and to act as thoſe who labouring to make a crooked Stick ſtrait, bend it in ſuch a manner on the contrary ſide, that at laſt they may reduce it to a perfect ſtrait, which is that of Right and Equity.

Of the Apathy, or the Inſenſibility of Stoicks.

NOW as the Stoicks differ from the Peripateticks in particular, that the Stoicks in the firſt place would have a wiſe Man be ἀπαθῆ, without Paſſion, whereas the Peripateticks diſtinguiſh the Paſſions or Affections into vain and uſeleſs, and into natural and neceſſary. They ſay well, that a wiſe Man ought to be free from the firſt ſort, but that the latter ſhould be kept in and bridled in ſuch a manner, that we may obſerve a convenient Mean and a juſt Mediocrity. Secondly, whereas the Stoicks will never allow a wiſe Man either to complain or grieve, nay, in the midſt of Pain he ſhould keep up to ſuch a ſevere and rigid Auſterity as may beſpeak him almoſt inſenſible; but the Peripateticks think that this was ſpoken out of an Exceſs of Vanity and Ambition, and that it is more convenient to

to be moved with Tenderneſs, to let fall a few Tears, Sighs and Groans, than to be wiſe after ſuch a manner, to be inwardly tormented, as ſaith *Crantor*, by ſuch a kind of Inhumanity and Inſenſibility. As there is this difference, I ſay between the Stoicks and the Peripateticks, let us examin in few Words what *Cicero* ſaith, who ſeems to be a Defender of this Inſenſibility in anſwer to the Peripateticks. After he had given ſuch a deſcription of a wiſe Man as we have already ſeen, thus he goes on. *Therefore we ought to look upon the Judgment of the Peripateticks, as weak and contemptible, when they ſay, That it is neceſſary that the Minds of Men ſhould be toſſed up and down and diſturbed; but yet they appoint a certain Moderation beyond which it is not lawful to paſs: What*, ſaith he, *wilt thou aſſign a Moderation to Vice? Is it not Vice to diſobey Reaſon? To deſire any thing paſſionately, and after we have obtained it to behave our ſelves Proudly and Inſolently; to be eaſily dejected, or for the very fear of Oppreſſion to grow furious, and deprive our ſelves of the uſe of our Judgment? Is it not a great Fault and Error to be either too much Dejected or Exalted?* Thus *Cicero* argues. But to ſpeak the Truth, the Peripateticks never had any ſuch Fancy, that Vice ought to be moderated in ſuch a manner that it ſhould ſtill remain in any reſpect a Vice; they held Virtue to be a Medium, not that it was ſuch as participating of the Extremes, as Lukewarm doth of Heat and Cold; but that it is between two Extremes, as the Center is between the extremities of a Diameter, the ſtrait Line between two crooked. Neither did they pretend that it was no Vice to diſobey Reaſon, for they would have Reaſon to preſcribe a Moderation: Nor did they allow a too eager or paſſionate Deſire of Things, or when obtained, to be too much exalted or puff'd up; for they were perſuaded, that the power of Reaſon ought to give

a check to all Fury and Inſolence, and to confine them within due Bounds: So that they denied not that it was evil to be too much Dejected and Afflicted, or for fear of being ſo, to fall into ſuch Deſparation and Fury, as to loſe all, and be deprived of the uſe of their Judgment; for they ſtill thought that we ought to rouſe up our ſelves, and keep us free from Deſpair, and in a due and moderate Temper. Neither did they believe that it was no Error in our Actions to expreſs too much Grief or too much Joy; for they taught, That we ought ſo to correct our Error, that there might not appear either too much or too little in any thing.

He goes further on, and ſays, *That he who ſeeks a Moderation in Vice, acts as he who caſting himſelf down headlong from a ſteep Mountain, endeavours to ſtop himſelf in his Fall, but in vain; and to as little purpoſe, as it is for a Man whoſe Thoughts are Diſtracted, and his Paſſions Predominant, on a ſuddain to appeaſe 'em and make a Calm.* But they will deny perhaps, that where Mediocrity or Moderation, in which Virtue conſiſts, being obſerved, there ſhould remain any thing of Vice; nor will they allow of that Compariſon, that where a Man hath once caſt himſelf down headlong, that its not in his Power to retrieve himſelf from Falling, to hold good in this Caſe; for he who is fallen into a Paſſion hath ſome Reaſon in him ſtill remaining, which is able to repreſs or check it, eſpecially if he hath the feweſt Grains of Wiſdom remaining, or the leaſt Inclination for Virtue, as ſuch a one may have that we now inſtance in.

At laſt he concludes in this manner, *Therefore if they approve of a Moderation in Trouble, 'tis the ſame as if they allowed of a Moderation in Injuſtice, a Moderation in Cowardiſe, a Moderation in Intemperance; for to apportion a Moderation in Vice, is to approve of ſome*

ſome part of the Vice. But *Cicero* inſiſts upon that which they will not allow; for he looks upon Virtue not as a Medium between two Vices, but as a Vice moderated, which is quite contrary to the Judgment of *Ariſtotle*; for he ſaith, *For to ſeek a Mediocrity in Adultery, or any ſuch like Vice, 'tis the ſame as to admit of a Mediocrity, Exceſs, or a Deficiency in Injuſtice, in Cowardiſe, and in Intemperance.*

Cicero afterwards more at large mentions the Reaſonings and Arguments of the Peripateticks, with a deſign to oppoſe 'em, *That according to their Judgment, the inward Diſturbances and Paſſions are not only Natural, but that they have been allowed by Nature for good Uſes; That they allow of Anger as a Whet-ſtone to Courage, becauſe the Aſſault of an angry Perſon, againſt a publick Enemy, or a treacherous Subject, is more Powerful than if he oppoſed him in cold Blood; That ſevere Injunctions are not without a Mixture of Anger; That if an Orator is not angry, he ought at leaſt to pretend to be ſo; That a Man is not a Man, if he cannot be angry, and that what Men call Calmneſs is a kind of ſtupid Inſenſibility; That it is impoſſible to perform any great thing without ſome Tranſport, witneſs* Themiſtocles *and* Demoſthenes; *That without this Incentive, the great Philoſophers had never made ſo large a Progreſs in the Sciences, and that without ſuch an earneſt deſire,* Pythagoras, Democritus, *and* Plato *had never travelled as they did about the World; That it is notwithout ſome great advantage that Nature hath appointed Diſpleaſure and Grief, that Men might be vexed and grieved for their Crimes, and troubled for their Puniſhments, Reproofs, and Shame; That Mercy is uſeful to oblige us to aſſiſt the afflicted, and that to be emulous is not altogether uſeleſs; And laſtly, That he who will take away Fear, takes away all Diligence, &c.* He adds many other

Particulars which he ſeems to anſwer when he ſaith, *Nevertheleſs, they confeſs when they Diſpute of theſe Matters, that they ought to be cut off in part, but that they cannot, nor ought not to be totally rooted out. So that they eſteem Mediocrity or Moderation to be requiſite almoſt in every thing.* And truly in relation to what he objects; for Example, *That it belongs not to a ſtout and generous Spirit to be angry, but to a Fencer; that without this Anger of a Fencer,* Ajax *will encounter* Hector, *and that* Torquatus Marcellus *the* African, *was free from it,* &c. They will anſwer, That it may be proper for a Fencer to be furiouſly angry and beyond Reaſon, but the Anger of a generous Perſon is more Temperate and hearkens to Reaſon.

And as to what he ſays concerning Mercy. *Cannot we be Liberal but we muſt be touched with Compaſſion and Pity? Seeing we ought not to afflict our ſelves for others, but to ſtrive, if it be poſſible, to raiſe them out of their Afflictions.* They will anſwer, That Mercy will cauſe us to be more inclined to Liberality; and that the wiſe Man ſuffers not himſelf to be vexed and afflicted for others, in ſuch a manner as to be diſturbed in himſelf, but it is a kind ſenſe of Humanity that obliges him to lend Aſſiſtance to others.

In relation to Jealouſie or Emulation, they will anſwer, That the Jealouſie of a wiſe Man is nothing but a certain Motion or Deſire that ingages him to ſtrive to attain to a degree of Glory, equal or greater than that of another.

As to what concerns Fear, they will willingly agree, That Timerouſneſs or too great Fear is to be condemned; and they will ſhew, that this Life cannot be without Fear, which cauſeth us to provide before-hand againſt ſeveral Caſualties which we fore-ſee.

Finally,

Finally, in relation to what he ſaith of Anger and Deſire, they will prove that it is natural to be angry, and have an Ambition: But to be angry without meaſure, or to aim at any thing with too much eagerneſs, this proceeds from an Error that we ought to correct; ſo that when they adviſe us to avoid or abſtain from all Exceſs, they adviſe us to extirpate and deſtroy whatſoever proceeds from Error, but not ſo that what is natural or naturally planted in us, either can or ought to be rooted out and totally defaced.

Of the mutual Connection of Moral Virtues.

NOw to ſpeak ſomething concerning the Connection or mutual Relation of Moral Virtues, it is to be collected from two Particulars; Firſt, That they are all united with Prudence, as all the Members with the Body, the Streams of Water with the Fountain from whence they run. Secondly, That Prudence and all the reſt are unſeparable from a pleaſant Life, for Life cannot be pleaſant without Virtue; and where-ever Virtue reſides, there Life muſt needs be pleaſant. From hence it appears, that the conſequence of this mutual Conjunction of Virtues, is grounded upon this Maxim, *That things that are united in any third thing, are united among themſelves.* Now 'tis not needful to ſpeak any thing of the ſecond Particular, for we ſhall underſtand this Matter ſufficiently hereafter, when we ſhall conſider the ſaying of *Epicurus*, *That Virtue is not deſirable for its own ſake, but for the ſake of Pleaſure.* This hath cauſed ſome to exclaim againſt him. We ſhall be here ſatisfied by alledging a Paſſage out of *Ariſtotle*, by which it appears, that he was in this Matter of the ſame Opinion as *Epicurus:*

Epicurus: As, ſaith he, *the thing beloved is pleaſing to the Lover; the Horſe, for example, to him who loves Horſes, the Theatre and Shews to him who loves them; ſo to him who loves Juſtice, the things that are juſt are grateful, and generally to him who loves Virtue, the Actions that are Virtuous. I confeſs, that the things that pleaſe the common People don't agree together, becauſe they are not ſo really of their own Nature: But ſuch as are pleaſing to them who love honeſty, are of themſelves, and of their own Nature, grateful and agreeable. Such are the Actions of Virtue, which are by conſequence pleaſing, becauſe they are of themſelves ſo; their Life therefore hath no need of Pleaſure, as of an addition, but it poſſeſſeth in it ſelf an inward Pleaſure. Nay, to go yet farther, he who delights not in honeſt Actions, is no juſt and honeſt Man, nor can we denominate ſuch an one a juſt and liberal Perſon to whom juſt and liberal Actions give no Pleaſure: And the like is to be underſtood of the other Virtues. From hence therefore we conclude, That virtuous Actions are of themſelves, and of their own Nature, Pleaſant and Delightful.*

In relation to the firſt Particular, the Judgment of *Ariſtotle* is yet more plain, for he gives this Definition of Virtue; *An Habit that relates to Mediocrity*; Or, *a Medium which Prudence hath preſcribed and directed.* This ſhews, that no Virtue can be without Prudence, and by conſequence all Virtues being united with Prudence, they have a mutual Correſpondency: This anſwers the Objection which ſome might make by ſaying, That ſure Men are not fit for all Virtues, and therefore he may be inclinable to one before he hath attained another; for he diſtinguiſheth and teacheth, that this may happen in reſpect of the natural Virtues, or of the Seeds of natural Virtue; *For,* ſaith he, *as ſoon as we are born, we are qualified for Juſtice, for Temperance,*

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Fortitude, and other Virtues. But this cannot be ſo, in relation to ſuch Virtues by which a Man is ſtiled a good and virtuous Man, becauſe all the reſt accompany Prudence; and to ſpeak properly, a good Man cannot be without Prudence, and a prudent Man can't be without Virtue.

Now we muſt obſerve, that this diſtinction may ſerve to reſolve the Opinion, that *Laertius* aſcribes to him, That he was perſwaded that all the Virtues had not a mutual Connection, for it might happen that a Man might be Prudent and Juſt, and yet might be Intemperate and Debauch'd; for he will reply, That thoſe who ſeem to be adorned with ſome certain Virtues, if they have not the reſt, have 'em in Appearance and Imperfect, becauſe their ſeeming Actions of Virtue are not inlivened with that inward Paſſion and general Inclination for Honeſty, whereby the Soul is influenc'd to act nothing without the direction of Reaſon. 'Tis the ſame as if we ſhould ſay, That they have a material Virtue, but not a formal; for the Form or Perfection and Completion of all Virtue, is this Affection and general Diſpoſition of the Mind, by which a Man does nothing but in a juſt manner, and out of a principle of Virtue; for according to the Judgment of *Ariſtotle*, nothing but this Diſpoſition can qualifie Men to be Honeſt and Juſt: So that he who is not rich, and conſequently not in a Condition to ſhew his Liberality or Magnificence, yet may have a Soul ſo qualified, that if his Eſtate increaſed he would do nothing but what is Juſt, Honourable, and Magnificent; for tho' he hath not the Habit of beſtowing large Gifts, yet he hath a Propenſion of giving according to his Abilities, and is not ſparing of that which is in his ſmall Power to give. Therefore the Liberality of that poor Country-man, who having nothing

thing elſe, preſented Water to the King which he had drawn out of the River, was as acceptable, as the Gifts of Princes in rich and coſtly Veſſels.

I ſhall not here mention the ſeveral Reaſons that *Alexander* hath collected, nor with him ſtay to tell you, for inſtance, That it is impoſſible for a Man to be juſt, unleſs at the ſame time he hath all other Virtues; for if he be intemperate, or fearful, or covetous, he will ceaſe to be juſt, when an Opportunity offers of Pleaſure, Danger, or Hopes of Gain; and ſo it is with other Vices, there is not any but is able to cauſe us to Violate and Corrupt ſome part of Juſtice. I ſhall only take notice, that this Doctrin of the Connection and Correſpondency of Virtues together, is common not only to *Epicurus*, *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, St. *Ambroſe*, and St. *Gregory*, but *chiefly* to the Stoicks, tho' theſe laſt add this Paradox, That Virtues are all equal. I add the word *chiefly*, for among them theſe Opinions paſs for Current; *That a wicked Man hath no Virtue, and a juſt Man no Vice*; *That the firſt ſins in every thing, and the latter acts nothing ill*; *That whatſoever a wiſe Man doth, he doth it aſſiſted by all the Virtues, and if he did but wag his Finger without the direction of Reaſon, he would commit a Sin.*

Ni tibi conceſſit ratio digitum exſere peccas.

A General Diviſion of Virtue.

But as we are now to ſpeak of the ſeveral kinds of Virtue, we ought here firſt to lay down the common Diviſion thereof. Not to mention here what *Zeno* taught, that there were divers ſorts of Virtues, (which yet the Megarians would not allow of, ſuppoſing 'em to be but one, under ſeveral Names;)

Names:) Nor what *Apollophanes* aſſerts, *viz.* That of Prudence only: That celebrated Diviſion of Virtue into four parts is ſufficiently known, *viz.* of Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, and Juſtice. Nevertheleſs, *Ariſtotle* in his Morals, treats of theſe four Virtues in the ſame manner as he treats alſo of Gentleneſs, of Liberality, of the greatneſs of the Mind, of Magnificence, of Moderation, of juſt Indignation, of Modeſty, of Gravity, of Truth or Veracity, of Civility, and of the reſt, as diſtinct kinds of Virtue, not tying himſelf to any limited Number; And ſo begins to diſcourſe of Fortitude.

For the Stoicks, tho' they have variouſly divided Virtue, nevertheleſs, *Poſſidonius*, among the reſt, holds to theſe four kinds; and therefore *Cicero* ſeems to have taken this from the Stoicks; *Whatſoever is juſt and honeſt, proceeds from one of theſe four Species; for either it relates to the diſcerning of Truth and Falſhood; or the Preſervation of the Society which conſiſts in the faith of Contracts, and in giving to every one what appertains to him; or the ſtrength and greatneſs of the Soul; or elſe in the Moderation in all that we ſay or do:* By which Words the four ſorts of Virtue are deſcribed. Now we muſt obſerve, that if ſince the days of St. *Ambroſe*, and St. *Jerom*, theſe four Virtues have been ſtiled Cardinal Virtues, becauſe they are look'd upon as the Hinges upon which the reſt turn; it is doubtleſs in imitation of the Stoicks, who affirm, That among the Virtues ſome are Primitive or Principal, the others ſubject and depending on the former; and that the firſt are Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance and Juſtice; and the latter a greatneſs of Mind, Continency, Patience, quickneſs of Apprehenſion, or livelineſs of Spirit, Subtilty, and ſound Judgment, all which *Cicero* terms Companions, and *Seneca* branches of the firſt Stock.

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The Schoolmen call 'em Parts, and divide 'em into three kinds, that they might refer all the Virtues called Moral to one of the four chief. Thus *Thomas Aquinas* hath dealt. Now theſe three Parts are, Firſt, Such as are properly called Subjects or Species. Secondly, The Integral Parts, or which have in ſome reſpect the Parts which compoſe the whole, and ought neceſſarily to aſſiſt to the perfect Act of a certain Virtue. Thirdly, The Potential, which like the Powers of the Soul, are accompanying, but have not the Efficacy of a a principal Virtue.

Thus the Virtues ſubject to Prudence, are the Private, the Oeconomick, the Politick, the Military, and the Royal: The Integral, are Memory, Docility, Sagacity, Reaſon, Providence, Circumſpection, and Precaution or Fore-ſight: The Potential, which bear their ancient Greek names, are *Ebulia*, that is, Wiſdom in Counſel; *Syneſis*, ſharpneſs of Apprehenſion; *Gnome*, a prudent Elocution.

Thus the Subject Parts of Juſtice, are the General, the Legal, and the Special, which have for Species, the commutative and diſtributive Juſtice: The Integral, are the Precepts of the Law, as To do wrong to no Body; To give to every one what belongs to him; and if we may make uſe of the words of Holy Writ, *To fly from Evil and to do Good:* The Potential, are Religion, Holineſs, Piety, Charity, Obedience, Truth, Gratitude, Liberality, Affability, and Amity or Friendſhip.

In like manner, the Subject Parts of Temperance, are Abſtinence and Sobriety; firſt in relation to Eating, the latter in reſpect of Drinking, Chaſtity and Modeſty; The Integral, are Baſhfulneſs and Honeſty; The Potential, are Clemency, Humility, Modeſty, Mildneſs, Mercy, Moderation, Decency, Gratefulneſs, and Urbanity.

For

For Fortitude, as it is not uſual to aſcribe to it any ſubject Parts, becauſe of that chief Matter about which it is employed, ſo only four Parts are aſſigned to it, which are reckoned to be Integral, when they are lookt upon as being employed about a difficult Matter; or Potential, if the Matter hath leſs difficulty. Theſe parts are Confidence, Magnanimity or greatneſs of Courage; Magnificence, Patience or long Forbearance; Conſtancy or Perſeverance. The two firſt are for an Aggreſs or Aſſault, the two latter for Defence and Support.

CHAP II.

Of Prudence in General.

NOW to ſay ſomething to the purpoſe concerning the four principal Virtues, and about ſome of their chief Species: And we will begin with Prudence, which *Ariſtotle*, *Epicurus*, and all the other Philoſophers, not without Reaſon, call the Head, the Fountain, the Miſtreſs, the Queen of all other Virtues. But to lay aſide all Equivocation, tho' Prudence and Wiſdom are often uſed Promiſcuouſly and to the ſame Senſe, nevertheleſs, *Ariſtotle* diſtinguiſhes them in ſuch a manner, that he takes Wiſdom for the knowledge of Things honourable and worthy; but Prudence for a particular Virtue, which reſpects the Things uſeful and convenient for the Life of Man. *From hence it is*, ſaith he, *that* Anaxagoras, Thales, *and ſome others, may very well be accounted Wiſe, but not Prudent; becauſe we find that they were Ignorant of the Things that were needful,*

ful, and yet they understood several excellent, admirable, difficult and divine Things; but useless for the good and happiness of Life. Now 'tis certain, that we are not to speak of Prudence as it is taken for that high and speculative Wisdom, but as it is a moral Virtue, which is to rule and govern all the Actions of our Life; and which by distinguishing the good from the evil, the useful things from such as are hurtful, points out that which we are to Embrace, and that which we are to Avoid; and by that means leads and directs Man to live well and Happily.

Therefore *Cicero* gives this definition of Prudence, *The knowledge of the Things that we are to desire or avoid.* And *Aristotle* saith, *'Tis an habit of Acting according to right Reason, in the Things that are good or evil to Mankind.* Now we must observe, in relation to what he saith, that it is an Habit of Acting according to right Reason; that he don't understand but that a prudent Man may sometimes be impos'd upon by a colourable Reason, and which does not exactly answer the event of Things; yet he ought to perform nothing but with due Consideration; and after he hath well examined every thing, and hath had a regard to the Place and Time of his Deliberation, he perceives no Reason truer or more probable, than that which he resolves to embrace and follow; but still at the same time, notwithstanding his serious Deliberation, if a Reason more likely or probable comes into his Thought, he is more ready to embrace it, and be led by it. This makes Prudence to be a very uncertain Habit, full of Conjectures, by which it differs from Science, as *Aristotle* understands it; for Science hath necessary Things for its Objects, Things necessary, and which cannot be otherwise; but Prudence looks upon Things that are contingent and casual, that may happen or not, may fall out this way or t'other.

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We muſt likewiſe obſerve, That *Ariſtotle* underſtands by good or evil Things, chiefly the Means, which are ſaid to be good, as they are uſeful and convenient for the purpoſes of Virtue, and evil as they are hurtful and prejudicial to ſuch purpoſes: For tho we deliberate about an End, it is not abſolutely an End, but it is really a Means to obtain another at a diſtance, and which alſo may be lookt upon as a further Means, until we arrive at the laſt of all, which is Happineſs, about which there is no deliberation, for there is no Body but would be Happy, and we trouble our ſelves about nothing elſe but how to attain to it. Therefore we have given this Definition of Prudence in general, That it directs a Man to a good and happy Life; not but that it reſpects particular Caſes alſo, ſeeing it is the Duty of Prudence to dictate what we ought, and what we ought not to do, on every particular occaſion: But becauſe it appears chiefly in a certain proſpect of a general Life that we propoſe to our ſelves, and which may be ſuch, that all our particular Actions mutually agree among themſelves, and tend all, without any oppoſition, to Happineſs; or, as we have ſaid, to live Well and Happily; for that Reaſon, Prudence is uſually term'd the Art of Living; and *Plato* calls it, the Knowledge which procures Happineſs. And *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That it is the part of a Prudent Man, not only to conſult and maturely to deliberate upon particular Matters, ſuch as Health, *&c.* but generally about all things which may contribute to our living Well and Happily.

Of the general Offices or Duties of Prudence.

WE commonly divide the general Offices or Duties of Prudence into theſe three Parts, *viz.* To Conſult or Adviſe well, to Underſtand and Com-

prehend aright, to Command and Prescribe. 'Tis what is usually express'd by these Words, Εὐβουλία, Σύνεσις, Γνώμη, which are term'd in the Schools the potential parts of Prudence, tho' they are really, and rather the acts of Prudence. The first then is to advise well, the Particle [*well*] being here added because this belongs peculiarly to a prudent Man; for rash and inconsidering People run headlong without ever examining the Matter: But Deliberation, which regards Prudence, ought to be good, as *Aristotle* saith, and tend to a good End. So that if any by taking wrong Measures suceeds, that cannot be said to be a good Deliberation; for tho he obtains what he seeks to obtain, yet 'tis not by such Means as he ought to make use of. Therefore Cunning or Subtilty that cares not what Methods it takes to accomplish its Ends, whether Good or Evil, is placed as one of the Extremes of Prudence. And therefore a subtil and cunning Man, having no respect to Honesty, is lookt upon by a prudent Man, just as a wicked Person is by a good Man. For Malice, saith *Cicero*, will often imitate Prudence.

The second Duty is to apprehend well, and understand the ways and means that we are to make use of, after we have soberly and seriously deliberated and advised. *Aristotle*, by this word *Understand*, seems to mean nothing else but an easy Apprehension, or an Understanding quick and nimble; therefore he opposeth this Understanding to Stupidity, or a slowness of Apprehension. So that according to his Opinion, a prudent Man being between the Subtil and Knavish, and the Dull and Stupid, may be judged to be placed a Man between the evil Spirit and a Brute; they are his own Words.

The Third is to command or prescribe the performance of the Things that have been formerly judged or resolved on; or, which is in effect the same,

ſame, to order that the Means that have been thus reſolved on, may actually be put in Execution: For Prudence, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, is of its own Nature ἐπιτακτική, *Imperatoria*, born and deſigned to Command; ſo that inſtead of γνώμη, which, according to *Ariſtotle*, ſignifies no other thing but a right Judgment, we ought to have uſed the Word ἐπιτάξις, which imports Commanding.

Of the Diſpoſitions or Qualities needful for performing the Duties of Prudence.

THE Duties or the Acts of Prudence being ſuch as we have already mentioned, it is certain that ſome Diſpoſitions, Qualities or Faculties, are requiſite in the Soul for their due Execution. Theſe are properly the Faculties which are called *Partes Integrantes*, and which are commonly comprehended under theſe general Terms, of the recollecting of Things paſt, the right underſtanding of Things preſent, and the foreſight or providing againſt Things to come. For firſt it is plain, that Prudence makes it abſolutely neceſſary to call to Mind Things paſt; for in the ſequel of Affairs the Things that ought to be done hereafter, have ſuch a relation with what hath been already done, that if we forget that which hath been done, in the manner as it hath been done, that accordingly we may effect what remains to be done, it often happens either that that which is already done comes to nothing, or that which is to be performed rarely ſucceeds, but croſſes our Expectation. Beſides, our Judgments are to reaſon and judge according to our Knowledge, neither can they conclude upon more certain Grounds than this, That from like Cauſes, probably may follow like Effects. Now it is certain, that

to be able to make this Compariſon of one Cauſe with another, it is abſolutely neceſſary to remember Things paſt: Beſides, as it ſeldom or never happens that one thing is intirely like to another in all Circumſtances, we ought to have in our Mind and Memory ſeveral Occurrences which are truly alike in moſt Things, and yet may be different as to other Circumſtances, that ſo in our Reſolution we may have a regard to thoſe Circumſtances. This cauſed *Ariſtotle* to ſay, That young Men may propably attain the Art of Geometry, and become Maſters of ſuch like Sciences; but they cannot ſo eaſily attain to Prudence, becauſe this reſpects particular Things, whereof the Knowledge is obtained only by Experience and Obſervation. Wherefore *Afranius* ſays of Wiſdom, that Uſe had begotten her, and Memory was her Mother.

Uſus me genuit Mater peperit Memoria:
Σοφίαν vocant me Graij, vos Sapientiam.

But this may properly be underſtood of Prudence, as *Ovid* ſeems to imitate in theſe Verſes, where he brings in *Pallas* in the Habit of a grave Matron, ſaying, That Youth and even riper Years are ignorant of moſt Things which we ought to avoid, and that a good and judicious Choice is not to be made, but by a long tried and well ſeaſon'd Experience.

——— non omnia grandior ætas
Quæ fugiamus habet; ſeris venit uſus ab annis.

It is likewiſe manifeſt that the underſtanding and knowledge of preſent Things is abſolutely requiſite, and that to act prudently we muſt very well underſtand the nature, the qualities and circumſtances of our preſent Affairs. For if it happens that, for

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Example, any be obliged to take a Reſolution, as we ſay, upon a ſudden, How can that well be done, if he knows not perfectly all the Circumſtances of the Buſineſs, ſo that he may run them over in a moment in his Thoughts, if he ſees not the Correſpondency and Oppoſition that this Buſineſs hath with others, and if he knows not what will follow from this rather than from that? Suppoſe that he hath time to conſider, yet if he underſtands not the Nature, the State and Circumſtances of the thing he is conſidering of, the Will or Ability of thoſe who may be Aſſiſting or Prejudicial to the executing of it, what dependence it may have with Matters that may either retard or hinder it, or if he knows not his own Strength, or what he is able or not able to perform, what good can ſuch a one do, and which way will he propoſe to ſucceed? Let us therefore take it for granted, that a Man is ſo much the more Prudent and more able to deliberate, to judge well, and execute accordingly, the greater and more exact his Memory is of the time paſt, for by that the greater and more exact will likewiſe his Knowledge be of things preſent.

Laſtly, All the World will acknowledge, that the Fore-ſight of things to come, as far as we can ſearch into and apprehend 'em, is very requiſite, that if any Evil is impendent, we may endeavour to avoid it; and if any Good, we may the better ſecure it, and may ſo adapt the means to its proper end, that all things may ſucceed well. I ſay, as far as Men are able to fore-ſee and apprehend; for ſometimes things ſo fall out that all human Art and Contrivance can no wiſe fore-ſee, ſo that all our Imaginations have been deceiv'd and impos'd, things falling out quite otherwiſe than we have ſuppoſed, or our Reaſon could fore-ſee: From hence we may conclude, that our Prudence depends

much upon Conjectures, and admoniſhes us at the ſame time to remember our natural Weakneſs, and to acknowledge that God only knows certainly what is to happen: And here by the way, we ought to take heed of being impos'd upon by Jugglers and Fortune-tellers, who take upon 'em to predict things to come. Yet, notwithſtanding Prudence hath theſe three conſiderable Advantages, Firſt, That tho' ſometimes it is miſtaken, as namely, when an Accident intervenes, which it was not poſſible to fore-ſee, yet it often attains its End; whereas Imprudence is often deceiv'd, and ſeldom or very rarely compaſſes its End, except by Accident. Secondly, That a prudent Man, conſidering the uncertainty of all things, he propoſes nothing ſo certain to himſelf, as if it ought infallibly to fall out; ſo that hereby he prepares againſt all Caſualties that may happen contrary to his Expectation, and by this means fore-ſees as it were the Event, by being fore-warned. Thirdly, Tho' Matters ſucceed to him contrary to his Contrivance and Fore-ſight, yet he never has juſt Cauſe to repent, becauſe he ſquares his Actions by the Rules of right Reaſon, and therefore without ſome Caſualty intervening (which is out of the reach of human Fore-ſight to prevent) he could not rationally expect to be diſappointed. But on the other hand, an imprudent Man is always wrack'd with Repentance, becauſe he finds that he hath neither foreſeen nor prevented what he might have done, but ſuffered ſuch things to befall him which a cautious and timely Fore-ſight in all likelihood might have prevented.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of private Prudence.

NOW to deſcend to the ſeveral Species or diſtinct Parts of Prudence; we have already mentioned the ordinary Diviſion of the Schoolmen who name five; the Private, which they alſo call Monaſtic or Solitary, by which every one Governs and Rules his own proper Manners; the Oeconomic, by which every one Governs his Family; the Politic, which they aſcribe to Subjects when they behave themſelves conformable to the Laws of the Society; the Military, by which an Army is Governed; the Regal, by which a whole Nation is ruled. But *Ariſtotle*, whoſe Method and Conception ſeems to be more reaſonable in the Diviſion of Prudence, makes no mention of the Military, becauſe it belongs to the Politic, nor of the Regal, as being alſo a part of the Politic; but after the Private and the Oeconomic, he acknowledgeth none but the Politic, which he ſuppoſeth to be not in the Subjects but in the Governours. Therefore we ſhall follow the Diviſion of *Ariſtotle*, as the moſt reaſonable and the moſt convenient. I ſhall only take notice of the firſt Species, that it is named Private, Monaſtic, and Solitary, not becauſe it is preciſely deſigned to Moderate and Rule the Manners of one who leads a private Life, and intermeddles not with public Affairs, or who living in a ſolitary Place, ſeparates himſelf from the Society of Men, as the Hermits; but we make uſe of this Appellation to ſignifie that every Perſon of what Condition ſoever, ought to be endowed with a certain Prudence which belongs to him alone, and re-

gards his particular Perſon. So that tho' he may Govern others, he muſt alſo Govern himſelf chiefly, according to the Dictates of Reaſon, and ſo provide for himſelf that he may become an honeſt Man; that is to ſay, a Man of good and laudable Manners. Therefore this kind of Prudence is neceſſary as well for a Prince as a Maſter of a Family, for both are bound not only to Rule others, but moreover to know how to Rule themſelves, and not only to be good Governours, but alſo to be honeſt and good Men. From hence it is therefore, that this kind of Prudence is not only named Private or Solitary, but alſo Ethic and Moral; for it ought to preſcribe and appoint the Manners of every particular Perſon, and adjuſt them to the Rules of Reaſon. For according to the Opinion of *Ariſtotle* and his Followers, it belongs to Morality, or to Moral Diſcipline, to look after every ones manner of living, thereby to render his life better: So that by obeying its Precepts, a Man may become a juſt and honeſt Man, *viz.* by living prudently, by ſubduing Anger and his other Paſſions to his own Reaſon, by regulating their diſorderly Motions, and not ſuffering 'em to act extravagantly; ſo that if he performs any thing, he may be always ready to give a good Reaſon why he hath thus proceeded, tho' none requires it of him, and to give a check to himſelf, by examining his own Manners and Actions, and inquiring of himſelf as *Phocilides* did, By what Courſe have I ſteer'd? What have I been doing? What good have I performed or omitted?

Quanam tranſilii, quid feci, quid boni omiſi?

Rejoycing when he perceiv'd that he had judged aright, that he had acted according to Reaſon and done wiſely, and grieving when he found the contrary.

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Of the Offices of private Prudence.

THe Offices of a private Prudence, are generally reckon'd two; The firſt, is to fix upon a certain courſe of Life, wherein to ſpend the reſt of our days; The ſecond, to govern and direct all our Actions in that condition of Life, according to the Laws of Reaſon and Virtue. It is evident, that the firſt concerns us very much, and is not eaſily to be effected, eſpecially if we will not venture upon it without adviſing with our beſt Friends, and duly conſulting our Reaſon. For ſuch is the Condition of our Life and of all human Affairs, that upon what State ſoever we caſt our Eyes, we ſhall perceive preſently ſeveral inconveniences attend it, which are ſo much the more troubleſome, becauſe we can't well diſcover their Events; for they appear to us as in a kind of a Chaos, and their firſt Beginnings and Conſequences are covered over with a kind of thick Miſt not penetrable to our Underſtanding.

The ancient Greeks have often painted out to us this Incumbrance or troubleſome Confuſion; and *Auſonius*, after them, hath left us an excellent Picture in his Poem, where he tells us, That he knows not what to reſolve, nor what kind of life to chuſe; That the Bar is full of trouble; That the care of a Family is uneaſie; That a Traveller is always thinking of what is doing at home; That a Merchant is continually ſubject to freſh Loſſes; That the fear of Poverty hinders us from quietly enjoying what we have; That daily Labour oppreſſeth and wearies the Workman; That the Seas are dreadful becauſe of the many Ship-wracks; That a ſingle Life hath its Inconveniences; That the idle

Suſpicion

Suſpicion of a jealous Husband is intollerable; That the War is ſubject to Wounds, Blood, and Slaughter.

Quod vitæ ſectabor iter? Si plena tumultu
Sunt fora; ſi curis domus anxia; ſi peregrinos
Cura domus ſequitur; mercantem ſi nova ſemper
Damna manent; ceſſare vetat ſi turpis Egeſtas;
Si vexat labor Agricolam; Mare naufragus horror
Infamat; pœnæque graves in cœlibe vita;
Et gravior cautis cuſtodia vana Maritis;
Sanguineum ſi Martis opus, &c.

Now as there is nothing more unhappy than to be always wavering in Uncertainty, which we ſee to be the Condition of many, and to ſpend all our Life in conſidering how we ſhould ſpend it, and in what Condition it concerns us moſt to exert to the utmoſt of our Power, all our Faculties in conſidering and deliberately chuſing ſuch a State and Condition of Life, as may be leaſt ſubject to Miſchiefs and Inconveniences. Neither are we in this Caſe to ſlight the Counſel and Advice of wiſe experienc'd Friends, Perſons of a clear Repute, and who aiming not at their own private Gain, may afford us ſound and profitable Advice. But every one ought chiefly to conſult his own Nature, and underſtand what his own Strength can perform or not; for we ought to be beſt known to our ſelves; and we may diſcover in our ſelves, for the moſt part, ſomething which is hid to all the World beſides: But we ought to know the unſetledneſs of human Affairs, and the obſcurity of the time to come to be ſuch, that we muſt in all things allow ſomething to Chance, and hope that every thing will ſucceed well. And becauſe ſome things may happen which may make us uneaſie, we ought to fortifie our Spi-

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rits againſt ſuch Accidents, in ſuch a manner that we may ſlight them, bear them eaſily, and paſs over them quietly.

What has been ſpoken is in reſpect to that State and Condition which our Laws will not allow us to change, ſuch as Marriage, a Monaſtical Life, or of that State which we cannot change but for a worſe, and with great diſgrace: For as for that which we may quit when we will to embrace another, there is no need of ſo great Caution and Circumſpection, tho' ſtill we ought to engage in ſuch an one, as if we always did intend to abide in it. Otherwiſe the very Thought of changing, will frequently diſturb our Minds with various Imaginations, and which being fixed to nothing but altering every moment, as we ſay from white to black, we ſhall never remain fix'd and reſolv'd, according to that Expreſſion of the Poet;

Æſtuat, & vitæ diſconvenit ordine toto.

So that we ought not to change, except for ſome very weighty Cauſes; for if we alter upon every light Occaſion, the ſame miſchief will attend us in all our ſucceeding Conditions.

As for the laſt Office of private Prudence, as it is not diſtinct from the Offices of other Virtues, we ſhall not trouble our ſelves to treat of it particularly in this Place, and the rather becauſe this Matter would be too tedious; and it is as differing as there are differing Affairs and Actions of Life, which are to be directed by Prudence: Therefore it ſeems there remains for us nothing elſe to do but to mention this General Rule, To undertake nothing raſhly; or, as *Cicero* expreſſes it, of which we cannot render a probable Reaſon. Now this Rule hath divers excellent Particulars belonging to it.

Firſt,

First, That we ought to underſtand the Nature and Qualities of the Buſineſs that we undertake: Becauſe if we have not a clear inſight into that, it will be impoſſible to diſcover all the convenient Expedients, and conſequently all our Care and Diligence will be vain and uſeleſs; and therefore here we muſt chiefly take heed that our Mind be not blinded with Paſſion, and ſo miſtake Error for Truth, but that we may give to every thing its due eſtimate.

Secondly, It is requiſite that the Nature and Condition of thoſe with whom we are concerned be not concealed from us, for if we don't underſtand whether they be honeſt Men or deceitful, wary or raſh, powerful or weak, *&c.* we can undertake nothing with any aſſurance, neither can we reaſonably expect it. And here it is, that we muſt keep to a certain Medium between Confidence and a too great diſtruſt, becauſe as it is often hurtful to have too great Confidence, ſo it is no leſs and as often to be too diſtruſtful.

The Third, Is to conſider our own Strength; becauſe if we know not what we can do of our ſelves, or by our Friends, or by our Riches, we cannot promiſe to our ſelves to compaſs any thing. I confeſs we muſt yield ſomething to Chance and Deſtiny, but in the mean while, we muſt be enabled with Induſtry and Strength to drive on to a Performance, or to divert the Caſualties that oppoſe us.

Fourthly, We muſt have the Means and Inſtruments ready at hand, for there is nothing more ridiculous than to undertake a Buſineſs and not know where to begin it. And here the Circumſtances, in relation to the Thing, or in relation to the Agent, which may either further or hinder the execution, are chiefly to be inquired into.

Fifthly,

Fifthly, That we take care to make uſe of a fit Time and Occaſion, for fear if we be too haſty, we over-throw all, or by too long delay all our Counſels become uſeleſs.

Sixthly, That when the Buſineſs hath been begun, after a ſerious Deliberation, we ought to proceed vigorouſly, for fear that if the Mind ſtops in the execution, or wavers in conſidering and meditating upon the Reſolution, it will effect nothing. This hath given occaſion for that famous Sentence of *Bias*, *Aggredere tarde agenda, ſed aggreſſus age conſtanter.* Undertake deliberately, but when you have begun, proceed with Vigour and Reſolution.

Laſtly, That we keep our ſelves ſteady and fixt in the Reſolution we have taken, never to deviate out of the Paths of Virtue and Honeſty. Whatever Temptation may be offer'd, we muſt never prefer Profit before Honeſty, nor Injuſtice before Juſtice, but we are to obſerve conſtantly this general and excellent Rule of Morality, That it is better never to ſucceed in any Buſineſs, by keeping our Conſcience blameleſs and undefiled, than to ſucceed by polluting it; for he that cannot tax himſelf with any Guilt, is not to be deemed miſerable, and he that is conſcious of any Evil, cannot be counted happy.

That it is dangerous to undertake any thing againſt our natural Inclination.

WE ought here, upon the occaſion of the firſt Particular, to examine if *Lactantius* had any Cauſe to upbraid *Epicurus* with this ſuppoſed Crime, That he adviſeth in general, to follow Nature; and the rather becauſe if this Saying be rightly underſtood, and taken in a good ſenſe, it ſeems very reaſonable;

reaſonable; for ſeeing that Nature and Inclination differ in ſeveral Perſons, what Rule more general and more ſecure could be given, than to adviſe with our ſelves, and to provide our ſelves a ſettlement in a certain condition and ſtate of Life, according as we find our ſelves either fit or otherwiſe? Should any Man in a Buſineſs of ſo great Moment forget himſelf, I mean not remember his own Temper and Abilities, and by that means caſt himſelf into a neceſſity to be always labouring in vain, as *Siſyphus*, or as the Gyants, contend with the Gods to no purpoſe. This *Cicero* calls ſtriving againſt Nature. It is, without doubt, a very dangerous Ambition to pretend to excel in any thing, out of a meer Fancy, that by the ſame means others have been made Famous, tho' we are often deſtitute of the ſame advantages of Mind and Fortune which others had. 'Tis by this means that Parents make their Children Miſerable, by putting them upon Employments, without conſidering their Nature, Temper, and fit Qualifications, but out of a fooliſh Ambition to raiſe them in the World, higher than their Circumſtances will permit. Wee need but hearken to *Seneca* upon this occaſion. *Before all other Things, we ought to make a right Judgment of our ſelves, and put a juſt and true value upon our Abilities; for commonly we fancy to have more Strength and Merit than really we have. Some loſe themſelves by truſting too much upon their Eloquence. Others ſpend more than their Eſtates will allow; and ſome who have but infirm Bodies, have lain oppreſſed under too weighty Employments. The Modeſty of ſome will not ſuit with publick Functions, that require a bold and daring Countenance; and others have too much Pride, or too little Complacency, to obtain any Suit at Court. Some can never be moved, and others at the leaſt diſtaſt, are provoked to a high degree. Some cannot behave themſelves with any*

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Decency and Civility, nor refrain themſelves from offering ſharp Jeſts, whatever danger they incur. To all theſe kind of People it is more convenient for them to live a private Life, than to be admitted to the management of publick Affairs; for a proud and haſty Temper ought to avoid all occaſions that might interrupt or obſtruct its own Freedom. Cicero ſpeaks almoſt to the ſame purpoſe, when he ſaith, *We muſt behave our ſelves in ſuch a manner, that we may not act againſt our Nature in general, but follow our own Diſpoſition; for we muſt not oppoſe nor force Nature, or proceed in any thing, as we ſay,* Invita Minerva, *that is, againſt the Grain. If there be any thing Commendable, it is doubtleſs the equality and evenneſs of our Life and Actions, which you can't poſſibly obſerve, if you imitate the Tempers of others, and neglect your own. Let every one therefore conſult his own Genius, and judge exactly of himſelf, of his Vices, and of his good Diſpoſition, that the Stage-Players may not ſeem to excel us in Prudence: For they chuſe to repreſent not always the moſt excellent Perſons, but ſuch as beſt becomes them.* Now let us hear what *Lactantius* objects.

The Doctrin of Epicurus, ſaith he, *hath always been more famous than the reſt, not becauſe it is more agreable with Truth, but becauſe he ſpeaks more agreable with the Inclinations of every one; and by that means, he hath drawn the common People to his ſide. To him who is Slothful, he forbids Study; to the Covetous, he admoniſhes to forbear Grieving; to the Effeminate and Slothful, to enter into the managment of publick Affairs; the Coward, he adviſes not to go to the Wars; to him who hates Company, he praiſeth a ſolitary Life. If any delights not in Marriage or hath unruly Children, his directions to him is to keep to a ſingle Life. He who is Stout and Courageous, ſhall be told that the wiſe Man is Happy even under Pain. If any Fancies Honour and Preferments, he will counſel him to be acquainted with Kings;*

Kings; but another who cant bear a repulſe, he'le admoniſh to depart from the Court. Theſe are the Objections of *Lactantius.*

In the mean while, if we may take the Words of *Epicurus*, in a plain Senſe, without any ſuch Gloſs, in my Judgment they will not ſeem ſo unreaſonable: For firſt, for the advice he offers to a lazy Fellow not to ingage himſelf in Study, he don't hereby blame Study abſolutely, but rather he eſteems and values it highly; for he exhorts both Young and Old to the Study of Philoſophy; and for the ſake of thoſe who would apply themſelves to it, he took the Pains to make Abridgments of his own Works. But becauſe Arts and Sciences are not to be obtain'd without a reſolute and continued Labour, if there be any that either cannot or will not endure the Fatigue of this Labour, what harm is there to forbid him to ingage himſelf in it, ſeeing thereby he would do himſelf no good? We have before cited this Sentence of *Epicharmus.*

Labor nobis cuncta Dij vendunt bona.

But if this be true, in reſpect of other Things, how much more in relation to the Sciences; which as they cannot be bought with all the Gold of the World, they cannot be obtained but by a vaſt Labour and Induſtry. And if in another place he adviſes the Covetous to be ſparing in his Bounty, he don't thereby condemn Liberality, or thoſe Expences which are made for good and lawful Uſes; but he means plainly, that if any fears to fall into Want, that he ſhould not be too laviſh of his Eſtate, and caſt it away in ſuch Liberalneſs, as belongs only to Princes, and ſuch as abound in Wealth. If he forbids them that are naturally Slow and Lazy to engage themſelves in publick Affairs, it was

was not without great Reaſon, as we ſhall ſee hereafter.

He forwarns a timerous Man to go to the Wars. But why ſhould we not approve of his Advice? As if we ought not to make choiſe of Men for the Wars, or as if we ſhould deſire ſuch to go thither who tremble and are affraid of the leaſt Noiſe, and whoſe Sword falls to the Ground at the ſight of Danger: Are we not ſenſible, that in an Ingagement one Coward does more miſchief with his idle Fears, than a great many brave Men may do good with their Courage? And don't pretend that we ſhould rather encourage a fearful Spirit, and make him Courageous; for if he be ſo of his own Nature, we know the common Saying, It is not an eaſy matter to turn an Hare into a Lion; Or, of a ſlender Reed to make a Lance.

He adviſes a wiſe Man to do all for himſelf. But we have already diſcovered how that is to be underſtood, and that the wiſe Man acts for himſelf, tho he puts himſelf upon Inconveniences, or even Dies for the ſake of his Friend; and yet what is there more dear and precious than Life?

He praiſeth Solitarineſs, to him who naturally cares not for Company. How can we blame this, without blaming the Retreat of many great Men, and the Rules of Living of ſeveral Societies or Fraternities of ancient Philoſophers and religious Perſons, who purpoſely ſhun the throngs of Men, for the better improving of their Minds?

If he praiſeth the ſingle Life to ſuch as decline Women, and the Happineſs of having no Children, to ſuch as are troubled with Diſobedient ones: He means not that he who hath a wicked Wife or perverſe Children ſhould ſhake them off; but he would have him who thinks of Marriage, conſider how he would endure his uneaſineſs, if he had a troubleſome

Wife, or Children of corrupt Manners; ſo that by apprehending the Miſchiefs that may proceed from thence, he may the better underſtand, that it is not convenient to have either.

CHAP IV.

Of Oeconomick Prudence.

AS to Oeconomick Prudence, which conſiſt in the due ordering of a Family, and wha belongs to it, I ſhall not inſiſt on it; for let us bu ſuppoſe private Prudence, and it is eaſy from thenc to learn what belongs to Oeconomick, if we wi but mind ſuch as do generally exerciſe themſelv in it, or preſcribe Rules for it: Nevertheleſs, th we may not ſeem totally to neglect this Matter, it is neceſſary to obſerve; Firſt, what we meet with in *Ariſtotle*, That the Oeconomick Dominion is a kind of Monarchy or Principality, becauſe every Houſe is governed by the command of one ſingle Perſon. Secondly, That he who governs in a Family is called Father, or Father of a Family, in reſpect of the Children; Husband, in reſpect of the Wife; Maſter, in reſpect of the Slaves and Servants; Owner, in reſpect of the Goods and Eſtate. Thirdly, That the Houſhold or Family, in reſpect of the Relation between Husband and Wife, Parents and Children, is called Natural, and firſt inſtituted by Nature; for there can be none more agreeable with Nature. Fourthly, That for the Government between Maſter and Servant, it is alſo agreeable with Nature, for among Men ſome ſeem to be born to

to Command, and others to Obey; ſo that beſides that Slavery that the Laws or Rights of Nations have introduced, in reſpect of thoſe who have been taken Priſoners in War, or have been Sold; there is another certain natural Slavery, by which, as the Soul commands the Body, and Men Brutes, ſo he who excells in the Abilities of the Mind, commands over him who excels only in Strength of Body, and the rather, becauſe it is needful for the latter to be ruled by another, as it is uſeful for Brutes to be tamed by Men. Fifthly, in reſpect to the Right that we have over certain Things which we poſſeſs to our ſelves; for tho according to the primitive Right of Nature, one thing is no more mine than thine, nor thine more than mine; nevertheleſs, it ſeems agreeable with Nature, That every one ſhould have and poſſeſs to himſelf ſomething which is not lawful for another to take away, becauſe there is nothing more agreeable with Nature, than to preſerve our ſelves ſafe and ſecure, which would be impoſſible among the Quarrels and Violences, unto which Men would be continually ſubject and liable, if all Things did ſo belong to all Men, that every one might have Right over his Neighbour's Goods, and might lawfully take them away at his Pleaſure. Sixthly, That our Houſholds, chiefly thoſe of Princes and great Perſons, are far from the plainneſs of our Anceſtors, when Men reckoned among the principal Poſſeſſions of a Family, the Wife and the Ox.

——*Uxoremq; Bovemq; jugalem.*

When a cold Cave was all the Houſe which contained the Fire; the domeſtick Gods, the Houſhold-Goods, and all the Stock under the ſame Roof.

——Cum frigida parvas
Præberet ſpelunca domos, ignemque laremque
Et pecus, & dominos communi clauderet umbra.

Laſtly, That the Oeconomick Prudence is divided into four Parts; The Nuptial, or that of a married State, in relation to the Wife; The Paternal, in reſpect of the Children; The Lordly or Magiſterial, which relates to the Servants and Slaves; The Poſſeſſions, which reſpects the Goods, Poſſeſſions, and other Enjoyments of the Family.

Of the Nuptial Prudence and its ſeveral Duties.

AS for what concerns, among other things, the Nuptial Prudence, it is moſt certain that the firſt and principal Duty, is to chuſe a good Wife; for he who endeavours to marry with Beauty, Nobility, or Riches, rather than Virtue, is ſtriving doubtleſs to load himſelf with a tedious and troubleſome Croſs. When the Election is made, and the Marriage conſummated, the Husband ought in ſuch a manner to labour to gain the Love of his Spouſe by all the Expreſſions of Affection and Reſpect, that ſhe may eaſily ſee her own Happineſs, and be perſuaded that ſhe could never meet with a better Husband, a more honeſt Man, nor a more ſuitable and more pleaſant Companion. Yet this ought to be managed with ſo much Moderation and Diſcretion, that no occaſion may be given to her to become Inſolent; and that with the Love ſhe bears to her Husband, ſhe may not forget the Reſpect that ſhe owes him: For tho' there is an Equality between the Husband and the Wife, there are a great many things in which the Husband ought to have the

the Pre-eminence; and if in ſuch Caſes he yields by chance to the Ambition of the Woman, he will quickly find himſelf under a moſt intolerable Yoke, and with the loſs of his Authority, he will loſe alſo his Peace and Quiet.

He ought likewiſe to train her up and inſtruct her in ſuch a manner, in the Management of Domeſtick Affairs, that he may leave to her the ordinary Care and Command of the Family, and may himſelf be better able to look after the Concerns abroad. By this means ſhe will ſhare in the Government, and eaſe her Husband of thoſe Cares which are of leſs Moment, and within the reach and capacity of the Female Sex.

He muſt alſo acquaint her with ſuch of his Deſigns which he knows do not exceed the capacity of her Underſtanding, and which he believes ſhe will keep ſecret if there be any need of Concealment; that ſhe may thereby underſtand that ſhe is not ſlighted, and that her Husband deſires that ſhe may have a ſhare in his Affairs; and that if ſhe is to be concerned in doing any thing, ſhe may perform it more ſatisfactorily and with greater affection. Beſides, as ſhe is admitted to be a Fellow-labourer, ſhe will add to his Joy upon good ſucceſs, and leſſen his Grief upon ill.

I need not mention, that he ought not to violate his conjugal Faith that he has plighted to her; for this were to do her a great Injuſtice, and to incline her to return him the like; beſides, this is apt to beget a certain Indignation and Averſion in her, with a domeſtick Hatred never to be reconciled, attended with perpetual Quarrels; not to mention ſomething elſe which too commonly attends the furious Jealouſie of a Woman, *Quid non poſſit fœmina furens?*

Laſtly, if ſhe hath neither Modeſty nor Manners, and after that the Husband hath applyed all poſſible induſtry to make her better, if ſhe remains ſtill untractable, it is not lawful doubtleſs to deſtroy her, as it was among the *Romans*, the *Greeks*, and the *Gauls*, according to thee too cruel Laws of their Country; but in ſuch a caſe it is convenient either to ſeparate, or to reſolve to ſubmit with Courage, and to alleviate with Patience the Evil that we cannot Remedy, eſpecially if there be Children, that ſo the Follies and Infamy of the Mother, and the Diſcredit of the Family may not be divulged.

But we muſt here acknowledge the Truth, That the brutiſh Temper and ill Conduct of Men, oftner make Marriages unhappy, than the Lightneſs, Unconſtancy, Vanity, and Ambition of Wives. Therefore the modern *Perſians* have a common Proverb, *That the Husband who hath an ill Wife, don't deſerve to be married.* They mean thereby, That a Man who dares venture upon Marriage, ought, beſides the certain knowledge of his bodily Strength, to know at the firſt beginning, how to manage and order the Mind and Temper of his Wife, ſo as to make her become good. Now if he be defective in this, it will be accounted his Fault, his want of skill or complacency of Temper, and conſequently his incapacity of rendring Matrimony ſo eaſie and agreeable as it ought to be.

Of paternal Prudence, and its ſeveral Duties.

THE principal Office of paternal Prudence, ſeems chiefly to have regard to the begetting of Children; becauſe from hence proceeds the Temper of the Body, and conſequently the Diſpoſition and Inclination, either to Good or Evil Manners.

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It is not therefore without Reaſon, that this Reproach is ſo common, *Genuit te Parens ebrius cum foret.* Thy Father was Drunk when he begot thee. But if we ſhould adviſe Men what *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Plutarch*, and others have taught concerning the Age, the Seaſon, the Manners of Living, the preceding Continency and other things requiſite, they would but little regard it, being carried to the Act by a blind and luſtful Fury; ſo that it is a hazard if the Off-ſpring thus engendred prove virtuous or otherwiſe; and Children thus caſually begotten, are educated ſuch as they are born.

Therefore if we conſider this Duty, the Firſt thing will be to look carefully to Children in their Infancy; to take a principal care that if the Mother hath not the Patience to ſuckle her Infant, and to give it the Breaſt, and that Milk which Nature hath beſtowed upon her for that purpoſe, to make choice of a Nurſe of a good Diſpoſition, ſound Conſtitution, and good Temper; for certainly this firſt Nouriſhment hath a great influence upon the remaing part of our Life, upon the health of our Bodies, and the diſpoſition of our Minds.

The Second thing is to train 'em up in good Manners, and give 'em prudent Inſtructions, which is of ſo great importance, that we cannot be too careful and ſolicitous in providing 'em able and diſcreet Tutors. And here by the way, I cannot but admire at the niggardly Thrift of ſome Parents in this particular; not conſidering that this lays the foundation of their Childrens future Happineſs or Ruin. And if a Child ſhall perceive, when he comes to Age, that any thing in that reſpect hath been wanting to him, he will ſcarce ever forgive them.

The Third, is to deſign 'em to a certain manner of Life, always with a regard to their Condi-

tion, Abilities, and chiefly to their Genius and Natural Inclination, for fear that we ſhould engage them in an Employment which they are not able to diſcharge with Credit, or to reap much Advantage or Pleaſure by.

The laſt Duty is to admit them in ſuch a manner into their Counſels, that they may underſtand betimes the Buſineſs of the Family, and how it is like to go for time to come, for fear that they ſhould be altogether ignorant of it, and be unable to bear the Burthen, if the Father ſhould happen to fail. It is doubtleſs, a fooliſh and ridiculous kind of Envy in Fathers and Mothers, to be unwilling to communicate their Concerns to their Children, as if it did not behove them to be acquainted therewith; for if thereby they imagin the better to ſupport their Authority, they are very much deceived, not conſidering that by this Concealment they leſſen the Love that Children would have had for them, and offer 'em Motives, if not to deſire their death, at leaſt to bear it with leſs Concern. 'Tis true, a Father ought always to preſerve himſelf in the Eſteem and Veneration of his Children, and as we commonly ſay, Command over his Family till Death. But this Reſpect muſt be obtained in ſuch a manner, as he ought not to loſe his Childrens Love, which cannot be better preſerv'd than by ſuch Actions as may convince them they love them ſincerely, and that they labour only for their good. They ought to behave themſelves after ſuch a manner, and with ſo much Prudence, that they may eſteem themſelves happy to be the Children of ſuch a Father, who is one of the beſt of Parents and faithfulleſt of Friends that they could ever deſire. Theſe Expreſſions of Affection are ſo much the more needful for Fathers and Mothers, becauſe as it hath been always obſerved, Love never aſcends

as

as it doth deſcend. The love of Children to Parents, is commonly much leſs than that of Fathers and Mothers to their Children, the latter ſeeming as it were much more natural than the former.

Of the Prudence of Superiors, and their ſeveral Duties.

Ariſtotle teacheth, That the Prudence of a Lord hath in it nothing great and ſublime, becauſe it ſufficeth, that the Maſter knows how to Command what the Slave ſhould perform. Yet according to his Opinion, there is a particular Knowledge that regards the Government of Slaves: The Firſt Office is to diſtinguiſh and underſtand the Ability and Capacity of each Servant or Slave, leſt by a miſtake we ſhould employ one who is by birth fit to be an Overſeer, in mean and laborious Drudgeries, or on the contrary we ſhould advance one who is leſs capable, to a more conſiderable Poſt.

Secondly, ſo to behave our ſelves with our Servants, that they may not grow Inſolent, nor be caſt down, or too much diſcouraged; for this purpoſe we muſt ſhew ſome Reſpect to ſuch as are the beſt qualified, the moſt poliſhed and moſt civilized, and ſupply the meaneſt with a competent Subſiſtence; for that little Reſpect that we render to the firſt, and the neceſſary Allowance that we give to the latter, is inſtead of a Reward and Incouragement to them for their Labour.

And tho' what we have ſaid be commonly underſtood only as to Slaves, yet it may alſo be meant of thoſe whom we call Servants, in whoſe place many would willingly have Slaves reſtored, for Reaſons that are ſufficiently known: However, whether we uſe Slaves or Servants, we ought always

ways ſo to behave our ſelves towards them, that they may be inclined to perform their Duty with Reſpect and Willingneſs, which may eaſily be obtained, unleſs it be ſometimes in Servants, becauſe they have the liberty to leave and depart, and ſeldom will endure Correction. But it is not ſufficient that they ſerve with Reſpect, but we ſhould endeavour that Affection may accompany it, which can never be expected, unleſs we make them ſenſible that we love them our ſelves, that we have a care of them, and that whiles they perform their Duty, we ſhall never be wanting in our care of their Welfare; and that at the appointed time, ſome ſhall have their Freedom, others their Reward: At laſt, whether we promiſe them any Reward, or whether they have any Reaſon to expect any, we muſt not ſuffer them to be diſappointed of their Expectation, not only becauſe Equity requires it, but alſo becauſe Prudence is concerned, that other Servants and Slaves may ſerve ſo much the more willingly, becauſe they will expect to be treated in the ſame manner, and will thereby underſtand that they have to do with a good Maſter, and a very honeſt Man.

Of Poſſeſſory Prudence and its Offices.

LAſtly, As to this ſort of Prudence, its main Office it ſeems is to take care that nothing neceſſary be wanting to the Family; for a Father of a Family commands over all its Members, to the end that by his Prudence and Diligence, he may mind that nothing be deficient, which they are to have with reſpect to the Condition of the Perſon: For tho' abſolutely, and according to the Preſcript of Nature, nothing is neceſſary but that which expels

pels Hunger, Thirſt, Cold, and ſuch like Inconveniences; nevertheleſs, civil Society makes ſeveral other things needful, which are ſuitable to the Rank and Degree that we bear in that Society. A conſequence of this Duty is to take heed that our Expences do not exceed our Incomes, becauſe the Debts contracted by degrees, will drain the Fund and bring the Family to Penury and Want. We don't ſpeak of idle and ridiculous Expences, which are never to be ſuffered, but ſuch as Prudence will permit, and which are to be regulated according to our Abilities and the clear Rents and Incomes of our Eſtates; which cannot well be expected without this ſecond Duty, that ſeems to be of a greater Concernment than all the reſt, That the Maſter himſelf ſhould underſtand his own Buſineſs; and if he cannot think upon every particular thing, he ought not to truſt ſo much to his Agents and Stewards, but that he ſhould well know in what his Eſtate conſiſts, and be perfectly acquainted with the ſtate of his Incomes and Expences. We commonly ſee that all things go to wrack in great Houſes when the Maſter underſtands not his Affairs, but leaves 'em to the Management of Servants and Stewards, in ſuch a manner that they think they may do what they pleaſe without being called to an account or controlled. It is known what *Socrates* and *Ariſtotle* relate of a certain *Perſian*, who being asked what it was chiefly that made his Horſe ſo fat, anſwer'd, The Eye of his Maſter. And we have likewiſe heard the anſwer of that *African*, from whom they inquired, What was the beſt means to improve Land and make the Fields fertile, anſwer'd, The Foot-ſteps of the Landlord. From whence we may conclude, that commonly a Buſineſs is never better manag'd, than when thoſe who are chiefly concerned, take care of it themſelves.

Now

Now becauſe ſome would have the preſervation and increaſe of an Eſtate patrimonial, or an Eſtate otherwiſe obtained, to belong to this kind of Prudence; this doubtleſs is to be underſtood, where our Eſtate is not ſo large as to ſpend our Days in Eaſe and Leaſure, and have ſufficient to leave to our Poſterity. In ſuch a Caſe, 'tis not only Honorable, but alſo needful to employ our Cares to increaſe our Eſtate. But to think upon nothing elſe but how to heap Riches, and to purchaſe Lands, to add Houſes to Houſes and Fields to Fields, is to run into that Covetouſneſs and unſatiable greedy Deſire, of which we have been Diſcourſing before.

But as there are Three expedients of gathering Wealth, Husbandry, Induſtry, or honeſt Labour and Uſury; *Cicero* tells us, that of all thoſe means by which we get an Eſtate, there is none better, more pleaſant, and more ſuitable, and worthy of a Freeman, than Husbandry. He Speaks of Merchandiſe, that if the Traffick and Gain be ſmall, it is Sordid and Baſe; but if great and large, and gives an Opportunity of being Bountiful without Vanity or Preſumption, it is not to be ſlighted. But for Uſury, ſaith *Ariſtotle* and *Cicero*, 'tis hated not without cauſe, but chiefly when it is exceſſive. For as the Poet obſerves, conſtant Uſury deſtroys the Poor.

——*Velox inopes uſura trucidat.*

I know there are other Means to grow Rich; as the Service of great Men, Flattery, &c. But it is not requiſite that we ſhould ſpeak of thoſe that take theſe Courſes; nor of ſuch as purchaſe Offices, and make Parties by Bribery; nor of ſuch as going to the Wars, not contented with their Pay, plunder and take the Goods of other Men; ſeeing ſuch kind of Men differ in nothing from thoſe who make themſelves

ſelves Rich by Cheating, by Perjury and Robbing: But not to ſtay too long upon this Matter, let us examin Two great Complaints that are made againſt *Epicurus*.

The Firſt becauſe he ſaith, That a *wiſe Man ought not to be Married, nor trouble himſelf in the Education of Children*; which ſeems not only to overthrow the very Foundations of Families, but even of Commonwealths. The Second is, they ſeem to charge him with having ſaid, That *there is no natural communication among Men, and that the great Affection of Parents toward their Children, is not the effect of Nature.*

As to the Firſt, it is certain that he never intended this as a general direction to all Mankind, but only to a few wiſe Men; neither hath he preſcribed, that wiſe Men may not nor ought not to Marry, if the good of the Common-wealth, or ſome other weighty Conſideration require it. Now how can this be to overthrow the Foundation of the Commonwealth? Is not this, I pray, more Holy and Religious than the practice of *Ariſtotle*, who promulg'd a Law, That ſuch Children as were deficient in their Members, ſhould be deſtroyed, that the number of ſuch as ſhould be brought up might be limited, and that as many as ſhould happen to be Born beyond that Number, ſhould be expos'd; but if any Conſtitution of the Country prohibits ſuch Practices, they ſhould cauſe the Fruit of the Womb to periſh, before it comes to have Life or Feeling: And as to the Reaſon or Excuſe he pretends, of the privation or want of Senſe and Life in the *Fœtus*, it is but a meer Mockery, for he cannot prove that when a Woman Miſcarries, the Fruit or *Fœtus* hath neither Senſe nor Life; and that to deſtroy any ſuch Fruit, which would be alive in a very ſhort time, if it be not already, is the ſame thing as to deſtroy

deſtroy a Corps or a Body, altogether incapable of Life.

For the Second, 'tis true, *Epictetus* repreſents *Epicurus* exclaiming againſt that vulgar Error, That there is a natural Communication between Men, and that the Affection of Parents to their Children, is Natural or Born with them. Be not deceived, as he repreſents him Speaking: *Ne decipiamini O Mortales! Non eſt ratione præditis ulla inter ſe naturalis Communicatio; Amor Parentum erga Liberos non eſt Naturalis. Mihi credite, qui ſecus loquuntur in errorem inducunt vos, ac rationibus falſis circumveniunt vos.* But doubtleſs the Envy and Hatred againſt *Epicurus* hath cauſed many to make him ſay things that he never imagined: For certain it is, that he allows a natural Communication between Nations, and among Men who live under the ſame Laws. Now if this be granted, 'tis plain that there is more reaſon to allow a natural Communication between thoſe of the ſame Blood, and between Parents and Children who are immediately united together by Blood and Nature. *Epictetus* himſelf acknowledges that *Epicurus* was of Opinion, That we are naturally inclined to Communication, and that when we have a Child Born, 'tis not in our Power not to Love it, or to Slight and Diſregard it. It ſeems they will have him maintain this Doctrin.

Nevertheleſs, I will ſay, That if they will abſolutely make him hold this, that the Love of Parents to their Children is not Natural, they ſhould at leaſt give him liberty to interpret his own Words. His Meaning is, That this Affection is begot in us, and increaſes by degrees, not ſo much by a certain blind inſtinct of Nature, as by a perſuaſion of the Father that it is his Child, and a part of himſelf; and by the Hopes that he ſhall be Beloved and Honoured, or Relieved and Supported by him; or becauſe he judges

judges his Name to be eternized and conveyed to Poſterity by this means, and that the plain and ingenuous Converſation of a Child that promiſeth much, rejoyceth his Heart.

Epicurus ſeems to have very good Reaſons to be of that Opinion; Firſt, becauſe we ſee many that have equal Affection for Children that are none of their own, but Baſtards, as they have for their own, if they believe them to be lawfully begotten. Secondly, we find not that Love in thoſe whoſe Children are lawfully Begotten, if they are otherwiſe perſuaded. Thirdly, we find as great a Love in thoſe who have adopted Children, when the Reſolution or Will ſupplies the defects of the Perſuaſion. Fourthly, That if the Fruit is Abortive, the Father and the Mother are not ſo much afflicted, as if it had continued with them a longer time, and been converſant with 'em; not ſo much when it dies a young Infant, as when it departs in a more advanc'd Age; when it hath many Brethren, as when it is the only Child; if he hath had already any Children, as if he hath none left behind; if he be Debaucht and Untractable, as if he were Wiſe and Vertuous.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of politick or civil Prudence.

WE ſhall now ſpeak of Politick Prudence, which *Ariſtotle* calls not only Science or Ability, but ſuppoſes it to be the Lady and Queen of all the reſt, the knowledge of Morality being ſubject to it as a part of it; for he tells us, That it belongs to a Politician to underſtand what may make for the Happineſs of the People, that he is properly the Maſter and chief Contriver of their Welfare, and that conſequently it belongs to him to take cognizance of Pleaſure and Pain, and of Virtue and Vice, which are the Springs of Pleaſure and Pain. Now the politick Prudence, is like the Oecononomick; for as the latter is to regulate a Family, compoſed of ſeveral particular Perſons; ſo the Politick or Civil is to govern a City or Town compoſed of divers Families. We ought therefore, firſt to examine in whom this Prudence reſides, or ought to reſide, as in its proper Subject: This appears not difficult to reſolve, for it is plain that it ought to reſide in none more than in him who hath the ſovereign Power, the chief Authority, or the abſolute Right to Command, which Right may be diſcovered chiefly by certain particulars, which *Ariſtotle* mentions: As to be able to conclude Peace or War; to make Alliances, and diſſolve them; to eſtabliſh and diſannul Laws; to determin about Life, Death, Baniſhment, confiſcation of Goods or Reſtitution.

Of

Of the first Origin of Sovereign Power, according to the Opinion of the Ancients.

THIS Power is ſuppoſed by the Vulgar, to have firſt taken its beginning, when Men, like Beaſts, wandred up and down the Fields without any ſubjection, each enjoying his full Liberty according to his own Will and Pleaſure. Hereupon they contrived to make up Societies, in which every one renouncing, in ſome meaſure, his own Liberty, yeilded to the Will of the Multitude, which by this means claimed a Right and Authority over each individual Perſon; and provided not only for their Safety and quiet way of Living, by giving a check to the moſt Powerful and Robuſt, by hindering them from inſulting over their weaker and more peacable Neighbours, but alſo hereby they made a more equal Diſtribution of the Products of the Earth, and likewiſe communicated to each other the effects of their Arts and Labours, wherein any excelled another: For that lawleſs freedom which they pretended to enjoy in thoſe early Days, muſt doubtleſs coſt them dear, becauſe every one having an equal Right over every Thing, and no Man being able to appropriate any thing to his own uſe, which another was able to take from him; they muſt needs be continually Warring and Contending with one another. So that ſuch a way of Living being full of Quarrels, cannot be properly called a Freedom, becauſe of the many Inconveniences and Miſchiefs that attend it. Therefore true and natural Liberty is eaſier to be found in a Society, where Men being obedient to the Laws of that Society, I mean thoſe Laws that were enacted and approved for their Benefit and Advantage, act in all other things as they

pleaſe, and have a Right to their proper Goods, ſo that no other can take them away, becauſe of the publick Authority and Power that protects 'em.

For this Reaſon, *Ariſtotle* ſeems to diſapprove of *Plato*'s Common-wealth, in which Women, Children, Eſtates, and all other Things were to be common: For if we take away Mine and Thine, the Common-wealth is ſo far from being at Unity thereby, and conſequently more perfect and compleat, that it is the only way to introduce again that primitive Barbarity and brutiſh manner of Living; for what we Fancy to be common to every one, belongs properly to no Body. This made *Colotes*, a Diſciple of *Epicurus*, to ſay, *That they who have made the Laws, and have ſettled the Government and the Magiſtracy in Cities, have thereby ſecured Mens Lives, and ſettled them in a peaceable State; and that if we offer to aboliſh them, we muſt return to live like Beaſts, and devour one another.* There may perhaps be found ſome who in conſideration to Virtue, and out of their own good Inclination, may Rule and Govern themſelves: But truly they ſeem Strangers to the generality of Mankind, who Fancy that they will reſtrain from Acts of Injuſtice by the Principles of Reaſon or of Honeſty, rather than by the Terror of the Magiſtrates or of the Laws.

But to return to our Matter in hand, I omit to ſpeak of the ſovereign Power or ſovereign Authority, tranſlated by common Conſent from particular Perſons to all the People. Now the People meeting together to deliberate and reſolve upon any Buſineſs, what was reſolved by all, or by the greateſt part, was taken to be the Reſolution of the whole Society. And becauſe it is inconvenient that all the People ſhould meet, and that every private Perſon ſhould declare his Sentiment, it happened that all the People, of their own accord, made over this Power to a certain number of Perſons, or to one

ſingle

ſingle Perſon, or it may be that this one Perſon, or a greater Number, by Force or by Cunning have taken it upon them. I obſerve only, that we underſtand from thence, why we commonly diſtinguiſh according to the ſaying of *Tacitus*, *Cunctas Nationes et Urbes Populus, aut Primores, aut Singuli regunt*; Three kinds of Common-wealths, or of political Governments, namely, Monarchy or the Dominion of a ſingle Perſon, when the ſovereign Power reſides in one who Commands all the People, and is Commanded by no Body: Oligarchy or the Dominion of a few particular Perſons, when the ſovereign Power is in a ſmall Number: Poliarchy or the Dominion of many, it may be of all the People, when the ſovereign Power reſides in every private Perſon. Moreover, tho from theſe three Sorts we may obſerve and diſtinguiſh two Kinds, one Good, Lawful and Praiſe-worthy, the other Vicious, Unlawful and deſerving Blame; yet common Experience hath Taught us to call the good ſort of the firſt kind Kingdom, and the evil, Tyranny; but the good ſort of the ſecond Ariſtocracy, or the Dominion of the Chieftains, and of the beſt; the evil ought to be called Kyriſtocracy, or the Dominion of many wicked Perſons, but it retains the Name of Oligarchy. Beſides, *Plato*, *Xenophon*, and ſeveral others Teach, That the third kind is called Democracy, or Dominion of the People: *Ariſtotle* nevertheleſs tells us, That the word Democracy is aſcribed to the vicious Species of that kind of Government, and that the beſt is named Common-wealth; but according to the preſent Uſe and Practice, the Three ſorts or forms of Government are called Monarchy, Ariſtocracy and Democracy.

Now 'tis not neceſſary that we ſhould buſy our ſelves in giving the Character or Marks of each ſort of Government, they are ſufficiently known; I ſhall

only here obſerve Two or Three particulars: Firſt, That to the two kinds of Monarchy, namely, Kingly and Tyrannical, they commonly add a Third, which they name Deſpotick; for the Kingly is when the Monarch Rules his Subjects, as a Father his Children; and that as his Subjects are Obedient to his Commands and Laws, he himſelf is Obedient to the Laws of Nature, ſuffering his Subjects to enjoy as well their natural Liberty, as the propriety of their Goods. But the Tyrannical is that where the Monarch commands his Subjects as Slaves or Brutes, and trampling under Foot all the Laws of Nature, he deprives them of all Liberty and Propriety, which he Uſurps and claims to himſelf as his own. The Deſpotical, they ſay, is where the Monarch Commands his Subjects, which have been overcome by War, as a good Maſter of a Family doth his Slaves. Secondly, I ſhall obſerve, That 'tis not without Cauſe that the regal and tyrannical Dominions are ſaid to be contrary; for as the Regal aims at the common good of the Society, and deſigns for its End the Security, the Tranquility, the Plenty, and in a Word, the publick Happineſs: So the Tyrannical aims at nothing but its own private Advantage, and fills all Places with Fear, Trouble, Poverty and Calamity. And as in the regal Government, not only the Subjects are Happy, but alſo and chiefly the Prince, becauſe of that Reſpect and Love which he knows that his Subjects have for him, when he ſhews them that he fears God, that he is Obedient to the Laws of Nature, and that he looks upon the welfare of his People, as his greateſt Intereſt; that he is wiſe in his Deliberations, couragcous in his Actions, moderate in Proſperity, conſtant in Adverſity, reſolved in the Execution of Juſtice, faithful to his Promiſes, mild to good Men, ſevere to the Wicked, ſupporting his Friends, terrible to his Enemies, in a Word,

Word, that he is the Father of his Country, and a true Shepherd of his People: Thus in the tyrannical Government all kind of Miſchiefs, Griefs and Anxieties oppreſs not only the Subjects, but more particularly the Tyrant himſelf, who is not inſenſible of the ſecret Contempt they bear him, and the implacable Hatred that his Subjects harbour in their Breaſts againſt him, when he makes them ſenſible, and feel by his tyrannical Proceedings, that he values neither God, Nature, nor the ſafety of his People; for every one ſees that he acts nothing but by Subtilty and Violence; that good Succeſs renders him Inſolent and Proud, as the Evil cauſeth him to be Cruel; that he is full of Injuſtice, Perfidiouſneſs and Barbarity; that he hates good Men, that he favours Wicked, in ſhort, That he is not the Father of his Country, but a publick Enemy; not a Shepherd, but a Wolf to his People. Therefore being feared and dreaded by all the World, he is himſelf in continual Fear and Dread, which ſuffer him at no time to be at reſt. For he fears both Friends and Foes, and trembles at the ſhaking of a Leaf, yea, at his very Shadow. Therefore *Cicero* and *Seneca* have very well remarkt, according to *Epicurus*, that it muſt needs be, *That he whom many fear, ſhould ſtand in fear of many*, which *Seneca* brings in *Labericus* thus expreſſing,

Neceſſe eſt multos timeat, quem multi timent.

Whether Monarchial Government is the beſt.

THe third thing that I have thought fit to obſerve, is, That of the ſeveral approved ſorts of Government, the Monarchical ſeems to be the beſt: For tho' they have all of 'em their Incon-

veniences and Advantages; yet the Advantages of the Monarchical are above the reſt, and the Inconveniences fewer. For as in the Monarchical, all Orders proceed from one Perſon, and relate to one; the ſtate of Affairs is more ſettled and conſtant; the neceſſary Orders upon all occaſions more eaſie to be given; the Reſolutions more ſecret; the Execution quicker, and all opportunities of Factions and Seditions prevented. Liberty likewiſe and Security, which other Forms of Government pretend to, is greater and larger, and ſo of other Advantages which are very well known. This is ſufficiently proved by the Government of a Family, which requires but one Maſter or Father of the Family; or by that of an Army, which ought to have but one General; and by the Government of the World that acknowledgeth but one Sovereign Lord. Beſides, the Annals inform us, That when the Affairs of a Common-wealth have been reduced to the laſt Extremity, they have ſet up a Dictator as the only Remedy. And tho' *Ariſtotle* in his Politicks, ſeems to prefer Ariſtocracy before Monarchy, he deſires that we would conſult the Genius of the People; for ſome are more fit and inclinable to one Government than to another; nevertheleſs, in his Metaphyſicks, he concludes without any Exception, That Government by many is inconvenient.

Of the Duties of a Monarch in General.

BUt as we ſhould be too tedious, and it is not convenient to treat here, what belongs to the ſeveral Forms of Government, it ſhall ſuffice to mention ſomething of the Monarchical, which may be applied to the reſt. Now as the Duty of a Sovereign hath chiefly reſpect to two times, *viz.* that of

of War and that of Peace; there are certain things among others, which he ought principally to mind. Firſt, To underſtand well, and to imprint in his Thoughts this Perſuaſion, That the Welfare, the Security and Advantage of his People; or as *Cicero* calls it, the Happineſs of his Subjects, ſhould be the great Deſign and End of his Government: That for this purpoſe he Rules, and upon this account it is that he is reſpected and obeyed. *For as the Pilate*, ſaith *Cicero*, *deſigns a happy and ſafe Navigation, the Phyſician the Health of the Patient, the General of an Army Victory, ſo the Governour of a Common-wealth deſigns the Happineſs of his Subjects, which is ſecured by Riches, by Military Forces, by Glory, Virtue and Honeſty.*

Secondly, To propoſe to himſelf no other Reward of his Cares and Labours, but the Glory of Governing well, the Gratitude, the Reſpect and Affections of his Subjects. How well was *Trojan* rewarded, when he heard the Applauſes of all the People, who cried out with a loud Voice, *May the Gods love thee as thou loveſt us; for who can be happier than we, who need not wiſh that our Prince ſhould love us, but only that the Gods ſhould bear us equal Affection as our Prince doth? Timoleon* alſo own'd himſelf ſufficiently requited, when walking abroad, he heard the like Acclamations of the People, full of Love and Veneration. Therefore Princes act with little wiſdom, or rather very imprudently, who being deſirous of Glory, endeavour to purchaſe it by any other Means than by doing good to their People, and by deſerving their Affections: For the Applauſe gained by other Methods, is accompanied with Contempt, Hatred, and Execrations of the Common People, and deſerves to be called Infamy. Excellent and Admirable was the Speech of *Xunus* Emperor of *China* to his Son *Taiis*, who according

to the Relation of *Martinius*, lived Two Thouſand Two Hundred and Fifty Eight Years before the Birth of Chriſt. *Take*, ſaid he, when he was dying, *this Scepter due to your Virtue and Merits. Remember that you are the Father of your People, that you are to deal with them as with your Children, that the People are not born to ſerve you, but that you are born and deſigned to ſerve them; and that a King is alone raiſed up above all the reſt, that he might alone be able to ſerve all.* *Seneca*'s Expreſſion is likewiſe very admirable; *The greatneſs of a Prince*, ſaith he, *is ſettled, firmly grounded and unſhaken, when all the People underſtand that he is as much for them as he is above them; and find by experience that he watcheth daily, and takes care as well of the Welfare of every particular Perſon, as of the general Safety of the State. They look upon him then not as a wild and dangerous Beaſt that comes out of his Den, but as a beautiful Star full of Divine Influence; they all ſtrive to turn towards him, ready to hazard themſelves in a thouſand Dangers, and ſacrifice their Lives to ſave his Life.*

Thirdly, To excel all others in Virtue, as he excells them in Dignity: For doubtleſs, 'tis not without Reaſon, that *Cyrus* in *Xenophon*, judgeth, That *it is not proper that he who is not more Virtuous than thoſe over whom he is to Command, ſhould have Power to Command them.* Truly he is obliged to encourage Virtue for his Peoples ſake, for it is certain that the Example of Kings is the Pattern and Rule of the whole Kingdom.

——*Componitur Orbis,*
Regis ad exemplum.

And the Condition of Princes, in the Opinion of *Quintilian*, *Seneca* and *Cicero*, is ſuch, that being in view of all the World, they can no more be con-

concealed than the Sun; they therefore, if they are vicious, expoſe their Vices to publick View, and do more Miſchief by their Examples, than by their wicked Actions. Now as he is bound to encourage Virtue for his Peoples ſake, ſo likewiſe for his own, that ſo he may gain the Eſteem and Veneration of the World, which he can never obtain if he be reputed Vicious: And among all the other Virtues, he ought chiefly to encourage Piety and Religion, as well that he may be bleſſed with Rewards from Heaven, and Abilities neceſſary to bear up the weight of ſo heavy a Burthen as the Government of the State is, as alſo to make his Subjects the more Faithful, more Reſpectful and Obedient to him; for they believe that he whom they ſee addicted to Piety and Religion, is beloved and favoured of God; and that when they are govern'd by ſuch a one who is beloved of God, they are governed by the very Spirit of God.

He muſt alſo have a ſpecial regard to the execution of Juſtice, for this purpoſe, as it hath been obſerved ſince the days of *Heſiod*, Kings were firſt appointed; namely, for the Chaſtiſement of the Wicked, and for the Rewarding of thoſe who deſerve it, and to end the Differences that ariſe among his Subjects, by cauſing every Man to receive his own. Therefore when a Prince deveſts himſelf of this Virtue, he ſeems to profane the true and natural Duty of a Prince; for of all the Titles of Honour, the moſt glorious and ſplendid doubtleſs is to be ſtiled Juſt.

There is alſo nothing that he ought more to heed than the keeping of his Word which he hath once given; and to obſerve punctually his Promiſes and the plighting of his Faith; for the violation of this is more unworthy in him, becauſe he hath the Power in his own Hand, ſo that there is nothing

that

that can eaſily excuſe his breach of Promiſe; nay further, he is obliged as far as in him lies, to hinder others from doing ſo. This quality is ſo much the more excellent, becauſe it is rare among Men, and requires a firm Reſolution, Conſtancy, and a greatneſs of Mind, chiefly when the Concerns are weighty and conſiderable; we ſhall paſs over Diſſimulation in ſilence, which is too common. I know ſome Politicians do permit of ſome kinds of Deceits in a Prince, if they tend to the Advancement of the Publick good. *Plato*, among others, maintains, That *they who Rule, are often obliged to lie and deceive for the Advantage of their Subjects.* But this is a difficult Queſtion, which we ſhall examin hereafter.

Fortitude and Clemency are alſo Regal Virtues, and every one knows that a Prince cannot be excuſed from practiſing them; for as Fortitude is needful to ſtrike an Awe and prevent any ſuddain Rebellion or Diſturbance of the publick Peace: So Clemency is proper to beget in us a Love for the Prince, becauſe of his Readineſs to pardon Offenders: This alſo creates an opinion of his Goodneſs in us, when we find him naturally inclinable to obſerve that excellent Rule which adviſes a Prince to be merciful to the Submiſſive, but to correct the Stubborn.

Parcere Subjectis & debellare ſuperbos.

As to what relates to Modeſty, it highly concerns him to know how to temper it with Majeſty; for fear that forgetting his human Condition, and being puff'd up with Glory and Pride, he ſhould become Inſolent, and ſhould draw upon himſelf unavoidably the hatred of his People; or on the contrary, by abaſing himſelf below his Dignity, he ſhould fall into Contempt. There

There is no need that we ſhould ſpeak of Liberality, every one knows that it is a Virtue which ought to be familiar to Princes, and the rather becauſe there is nothing that procures more the good Will and Approbation of the World, than liberal and bountiful Actions. To this end the great abundance of Riches ſeems to ariſe from all Parts, and at laſt to Center in the Treaſury of the Prince, and thence to iſſue forth again as from a plentiful Fountain. But theſe Liberalities are to be beſtowed prudently, with a regard to the Quality and Merit of the Perſons whom he intends to gratify; and alſo to his own Treaſure, leſt by ſtirring up Emulation and Envy, he give too great opportunity to abuſive Tongues. As for Continency, Sobriety, and other Virtues, the more he is endowed with them and practiſes 'em, the more glorious they will certainly render him.

The fourth particular that a Monarch ought to apply himſelf to, is to underſtand well the Nature and State of the Kingdom, if he comes to it by Election or by Succeſſion, if it be Ancient or Modern; what are the Fundamental Laws of the State, what Evils and Miſchiefs have happened either from the Obſervance or not Obſervance of thoſe Laws; what relation it hath with the Ariſtocratical or Democratical Governments; what Power the Grandees have; what is able to ſtir up or to move the common People, and conſequently what are the Manners and Cuſtoms of both. He ought not to be ignorant of the Extent of his Dominion, of its Confines, Situation and Riches, and whether the Traffick be within or without his Realm. He muſt alſo know his Caſtles and Fortifications, and the Neighbours who are able to break in upon him, or incourage Factions. This will oblige him to be acquainted with Chronology, with Geography, and with

with Hiſtory, which derives its Beauty and Perfection from the two former Sciences, and which is ſo needful to him, that without the Knowledge of this he can never expect to become a perfect and an accompliſhed Politician.

Fifthly, He muſt be always furniſhed with thoſe things, without which a Kingdom cannot ſafely ſubſiſt; namely, a wiſe and prudent Counſel, that when he himſelf cannot well underſtand, fore-ſee and determin all things, he may make uſe of ſuch Counſellors, whoſe Diligence, Experience, Wiſdom, Integrity and Faithfulneſs have recommended 'em to him; for he muſt remember what *Cicero* ſaith according to *Heſiod*, That he is truly very wiſe who knows of himſelf what ought or what ought not to be done; but his Wiſdom is next a kin, who knows how to make uſe of good Advice, and to ſubmit to it. *Sapientiſſimum eſſe dicunt eum cui quod opus ſit veniat in mentem, proxime vero accedere illum qui alterius bene inventis obtemperet*, which is comprehended in theſe two Verſes,

Ille quidem eximius qui per ſe ipſe omnia novit,
Sed præſtans etiam, qui paret recta monenti.

Therefore he ought always to keep himſelf in that diſpoſition of Mind, that Truth may never offend him; that loving Uprightneſs and Sincerity, he may hate all Flattery, which is the chief Plague and Bane of great Men; For fear, ſaith the ſame Author, that having tender Ears, he ſhould be the laſt who ſhould underſtand the diſhonour of his Kingdom, and that his Ruin ſhould befal him before he could become ſenſible of it.

He ought likewiſe to be furniſhed with worthy Officers; for as he alone is not able to do all things, the ſeveral Offices of State ought to be poſſeſs'd by ſuch as

as are able to ſupport them; ſuch are the Governours of Cities and Provinces, the Generals of Armies, the Captains, Judges, Magiſtrates, and ſuch like, who are to be of Ability and known Integrity, otherwiſe there will be a continual and unavoidable ſequel of Miſtakes, Wickedneſs and Miſchiefs that will attend.

There is no need to adviſe, that as Mony is the Strength of all Affairs, his Coffers ought never to be empty; that the Forces of the Kingdom may always continue on foot, and that when a War happens or ſome other Occaſion of great Expences, he may not be obliged to levy ſuddain, violent and extraordinary Taxes. Neither is it needful to mention the General Deficiences of the State, ſuch as are the Fortreſſes and Caſtles, which ought to be well provided, eſpecially on the Borders, and on that ſide which the Enemy is to be feared: The Military Forces ought to be in a conſtant readineſs, that he may never be ſurprized, but always able to repel a Foreign Invaſion, and pacify a home-bred Sedition: As to Alliances, and chiefly ſuch as are made with thoſe People, who, as *Ariſtotle* would have them, are Neighbours and Powerful, there ought to be frequent and true Intelligence of all Things that happen, and of all the Deſigns that are on foot among the Subjects, Neighbours or Enemies; for fear of being ignorant herein, there might be ſome Contrivance againſt him unexpected, whereby he himſelf may be oppreſſed or ruined. This will cauſe him to venture ſomething, as *Plato* ſaith, or rather, ſpare nothing for the Maintenance of Spies.

Of

Of the great Concerns of Meum *and* Tuum, *or of the Property of the Subject.*

THe ſixth Particular, which a long Experience in Travelling over *Europe* and *Aſia*, hath diſcovered to me, is of no mean importance to a Sovereign Prince to cauſe his Kingdom to flouriſh, *viz.* Not to make himſelf abſolute Lord or Proprietor of all the Lands of his Realm, as the Grand Segnior, the King of *Perſia*, the Great Mogul, are in the greateſt part of their Dominions; but to eſtabliſh a Propriety, not only as in *Poland*, among the Nobility, but generally among all his Subjects: For if we take away this great Foundation, we deprive every private Perſon from all hopes of advancing themſelves, or of ſecuring what at preſent they enjoy. In ſuch a Caſe none is in a Condition to ſay, If I labour 'tis for my ſelf and my Poſterity; I ſhall be the Owner of this little Portion of Land that I intend to purchaſe; and I will leave it to my Children after me, whereby common People become ſo negligent and lazy, that they ſcarce labour but by conſtraint; and they are ſo careleſs of Husbandry, that the beſt Lands are covered with Sand and Gravel, as in *Egypt*, by the over-flowing of the *Nile*; the moſt beautiful Hills are full of Brambles and Thiſtles, as in *Paleſtine*, and thoſe admirable Vallies of *Alexandretta* and *Antioch*, which are become noiſom Marſhes and infectious Lakes; nay, all thoſe excellent Plains, rare Portions of Land and fruitful Hills of *Aſia Minor*, are become Places covered over with high and uſeleſs Graſs and Woods; the wonderful Country of *Meſopotamia*, that true Land of Promiſe, lies unmanur'd and totally forſaken: In ſhort, all *Turky*, which is capable

ble of being made the moſt fertile Soil in the World, and ſtock'd with the greateſt number of Inhabitants, at preſent lies deſolate and neglected.

Beſides, in a Government where Propriety is not regarded, there are no Miniſters of Juſtice, of ſufficient Power to redreſs the Grievances of the People at a diſtance from the Imperial Court, becauſe all Governours in their Provinces have an abſolute Power and Authority, which inclines them to Tyranny; and the more, becauſe they are all Perſons who have riſen from nothing, or miſerable Slaves taken out of a Seraglio, and who have borrowed from thoſe who poſſeſs the Treaſure of the Kingdom, as the Jews in *Turky*, vaſt Sums of Mony to purchaſe their Governments, not to mention the Preſents they are obliged to make every Year to be continued in their Poſts. So that all things being at the diſpoſal of the Governours and Jews, there is no Country-man, Handycrafts-man nor Merchant, that can be ſecure, but lives in a continual dread and apprehenſion of ſome Miſchief befalling him, by ſome pretended Quarrel or Deſign againſt him. From hence it is, that Arts which procure the Riches of a Kingdom, are ſlighted in thoſe Countries; and Sciences, which are the Glory and Accompliſhment of a Nation, are totally baniſhed: For no body there hath either Courage or Hopes to riſe to any thing conſiderable. Neither are there any Offices or Places that require Learning, nothing but ſome pitiful Towns, that is to ſay, certain Villages appointed for the Maintenance and Penſion of Soldiers, who draw out of them all that they can, without expending any thing, either for the Repair of the Dwellings, or for Cleanſing and Draining of the Ditches, or for any other purpoſe; for they are never aſſured of any thing, and they know not

not to Day, but that they may be abſolutely diſpoſeſs'd to Morrow, or at leaſt their Lands changed by their Maſters.

For this Reaſon, I have ſometimes given this Definition of a Turk; *An Animal Born for the Deſtruction of all that is Beautiful and Good in the World, and even of Human Race it ſelf.* Not but that the true Turks are often of a kind and good Diſpoſition; but becauſe their miſtaken Policy, their Ignorance and Negligence tend to take away and baniſh all Property; from whence proceeds, as I have ſaid, the Lazineſs of the People, the neglect of Husbandry, Tyranny, and the deſolation of their Provinces. All this is a certain Truth, and not the Dreams of a fantaſtical Traveller, all thoſe Countries not being now what they formerly were: Above half the Land lies Unmanured; a Man may often Travel a whole Day without meeting one Man; great Towns are generally half demoliſhed and forſaken; nay, the beſt and moſt populous Cities, as *Grand Cairo*, *Alexandria*, *Babilon*, and ſeveral others, lie the third part at leaſt in Ruins. And there is no doubt that thoſe Princes, tho very conſiderable, becauſe of the vaſt extent of their Dominions, are therefore the leſs Wealthy, and leſs Powerful, than they would be if it were otherwiſe; for they don't ſee, that in graſping at all, they have nothing, and by making themſelves the only Proprietors of all the Lands of their Empire, they make themſelves Kings of Wilderneſſes, of Beggars and deſpicable Wretches. So that if they daily get Ground, and grow greater, 'tis through the Weakneſs and Diſcord of their Neighbours; and becauſe their Empire is, as I have ſaid, of ſuch a vaſt extent in compariſon of others, and becauſe the Tartars (beſides thoſe who are taken from the Breaſts of their Mothers) ſupply them with Slaves from ſeveral

veral Parts, as from *Ruſſia*, *Circaſſia*, *Mingrelia*, *Armenia*, and other Countries.

Of the Duties of a Sovereign in times of Peace.

BUT to return to our Author, and to ſay ſomething in a few Words, concerning that which in ſome reſpect relates chiefly to the times of Peace, and that kind of Prudence which the Latins named *Togata*.

The Firſt and chief Duty is to have a Care that Religion and Piety towards God, be inviolably obſerved in all parts of the Kingdom, that Heaven may be propitious to him, and that his Subjects being awed with the reſpect and dread of the Almighty Power of God, who is every where, and ſees all Things, may more readily abſtain from thoſe Crimes which he cannot hinder by his Laws. Now the Experience of our latter Days hath ſufficiently diſcovered to us the Importance and Truth of that Counſel that *Mecænas* gave to *Auguſtus*, concerning Religion, and the Divine Worſhip. *You are*, ſaid he, *to oppoſe and never let go unpuniſhed the Innovators and Authors of new Religions; not only becauſe that the Gods will not permit ſuch as deſpiſe them, to perform any great Actions; but becauſe thoſe who introduce ſome new Divinity, generally perſuade the People to alterations in Government, from whence proceed Conſpiracies, Seditions and ſecret Aſſociations, which are doubtleſs very dangerous to a Monarchy.*

Secondly, To have a care that Arts be encouraged; not only thoſe that we term Liberal from which the Kingdom receives a particular Accompliſhment, but alſo ſuch as we call Mechanick, from which we reap great Advantage and Profit; chiefly to have a particular regard to Husbandry and

Navigation, becauſe the Firſt is to ſupply us plentifully with the Neceſſities of Life, and the Second encourages Traffick, by which we communicate to Strangers the Things that they want, as they return to us the Things that we ſtand in need of.

Thirdly, To endeavour that the Kingdom may increaſe in Virtue and Riches, that is to ſay, in all Things needful to make our Lives Innocent and Happy. And as Debauchery does eaſily and inſenſibly inſinuate it ſelf, he ought to give a Check to it by ſevere Edicts; and in the mean while, he ought to give order, that ſuch as abound in Wealth, may not ſuffer the Poor at their Gates to pine away for Want: In ſhort, he ought to provide in ſuch a manner, for the ſeveral Indigences of his Kingdom, that Happineſs and Plenty may ſpread over all his Dominions in every Corner.

Fourthly, He ought to provide for the ſecurity of the Peace, that the Happineſs of the Kingdom, which ought to be the firſt and chief Aim of Kings and Governours, may be more fixt and permanent; to which purpoſe, the particulars, before mention'd, will contribute; namely, To take care to prevent all Invaſions of Strangers, of home Factions and Seditions of his Subjects; about making Alliances and Leagues, and to obſerve and preſerve them as much as is poſſible; nevertheleſs, to make the Allies privately ſenſible, that it will be in vain for them to break them: For we muſt always ſuppoſe of Strangers, that Force and Power is rather wanting to them, than a deſire or a pretence to Invade our Realm, and Conquering of it either in part or all. Therefore he ought to keep his Garriſons well furniſhed, and to be as careful of ſecret Ambuſcades, and private Treacheries, as of open Aſſaults. He ought likewiſe in the ſame manner, to have a convenient Number of Troops and Soldiers ready in Pay;

Pay; and as for his Recruits and new raiſed Regiments, he ought to cauſe them to be trained up with care and exactneſs in all Military Exerciſes, that the old Soldiers teaching the new, they may be all ready to do Service when occaſion requires.

The Fifth reſpects the Subjects, That is, to prevent the Conſpiraces and Factions of the Grandees, not only by a juſt and prudent Diſtribution of Offices, but alſo by particular Expreſſions of Kindneſs, that they may have no cauſe to complain; nevertheleſs, he muſt make them know that he is their Lord and Maſter, and that he is quick-ſighted enough to ſee into their Deſigns and moſt ſecret Intentions: I ſhall not ſpeak here of the Advice of *Periander*, who, as *Ariſtotle* relates, gave no Anſwer by word of Mouth to the Embaſſadors of *Thraſibulus*, but only by ſigns; for he cut off the Tops of the higheſt Poppies before their Faces.

Sixthly, He ought, as we have already hinted, to prevent the Mutinies and Seditions of the People, not only by reſpect and fear; for there is nothing that more inclines popular Spirits to Inſolency, than when they ſee the Prince fallen into Contempt, and that they are ſecure from all Puniſhment, but alſo by an exact and regular Juſtice, which may free the weakeſt from the Oppreſſion of the moſt Powerful, and by eaſing the People, either by reducing their Taxes to a ſmall Proportion, or by taking them quite away; for there is nothing that more ſtirs up the Peoples hatred, and makes them more impatient, than extraordinary Taxes. But if the preſſing Neceſſities of the State obliges him to great Expences, and conſequently to raiſe large Sums of Mony, he ought to let his Subjects underſtand that ſuch Levies are for the neceſſary ſupport of the publick Security. So that if they deſire their own Welfare, ſaith *Cicero*, they

are to comply with Neceſſity: And beſides, this is to be ordered with a great equality, and with a reſpect to the Condition and Abilities of every one. I ſhall not ſpeak concerning that Advice, of ſending abroad Colonies and Parties out of the Kingdom when the People grow too numerous; nor of that other Advice, of impoveriſhing the People, and making them grow lean, when there is danger, by too great a Plenty, of growing over-fat, and ſo are apt to become Inſolent.

Seventhly, If there be any Factions begun, or any Seditions raiſed, he ought ſpeedily to pacify them by the Mediation of ſome Perſons, whoſe Virtue, Merit and Abilities have rendred them famous and acceptable: But if the Advices, Reproofs and Counſels of thoſe Perſons don't prevail, he muſt have recourſe to Force and Arms, that he may extinguiſh an Evil in the beginning, which in time might gather Strength, and become at laſt remedileſs: He muſt not be unmindful in the mean while, if he hath not time to raiſe Forces, and that the Caſe ſeems dangerous, that it is the ſureſt Method to yield and grant ſomething of that which gave the occaſion to the Sedition.

Eighthly, If the Evil cannot ſuddenly be ſtopp'd, neither by Wiſdom nor by Arms; but if that proceeds to a Civil War, which is the great Plague of a Kingdom: Let him in ſuch a Caſe make uſe of theſe Remedies, either to yield in ſome things, and to agree upon certain Terms, or to put an end to the War by Victory, if there be any hopes, taking a good Courage, and ſaying reſolutely to himſelf in the Language of *Æneas*, *Nunc animis opus*, *Ænea*, *nunc pectore firmo*. He muſt alſo remember, after he hath obtained Victory, or reſtored every thing by his Authority, to puniſh none but the chief Authors of the Tumult, and the moſt ſeditious Perſons,

ſons, and to Pardon the reſt of his Subjects; that in ſtriking a Terror by Executions, he may prevent the like Diſorders for the future, and by his Mildneſs and Clemency, he may declare, That he acts as the Father of his Country.

But here may ariſe a Queſtion; If a Perſon of Quality, in a Civil War, may withdraw himſelf, or keep himſelf private and retired, as we ſay, out of harms way, without declaring for either ſide; or if he ought, according to that Law of *Solon*, ſo remarkable in *Ariſtotle*, *Plutarch* and *Agellus*, declare for one ſide or other. I anſwer, If he be a Perſon of Note and Figure in the Realm, and if he be in ſome great Poſt, he ought not to leave his Station and ſtand idle, but as a wiſe Pilot, he ſhould govern the ſame Helm in the Storm which he held in the Calm. But if he be a private Perſon, who ſeldom medled with publick Affairs, he may ſeem to be excus'd from ſiding with any Party, but live quietly and retire at his own Home, without affronting either Party. But if the Realm be threatned with a Foreign War, he ought not to deliberate, but declare for his Prince and Country.

Of the Offices of a Sovereign in times of War.

NOw that we may alſo ſpeak as to what chiefly concerns the time of War, and conſequently of Military Prudence, which ſhews it ſelf by undertaking, managing and finiſhing a War. A wiſe Prince will never take up Arms raſhly, whether he acts as an Aſſailant or Defendant; but will firſt examin his own Forces, ſo that if he finds them not ſufficient, he will never adventure to make an Aſſault, for fear of not being able to ſave himſelf upon this firſt Attempt; and to prevent drawing

all the Forces of the Enemy upon him, he will not expect their coming, but endeavour to prevent them by ſending Embaſſadors of great worth, and by yielding rather ſomething of his own, than to draw upon himſelf ſo conſiderable a Detriment. But if nothing can prevail upon the Enemy, whom he finds too powerful, his only Remedy will be to gather together his own Forces, and thoſe of his Confederates; and placing his Confidence in the Divine Aſſiſtance, and in the Juſtice of his Cauſe, arm himſelf with Courage and reſolve to undergo all Events, either ſtoutly to over-come with leſs Force, which often happens, or as we often ſay, ſell his Deſtruction at a dear rate. Neither ought he to undertake any War but upon a juſt account, for a juſt and reaſonable End; as for Example, To oppoſe the Enemy that would not fail to invade him; To retake ſomething that the Enemy hath wrongfully uſurped, and would never reſtore, tho' often ſolicited; To ſuccour his Allies unjuſtly oppreſſed, or to aſſiſt ſome other Nation, who being too weak and unjuſtly aſſaulted, have requeſted his Aſſiſtance. The War will alſo be deemed juſt, tho undertaken or maintained wrongfully, after that the Prince hath made reaſonable Offers, and that the Enemy hath rejected them. In all Caſes, he is to look upon War as a Sea of Calamity and Miſchiefs, which is eaſily diſturb'd but not ſo eaſily calm'd, becauſe of many unexpected Accidents hapning; ſo that only Neceſſity can be a lawful Excuſe or Pretence to cover and ſecure the Prince from thoſe direful Imprecations which the People, oppreſſed by the Miſchiefs of the War, are wont to Vomit out againſt the Authors of it.

Now that he may ſufficiently and prudently carry on the War, when it is once reſolved and concluded, he ought to take care that four things be not

not wanting to him; Men fit and able for the Employment; convenient Arms; ſufficient Proviſions, and as much Mony as is requiſite for his Men. It is certain alſo, that he ought firſt to make choice of good Officers, and chiefly of a General; and this General ought to be but one; for it hath been obſerved in all Ages, as *Thucidides* takes notice, That nothing is more pernicious than many Commanders in chief. He ought to be of a tried Experience and a ſharp Underſtanding, that he may be able to reſolve ſuddenly and with advantage; He ought to know the Situation of the Country where he makes War, becauſe the Victory or the Loſs of a Battel, often depends upon a very trivial thing, upon a narrow Lane, a ſtream of Water, a Wood, or ſome riſing Grounds, *&c.* *Ariſtotle* is of Opinion, That he ought to be an honeſt Man; but that more reſpect is to be had of his Ability than of his Manners. Beſides, he muſt have Authority, and the Reputation of a great Warrier; and ought to be ſucceſsful, not only becauſe that is a great Encouragement to an Army, but becauſe that makes the Soldiers ready, bold and reſolute, and ſtrikes a Terror into the Enemy. The Qualifications neceſſary for a General of an Army, which *Cicero* requires, ſpeaking of *Pompey*, are ſufficiently known; He muſt be indefatigable in Labour, undaunted in Danger, induſtrious in Re-encounters, quick in Execution, and a Man of an excellent Fore-ſight, *Laboris in negatio, fortitudinis in periculo, induſtriæ in agendo, celertatis in conficiendo, concilij in providendo.* A Prince muſt alſo look to his Soldiers, that they be of a competent Age, ſtrong of Body, for they are deſigned for Labour and Fatigue; That they be of the ſame Country, rather than Strangers, for ſuch will be more faithful and leſs inclinable to Sedition; That they be well Exerciſed and Diſciplined, for

otherwiſe they will ſtand in little ſtead: We all know what ſucceſs a rigid Diſcipline, ſtrictly obſerved, had antiently among the *Romans*. Now tho' the Infantry and Cavalry be both needful, yet the Infantry are generally more uſeful in hilly Countries, and in beſieging of Towns; and often ſo in Battels, when well inſtructed and diſciplined: For *Tacitus* obſerves, That as the Horſe fall on with ſpeed, ſo they often as ſpeedily ſurrender their Victory. As for their Weapons, every one knows that they muſt be fit and convenient both for Offence and Defence; and as for their Ammunitions and Proviſions, 'tis ſufficiently known of what importance they are, the want of which having cauſed many Armies to Periſh, and their Fortifications to be ſurrendred up without a ſtroke. And laſtly, as for Mony, 'tis plain, that as it is the Sinews of a State, ſo it is likewiſe of War; That Army that is not paid, becomes mutinous, and a company of Robbers rather than Soldiers; That great things are accompliſhed by Mony as well as by Force and Counſel; and finally, that which *Cicero* relates of *Philip* is true, *That there is no Fortitification impregnable where a Horſe loaden with Gold can enter.*

But ſome may expect that we ſhould here treat of ſeveral Accompliſhments and Duties of a General, in marching of an Army, in Incamping, in Drawing it up for Battel, in an Engagement, or in a Siege, or in the Defence of a City, *&c.* But this depends upon his Ability, Capacity, Preſence of Mind, Time, Place, and many other Circumſtances; that which may be ſaid in general Terms is this, That there is nothing more uſeful and more important for a General of an Army, than to know well the Condition of his Enemy, to obſerve and underſtand perfectly how to prevent them, and never to loſe the Opportunity of an Advantage.

We

We might alſo here ſpeak of Stratagems, but it will be ſufficient to ſay, That they have been approved of in all Ages, and judged to belong to War, and that they tend to preſerve an Army, and that we are always in danger of being circumvented if we be not before-hand. Therefore *Cyrus* admired, among his Friends, at the ſtrange Qualifications requiſite to make a compleat General; He ought to be Cunning, Subtil, a Diſſembler, a Cheat, *&c. Debere eſſe inſidiatorem, diſſimulatorem, doloſum, deceptorem, furem, raptorem, ac omni in re hoſtibus prævalentem.* But we may eaſily underſtand St. *Auſtin*'s Opinion in the Caſe, who ſaith, *That the Orders that God gave to* Joſhua *to lay Ambuſhes, ſhews us that 'tis no Injuſtice to make uſe of them in a juſt War; That a righteous Prince ought principally to take heed that the War be not unjuſt, and if ſo, then it matters not whether we over-come by Subtilty or by plain Force and Fighting.*

Let us add one thing more in relation to the End and Iſſue of the War. If the Prince becomes Victorious, he ought to neglect nothing, to hinder the Enemy from gathering together his Forces, and putting himſelf in a poſture of doing farther Miſchief: But he ought not to inſult over him and his Misfortune, for that is unworthy of a generous Soul; neither ſhould he drive him to a Neceſſity, leſt being reduced to deſpair, he ſhould make an extraordinary Attempt and Raviſh away the Victory already obtained. But if there be no fear of Indulgence, it is certain that Moderation, Mercy, Kindneſs and Clemency to an Enemy, ſhall always be recommended and eſteemed. But if he be ſo unhappy as to loſe the Victory, it will be expedient for him to bear his Loſs courageouſly, and to look upon it as a Misfortune unto which our human Condition is ſubject: But in the mean while he

he ought not to neglect his ſcattered Forces, but gather them together; and complying quietly with the Times, never to deſpair, but expect that Providence at another time and in another juncture may become more favourable to him.

This Obſervation that I have mentioned before, That Conquerors ought not to inſult over the Vanquiſhed, calls to mind the Reproaches that *Bajazet* offered to *Tamerlan*, when he viſited him in his Chains, and began to Smile on him: *Laugh not at my Calamity*, ſaid *Bajazet* to him, with a haughty Tone, *inſult not over my Misfortune; underſtand that God is the Lord, and the giver of the Empires of the World; and if now thou art raiſed up to the top Spoke of the Wheel, thou may'ſt be to morrow caſt down to the bottom. I know*, anſwer'd *Tamerlan* as well as thou doſt, *that God is the Lord, and giver of Crowns and Empires; if I laugh, 'tis not that I inſult over thy Calamity, but when I conſider that theſe great Empires of the World muſt be very mean things, and that this Sovereign Lord muſt eſteem them of no great Value, ſeeing he hath given them to Perſons ſo ill-favour'd; to a wicked and ſquint-ey'd Fellow as thou art, and to a wretched lame Perſon as I am.* For *Timur-leng*, which by Corruption we call *Tamerlan*, ſignifies a lame Prince, and *Bajazet* was ugly in Face and ſquint-ey'd. But this by the by.

If a wiſe Man ought to intermeddle with publick Affairs.

IN this place we might anſwer ſeveral Objections which by means of this kind of Prudence, ſeem to make againſt thoſe unto whom this Rule of *Epicurus*, (That a wiſe Man ought not to intermeddle with the Affairs of Government,) ſeems not unpleaſing.

pleaſing. But we have already proved by the Teſtimony of *Seneca*, that this is not to be underſtood abſolutely without Exception, but only upon this Condition, If nothing happens that does oblige him. He deſigns to adviſe us plainly, that a wiſe Man ought to concern himſelf with the Affairs of Government only when an occaſion ſhall be offered, where his Wiſdom and Counſil are required and needful, but otherwiſe he need not engage himſelf; and that Ambition, the deſire of Riches, Offices and Dignities, ſhould not draw him out of his private Station. And if *Epicurus* would never take upon him any publick Employ, doubtleſs, it was not out of the Perſuaſion of *Theodorus*, and ſome others, that Wiſdom is too precious, and of too great a Value, to expoſe it ſelf to Toils, Labours and Dangers, for our Country ſake, which commonly comprehends ſo many Fools and ungrateful Wretches; but it was out of pure Modeſty, as *Laertius* hath obſerved, and becauſe he thought it not juſt to thruſt himſelf of his own accord into Buſineſs, unto which he knew that he was not called; or to follow the practice of the Ambitious, who at laſt underſtand, too late, that which *Theophraſtus* complain'd of in his latter Days, when he told his Diſciples, *That he had not any thing more to ſay to them, but only, That the Life of Man ſuffered fooliſhly many Pleaſures to eſcape, through Vain-glory and Ambition. That as ſoon as we begin to Live, we begin to Die; and that there was nothing ſo inconvenient to Mankind, as Ambition, and the exceſſive deſire of Glory.* An excellent Doctrin! which may make us underſtand, that we ought not to defer the enjoyment of this happy Philoſophical Repoſe to a decrepit Age. We need but caſt an Eye upon the Condition of Courtiers, or ſuch as are raiſed to high Places and Dignities, and incumber'd with Buſineſs: There is ſcarce any but

is

is wearied with his manner of Living, and wiſhes for the quiet repoſe of thoſe whom he ſees eſcaping as it were from out of a troubled Sea, ſwelling with Storms and Tempeſts, to a ſecure and peaceable Haven. Who is there that don't often think of retreating from the hurry of Buſineſs, and endeavour to arrive to that retiredneſs from the World, wherein he may compoſe his diſtracted Thoughts, and render the remainder of his Days eaſy and happy? Pray tell me, ſhould not we act much more Prudently, did we never hazzard our ſelves in this tempeſtuous Sea of Buſineſs, but withdraw our ſelves as ſoon as we can from it, and begin to live happily from our very Youth forward? Were not this a much wiſer Deſign, than to allot to our old Age, (the very Dregs of our Life, commonly accompanied with various Infirmities, and which oftentimes we never arrive to) the Pleaſure of living Happily. Doubtleſs they are happy who have taken a firm Reſolution to ſpend all their Life in ſuch a quiet State, in which others eſteem themſelves happy if they can ſpend but a ſhort, and the worſt part of their Lives. Admirable was that Advice of *Cyneas* to *Pyrrhus*, and worthy to be written in Letters of Gold; who when he was deſigning to make War againſt the Romans: *Well Sir*, ſaid *Cyneas*, *And what ſhall we do when we have overcome the Romans, conquered* Italy, Sicily, Lybia, Macedonia, *and all the World beſides? We will then live in Pleaſure and Eaſe*, anſwered *Pyrrhus*, *We will Feaſt and Rejoyce, and ſpend the reſt of our Days in Peace and Pleaſure. But I beſeech you great Sir*, replyed *Cyneas*, *What hinders us at preſent, but that we may take the ſame Repoſe and Eaſe, Feaſt and enjoy our ſelves, and live with as much Content and Happineſs? We are in preſent poſſeſſion of what we could not otherwiſe attain, but by great Labour, Bloodſhed and Rapine, beſides a Thouſand ways*

of

of expoſing our Selves and our People, to infinite Hazards and Dangers.

I ſhall not here any longer inſiſt upon this Subject, *viz.* The Advantage that a wiſe Man reaps from his Tranquility and Retirement, having been often mentioned already. I will only mention, that *Damocles* had good reaſon to ſay, That thoſe who ſo earneſtly ſeek after great Honors and Preferments, commonly mind nothing but the outward Splendor, which dazles the Eyes of the Vulgar, but never heed the griping Cares, I may ſay Furies, which torment thoſe who are already exalted to thoſe high Places. *Ariſtotle* cites the Verſes of *Euripides*, in which he accuſeth himſelf of Folly, becauſe that when he was able to live happily as a private Man, indiſcreetly made himſelf miſerable by intangling and incumbering himſelf with Buſineſs. *Am I Wiſe*, quoth he, *to thruſt my ſelf upon Trouble, when I could have eaſily been without it?* But the ordinary Labors that we commonly undergo in the management of our neceſſary Affairs, ſeem not worthy to be taken notice of, if compared with the continual dread and terror of Mind, which attends thoſe who ſee themſelves always walking upon Brinks and Precipices in continual danger of falling ſo much the lower, by how much the higher they have raiſed themſelves. *Sejanus*, ſaith the Satyr, knew not what he deſired, when he greedily long'd for, and earneſtly ſought after the great Honors and boundleſs Riches, which at length he was poſſeſs'd of. For they were as ſo many Degrees, by which he aſcended to the top of that Pinacle, from whence he was to be miſerably caſt down. What ruined *Craſſus* and *Pompey*? Was it not that high Station for which they had ſo earneſtly endeavour'd, that nothing of Labour or Difficulty could hinder them in their Attempt; Such earneſt Petitions as theſe the Gods grant us in their Wrath.

Ergo

Ergo quid optandum foret ignoraſſe videris
Sejanum? Nam qui nimios optabat honores,
Et nimias poſcebat opes, numeroſa parabat,
Excelſæ Turris tabulata, unde altior eſſet
Caſus, & impulſæ præceps immane ruinæ.
Quid Craſſos? Quid Pompeios evertit & illum
Ad ſua qui domitos deduxit flagra Quirites?
Summus nempe locus nulla non arte petitus,
Magnaq; Numinibus vota exaudita malignis.

CHAP. VI.

Of Fortitude.

TO treat of the ſeveral Virtues in their Order, we ought, next to Prudence, to ſpeak of Fortitude, which is as the firſt part of Honeſty, as Temperance is the Second. Not that other Virtues do not participate of Honeſty, but becauſe thoſe who behave themſelves according to the Rules of Fortitude and Temperance are principally and more eſpecially ſaid to act Honeſtly and Honourably. Now Fortitude, in the Senſe that it is here taken, is not ill deſcribed by *Cicero*, viz. *A conſiderable firmneſs and reſolution of Mind, able to encounter Danger and ſubmit to Labour.* Becauſe this Definition points at the two chief acts of Fortitude, the one undertakes, the other ſuſtains and teaches to ſhun the two vicious Extremeties, namely, Audacity and Timidity, into which we may run for want of a mature Conſideration. This Virtue ſeems alſo to be well defin'd by *Ariſtotle*, *A Medium, or Mediocrity between Fear and*

and too great Confidence: And *Seneca* ſaith, *It is the Knowledge how to repel, ſubmit to and encounter Dangers.*

However, tho Fortitude as it is a particular Virtue be ſuch as we have repreſented it, yet ſometimes Men give to it too large a Compaſs, ſometimes too Narrow; too Large is allowed it, when they extend it as far as any Virtue reaches, as St. *Ambroſe* doth, and before him St. *Clement*, when he ſaith, *The Duty of Fortitude is not only to bear patiently human Caſualties and Misfortunes, but alſo to reſiſt Luſt, Debauchery, Pain and Wrath.* They allow too narrow a Compaſs, when they take it only for a Military Virtue, as if ſcarce any were to be allowed Valiant, but ſuch as ſhew their Courage in War, or Dye Fighting, and by this means become Illuſtrious, and obtain everlaſting Renown: But we ſee thoſe who expreſs no leſs Fortitude and Courage, either under Diſtempers, or in Dangers at Sea, and on other Occaſions, and Dye with as much Reſolution. However, *Ariſtotle* will have him to be termed properly Courageous, who ſees with an undaunted Spirit, an honeſt Death, and the preparations to it, ſuch as are principally thoſe that we meet with in War. This made *Cicero* ſay, *That the great and noble Actions performed in War have this belonging to them, that they are I know not how, more Praiſed and Extolled than others.* Nevertheleſs, he proves at large, by many Examples, and without forgetting his own, *That though Men put a higher eſteem upon military Actions than upon Civil, yet we muſt except againſt this Opinion; for if we will Judge according to Truth, there are many civil Actions far greater and nobler than the Military:* From whence we may conclude, that tho thoſe who behave themſelves with Courage in War may be eſteemed Brave and Excellent, yet this Virtue of Fortitude reſides not in them alone, nor do they only deſerve the Titles of Brave and Stout.

Now

Now to treat of Fortitude contained within its juſt Limits, two Things ſeem generally requiſit. The Firſt, That it be an invincible ſtrength of Mind, againſt all Things that may be difficult, that is to ſay, againſt ſuch Evils as are difficult either to overcome or to undergo. The Second, That it be not raſh or unadviſed, that it tends to a good End, namely, to the ſupport of Honeſty and Equity.

In relation to the Firſt, when I ſay that Fortitude is a certain ſtrength of Mind; doubtleſs we ought not hereby to underſtand, that this Virtue conſiſts, as ſome vulgar People may imagine, in the meer Strength and Vigour of Body; for a Man of a weak and infirm Body may deſerve the name of Brave, if he deſigns the Juſtice of the Cauſe he undertakes, and continues reſolute and unſhaken in his purpoſe, not knowing how to yield; nay, tho he meet with ill Fortune, if his Courage never fails, but he proceeds on with the ſame Bravery and Reſolution of Thought. Much leſs do we ſuppoſe it conſiſtent with a boaſting and vain-glorious Humour, too much incident to ſome Perſons; for if you remove this Oſtentation which puts them in purſuit after a dim Light of Glory, you will find them Mean, Contemptible Cowards; nay, when it moſt concerns them to encounter with real Dangers, they'l draw back, their Courage failing 'em, and very often ſeek to ſave themſelves by a ſhameful Flight.

Again, when I ſay, that it is a firm, inflexible reſolution of Mind, I hereby obſerve that it ought to be ſuch a firmneſs as ought never to yield, but to continue ſo, not only in reſpect of the greatneſs of the Labour and Danger, but alſo in reſpect of its long continuance and repeated Endeavours.

I ſay that this ſtrength or firmneſs of Mind is to encounter all Evils; becauſe this Virtue of its own Nature, is as a Bulwark againſt all that is or appears

pears to be Evil in our Life, and that it properly hath no other Poſt aſſign'd but this.

I ſay moreover, That the Evils that Fortitude deſigns to overcome, are to be difficult; for tho this Virtue may extend to light, eaſy and common Ills, yet it is very profitable to accuſtom our ſelves to encounter 'em and ſupport our ſelves under 'em, that we may thereby alſo the better begin to form an Habit; for juſt as the Virtue of Temperance is not required that one ſhould abſtain from doating on an old wither'd Hag, as it was objected to *Cryſippus*, ſo Fortitude appears not in little Evils, but only in great and difficult; ſuch as is Death, Pain, Ignominy, the loſs of Friends or of Children, Poverty, Impriſonment, Baniſhment, and others, that are able to terrify us at a diſtance, or ready to overwhelm us when they draw near.

As to the Second thing requiſite: Fortitude would not be a Virtue, if it were fooliſh and unconſiderate, but it would be Raſhneſs, and as *Ariſtotle* terms it, a certain Brutality, or a brutiſh Effort, oppoſite to this Virtue which is call'd Heroick and Divine, which is nothing elſe but a kind of noble Courage and Bravery, which gave the very Name to Heroes, and cauſed their Deeds to be ſtiled Heroick. Such therefore ought not to be eſteemed Brave or Courageous, who being carried by a blind Fury, and truſting chiefly to their bodily Strength, run head long upon any Undertaking, and as if they had bid defiance to Dangers, ſeem to fear nothing ſo much as to appear fearful of any thing. But thoſe are truly Brave who underſtanding Dangers, neither loving them nor provoking them Indiſcreetly, behave themſelves nevertheleſs with Courage, as often as they ought, and in that manner that they ought; for *Ariſtotle* makes this Remark, That a ſtout and brave Man, is not he who fears nothing, or is reſolved to

bear all Things, or to undertake all Things; but he who acts thus where he ought, for the end and purpose that he ought, when he ought, and in that manner that he ought. *Qui quod oportet, & cujus causa, & quando, & quo modo oportet.*

As therefore on the one Hand, he opposeth to a brave Spirit the timerous Soul, who for Fear undertakes not the thing that he should; so on the other the Audacious and Rash, for want of Fear, or out of too much Confidence in himself, undertakes what he ought not. Not to say, that according to his Opinion, such may be termed Fools and mad Men, who fear nothing, neither Earthquakes nor Storms, such as the *Celtæ* were: For there are some Things that are truly to be feared; as Shame, and Infamy which attends it; for as he saith, 'tis Impudence not to fear them, because Shame is an Evil. And as *Seneca* observes, Fortitude is no inconsiderate Rashness, nor a Love of Dangers, but it is the knowledge how to distinguish what is or what is not Evil. It is always Watchful, Constant, Patient, *&c.* Neither would it be a Virtue, as it is manifest, if it did not propose Honesty and Justice for its End: For that cause *Aristotle* will have a brave Man to be undaunted, but still with an honest Intent. And for the same Reason, after he hath condemned those for Cowards, and far from Brave, who destroy themselves for fear of Poverty, or for Love, or Grief; and after he hath declared that those may be esteemed Brave, who being tempted by Rewards, or frighted by Torments, yet behave themselves resolutely, (which in some respect may be said of Soldiers, who are reduced to the necessity of Fighting) he saith, That he who is truly Brave, ought not to be obliged by Necessity, but moved by Honesty.

We add particularly this word *Equity*, because those who are commonly reputed Brave, often abuse their

their Strength againſt the dictates of Juſtice, and ſpeak according this barbarous Dialect, *Power is above all Things; the Right is in the Conqueror.* Hence it is that *Plato* judges Fortitude to be a kind of a Flux or Torrent againſt the endeavours of Unjuſtice; and therefore blames *Protagoras.*, who eſteemed thoſe Men brave, who were moſt Profane, moſt Unjuſt, moſt Intemperate, and the greateſt Fools; becauſe, ſaith he, we are not to judge of Fortitude by the Strength of the Body, but by the Conſtancy of the Mind, and by an end that is Honeſt and Praiſe-worthy, in which Juſtice and Equity principally appear. 'Tis alſo to be obſerved, That the Heroes have always been the Protectors of the Innocent, and Enemies of the Wicked, of unjuſt Men and Tyrants. And *Ageſilaus* well deſerved Praiſe, when being asked, If Juſtice was better than Fortitude, anſwered, That if all Men were Juſt, there would be no need of Fortitude. And becauſe it is Anger that commonly carries thoſe who are thought to be Brave, to Unjuſtice, *Ariſtotle* adviſes us to ſtand upon our Guard, and to have an Eye to that Paſſion, for fear that what is as the Stone to ſharpen Fortitude, ſhould become as a Sword, to cut the knot of Juſtice. He ſaith moreover, *That tho there is no greater Provocation and Encouragement to encounter Danger than Anger, yet there is no true Fortitude in it, unleſs it be directed by Counſel, and by the conſideration of a juſt End.* It was this that made *Taurus* ſay, in the Writings of *Agellus*, *The brave Man is not he who out of a brutiſh Humour, Inſenſibility or Cuſtom, Fights as a kind of Monſter againſt Nature, and goes beyond his juſt Limits; ſuch as was* Cæſar's *Gladiator, who laughed at the Chirurgeons who cut his Wounds wider; but true Fortitude or Bravery, is that which the Antients have duly ſtyled the Knowledge of that which is, and of that which is not to be ſupported, which diſ-*

covers to us, that there are certain things unſufferable, and which Men truly brave ought to abominate.

From all this, and what I have mentioned elſewhere, we may obſerve that we have the Seeds of Fortitude truly ſpringing in us; but that they may grow up and become Virtues, Exerciſe and Learning are abſolutely neceſſary.

Of the ſeveral kinds of Fortitude.

BY what has been here ſaid, we may obſerve, that commonly Men do not reckon ſeveral kinds of Fortitude, becauſe they make this Virtue to be employ'd about a very particular matter. But if it be true, that it reſpects all that may be judged Evil in this Life, how much rather ſhould this matter be General, and why ſhall not we reckon as many ſorts or kinds, as there are kinds of Evil in our Life? And as there are ſome who bear patiently the loſs of Riches, but not the loſs of Honour; and who ſuffer death bravely in War, but not on a Bed of Sickneſs, and ſo of the like; why ſhould it not be neceſſary for ſuch diverſity of things to form to our ſelves divers Habits, and ſo to diſtinguiſh ſeveral kinds of Fortitude?

For as to what concerns thoſe which ſome would have to be ſometimes Integral parts in difficult Matters, and ſometimes Potential in leſs difficult, namely, Magnificence, Magnanimity, Conſtancy and Patience; It is certain, firſt, for Magnificence, that it belongs not to this Virtue, but to Liberality; becauſe as *Ariſtotle* tells us, it regulates the Expences of Mony, and chiefly the Expences needful in great things, as are the publick Shews and Stages, the building of Ships to defend the Commonwealth; and in ſhort, all other things which have ſome-

ſomething of Grandeur, and commonly ſtrike the People with Admiration. And therefore agreably with this Opinion of *Ariſtotle*, *Cicero* recommends to us this excellent Definition, *Magnificientia eſt rerum magnarum, & excelſarum cum animi ampla quadam, & ſplendida propoſitione, agitatio atque adminiſtratio.* We ought alſo to take notice, that as Magnificence is a Virtue and conſequently a Mediocrity, *Ariſtotle* names the two contrary Vices, *viz.* On the one hand, Proud, Extravagant and Superfluous Expences; and on the other, doing things niggardly and mean; parting with nothing but what is drawn from us by force, againſt our free Conſent; always grudging and repining at what goes from us.

As for what concers Magnanimy, or as we term it Generoſity, it is likewiſe manifeſt that it belongs not to this Virtue, or if it doth, 'tis nothing elſe but Fortitude it ſelf under another Name. Indeed, as Fortitude is properly concerned with difficult things, it is certain, that to undertake and endure ſuch things, we muſt have a great and generous Soul, or as *Cicero* ſaith, *We muſt have a mind highly elevated and aſſured of it ſelf, with a certain hope, having a regard to things good and honeſt.* Beſides, when *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That Magnanimity or greatneſs of Mind conſiſts in a Perſuaſion that we deſerve much, when really our Merits anſwer our Perſuaſion; 'tis evident that this opinion of Honour that we deſerve, relates to Juſtice, or to the conveniency of Temperance, and not to Fortitude, which conſiſts in encountering Dangers, and courageouſly undergoing Labours.

As for Conſtancy, or as the Holy Scriptures ſtile it, long Forbearance or Longanimity, 'tis nothing elſe but Fortitude it ſelf, when it diſcovers it ſelf by a ſequel of many repeated Acts, and by a long

continuance of Time. For a Man cannot be ſaid to be brave, but rather weak and feeble, if he continues not reſolute in what he hath undertaken, but after he hath a while ſupported himſelf, his Heart at laſt begins to faint and fail him. From hence it is, that Conſtancy and Perſeverance being ſynonimous, *Cicero* tells us, *That Perſeverance conſiſts in a continuing reſolute a long time, and conſtant in the things that we have propoſed, after that we have maturely conſidered upon 'em.*

Laſtly, As for Patience, it ſeems to be ſcarce any thing elſe but Conſtancy, unleſs it be that it conſiſts in ſuffering, as the word imports, rather than in attacquing. Therefore *Cicero* ſaith, *That it conſiſts in ſuffering willingly and a long time, difficult things, for the ſake of Honeſty or Profit.*

Therefore not to inſiſt any longer upon this Point, let us obſerve with *Epicurus*, *That a mean Soul becomes inſolent in Proſperity, and dejected in Adverſity.* Let us then conclude from hence, by the Rule of Contraries, That it is the property of a noble and generous Temper, not to be inſolent, lifted up by good Succeſs, nor to ſuffer it ſelf to be abaſed in a low Eſtate, but to bear and ſuffer the good and evil Fortune with an equal Mind, and in the ſame manner. And becauſe when all things proſper, it plainly belongs to that part of Temperance which we name Moderation, to moderate and govern our Thoughts, and to hinder 'em from riſing too high; it follows, that when Croſſes happen, it belongs to Fortitude, to keep our Minds in a conſtant and even Temper. Now as Calamities are nothing elſe but external Evils, we muſt remember that they are not really Evils, but only as they are accompanied by Pain which they cauſe in the Body, or by Grief which they produce in the Mind by the means of Opinion; ſo that only this

Pain

Pain and this Grief are the real Evils: Now it belongs to Fortitude to hinder theſe from cauſing Pain, or at leaſt obliges us to bear it patiently when it comes, and to hinder it from oppreſſing and over-whelming the Mind with a vain Grief; all which is to be effected by curing our Judgment of vulgar Opinions or falſe Perſuaſions, without which it would have little or no Power upon the Soul.

Whether Evils fore-ſeen make the leaſt impreſſion upon us.

FRom hence it is, that we muſt obſerve in the ſecond place, that there are as it were two general Bulwarks againſt theſe ſorts of external Evils: The firſt is a good Conſcience; for as *Crantor* ſaith, 'Tis a great ſupport under Afflictions, to be free from Guilt: The ſecond is to fore-ſee, and to lay before our Eyes the Miſchiefs and Evils that may happen; for he who fore-ſees the blow, and is prepared to receive it, is not ſo eaſily beaten down, as when he is ſtruck unprovided; when he is armed with Reſolution and Courage, as with a kind of Breaſt-plate, he is not ſo ſoon wounded as when he is naked and unguarded. Therefore a wiſe Man never truſts ſo much to his good Fortune, but he thinks alſo upon his Evil; for Fortune hath nothing fix'd, neither is there any thing certain or of a long continuance in human Affairs: He always repreſents before his Eyes ſome Examples of the Viciſſitudes of good and evil Things, and knows that there is no Miſchief that happens to any Body but that the ſame may befal him. Therefore he don't wait till the time of War, then to furniſh himſelf with Arms to ſupport it, nor till a Storm happens, then to prepare to reſiſt it.

If a wiſe Man begets a Son, ſaith *Cicero*, he knows that he hath begotten a Mortal, and brings him up in that Perſuaſion: If he ſends him to *Troy* to defend *Greece*, he knows that he don't ſend him to a Feaſt, but to a dangerous War. This Conſideration, ſaith he, and this Meditation upon the Evils to come, before they happen, qualifies and allays the Miſchiefs that befal afterwards. So that I think *Theſeus* cannot be too much commended for ſaying in *Euripides*, I thought before upon the Calamities to come; upon Death, Baniſhment, *&c.* that I might be the better enabled to encounter with adverſe Fortune.

'Tis an undoubted Truth, that the Evils that are not fore-ſeen, are much more grievous; and that the Fore-ſight and Preparation of the Mind, hath a great Efficacy to leſſen the Pain. Let Mankind ſet always before his Eyes the Caſualties of the World; for this excellent and divine Wiſdom conſiſts in having a long while perfectly known and conſidered human Affairs, and meditated upon them; not wondering at any thing that happens, nor believe before a thing happens, that ſuch a thing cannot come to paſs. He afterwards commends the Advice of *Terence*, That a Man in Proſperity ſhould think with himſelf how he ſhould be able to endure Adverſity, Dangers, Loſſes, and Baniſhment, the Miſcarriages of a Son, the Death of a Wife, the Sickneſs of a Daughter; that all theſe things are common; that they may happen ſo; that nothing new ought to ſurpriſe us; and whatever good befalls us beyond our Expectation, it ſhould be look'd upon as ſo much Profit and pure Gain.

It was this kind of Meditation and Fore-ſight that cauſed that Conſtancy of Mind in *Socrates*, appearing always with a ſerene and pleaſant Countenance;

tenance; truly, how could his Looks be otherwiſe, ſeeing his Soul was never moved nor diſturbed? *Agrippinus* proceeded yet farther, for he was wont to make a Panegyrick of all the Evils that befell him; of Diſeaſes, when they ſeis'd upon him; of Infamy, when Men ſlander'd him; of Baniſhment, when he was driven away. And when at a certain time he was going to ſit at Table, a Meſſage was brought him from *Nero*, to command him immediately to be gone and to depart; he anſwered nothing elſe but, Well, we ſhall then dine at the Town of *Aricia*. *Aricia ergo prandebimus.*

How we ought to ſupport external and publick Evils.

AS Evils are uſually diſtinguiſhed into publick, ſuch as is War, Tyranny, the Ruin of our Country, Plague, Famine, and ſuch like; and into private, as Baniſhment, Impriſonment, Slavery, Ignominy, *&c.* It is not needful to ſpeak much of the publick Evils, becauſe they don't really concern us ſo much as they are Publick, but as they are Private, and come home to us in Particulars. 'Tis true, when Publick Calamities involve a great many Perſons, this muſt needs create much Noiſe, and they are reckoned ſo much the more unſufferable, becauſe our common Mother, namely, our Country is wrong'd and injur'd; but if we take more particular notice, we may perceive that the Evil concerns every one no otherwiſe than it ſtrikes at them in particular.

And to demonſtrate that this is no Paradox; That the Evil that is common to many, on whom we have Compaſſion, is not more uneaſie to be born; it would be ſufficient to inſtance in that which

which is in the Mouth of every one, and what our Experience ſufficiently verifies, *That it is the comfort of the afflicted to have Fellow-Sufferers.* But we need take notice but of one thing, and conſider that when a Neighbour's Houſe is on Fire, none but the Neighbours run to extinguiſh it; thoſe who live in the ſame City, at a diſtance, are not at all concered at it; for tho' they be all Fellow-Citizens, yet the Calamity don't touch them ſo much as it doth the others. So if the War be begun in *Perſia*, or if the Plague be hot in *India*, and makes there a great deſtruction, that don't concern us, tho' they be Fellow-Citizens of the ſame World; becauſe the Evil is too far off to injure us: And tho' it may infect the Borders of our Kingdom, either it moves us not; or if it doth, 'tis by accident, in that it reaches as far as us, and makes us ſenſible of the Evil.

But that I may not ſtop here: If it happens that we are involved in any common Calamity, there are two things chiefly to be weighed: Firſt, That ſuch is the Condition and natural Courſe of things which we cannot hinder; That 'tis the Sovereign Lord of the World who hath appointed ſuch Alterations and Changes, and he being moſt Wiſe, his Deſigns, tho' unknown to Men, may be, and are moſt excellent; That it belongs not to us to quarrel at, or alter that Order that he has eſtabliſh'd, but that we ought willingly to yield and follow the Paths that his Providence hath preſcribed to us; And that ſeeing 'tis not in our power to change Deſtinies, or rather the Decrees of the Divine Providence, it would better become us to mitigate the Harſhneſs and Trouble, by our own free Conſent, than to increaſe the Miſchief by fruitleſs Oppoſition; That Common-wealths have their natural Revolutions, and that it is needful that ſometimes

times they ſhould be govern'd by Princes, and become Monarchies, ſometimes by the People, and devolve into Democracies, and ſometimes by the Chieftains and principal Men, and be changed into Ariſtocracies. This *Cicero* tells us, which he had taken out of *Plato*, unto which he adds this excellent Paſſage, which ſhews the Nobility of his Mind, and the extraordinary Greatneſs and Reſolution of his Soul, when he deſcribes the lamentable State of the Common-wealth; *I have not hid my ſelf, I have not cowardly forſaken, neither have I extraordinarily afflicted my ſelf, I have not behaved my ſelf like a Miſanthropus, a Man provoked againſt the Times.*

Secondly, If a wiſe Man eſcapes, with Health of Body and Mind, from a publick Calamity, he hath no cauſe to complain againſt the ill Uſage of Fortune, as if it had treated him amiſs, and ſtript him of thoſe things that really belong to him. The excellent Saying of *Bias* is well known; after a general Conflagration, he declared, That he carried with him all the Goods that he ever poſſeſſed. And we may mention *Stilpon*, who having been driven away from his Country, loſt his Wife, Children, and all his other Goods of Fortune, gave this anſwer to *Demetrius*, who had taken the City, and had asked him, If he had loſt nothing? anſwer'd, *All my Goods are with me.* He underſtood, ſaith *Seneca*, Juſtice, Virtue, Temperance, Prudence; and he reckoned not among his Goods, that which could be taken from him. The wiſe Man accuſtoms himſelf to the Evils to come by thinking upon them often, as others do by ſuffering them long. *I knew not*, ſays the Fool, *that I had ſo many Troubles to undergo.* The wiſe Man underſtands that all Evils remain yet behind, and ſaith, I knew before, all that has happen'd, and

was

was prepared and provided for all that is come to paſs.

Of external and private Evils; and firſt of Baniſhment.

AS for what concerns particular and private Evils, we ſhall at preſent mention but few things, becauſe we have ſpoken of them elſewhere: I ſhall only add that of Baniſhment, that 'tis no real but a fantaſtical Evil, that depends upon Opinion; for 'tis nothing elſe but a change of Place or Habitation, which many of their own accord often deſire and covet for their private Satisfaction. The wiſe Man carries with him into a Foreign Country all his real and ſubſtantial Goods, his Virtues, the Goods of his Mind, which he can always happily enjoy, and by which he may make to himſelf Friends inſtead of them whom he hath left behind in his own Country: He hath not ſo narrow a Soul as to fancy himſelf a Citizen of one ſingle Town, or of one Region; he thinks himſelf rather to be a Citizen of all the World, and into what place ſoever he comes he thinks himſelf to be as well as in his own Country. A Man of Courage finds every where his Country, as a Fiſh in every part of the Sea, or a Beaſt in every corner of the Earth: He ſtill beholds Nature every where in the ſame Dreſs, the ſame Majeſty: He ſees the ſame Sun, the ſame Moon, and the ſame number of Stars ſparkling in the Heavens: He finds every where the ſame Face of Things, Mountains, Plains, Rivers, Trees, Towns, and all ſorts of Animals, almoſt the ſame; and if perhaps he ſometimes meets with any Variety, 'tis not unpleaſing to him, nor is he ſatisfied till he hath arrived to the full Knowledge of it;

it; and this is that which intices Travellers abroad, and gives them opportunity of much Knowledge and Experience. Nor is he to place this among his Misfortunes, that he is Baniſh'd by his Fellow-Citizens; for that has been the Caſe of many an honeſt and good Man, ſuch as *Ariſtides*, *Thucidides*, *Demoſthenes*, and an infinite Number beſides, who may give the ſame anſwer as *Diogenes* did to one who reproached him, *That the Inhabitants of* Synope *had condemned him to be baniſhed. No*, ſaid he, *you are miſtaken, I have condemned them to remain and live for ever in the bottom of* Pont Euxinus.

He might conſider that Baniſhment hath been often the occaſion of raiſing Men to an high Station of Honour, which cauſed that Expreſſion of *Themiſtocles* to be ſo famous; I ſhould have been undone if I had not been undone, *perieram niſi periiſſem.* He might likewiſe remember that ſometimes upon better conſidering of things, an honeſt Man is called back from Exile with much Honour, as it happened to *Evagoras*, *Pelopidas*, *Alcibiades*, *Camillus*, *Cicero*, and ſeveral others. And it often falls out that we live with more Content and Repoſe out of our Native Soil than we can in it. This cauſed *Marcellus* and *Rutilius* to ſay, That they never lived really, but during the time of their Baniſhment out of their own Country. Finally, he will return Thanks to Providence, becauſe his Condition is become like that of *Plato*, *Gallen*, *Zeno*, *Crantor*, and divers other famous Travellers, who of their own accord had baniſhed themſelves a long time from their own Country, and yet never repented of it; becauſe by viewing other parts of the World, they had furniſhed themſelves with the Knowledge of many things; and that by conſidering the differing Cuſtoms of Foreign Nations, they were freed from many Prejudices, and become quite

quite other Men than they ſhould have been had they continually liv'd at Home.

Of Impriſonment.

IMpriſonment looks like a thing more grievous; but a wiſe Man thinks it not ſo; for his Mind cannot be confined within any Walls, nor Bound with any Chains. How can a Soul, which is always at liberty, and always enjoys it ſelf, be limited within a Priſon, ſeeing it is not to be bounded by the limits of the World? It can run over the ſpacious large compaſs of the Earth, and in it ſelf examine the Paſſages of every Age, and by that means ſearch into Eternity it ſelf. His Body being confined and at Reſt, gives greater Liberty to his Thoughts, not being diſtracted with that variety of new Objects. 'Tis well known that *Anaxagoras*, while in Priſon, writ a moſt excellent Treatiſe of the Quadrature of the Circle; That *Socrates* did not only act the Philoſopher, while confin'd, but compoſed alſo excellent Verſes; that *Boetius* never writ with a ſtronger Stile, nor more Elegantly than when in Chains, for this requires a Mind free from Hurry, Calm and Serene.

Moreover, ſome for the more exact compoſing of an excellent Treatiſe, have confin'd themſelves to their Houſes, from whence they could not eaſily be drawn out. A wiſe Man makes no great difference whether his Confinement be voluntary or compulſive. Do but conſider the multitude of Artizans and Scribes, who are Daily confin'd to their Shops, and tied as it were to their Seats, ſeem not in the leaſt troubled or concerned, becauſe they look not upon the place where they are thus fixt as a Priſon, but as their Dwelling and Abode. This Conſideration will

will cauſe a Man to undergo his Confinement more eaſily, becauſe he will look upon the Priſon as his Dwelling, and not as a Priſon. Beſides, when he reflects upon the many Religious who voluntarily confine themſelves in a Cloiſter, and there ſpend their Days very pleaſantly, he will begin to conſider that a Confinement in it ſelf is not ſo unſupportable as we Fancy. And thus when he ſees Men ſhut up in Priſon againſt their Wills, who at firſt are full of Complaints, and ready to be drown'd with Tears, yet after a few Days rejoice and take delight, ſporting with the reſt of their Companions; he would think it very ſtrange, that Wiſdom ſhould not have as great an influence on a Man of Underſtanding, as Cuſtom hath over a Man of meaner Parts. I need not mention here, that it is no new or extraordinary thing for good Men to be clapt up in Priſon; that there are many whoſe Virtue never appears more glorious than in Fetters and under Confinement, and when they are freed they return with ſo much Splendor and Advantage, that their very Confinement ſeems to be deſired.

Of Slavery.

THE ſame may be ſaid of Slavery. The Mind of a wiſe Man is too great to be brought under the Dominion of a Maſter. His Body, the meaneſt part may indeed be enſlaved, but for his Soul this noble and excellent part 'tis too much at liberty, and ſoars ſo high, that its out of the reach of any Fellow-Creature to catch at, to ſubject it to his Dominion. Every one knows how much Courage and Conſtancy of Mind *Epictetus* manifeſted, when he was obliged to be a Servant. And none can be Ignorant what anſwer *Diogenes* gave to thoſe who

who came to Buy him, and asked him what he could do? Said, *That he knew how to command Men:* And turning himſelf immediately to the Crier, he bid him cry out, *If any would buy a Maſter:* Afterwards, when he came to *Xeniades*, who was the Buyer, he ſpoke to him in this manner, *Take heed what you do, for tho I am your Slave, you muſt hereafter obey me, as the Patient obeys the Phyſician, the Child its Governor; tho the Phyſician be Slave to the Patient, and the Governor to the Child.*

Moreover, whereas the wiſe Man having long ſince conſidered and meditated upon the ſtate of Human Affairs, finds that he has not the Command of Fortune, but as Unhappineſs befals others, it may alſo light upon him. He underſtands likewiſe, that being Born a Man, he is ſubject to all Human Caſualties, and therefore ſtands always ready and prepared to receive all the Shocks of Fortune, ſo that there is none but he can with Patience ſubmit to, and thereby render it not only tolerable, but in ſome meaſure Eaſy and Pleaſant. If the Maſter commands, he obeys willingly; and as if he had undertaken the Task of his own accord, it is much at one to him if he does it by another's Command or out of his own Choice. He is glad he has Strength ſufficient to undergo what is commanded him, and an Opportunity offered of exerciſing a Faculty, which otherwiſe might become benumm'd and uſeleſs. He thinks himſelf happier than his Maſter, being only in ſubjection to his Will, and having nothing elſe to do but obey his Commands; whereas his Maſter remains under the Tyranny of many Maſters, more Cruel and Troubleſome, his Ambition, Envy, Anger and other Paſſions; ſo that in ſhort, he muſt needs be much the happier, being freed from a thouſand Cares and Diſtractions, which the other is daily liable to.

I ſhall

I ſhall not mention how many have met with very good and favourable Maſters, under whom at laſt they have not only obtain'd their Freedom, and got great Preferments, but have been made Heirs of their Eſtates; and how many having fallen into the Hands of Maſters who were wiſe and learned Men, have had cauſe to deſire their Slavery, as the Servant of *Epicurus*, named *Mus*, and *Cicero*'s Slave, called *Tyro*, and ſeveral others.

Of Shame and Diſgrace.

A Wiſe Man will ſtill more willingly bear Shame and Diſgrace, when it is thrown upon him, if he be ſatisfied of his own Innocence, and that he has no way juſtly deſerv'd it. For whether it conſiſts in being depriv'd of ſome publick Office, Honour or Imployment, even for this he may congratulate his good Fortune, in having an opportunity of retiring and leading a private and quiet Life, which otherwiſe he could not eaſily have obtain'd, tho perhaps he earneſtly deſir'd it. Or if it conſiſts in the Whiſperings and Reports that ariſe from among the People, he hath too great and noble a Soul to value ſuch Rumours. He knows the Temper of the Populace to be very mutable, that they will this Day applaud, what they will to Morrow decry, being never long pleaſed, but as we ſay, more fickle and unconſtant than the Moon. His Conſcience ſtands him inſtead of a thouſand Witneſſes; his ſatisfaction is, that he cannot juſtly charge himſelf with any Crime, with any Guilt.

In ſhort, if it conſiſts in the Calumnies and Slanders of envious and malicious Men, or in opprobrious and injurious Language; he is not of ſo mean a Spirit, as to be caſt down and diſcouraged; for

he does not take them as Injuries done to himſelf, but gives them only the hearing, as if they concerned him not, as if they were related of ſome other, or of him who was the firſt Inventer. Therefore he who firſt unjuſtly rais'd em, has more reaſon to be concerned for falſly accuſing the Innocent; nor will he be a little diſſatisfied when he finds his miſchievous Intention thus diſappointed.

A wiſe Man further conſiders the great number of Fools there are in the World; and if he ſhould once think himſelf offended hereat, he would be deemed one of that Number, which muſt in no ſmall meaſure diſturb the quiet of his Mind. Therefore he Arms himſelf before-hand, againſt all ſuch kind of Affronts, by overlooking them; and thinks that he ought no more to be moved at the Revilings of evil Men, than the Moon is at the barking of the Dogs.

Of the loſs of Children and Friends.

BUT what ſhall we ſay of the loſs of Children and Friends, and in one Word, of all that is dear to us? A wiſe Man will the leſs afflict himſelf, becauſe he knows that our Complaints, our Sighs, our Tears, and our Lamentations are uſeleſs; and that it is in vain to deal thus with Death, who is not to be prevailed upon, and never reſtores to us the Friends which it once ſnatches from us. Therefore he prepares himſelf early for ſuch Accidents which he knows may happen, that when they do, he may bear them with Courage, and not be afflicted in vain.

Beſides, he obſerves, That when we are thus griev'd for the loſs of our Children or Friends, 'tis not for their ſakes, but for our own, that we thus lament and

and are troubled: For to be grieved becauſe they are ſafely arrived into the Haven, and are no more vexed with the Evils and Miſeries, unto which this Life is ſubject, this ſavours of Envy and Cruelty; and to be troubled becauſe they don't enjoy certain Pleaſures of this Life, is Weak and Ridiculous, becauſe they don't deſire or ſtand in the leaſt need of 'em, and therefore are not at all diſpleaſed, or ſo much as ſenſible, of being deprived of 'em. It makes therefore a very ſpecious ſhew, but at the ſame time is but a feigned and diſſembling ſort of Pity, with which we adorn our Grief when we declare that we are grieved for their ſakes, ſeeing that in reality 'tis for our own, becauſe for the time to come we ſhall be deprived of their Company; becauſe we ſhall receive no more kind Offices as formerly, no more Honour and Reſpect, but be deprived of every thing that might render them dear and acceptable unto us. Therefore a wiſe Man will think it unbecoming him to grieve in this manner for his own Intereſt, as if he would have had them live only for his private Ends, and ſo long only as they might be uſeful and ſerviceable to him; and not ſo long as the wiſe Diſpoſer of all Things had thought good and convenient for them to be.

Beſides, He may remember the time that he had no Children, and if it was not grievous then to be without them, ſo he ought not to think it ſo now he is deprived of 'em, ſeeing in reſpect of him, they are as when they were not. And if we grieve more for the privation of what we once poſſeſs'd, than to be without what we never had, this ſeems to ſavour a little of the Ingratitude of the Vulgar, who inſtead of being thankful for what they once enjoyed, are ſtill murmuring and repining becauſe they can enjoy it no longer. And he whom Death deprives of his Son, may with more comfort ſupport

it, conſidering that he hath not loſt his Son, but yielded him back to the Author of Nature, who had lent him to him for a time and intruſted him with his Cuſtody; not for ever, but for a limited time. And if it be a Father who is dead, a wiſe Son will conſider, that he hath left him enough to make his Life eaſy, and preſerve him from want, if he hath left him only a Soul that can be content with little. And if it be a Friend, he will ſuppoſe that he hath ſtill ſo much Virtue as to procure another; ſo that he may think that he hath not ſo much loſt, as chang'd his Friend.

Of the loſs of an Eſtate.

WHat ſhall we ſay likewiſe of the loſs of Riches? A wiſe Man will certainly ſo much the leſs concern himſelf, for that he will conſider, as we have elſewhere obſerved, That no Man becomes ſo Poor as to be deprived of the abſolute Neceſſaries of Life, ſeeing Nature places them within our reach in all parts of the World; and certainly he were much to be blamed that ſhould torment himſelf, for the loſs of that which is not abſolutely neceſſary to his well-being, and which he may live very well and happily without. Let what we have remaining be never ſo ſmall, we may always find a great number of Perſons, who have not ſo much, or perhaps no more, and yet without troubling themſelves, lead more contented Lives than rich Men generally do. Let them be never ſo Poor they Laugh and Rejoyce, and their Pleaſure is ſo much the greater, in that they are freed from thoſe Cares and Troubles which are inſeparable from Riches.

But ſuppoſe a Man's Fortune be changed to the greateſt diſadvantage, ſo that inſtead of a Palace, there remains nothing to him but a Cottage; inſtead

ſtead of a Silk Garment, one of Wool; inſtead of Partridges, nothing but black Bread; inſtead of Wine, cold Water; inſtead of a Coach or Sedan, a Traveller's Staff; inſtead of a Golden or Silver Cup, nothing but an Earthen Veſſel, or the Palm of his Hand, and ſo of the reſt. Suppoſe I ſay all this, how many Examples can we produce of thoſe who have been ſatisfied with theſe mean Things, have laugh'd and deſpis'd that deceitful Splendor, and have ſpent their Days with more Pleaſure and Content, than thoſe who abounded with 'em?

And how many are there at preſent who live very contentedly and happily, after ſuch a change; nay, who willingly part with their Riches, to enjoy a more retir'd and contented way of Life? We need not therefore here enumerate thoſe primitive Philoſophers, who out of an Affection to Learning, and the Pleaſure of a free and contemplative Life, forſook their Riches, and embraced Poverty. For we have of late diſcovered whole Nations, who having no need of thoſe Goods that we call Riches, lead an innocent Life, like to that of our firſt Fathers, whoſe Times were ſtiled the Golden Age, and ſuppoſed to be the happieſt of all Ages.

But if you Fancy that it is more grievous to fall from a great and high Fortune, than to have always remained in a low Condition, 'tis eaſy to perceive that this is nothing but an Opinion; for in reſpect of the thing it ſelf, there is no difference if you have been Poor a long time, or if you are become ſo of late; unleſs perhaps you ſuppoſe that we are to think as *Apicius* did, who as *Seneca* reports, having amaſs'd a vaſt Eſtate together, alotted ſome Thouſands of Pounds for his Kitchen; but when upon making up his Accounts, he found that he had not above an Hundred thouſand Pounds remaining, poyſon'd himſelf to prevent Starving.

Of Pain and of Death.

IN the next Place let us treat about Pain and Death, thoſe two Particulars, which in *Cicero*'s Opinion, require an extraordinary courage of Mind to be able to overcome them. For Pain, as it is almoſt the ſole and only ſubſtantial Evil, or which depends not as the reſt, upon meer Fancy, no doubt there is much Fortitude and a Greatneſs of Soul required, patiently to undergo it. A wiſe Man therefore will here ſeriouſly conſider, that he is born ſubject to many Inconveniences of Life, and among the reſt to Pain; that it is the Property of Nature to be ſenſible of Evil, but it is the Property of Virtue to bear it with Courage; and that when the Evil is not to be avoided, we ought rather to allay it, by a patient quiet ſubmitting to it, than to aggravate and incenſe it by uneaſy and vain Struglings. Alſo that Pain is not a thing altogether intolerable, ſeeing ſo many famous Examples prove the contrary, not only among great Hero's and Philoſophers, ſuch as *Zeno* and *Anaxarches*, but even among the very Slaves themſelves, witneſs him whom the greateſt Tortures could not hinder from expreſſing a joy upon his Countenance, for having reveng'd the Death of his Maſter, by killing *Aſdrubal*, who had Murdered him. Nay, whole Nations can teſtify the like, as for Inſtance, the *Lacedemonians*, whoſe Children were wont to whip one another almoſt to Death, and yet never ſhewed any ſign of Pain either in their Countenance or Speech, that ſo they might be rendred more capable of undergoing any thing for their Countries ſake. I ſhall not name that other Perſon, who knowing that it was reputed no Shame among his Country-men to Steal, but

but to be caught in the Theft, ſuffered his Bowels to be devoured by a little Fox that he had Stole and hid in his Boſom, without expreſſing any ſign of Pain, for fear of diſcovering the Theft.

He will alſo conſider, That if the Pain be light, it is eaſy to be born; if great, that it is ſo much the more Glorious and Honourable to endure it with Courage, and that by frequent Cuſtom it will become more ſupportable, or that being of no long continuance, it will ſpeedily put an end either to him or his Suffering. If it ceaſeth, the Pleaſure of being delivered from it, and the health of Body that ſucceeds, with a perfect Indolency, are ſo pleaſing and delightſome, that we ſeem to be well ſatisfied with the Pain we have undergone, from the Pleaſure we enjoy of being freed from it. And if it takes away the Sufferer, it brings him to the end of all Sufferings. So that this Suffering brings at leaſt this Advantage with it, that it makes our Life, which we muſt needs part with, leſs pleaſing, and Death leſs terrible; wherefore many care not how ſoon they Dye, expecting thereby to be delivered from their Pains, ſo that every Day they talk after this manner,

Nor is Death Grievous, whilſt it ends my Pains.

Now as for Death, we have already alledged ſo many things to ſhew that we ought to expect it, and bear it patiently, that it is needleſs to inſiſt any longer upon this Particular. Let us therefore conclude with that kind of general Conſolation which *Horace* in few Words expreſſeth:

With equal Foot impartial Fate,
Knocks at the Cottage and the Palace Gate.

And the French Poet *Malherbius* imitates him.

The Beggar in Straw,
Keeps the general Law;
And when Death gives the Word, muſt advance.
And the Guards that each Hour,
Take their Place at the Louvre,
Can't defend the great Monarchs of France.

CHAP. VII.

Of Temperance.

Cicero tells us, That Temperance makes up the ſecond principal Part of Morality. The Greeks ſtyle it σωφροσύνη, that is to ſay, the Protectrice of Prudence, or as *Plato* terms it, the ſafety of Prudence; from hence a temperate Man is called σώφρων, that is, one who preſerves Wiſdom, or one who keeps his Senſes entire and ſound; and herein he is oppoſed to ἀκόλαστος, an Imprudent Man, or a Fool; for he who is Intemperate ſeems to have loſt all Prudence, to have no due uſe either of his Senſe or his Reaſon. This Virtue alſo is ſometimes taken in too large an extent, ſometimes too narrow, and ſometimes in a mediocrity; and in this laſt Senſe we ſhall now treat of it. Now that it is taken ſometimes in too large a Senſe, as generally comprehending all Virtues, or for all that is excellent and commendable in any other Virtue, even the Word it ſelf ſeems to import, for Temperance expreſſeth a Mediocrity; and all Virtue is a Mediocrity. Beſides,

ſides, it is, as we have ſaid, the Protectrice of Prudence, without which no Virtue can ſubſiſt, and according to the Opinion of *Pythagoras*, 'tis the Life and Vigour of the Soul: *Socrates* names it the Foundation of Virtue; *Plato* the Ornament of all good Things; and *Iamblicus* the Breaſt-plate of all the moſt excellent Habits. That 'tis ſometimes taken in too narrow a ſignification, may appear when 'tis underſtood only for that Virtue that gives a check to the Pleaſures of Taſting and Feeling, and comprehends only Sobriety and Chaſtity.

Laſtly, It ſeems to be taken in a moderate Latitude and Extent, when we underſtand not only hereby the regulation of the particular Appetites of Taſting and Feeling, *&c.* but likewiſe ſuch as puff up the Mind, and carry it beyond the bounds of Decency and Honeſty. So that we may ſay that a temperate Man is not only ſuch a one who lives Soberly and Chaſtly, but he alſo who neither Speaks nor Acts any thing but agreeable with Juſtice and Moderation, and which is accepted and approved of by all good and wiſe Men.

Of Modeſty and Decency.

WHerefore among the ſeveral ſpecies of Temperance, Sobriety and Chaſtity are not only to be reckoned, which we have before mentioned, but alſo many of thoſe which we name Potential, as are Gentleneſs or Mildneſs, Clemency, Modeſty, and ſome others. So that Modeſty and Decency, which are ſaid to be the integral Parts, are of a larger Signification, as being too general Means, the one to draw us from Intemperance, and the other to incline us to it: For Modeſty, tho *Ariſtotle* pretends that 'tis no Virtue, but rather a baſhful diſturbance,

ſturbance, as being nothing elſe but a certain fear of Infamy; nevertheleſs, this diſturbance tends to oppoſe that ſort of Pleaſure which we may take in too great Confidence, which produces a great Diſpleaſure, namely, that which proceeds from Infamy and Diſgrace. And Decency at leaſt, as it is here taken, is nothing elſe but a certain Conveniency, τὸ πρέπον, approved of, which prevailing upon us by its Beauty, cauſeth us to give a check to that daring Impudence, ſo that thereby our good Reputation being preſerved ſafe and ſound, it procures a certain Pleaſure, much greater and more ſincere.

Now tho it is commendable to ſhun Intemperance and to follow Temperance, becauſe of Decency alone and good Manners, 'tis likewiſe commendable for Modeſty's ſake, or for fear of Shame, which would otherwiſe enſue. For as we cannot hate Darkneſs but we muſt love the Light, ſo we cannot hate Shame and Diſhonour, but we muſt have a love for a good Reputation, and for an honeſt Name. Therefore when *Ariſtotle*, in his Book to *Nicomachus*, ſeems to diſallow Modeſty, he does not mean that Shamefacedneſs which appears in the bluſhing Countenance of young Perſons, who are apt to be too far tranſported by a juvenile Heat; but he allows it not in aged Perſons, who ought never to commit any thing whereof they may be aſhamed; for elſewhere in his great Treatiſes of Morality, he placeth Modeſty among the other Virtues, and gives to it this Definition, A Mediocrity between Impudence and Inſenſibility; as if he ſhould ſay, That Modeſty is a certain kind of Shame, occaſioned not by the commiſſion of any baſe and diſhoneſt Action, but proceeds to adviſe and hinder us from the committing of it.

Of

Of Sobriety and Chaſtity in general.

THeſe two Virtues ſeem to deſerve a particular Tract at large, for they conſtitue two principal kinds of Temperance; but we can ſcarce add any thing to what hath been formerly ſaid, when we have mentioned the great advantages of a ſober Life, and when we have inſtanced that noble and celebrated Maxim of *Epicurus*, *Sapientem non eſſe amaturum*; *nunquam prodeſſe venerea.* Therefore I ſhall here only obſerve ſome things in general, and then more particularly. In general, that the Praiſe and Advantage of theſe two Virtues ſeem for the moſt part to conſiſt not in the withdrawing our ſelves from living after the manner of Brutes, in reſpect of Luſts and Pleaſure, but rather to approach nearer to 'em. This will not ſeem ſo great a Paradox, if we do but conſider that we are very frequently more intemperate and worſe than thoſe Creatures that follow the meer dictates of Nature, whereas we debauch and abuſe Nature. For there is no doubt but that that ſtrong Inclination and Deſire which we have for Eating and Drinking is natural, ſeeing we find it equally in all Animals, and proceeds from the inſtitution of Nature, who has ordain'd, that by Food the Life of every individual Creature might be preſerved and lengthned, and by the uſe of venereal Acts every Species of Creatures might by a ſucceſſion of Propagations be continued, and as it were eterniſed. Now this being certain, The Queſtion is, Whether Men or other Animals, which of them contain themſelves moſt within the bounds of Nature.

We ſee that the Beaſts live upon very plain Food, provided for them by Nature; whereas the Drink and

and Food of Men is changed, mingled and ſophiſticated in divers manners. We ſee alſo that when the Beaſts and other Animals are once ſatisfied, they neither Eat nor Drink any more, but ſtop till the next Hunger and Thirſt invites 'em; whereas Men are not ſatisfied to have filled themſelves with all the variety of Meats and Drinks, but ſtill farther provoke their Appetites by pinant Sauſes and reliſhing Morſels, after Nature is ſatisfied. We find alſo that other Animals have a ſet time for Copulation, and after Conception they abſtain; whereas Men have no time appointed for that purpoſe; nay after that the Female hath conceived they remain ſtill inclinable to the ſame Act, and with as much heat as before. Beſides, none but Men are guilty of the ſhameful and baſe abuſing their own Sex againſt Nature. Are not therefore Men in ſuch Actions rather Brutes, and Brutes ſuch as Men ought to be; and conſequently are not Men, in reſpect of the deſire of Eating and Drinking and of veneral Acts, to be ſent to be inſtructed by the Brutes, that they might be taught to live Temperately? Truly if to live according to the Rules of Virtue, is to live according to the dictates of Nature, no Man will ſay, that to live as Men do, is to live after the Rules of Virtue, but rather that we ſhould imitate the Beaſts and other Creatures. 'Tis therefore a high Diſgrace, not that Men ſhould be adviſed to live after the manner of Brutes, but when they live worſe than they, that they muſt be ſent to be inſtructed by their Examples.

But to not inſiſt any longer upon this particular, we will proceed to examin that excellent Deſcription of a temperate Man, recommended by *Ariſtotle*. After he had Taught, That Temperance is a Mediocrity between Intemperance and the want of Senſe or Stupidity, and had proved, that Intemperance

covets.

covets in ſuch a manner the things that bring Delight, that it ſuffers and is pained, not only when it cannot enjoy them, but alſo while it deſires them, and that the inſenſible Perſon who is not moved with any Pleaſure, is ſo far from all Humanity, that ſuch an one is ſcarce to be found; He proceeds to tell us, *The temperate Perſon keeps himſelf in a certain Medium, for he is not delighted in ſuch things wherein an intemperate Man places his Pleaſure, but he is rather offended at and abominates 'em. He takes no delight in that which is not Honeſt and fit to be delighted in; and there is nothing that tranſports him ſo much, but if he be diſappointed in obtaining it, doth any ways vex and torment him. He deſires nothing after ſo abſolute a Manner, but his Affections are moderate, never exceeding their juſt Bounds under all Circumſtances. All that procures Pleaſure, and which at the ſame time tends to the Health of the Body, he deſires with Moderation, and as it is convenient; as alſo the other things that are grateful ſo far as they are no Impediment to what we have mentioned, nor are contrary to Honeſty, nor above our Abilities: For he who is otherwiſe affected, and deſires theſe things with more earneſtneſs than he ought, is not Temperate, but he who deſires and ſeeks them according to the Rules of Reaſon.* In which Paſſage of *Ariſtotle* you ſee, the temperate Man is not he who abſtains abſolutely from all Pleaſures, but from ſuch as are not honeſtly to be attained; ſuch as thoſe are that are contrary to Nature, that are prohibited by the Laws, that prejudice Health, that blemiſh our Reputation or ruin our Family; but he ſcruples not to enjoy moderately the Pleaſures that have none of theſe inconveniences attending. For in ſuch there is nothing but what ſuits with his Humanity, and according to Nature, who hath not given us an Inclination to them in vain.

This

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covets in such a manner the things that bring Delight, that it suffers and is pained, not only when it cannot enjoy them, but also while it desires them, and that the insensible Person who is not moved with any Pleasure, is so far from all Humanity, that such an one is scarce to be found; He proceeds to tell us, *The temperate Person keeps himself in a certain Medium, for he is not delighted in such things wherein an intemperate Man places his Pleasure, but he is rather offended at and abominates 'em. He takes no delight in that which is not Honest and fit to be delighted in; and there is nothing that transports him so much, but if he be disappointed in obtaining it, doth any ways vex and torment him. He desires nothing after so absolute [illegible]r, but his Affections are moderate, never ex[illegible]r just Bounds under all Circumstances. All [illegible] Pleasure, and which at the same time tends [illegible]' the Body, he desires with Moderation, [illegible]venient; as also the other things that are [illegible] as they are no Impediment to what we [illegible], nor are contrary to Honesty, nor above [illegible] For he who is otherwise affected, and de[illegible]gs with more earnestness than he ought, is [illegible]te, but he who desires and seeks them ac[illegible] the Rules of Reason.* In which Passage of [illegible]*ecte* you see, the temperate Man is not he who abstains absolutely from all Pleasures, but from such as are not honestly to be attained; such as those are that are contrary to Nature, that are prohibited by the Laws, that prejudice Health, that blemish our Reputation or ruin our Family; but he scruples not to enjoy moderately the Pleasures that have none of these inconveniences attending. For in such there is nothing but what suits with his Humanity, and according to Nature, who hath not given us an Inclination to them in vain.

This

This is the Picture that this Philoſopher hath drawn us of a temperate Perſon. Therefore he reproves the Cenſoriouſneſs of thoſe who exclaim againſt the Pleaſures with which themſelves are taken; it ſeeming in it ſelf a Contradiction; as if every one did not always carry his own Nature about with him, which by word he may ſeem to deny, but in effect cannot.

Likewiſe, ſaith he, *for that reaſon 'tis no wonder, tho to live according to Nature be to live Virtuouſly, and notwithſtanding 'tis ſo eaſy to follow Nature, there be nevertheleſs ſo few that purſue after Virtue, becauſe the Virtue that they praiſe is rather againſt Nature, than agreable with its Rules.* 'Tis not but that there is a Virtue to deny our ſelves and abſtain from ſuch Pleaſures altogether, but this Virtue is not natural, but of another kind; it may, for Inſtance, belong to Religion, that commands Nature, and conſtrains it, being more excellent, and forces Nature to ſubmit to it.

Of Sobriety in particular.

NOW to ſay ſomething particularly of theſe two Virtues, Sobriety and Chaſtity, let us obſerve only this difference between them, That we may ſo order and govern our Life, that we may leſſen the firſt Motives, and conſequently may be leſs inclinable to thoſe luſtful Deſires, and in this State we may ſpend our Life. But as it is not poſſible to hinder the natural Heat from conſuming continually the radical Moiſture, ſo we cannot live but we muſt from time to time recruit that loſs by Eating and Drinking moderately. Now tho this Moderation may have divers reſpects, for Example, in reference to the Age, to the ſtate of Life, to the con-

titution of the Body, to the Manners of the Country, *&c.* Nevertheleſs it conſiſts generally to have a regard to our Health, and therefore in relation to Eating and Drinking, we muſt take care that we tranſgreſs not either in the quantity, which often happens, when we eat and drink without Hunger and Thirſt, or in the Quality, which is when we take any thing that either naturally or by art or mixture is too hot or too cold; and not being fit for Digeſtion becomes a kind of Poiſon, cauſeth Belchings, Winds and Collicks; makes the Head heavy, diſturbs our Sleep, attended with many more ſuch inconveniences.

As to what relates to the Quantity in particular, we muſt take a ſpecial care that we do not exceed what our Hunger and Thirſt prompt us to; for as Nature hath given us an Appetite of Eating and Drinking, it hath alſo given us Hunger and Thirſt, as the meaſure of what is needful to be taken, and what to be refuſed. But becauſe in the moſt part of the Meats, in Bread it ſelf, and in Wine, there is ſomething Artificial, from whence proceeds that which provokes Appetite, and makes it become greater than it would be naturally: Therefore wiſe Men have fancied that it makes for our Health to give a check to our Appetite, and ſtop betime. And becauſe ſome might object that other Animals that follow Nature, and conſequently never do ought in prejudice of their Health, Eat and Drink till they be fully ſatisfied; They anſwer, That the Animals live upon Food purely natural, and which never ſtirs up Hunger nor Thirſt, as that doth which Men make uſe of. This is plain in Drink, the moſt natural, which is Water, and that we drink with great Pleaſure, but as ſoon as the Thirſt is allayed we have no more Inclination to it. However, 'tis certain that no Perſon repents to have riſen from

Table

Table without being fully ſatisfied, but we have often been ſorry to have filled our Stomachs ſo full, that we were able to eat no more. And doubtleſs it is not without Cauſe that *Diogenes* wonders that Men will eat for Pleaſure, and that they will not forbear Eating for the ſame Reaſon, ſeeing there is ſo much Pleaſure in being Healthy and free from Diſeaſes, and by this means will be ready the ſooner to repeat the ſame Pleaſure with the more delight and Satisfaction.

In relation to the Quality, it ſeems alſo that then we have a regard to our Health, when we ſhall nouriſh our ſelves with plain Food, eaſy to be digeſted, and which we know to be proper and convenient. For this reaſon we ſee ſome Country-people who live upon nothing but Bread, Fruits and Water, and yet enjoy a perfect Health, without any need of a Phyſitian: Whereas thoſe who feed at plentiful Tables have but a weak Body, and are often forced to ſeek the aſſiſtance of the Phyſitian. Therefore there have always been ſome Sects of wiſe Men, ſuch as *Pythagoras*, who abſtained from Eating the Fleſh of living Creatures, and contented themſelves with the plain Products of Nature, and have ſpent their Life in Health and Pleaſure. I ſhall not here repeat what we have ſaid elſewhere, that Fleſh ſeems to be no natural Food for Mankind, but as Cuſtom hath made it ſo; we ſhould conſider at leaſt that the uſe of Fleſh is ſo much the more Healthy, the more plainly 'tis prepared. And that the Arts of Cooks, of Confectioners and others, who by their different Mixtures and Sauces do as it were change our very Food, ſeem to have been intended for the deſtruction of the Health of Mankind. Therefore we cannot but wonder why we ſhould with ſo much earneſtneſs proſecute ſuch as Poiſon, and yet hire and entertain the Contrivers of our dainty Diſhes, who

who by a deceitful Art deſtroy no leſs their Life and Health. But how few are there that are not carried away by the deceitful Charms of a liquoriſh Taſt, and being bewitched with the preſent Pleaſure, never take heed nor apprehend the Miſchiefs that follow? What great Reaſon had *Democritus* to Laugh at thoſe who make Vows to the Gods for their Health, and yet by their debaucht and diſorderly living, undertake to ruin it daily? *'Tis a wonderful thing*, ſaith *Diogenes*, *That Men have ſo much care to cauſe their Bodies to be Embalmed after their Death, and yet all their endeavours during Life is to become rotten.*

Of Chaſtity in particular.

FInally, in relation to Chaſtity, I will only obſerve, that whereas this Virtue is to ſtruggle with the moſt violent of all the Paſſions, unto which there is ſcarce any Body but ſubmits; I ſhall here mention Two or Three principal means that may ſerve as Bulworks to defend us from danger.

The Firſt is a great Sobriety; for it will be in vain to attempt to give a check to this unruly and imperious Appetite, unleſs you carefully cheriſh this Virtue which tho encourged, it you will ſtill have great difficulty to overcome this Luſt. Long before *Terence* was heard of, it hath been ſaid, That *without Wine and good Cheer Love grows Cold.* Which is eaſily to be made out; for that which encourages Love and ſtirs up Luſt, is the increaſe of natural Seed, which ſwells and moves in the Veſſels, excites Nature, and obliges it to free it ſelf from that which is troubleſome to it. Now as this increaſe proceeds from the quantity or quality of the Food, if any Perſon be very temperate in his living, and if

he takes care to uſe no Meats that are too hot, or fit to augment the Seed, he will take away the Fewel and the Oil, as I may ſo ſay, which ſerves to increaſe and add Flame to this Fire. Therefore thoſe who profeſs a chaſt and continent Life, ought not fully to ſatisfy themſelves, but as we have ſaid before, retain always a Stomach for more, *Citra ſatietatem veſci.* Their Virtue will not want a ſufficient Reward, for they will become ſtronger and more luſty, becauſe the ejection of the Seed diminiſhes the Strength and Spirits, which is the cauſe why other Animals, and even the very Trees, the more fruitful they are, the ſooner they grow Old.

The Second Means is ſome honeſt Employ, which may entertain and ſpend ſome of the Spirits that make the Seed to boil up, and ſo give a diverſion to the Thoughts: For the Imagination, which fixes upon the beloved Object, and is not otherwiſe diverted, is eaſily heated, and from a little Spark kindles and becomes a great Flame. Therefore we ought to take a ſtrong Reſolution to reſiſt all baſe and diſhoneſt Thoughts, to avoid all occaſions which might cauſe them to riſe, whether by the Sight, or too intimate and private Diſcourſes, or by Reading, or Touching, or otherwiſe; and if caſually any doth ariſe, not to give it time to take any deep root, but to baniſh it at firſt; and in ſo doing we diſcover our Manhood; for the more you give way, the greater will be the difficulty to ſtop your ſelf in ſo ſlippery a Path: So that there is nothing can be a greater Truth than what is commonly ſaid, That it is a kind of Combat, where the Victory is not to be obtained, but by flying away.

The Third is the cuſtom of reſiſting and overcoming; for as we become ſo much the more inclinable to Love, the more eaſy and the more often we yield and ſubmit to it, ſo we become ſo much the more

more Continent, the more courageouſly we reſiſt, and the leſs we are overcome by it.

I confeſs the violence of this Paſſion is great, but it often happens that the weakneſs of our Spirit is ſuch, that at the firſt Aſſault we ſuffer our ſelves to be overcome. You yield upon the firſt Aſſault, without making any effort, or exerciſing your Reſolution in trying whether you might not have Strength enough to withſtand the Temptation, and ſo no wonder that the Paſſion triumphs and gets the Victory over your Reaſon. But perhaps you will ſay, I have already contracted an Habit. Well, Why don't you endeavour by forbearance to deſtroy this Habit, and to bring in a contrary? For the thing is not impoſſible, if you will ſtrive with all your Courage. Learn by degrees to be Continent, and if you cannot abſtain one Day of two, at leaſt abſtain one in a Week; for by this means it will happen that in a little while you will attain three Days of Abſtinence, afterwards Six, and after that you will be Conqueror during whole Weeks and Months. But above all things remember, that as it is almoſt impoſſible but that many things muſt intervene, which may divert you from your Deſign, ſo you ought to keep ſteady and fixt to your Reſolution. You muſt break through all Obſtacles; You muſt proceed ſtill on, and be continually going forward; You muſt conſider with your ſelf, that it is a great weakneſs to expreſs ſo early a Repentance, and being a Man as you are, to ſhew nothing leſs than your Manhood. Conſider what a ſatisfaction you will have when the Fatigue will be over, and that you ſhall find that you have got the Victory; whereas if you ſuffer your ſelf to be meanly overcome, a troubleſome and uneaſy Repentance will attend you; but otherwiſe you will applaud and approve of your Happineſs when you ſhall have brave-

ly obtained the Conqueſt. You will alſo from thence receive new Strength to help you to overcome again in a like Temptation, and if you continue, you will find that by degrees you will alter the evil Habit, that you will draw your ſelf out of a cruel Bondage, deliver your ſelf from a baſe Tyranny; and inſtead of a dark and clouded Spirit it will become clear and Serene; inſtead of a feeble and diſeaſed Body it will become ſtrong and vigorous; and inſtead of a languiſhing and ſhort Life it will become healthy and long. Not to mention here the loſs of Reputation and Goods, neither ſhall I inſtance in thoſe other odious Miſchiefs which are known to all the World.

I ſhall not here trouble my ſelf to inform you, That it is uſual to ſubdivide theſe two kinds of Temperance each into two Parts; ſo that they aſſign four parts commonly ſubject to Temperance, whereof Two of them relate to the Taſt, namely, Abſtinence and Sobriety; the Firſt concerns our Eating, the Second our Drinking; and the other Two relate to Venery, namely, Chaſtity and Modeſty: The Firſt concerns the Act it ſelf, and the Latter ſome Circumſtances, ſuch as are Kiſſes, Approaches, Embraces, Looks and Diſcourſes, *&c.* I ſhall not inſiſt here to prove that Modeſty is either Chaſtity it ſelf, and principally that of Virginity, which being once loſt, as the Poet ſaith, can never be retrieved.

——— Nulla reparabilis arte,
Læſa Pudicitia eſt; deperit illa ſemel.

Or if it be underſtood for that Virtue that gives a check to the Circumſtances that we have named, it ought not to be eſteemed ſo much a part ſubject to Prudence, as a potential part of Chaſtity. I will only obſerve in relation to Modeſty, (which is ſo called

called from the word *Modeſt*, being a kind of a Guard to Chaſtity,) that tho Nature produces nothing whereof we ought to be aſhamed as an obſcene Thing; (and therefore among Nations who own no Obſcenity, neither in the Members of the Body, nor in the Language or Names that are given to them; for as to this we are to refer our ſelves to common Uſage,) nevertheleſs among thoſe People who do own any ſuch thing, we are to refrain from them, and we are not to baniſh Modeſty, which obligeth us to forbear them; for let it be either Nature, or Law, or Cuſtom, which makes things to be eſteemed Brave, Good or Honeſt, 'tis always Nature that commands them to be obſerved, which is to be obeyed for the common Good, in which the Happineſs and Welfare of every private Perſon, as due to him of common right, is compriſed. Therefore *Cicero* diſcourſes excellently well upon this Point. *We are not to hearken to the Cynicks, who Laugh at us becauſe we eſteem things to be filthy and undecent in Words, which are not really ſo indeed; and on the contrary, Things that are really Wicked and Diſhoneſt we don't ſtick to mention by their proper Names: As to Steal, to Cheat, to commit Whoredom, which indeed is Unjuſt and Diſhoneſt, and yet is ſpoken without any Obſcenity; To beget Children is an honeſt Act, but yet to uſe the proper Term is Obſcene and Immodeſt. For our part let us follow the dictates of Nature, and let us abſtain from all that our Eyes or Ears cannot honeſtly endure; let our Carriage, our Gate, our Sitting, our Lying down, our Countenance, our Eyes and our Hands, obſerve the Rules of Modeſty.* And hear what he ſays in another Place: After he had ſhewn that there is nothing more indecent and unbecoming, than in ſerious and weighty Matters to mix looſe and light Expreſſions; Says he, Thus *Pericles* treated the Poet *Sophocles* very wiſely, who while ſitting upon the Bench

with him in open Court, eſpied a beautiful young Damſel paſs by; and not being able to contain himſelf, cried out, What a Beauty is there before us! *Pericles* anſwered, O *Sophocles*, 'tis becoming a Judge upon the Bench to be Modeſt and Grave, not only in reſpect to his Hands, but in reſpect to his Eyes alſo.

Of Mildneſs and Gentleneſs.

WE ſhall now ſpeak ſomething as to the other parts of Temperance, which ſome name Subject Parts, others Potential. But Mildneſs ſeems truly to belong rather to Fortitude than to Temperance, in that it relates to Truth, which ariſeth becauſe of Pain, and becauſe it reſides in that part of the Appetite which derives its name from Wrath, namely, in the iraſcible part, therefore it ſeems to deſerve to be plac'd under Fortitude: Nevertheleſs, as it is the property of Fortitude to raiſe and encourage; and of Temperance to check and depreſs; and that in reſpect of Wrath the Mind hath not ſo much need to be incited and ſtir'd up as to be curb'd and kept in, for this reaſon it is commonly placed under Temperance. However, *Ariſtotle* teacheth, That Mildneſs or Gentleneſs ought to be reckoned among the Virtues, becauſe 'tis a Mediocrity or a Medium between two Extremes; the one a Temper inclinable to Wrath, as when a Man is either ſooner or in a higher degree enraged, than he ought againſt one who deſerves it not, or for ſome frivolous Cauſes: The other a ſimple Meekneſs or want of Anger, as when a Man is not angry, when, and againſt whom, and for ſuch Reaſons as he ought to be angry; for he declares that under certain Circumſtances,

cumſtances, 'tis not only lawful, but alſo requiſite and needful to be ſo, and that becauſe Nature it ſeems hath not only given Man an Inclination to Anger, but alſo becauſe that this Paſſion is as a Spur that ſtirs us up and encourages us to repel, not only private Injuries, but likewiſe puts us upon ſecuring our ſelves againſt ſuch publick Dangers and Calamities as may affect our Country, Parents, Relations, *&c.* and all good Men. By this means our private and publick Welfare is ſecured and maintained, and a Way is open to great and generous Actions.

Nevertheleſs, the Stoicks, not without ſome Colour of Reaſon, ſeem to require a total Suppreſſion of Anger; and becauſe 'tis impoſſible to be altogether free from it, we ſhall therefore at leaſt be ſo much the happier the leſs we are ſubject to this cruel and troubleſome Paſſion: I ſay, if it be not poſſible to be altogether freed from it; for there is ſcarce any hopes that a wiſe Man ſhould be altogether free from Anger, as *Seneca* very well obſerves by this diſcourſe which he aſcribes to *Socrates*, who yet was eſteem'd the wiſeſt of Men: *I would beat thee if I were not in Anger.* And by another Saying which he aſſigns to *Plato*: Speuſippus, *Chaſtiſe for me that Slave, for I am now angry.* He tells us, That when *Plato* held up his Hand as if he were going to beat his Slave, and that his Friend ask'd him what he ailed, and what he was doing, *Plato* returned this excellent anſwer, *Exigo pœnas ab homine iracundo*; I puniſh an angry Man. Now that there is nothing more deſirable than to be ſeldom or never angry is plain and manifeſt, becauſe there is no Paſſion that diſturbs all parts of the Body more, the Blood, the Heart, the Eyes, the Mouth, *&c.* nor is the Mind leſs quiet. For that Reaſon *Epicurus* hath very well ex-

preſs'd it, *That an extraordinary Anger turns a Man into a Fool.* And *Seneca* ſaith, *That a ſhort Anger is a ſhort Madneſs.* And *Philemon*, *That we all play the Fool while we are angry*, Deſipimus omnes donec irati ſumus. Therefore we cannot endeavour too much to root out this brutiſh Paſſion; which is not to be thought requiſite to defend us from, and revenge Injuries, ſeeing that a calm and quiet Spirit may do it much better, and without fear of Repentance, were it only to keep Servants within the Bounds of their Duty; for in ſuch a Caſe, a feigned and ſeeming Anger is ſufficient either to Puniſh their Crimes or to Chaſtiſe their Failings; for we are not to be more angry than the Law it ſelf; or than a Phyſician, who without any diſcompoſure orders his Burnings and Inciſions: We have already mentioned thoſe excellent Verſes of *Claudian*, who requires a wiſe Man to be always Maſter of himſelf, and to puniſh Offenders without Wrath.

But as the Fancy that we have of being offended, is that which ſtirs up Anger; we have already obſerved, (ſpeaking of Fortitude,) That a wiſe Man ought to be above all Affronts, and that he cannot revenge himſelf more honourably than by deſpiſing 'em. I will here only add, That we ought to moderate and over-come this eagerneſs of Revenge, and reduce it to a mild and meek Temper, which of all other Virtues is moſt becoming a Man, and makes him beloved; for every one hath Affection for ſuch as are naturally mild and full of Humanity, who are eaſily appeaſed, and apt and inclinable to forgive. We receive thereby a great Advantage; for by this means we free our ſelves from that Fretfulneſs which conſumes a revengeful Spirit, troubles our Mind, ſpends our Strength; and not being ſatisfied with the Evil already received,

ceived, he draws often upon himſelf a greater Miſchief, by endeavouring to take Vengeance. Can there be a greater blindneſs or madneſs than that of ſome Men, who being affronted, challenge the Offender in Duel, where it often happens that he who ſuffered the former wrong, loſeth alſo his Life, and ſacrifices it, if I may ſo ſay, to him whoſe Affront he could not ſlight and paſs by? Let us with due Thanks and Praiſes own the ſteddy and unſhaken Juſtice of a neighbouring Prince, who by his ſevere Edicts hath freed his Nation from this barbarous and inhuman Cuſtom.

Of Clemency.

AS for Clemency, it differs from Mildneſs, in that the latter relates generally to all Men; but Clemency only to Inferiours. Therefore *Seneca* ſaith, *That it is not only a Moderation of Spirit in that Power that we leave to revenge our ſelves; but alſo a gentleneſs in a Superiour, in Puniſhing and Chaſtiſing of Inferiours.* It is likewiſe known, that as Meekneſs or Mildneſs leans and inclines rather to the defect than the exceſs of Anger, ſo alſo Clemency inclines more to the want than to the exceſs of Puniſhment: So that Indulgence is not ſo much oppoſite to it as Cruelty of Mind, or that kind of Inhumanity that appears in the extraordinary Puniſhment of Offenders. 'Tis not without Reaſon that this Virtue is eſteem'd proper to generous and noble Minds. It becomes all Men in general, who have Authority over thoſe who ask Pardon for their Faults; but 'tis more particularly the Ornament and Glory of Kings and Princes. Therefore *Cicero* calls it a Royal Virtue: For as 'tis incident to a weak, cowardly, and ſavage Nature, to ſhew Cruelty

Cruelty to thoſe who are over-come, nay, tho' they have given no particular Provocation; ſo it belongs to a noble and generous Mind to expreſs Clemency to the Conquered. And as Cruelty renders Men hateful and odious, ſo Clemency, procures them love, affection, and reſpect; for as the ſame Author ſaith, *As 'tis a brutiſh Inclination to deſtroy by Cruelty, ſo 'tis a Divine Temper to ſave by Pardoning.*. In ſome Caſes indeed, we cannot well Pardon without bringing danger upon our ſelves, and this is more properly term'd Severity than Cruelty; but when there is no inconveniency to be feared, but on the contrary there appears a likelihood of purchaſing to our ſelves the Kindneſs of others, and to make them more ſubject and obedient by the Senſe of Gratitude, 'tis not only glorious to ſave ſuch as you may deſtroy, but profitable and pleaſant to deſerve or experience the Kindneſs, either of thoſe who are obliged, or of others who will find by that means a diſpoſition full of Goodneſs and Love. 'Tis ſtrange to conſider, how great Affection we have for thoſe whom we read of in Hiſtory to have ſhewn themſelves very kind and merciful, and how we abominate thoſe who have been barbarous and cruel. This ſhews ſufficiently what great difference there is in the Reputation of thoſe Princes who ſtrive to deſerve and purchaſe to themſelves the glorious and auguſt Title of Fathers of their Country, and of thoſe who fancy this Motto which *Seneca* calls odious, *Let 'em hate me ſo they fear me.*

Of

Of Mercy.

Seneca tells us, that after Clemency we ought to inquire what Mercy is, becauſe this Virtue ſeems to be near a kin, and much reſembles Clemency; nay, is ſometimes taken for Clemency it ſelf: For tho' Mercy ſeems to be nothing elſe but a certain grief or concern that we have for anothers Calamity; yet it reſembles Clemency, becauſe the Miſery of him who is fallen, even forces it from us. Therefore ſometimes it ſeems to be Clemency it ſelf; and that in the Judgment of the ſacred Writers, who highly recommended it, as alſo among the Philoſophers; as *Cicero*, who making his Addreſs to *Cæſar*, tells him, *Of all the Virtues that attend you, the moſt eſteemed of Men, and the moſt admirable, is Mercy; for nothing makes us ſo like the Gods, as to give Life to Men: Your Fortune hath nothing greater than to be able, and your Soul and Diſpoſition, nothing better than to be willing to preſerve many.* And tho' *Seneca* ſaith, That *Mercy is the weakneſs of a mean Spirit, that 'tis common to the moſt wicked; and that we ſee none but old Women, and generally the Female Sex who are moved, and pity the Tears of the greateſt Villains, who if not ſtrongly guarded, would break their Priſons*; Yet he confeſſeth, *That many extol this Virtue, and name an honeſt Man a merciful Man.* But he underſtands the matter as the Stoicks do, who pretend, *That a wiſe Man is never moved with Compaſſion, nor Pardons any.*

But tho' the Stoicks will have the Mind of a wiſe Man not ſubject to Diſpleaſure, and conſequently ought not to be moved with the Calamities of others; nevertheleſs, the Peripateticks and all others, maintain, That he may be moved moderately,

ly, that ſo he may thereby be excited to ſuccour and aſſiſt ſuch as are in Miſery. I confeſs it is no advantage to a Man in Miſery, that others ſhould be moved or afflicted for his Calamity, for that is only ſo far ſerviceable as to incline us to aſſiſt him, and therefore we are not to be blamed for keeping our ſelves from an affliction which is hurtful and brings no profit; however yet it tends to excite and further our aſſiſtance. Moreover, 'tis alſo Human and Natural to be afflicted with thoſe that ſuffer; nay 'tis to be ſuſpected that our aſſiſtance will be but ſlender and backward, if it be not encouraged by an inward Motion: For that Reaſon we are not altogether to condemn this inward Inclination, becauſe we may have it in ſuch a manner, as it may not be a torment to us, but rather the natural effect of a free and generous Propenſity to acts of Humanity and Charity.

Of Modeſty and Humility.

WE ſhall next ſpeak of Modeſty, which tho' it is of a large extent, yet chiefly conſiſts in moderating our Paſſions in the purſuit of Honour and Glory. Now 'tis manifeſt that this Virtue draws nearer to a defect than to an exceſs, in that Pride is rather oppoſite to it, than the contempt of Honour. I confeſs, *Ariſtotle* calls him Modeſt only who deſerves but little, and in reality Fancies according to his Deſerts; but the name of Modeſt ſeems likewiſe applicable to him, who tho he may deſerve much, nevertheleſs hath no overwean'd Opinion of himſelf, nor does he ſtrictly exact all the Honour and Reſpect due to him; for knowing the weakneſs of human Nature, and remembring his frail Condition, begins to ſuſpect that the Opinion that he

he entertains of his own Merit may deceive him. And truly that Magnanimity ſo much extoll'd by *Ariſtotle*, ſeems rather to conſiſt in prompting us to aim at and attempt great Things, than believe that we merit or deſerve 'em. Beſides, it ſeems not to be puffed up nor boaſt of its deſerts, by declining Honours, but at leaſt admits and receives them with Modeſty: In a Word, our expreſſing our Modeſty in our Actions and Behaviour, is as the crowning and completion of our great and noble Deeds. Therefore 'tis not without cauſe that the Antients have compared a Man of Merit and Virtue, to an Ear of Wheat, which the fuller it is, the more it ſtoops. And *Demoſthenes* obſerves, That a Man who is ſolidly learned, is ſo far from boaſting of it, that he bluſhes when any one ſeems to Extol and Praiſe him.

But we muſt not therefore think that this Modeſty is the ſame which we call Puſillanimity, which he ſuppoſes to be when any one believes that he deſerves leſs than really he doth; for this Puſillanimity or Baſhfulneſs conſiſts alſo in having rather an apprehenſion and fear of undertaking great Things, than in believing that we deſerve 'em. Now as in a Man of great worth, Oſtentation leſſens the Glory of his Merits, and darkens it very much; ſo 'tis an odious and vain-glorious Thing in a Man of no Merit to be puffed up with the over-wean'd conceit of himſelf and his own Actions. Vain-Glory hath this Evil attending, that it is approved by none, but hated of all the World; whereas Modeſty hath this advantage, that there is no Body but delights in it and loves it.

From whence we may here obſerve, That this Modeſty is not ſuch a contempt of Honour, as if there were no difference between Things honorary and Things blame-worthy; but only a contempt of Ho-

Honour without Merit, or meerly in Affectation, and which differs much from that which is real in the Opinion of good Men, and which we duly obtain, when we are judged worthy of it; which ſeems to be ſo much the more agreeable with Truth, that it is manifeſt that an honeſt Man undertakes great Things to deſerve this Opinion; neverthelſs he obſerves the Rules of Modeſty, to avoid the Shame and Diſgrace that Vain-Glory draws upon us. So that we may truly ſay, That the leſs we ſeek after Honour, the eaſilier and the ſooner we obtain it; it being more glorious, as an ancient Author obſerves, to ask why a Statue hath not been erected for ſuch an one, than why it hath.

We may likewiſe underſtand, That Modeſty hinders not thoſe who are advanced to a Dignity, to maintain the Honour of that Poſt; for it is the Intereſt of a Commonwealth or Kingdom, that thoſe who Govern ſhould be Honoured; for fear if Contempt ſhould creep in, the Government would ſuffer by it, and that the preſervation of the Honour of our Dignity is no vain Glory, but a real Act of Juſtice, as the neglect of it ſeems not ſo much to be a private Modeſty, as a publick Injury.

Now all that has been ſpoken of Modeſty, may be ſaid of Humility, as it is a religious Virtue: For tho heathen Authors look upon it as proceeding from a mean abject Spirit, nevertheleſs, 'tis with great Reaſon that the Holy Pen-men look upon it as a very great degree of Modeſty, and it is to be judged ſo much the more perfect, becauſe it comes from a love of Piety, and ſuppoſing it be true and ſincere, and not feigned nor hypocritical, it removes and baniſhes all Vain-Glory. For tho the Modeſty of the Philoſophers ſeems outwardly to deſpiſe Honour, yet it excludes not all the other Paſſions, but this Religious Humility aſcribes to God all Honour and Glory.

Glory. I ſay upon condition that it be ſincere, for there is ſometimes Hypocriſy mingled with it. Therefore we need not wonder that ſome have exclaimed againſt *Diogenes* and ſome other of the Philoſophers, That they had conquer'd one kind of Vanity by exalting another.

But 'tis not without ground what we ſaid before, that this Modeſty is of a large extent, becauſe it appears in all the things which we deſire to draw from Honour or Praiſe. And in Virtue it ſelf, which doubtleſs can have no exceſs, and in which there is nothing that might make us aſhamed: I ſay in Virtue it ſelf this Modeſty appears when there is no Oſtentation of it, but we embrace and practiſe it ſilently, without making it appear but when it is convenient, and always free from Pride. Which is alſo to be ſaid proportionably of Science or Knowledg, unleſs it be that there is moreover a certain kind of Diſtemper, commonly called *Curioſity*, to deſire to know thoſe Things which are not lawfully to be pried into, or which are uſeleſs when known. This Modeſty appears alſo in our Diſcourſe in ſeveral reſpects; for Firſt, as there is nothing ſo troubleſome as a pratling Loquacity, ſo there is nothing more commendable than a prudent Silence, or that Forbearance which makes us ſpeak only to thoſe to whom we ought, and of ſuch Things and at ſuch times as we ought. So that that Saying of *Simonides* is become a kind of Proverb; *That no Man did ever repent of being Silent; but very often of too much Speaking.* And *Epaminondas*, was commended becauſe *no Man knew more than he, and yet no Man Spoke leſs.* Wherefore, as Speech hath been given to Man to unfold and expreſs his Thoughts, it will ſuffice to take heed that this be not uſed indiſcreetly, as it happens, when any ſpeaks out of Seaſon, or without being required, or more than comes

to

to his ſhare, uttering all that comes uppermoſt, and ſcarce permitting any Body elſe to put in a Word; when he Speaks, as we ſay, at random, and that he utters all that comes firſt; in ſhort, when he hath ſuch an impatience of Speaking, that when he is forc'd to hearken to others, it is very uneaſy to him, never reflecting upon that wiſe Saying of *Pythagoras*, *Either let your Diſcourſe be more profitable than your Silence, or elſe hold your Peace.* And as there are ſome who magnify Things too much, and others who too much leſſen 'em, ſo there is nothing more commendable than to ſpeak plainly and ſincerely: For you may obſerve with *Ariſtotle*, That there is often a great deal of Arrogancy and Vain-Glory in thinking too meanly of our ſelves, as well as in thinking too highly, and that we may hereby fall into a Folly like that of the *Lacedemonians*, who gloried in their Garments of a low and mean Price.

Laſtly, as there are Two ſorts of Jeſting, according to *Cicero*, the one Inſolent, Sawcy and Malicious; the other Civil, Ingenious and Pleaſant: 'Tis known that this laſt hath been always as well accepted, and as he tells us, That it is becoming a Gentleman; whereas the other is very ill received, and not judged fit for any Man.

There are many other Things in which Modeſty diſcovers it ſelf, as in the decency and plainneſs of our Habits, in our Meen and Behaviour, *&c.* for in all theſe Things there is a certain Mediocrity to be obſerved. Theſe are *Cicero*'s own Words, *Adhibenda eſt præterea mundities non odioſa, neque exquiſita nimis, tanquam quæ fugiat agreſtem & inhumanam negligentiam. Eadem ratio eſt habenda Veſtitus, in quo ſicut in pleriſq; rebus Mediocritas optima eſt. Eadem geſtus & greſſus. Nam & paleſtrici motus ſæpe ſunt odioſiores, & hiſtrionum nonnulli geſtus ineptiis non carent, & in utroq; genere quæ ſunt recta & ſimplicia laudantur.*

dantur. I think *Horace* hath borrowed from this Paſſage what he ſaith of *Tigellus*, when he tells us, That he was a Man made up of Extremes; That ſometimes one might ſee him running as if he had fled from an Enemy, and ſometimes walking gravely and demurely, as if he were carrying the Image of *Juno*; one Day he would have two Hundred Servants attending him, the next Day ſcarce One; ſometimes he would talk like a King uttering nothing but what ſavour'd of Greatneſs and Magnificence, at other times he would play the Philoſopher and be contented with little.

Nil æquale homini fuit illi, &c.

Cicero ſays moreover, That Modeſty is concern'd in the Ornament of a Houſe and all its Furniture, and that where there is any Superfluity or Exceſs, it turns to the diſcredit of the Owner, becauſe 'tis above his Ability; for 'tis not the Houſe that ought to Grace the Maſter, but the Maſter ought to be an Ornament to his Houſe. *Eadem denique de ornatu domus totaque ſupellectile, in quo ſi quid modum excedat, dedecori eſt, quaſi poſſeſſori incongruum; neque enim domo dominus, ſed domino honeſtanda domus.* Laſtly, he will have Modeſty concerned even with the Goods of Nature and Fortune, in the which 'tis very commendable to obſerve a convenient Temper, ſo that they may be rather the Inſtruments of Virtue and Moderation, than of Debauchery, Pride and Arrogancy. *Tractanda etiam in laudationibus hæc ſunt naturæ, & fortunæ bona, in quibus eſt ſumma laus non extuliſſe ſe in poteſtate, non fuiſſe inſolentem in pecunia, non ſe prætuliſſe aliis propter abundantiam fortunæ, ut opes, & copiæ non ſuperbiæ videantur, ac libidini, ſed bonitati, ac moderationi facultatem, & materiam dediſſe.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of Juſtice, Equity and the Laws.

THere remains yet the fourth Virtue for us to Diſcourſe of, namely Juſtice, which conſiſts in rendring to every one that which belongs to him; therefore 'tis of a very large Extent, and eſteemed as the ſource and root of all other Duties. *'Tis Juſtice*, ſaith *Cicero*, *which gives the name of Good as well as that of Juſt*; for Juſtice is a kind of Goodneſs, or an Inclination full of Sincerity and Deſire of doing right to all the World; for that reaſon there is nothing that Men reſpect, reverence and love more than Juſtice. *Ariſtotle* tells us in expreſs Words, *That Juſtice is the moſt excellent of all the Virtues, that it excels the Morning and the Evening Star in Glory.* For this Cauſe Men have always given to it the name of a moſt precious Poſſeſſion, and in all times it is acknowledged to be the ligament of Societies, as *Cicero* calls it, that is to ſay, That Tie without which Society cannot poſſibly Subſiſt; inſomuch, ſaith he, that the very worſt of Men, and they who delight in Wickedneſs cannot live without ſome kind of Juſtice; for if one Thief openly Robs another, or privately Steals any thing from him, he is not ſuffered to continue in the Company of Thieves; or if a Captain of a Pyrate diſtributes not the Prey equally, his Companions will either kill him or forſake him.

But this Virtue is ſometimes taken more generally, ſometimes more ſtrictly; for there be many that look upon it as the Complexion of all the other Virtues, becauſe there is no Virtue but Juſtice preſcribes

ſcribes its Functions and Offices; as for Inſtance, in the practice of Fortitude, when we are in a Fight it orders us to keep our Rank, and forbids us to run away, or throw away our Weapons: In the practice of Temperance it prohibits Adultery; in that of Gentleneſs it Commands us to ſtrike no Body, nor ſo much as to ſpeak Evil of 'em; and ſo of the reſt.

But not to inſiſt too long upon this; it is not to be queſtion'd but that the two chief Offices or general Duties of Juſtice conſiſt in hurting or doing wrong to no Body, and in giving or rendring to every one that which he may lawfully claim, which is commonly expreſſed in Holy Writ by theſe Words, *Declina a malo, & fac bonum*, fly from Evil and do Good: This hath given occaſion to the Lawyers to define Juſtice, *A conſtant and perpetual Will or Reſolution to give or reſtore to every one his Right*; that is to ſay, what juſtly belongs to him. This Definition cauſeth us to make two Obſervations, Firſt, That 'tis not without Reaſon that it is named a Will or Reſolution; for tho this Word may ſignify the action of the Will or the Faculty it ſelf; nevertheleſs, as they add further, that it ought to be a conſtant and perpetual Willingneſs, they hereby underſtand the Habit it ſelf of Willing, which expreſſeth the nature and true praiſe of Juſtice. For to deſerve commendation for this Virtue, 'tis not ſufficient to perform ſome juſt Acts, ſeeing that he who may do them without Knowledge, or for Fear, or for a Friends ſake, or for Gain, or for ſome other ſuch conſideration, cannot therefore be Juſt, nor be ſaid to do Juſtly, becauſe the End ceaſing, he would act otherwiſe; but to be Juſt he muſt proceed willingly of his own accord for the ſake of Juſtice. Therefore *Ariſtotle* puts a difference between a juſt Action and an Action done Juſtly; becauſe

'tis the Will alone that makes the Deed to be Juſtly or Unjuſtly done, and that he who only does no Wrong is not eſteemed Juſt, but he who notwithſtanding his Capacity to act unjuſtly, yet will by no means do it, as *Philemon* ſaith,

Sed qui facere licet potis, non vult tamen.

And he who aims at no private Glory, but deſires rather to be truly Juſt than to appear ſo.

Vult eſſe juſtus, quam viderier magis.

Secondly, That 'tis not alſo without Reaſon that they add, *To render to every one his Right:* Becauſe theſe Words comprehend the Function and the proper Act of Juſtice; and beſides, ſignify from whence this Mediocrity is to be taken, which *Ariſtotle* requires, to place Juſtice in the Number of the Virtues. For Juſtice is not as the other Virtues, between two Oppoſite Vices, for there is but one only contrary to it, namely Injuſtice. But nevertheleſs 'tis employed in rendring that which is Right, which is to be reduc'd to a Mediocrity or Equality, upon which *Ariſtotle* obſerves in the firſt place,

Of Retaliation.

THat Retaliation, or as the *Latins* term it, *Perpeſſio reciproca*, a mutual Suffering, is no Right or Equity, ſimply ſo taken, whatever *Pythagoras*'s Diſciples pretend to, who ſeem to approve of the Juſtice that is aſcribed to *Radamanthus*, *Æquum jus fuerit, ſi quæ egit, quis patiatur*; To make a Man ſuffer the ſame Evil which he hath committed.

The

The Reaſon of this is, becauſe Retaliation cannot be found in diſtributive Juſtice, where a reſpect is to be had to the Worth and to the Perſon. For Example, if a Magiſtrate ſtrikes any Body, he ought not therefore to be ſtruck in the ſame manner; and it would not be ſufficient that he who ſhould give a box on the Ear to a Magiſtate ſhould only receive ſuch another for it, but he ought to be puniſhed more ſeverely. I ſhall not here mention that a regard ought to be had chiefly to that which is done willingly, and that which is acted againſt our Will. Neither hath it any room in that part of Commutative Juſtice, which reſpects the Actions, and which is properly called Corrective; for if for a Tooth pull'd out we only pull out a Tooth, or an Eye for an Eye, we don't hereby do Right, becauſe there is no amends made for the Injury or Wrong done; but we muſt as much as is poſſible recompenſe the miſchief done, either by Mony, or ſome other expedient which the Judge ſhall think convenient. Therefore it may have place in the other part of Commutative Juſtice, which reſpects the Things, or the exchange made in recompence of it,

Ariſtotle obſerves in the ſecond Place, That for this kind of Juſtice there is nothing could be invented more convenient than Gold, Silver, or ſomething of like Value; for as human Society ſubſiſts by a neceſſary ſupply of one anothers Wants, we cannot otherwiſe redreſs this defect than by exchange or commutation, and that this is to be done by ſome equality that is to be found out. Now what equality can we find between two Things ſo different (for Example) as a Horſe and Box on the Ear. As therefore we cannot find any equality as to the Thing, nevertheleſs, as by Cuſtom we have made Mony an equivalent to every thing elſe, by

this as by a common Meaſure we may adjuſt to every Man his due Right.

Thirdly, A Judge ought ſometimeis to do Right, not ſtrictly as the Law preſcribes, but as we uſually ſay, according to Equity, *Ex æquo & bono.* For as the Law orders nothing but under general Terms, and that often there happens particular Caſes, in which, becauſe of certain Circumſtances none can judge according to the ſtrict Letter of the Law without great Unjuſtice; For that Reaſon, ſaith he, *If a Legiſlator hath omitted or failed in any thing which he hath abſolutely enjoyn'd, here we muſt ſupply what was defective in this Law-giver, and what he himſelf would have ordain'd by this Law if he had been now preſent, or had known of it before.* Nay, the Interpreters of the Laws go yet farther, and ſay, *If the Law had commanded that no Strangers ſhould walk upon the Bulwarks, we muſt not therefore put to death one who is gone thither to defend the Town, and repulſe the Enemy; for if the Law-giver had foreſeen ſuch a Caſe, he doubtleſs had made ſuch an Exception.* For this Reaſon 'tis commonly ſaid, That under ſtrict and ſevere Laws we ought to implore the Aſſiſtance of the Judge, to make a reaſonable and equitable Conſtruction.

Judicis auxilium ſub iniqua lege rogato:
Ipſæ etenim leges cupiunt ut jure regantur.

But to return to the Definition of Juſtice. As this part of the Definition, *viz.* To render to every one his *Right*, obliges us to underſtand and ſeek more at large what this Right is, and from whence it derives its Original: Let us conſider, firſt, that this word being taken in ſeveral ſenſes, its primitive Signification is, that *Right* is a Faculty to do ſomething, to have ſomething, to enjoy, and to do ones

ones ſelf Right in ſomething; from thence we ſay, to keep, to retain, to recover, to purſue ones Right, to yield, to abate and ſurrender ones Right, to enjoy ones Right, or to be at our own Command, *Eſſe ſui juris*, &c. 'Tis alſo from hence that the Law, by a Metaphor, is called Right, becauſe it declares and preſcribes what belongs to every one as his Right, what Authority, Power and Command every one hath over any thing. And this by a like Metaphor, That we call Right the Court or Tribunal where Right is done; that is to ſay, where the Party injured hath his Right reſtor'd or Juſtice done him.

Nay, we may go yet farther, and ſay, That Right ſeems by conſequence to be originally more ancient than Juſtice; for as Juſtice is the ſame thing with that Affection or habitual Deſire or Inclination which we have to wrong no body, and that every one may enjoy their Right as we enjoy ours; 'tis certain, that this Juſtice ſuppoſeth that there is in other Men a Right, not depending upon it, and which nevertheleſs would be, tho' it ſelf were not in Being. Therefore it ſeems in the firſt place, we ought to acknowledge the Right that every one hath, tho' it be different from what Nature gives, or tho' it be by Contract or by Law. Secondly, That the Injury is nothing elſe but a Violation of this Right it ſelf. Thirdly, Juſtice, or the Will to render unto every one his own, which repairs the Wrong, reſtores Right, and gives the Title of Juſt to him who poſſeſſeth it. Fourthly, The Proceedings or Work of Juſtice, or the Right reſtored, which is alſo called Juſt, or that which is Juſt; Juſtice giving it that Denomination. But becauſe *Epicurus*, whom, both many of the ancient and modern Authors have followed, hath derived the very beginning of Right and

whatever is agreeable with Equity, from Utility or Profit; let us liſten to what he ſays in the four following Paragraphs. 'Tis in this manner that he diſcourſes of Juſtice in general Terms.

Of Juſtice in General, according to Epicurus.

'AS Juſtice is a Virtue by which we render unto every one that which is his due, and 'by which we take heed not to wrong any body; 'tis certain, that in this reſpect it relates to, and 'reſpects other Men, and that it is convenient for 'Man as he is a Member, and lives in Society, it 'being the common Tie, without which 'tis im-'poſſible a Society ſhould ſubſiſt.

'It hath this alſo in common with other Vir-'tues, *viz.* Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude, 'that 'tis not to be ſeparated from Pleaſure; not 'only becauſe it injures no body, but alſo becauſe 'it ſettles the Mind at Reſt, either by its own na-'tural Influence, or by the Aſſurance that nothing 'ſhall be wanting to us, which our Nature, not 'corrupted, can deſire.

'And as Raſhneſs, Luxury and Cowardiſe di-'ſturb and trouble the Mind, ſo from that very in-'ſtant that Injuſtice hath taken Poſſeſſion of the 'Soul of a Man, he cannot be otherwiſe but troub-'led and uneaſie: Inſomuch, that if he hath under-'taken any evil Action, tho' he hath done it never 'ſo ſecretly, yet he can never be aſſured that it 'will always remain ſo. And if there be any who 'by reaſon of their great Riches, fancy themſelves 'ſufficiently ſecur'd from the Inquiſition and Juſtice 'of Men, yet they are always afraid of a divine 'Vengeance; and they believe that this Uneaſineſs 'which Torments them Day and Night, is a Pu-'niſhment

'niſhment that proceeds from the Appointment of 'the immortal Gods, who are offended and diſ-'pleaſed with them.

And afterwards, ſays he, 'As to the Advantage 'which we receive from evil Actions, how inconſi-'derable are they to leſſen our Griefs, or to ſup-'port us under the Troubles of our Life? Do they 'not rather increaſe 'em by the remorſe of Con-'ſcience, by the fear of the Laws, and by the ha-'tred of our Neighbours? Nevertheleſs, ſome 'are unſatiable as to Mony, Honour, Authority, and 'preſcribe no limits to their Luxury, Debauchery 'and other Extravagancies, which the ill-gotten 'Goods do augment and increaſe more and more, 'rather than leſſen and appeaſe. Therefore it 'ſeems that all Rules and Precepts are uſeleſs to 'ſuch Men, and that there is nothing but Severity 'and Puniſhment that can reſtrain them.

'Reaſon therefore invites them who are of ſonnd 'Senſe and Underſtanding, to the obſervation of 'Juſtice, Equity and Fidelity. Wicked Deeds are 'uſeful to no body, and Riches are convenient for 'none but for honeſt Men, and ſuch as have a 'Mind tending to Liberality; for they know there-'by how to gain Mens Affections, and to make 'themſelves beloved, which tends very much to the 'ſecurity and quiet of our Lives; beſides, there is 'nothing that ought to oblige us to unjuſt Actions. 'The Deſires that proceed from Nature are eaſily to 'be ſatisfied; and for ſuch as are vain, fooliſh and 'needleſs, we ſhould not obey 'em. Theſe De-'ſires procure nothing worthy of our Affections, 'and the Wrong done to others, cauſes more Miſ-'chief than we obtain Advantage by doing that In-'jury. Therefore if Juſtice of it ſelf, and by it 'ſelf is not deſirable, 'tis at leaſt deſirable for the 'ſake of the great Pleaſure and Satisfaction that it

'pro-

'procures; for there is nothing more Pleaſant than 'to be beloved; becauſe that makes up the Society, 'and conſequently the Delights of Life. So that 'Wickedneſs is not only to be avoided, becauſe of 'the Puniſhments and the Miſchiefs that fall upon 'the Wicked; but chiefly alſo becauſe it never ſuf-'fers our Minds to be at eaſe, but Poiſons all our 'Delights, and renders our Life miſerable. What 'I have here ſaid, may ſeem to be ſufficient; but I 'think I ſhall not do amiſs to add ſomething con-'cerning that which we call Right or Juſt, from 'whence Juſtice derives its Name, that we may the 'better diſcover what the Origin of Right is, 'among what Nations it hath been received, and 'what are the Advantages that proceed from 'thence.

Of Right or Juſt, from whence Juſtice derives its Name.

'AS Juſtice hath been contrived and appoint-'ed for the Publick Good, it muſt needs 'follow that the Right and Equity which it chief-'ly reſpects, is Good for each individual Perſon 'that conſtitutes a Society: And becauſe every one 'deſires naturally that which is Good for himſelf, 'it muſt needs be, that what is Right or Juſt, is 'according to Nature, and by conſequence muſt be 'ſtiled Natural.

'Now 'tis not without Reaſon that I mention 'this, becauſe it ſometimes happens that in the 'Government of Societies, ſome things are order'd 'as Right and Juſt, which nevertheleſs are not 'Good, nor the true Intereſt of a Society; and 'conſequently being not natural, but againſt Na-'ture, ought not to be reputed Juſt, but only nomi-

'nally

'nally ſo, or by miſtake; that which is truly Right 'and naturally Juſt being ſuch as 'tis ordained, that 'is to ſay, effectively Uſeful and Good. There-'fore to ſpeak properly, Right or natural Equity 'is nothing elſe but what is mark'd out by Utility 'or Profit, or that Utility which, by common A-'greement, hath been appointed that Men might 'not injure one another, nor receive any wrong, 'but live in ſecurity, which is a real Good, and 'therefore naturally deſired of every one.

'I ſuppoſe therefore, that which is Profitable and 'that which is Good, to be but one and the ſame 'thing; and therefore to the making up of what 'is Juſt and Right, two things are prerequiſite: 'The Firſt, That it be Uſeful, or that it hath Uſe-'fulneſs on its ſide. The Second, That it be pre-'ſcribed and ordained by the common Conſent of 'the Society; for there is nothing perfectly Juſt 'but what the Society by common Agreement or 'Approbation hath thought fit to be obſerved.

''Tis true, ſome are of Opinion, That what 'things are Juſt, are of their own Nature and un-'changably ſo; and that the Laws do not make 'em Juſt, but that they only declare 'em and or-'dain 'em to be according to what they were na-'turally before: Nevertheleſs 'tis not ſo, but here-'in 'tis as in other things which are uſeful, ſuch as 'are thoſe that concern our Health, and a great 'many more ſuch like, wich are uſeful to ſome and 'hurtful to others, and conſequently vary from 'the End both in general and particular. And 'truly, as every thing ought always every where, 'and to every one appear ſuch as 'tis by Nature, 'becauſe Nature never changes and is unalterable 'in all Occurrences; pray tell me if the things 'that ſome name Juſt, be every where, at all times 'and in reſpect of all Perſons, really Juſt? Are

'we

'we not to conſider that what is ordained and eſta-
'bliſhed by Laws, and what is conſequently Law-
'ful and Juſt, is not ordained nor admitted
'among all Nations, but that ſome look upon 'em
'as indifferent, and others reject 'em as prejudicial
'and unjuſt? Are there not ſome who hold gene-
'rally for uſeful that which nevertheleſs is not ſo;
'and thus receive things which are not generally
'convenient, only becauſe that they ſeem ſo to
'them, or to their Society, and appear to have
'ſome general Utility or Advantage belonging to
''em?

'We may then ſay, for the moſt part, that that
'is univerſally Juſt or agreeable with the Nature of
'Juſt, which is uſeful or conformable to the No-
'tion of Juſt that we have now given. For to
'ſpeak more particularly, as Utility is otherwiſe,
'and differing among the ſeveral Nations, ſo like-
'wiſe what is Juſt differs in the ſame manner;
'ſo that what we fancy to be Juſt, others look up-
'on it as Unjuſt. This being ſo, when we enquire
'whether Juſt and Right is the ſame among all Na-
'tions, I anſwer, that univerſally 'tis ſo; that is,
'ſomething that is uſeful in the mutual Society;
'but if we look to Particulars, and conſider the
'ſeveral ſorts of People, and the diverſity of Cir-
'cumſtances, we ſhall find that 'tis not the ſame
'every where.

'In a word, a thing is and ought to be reputed
'Juſt, or to have the Qualities of Juſt in a Society,
'if its Uſefulneſs reſpects all the Individuals aſſo-
'ciated; but if it be not ſo, 'tis not properly to be
'called Juſt, nor deſerves to be ſo eſteemed. So
'that if a Thing or an Action having been uſeful
'in a Society, if by any Accident or by any Altera-
'tion this Uſefulneſs begins to ceaſe, that thing
'will alſo ceaſe from being Juſt, it being no longer

ſo

'ſo than only while it continues uſeful and profi-
'table to Society. And thus I ſuppoſe every one
'will judge, who ſuffers not himſelf to be miſled
'and blinded by vain and frivolous Diſcourſes, but
'has a general Reſpect to all things.

Of the Origin of Right and of Juſtice.

'But to begin the Matter a little higher, and
'trace it from its firſt Source. Right, Equity
'or Juſtice ſeem to be as ancient among Men, even
'as mutual Societies are.

'For in the beginning, when Men were Vaga-
'bonds, wandering up and down like Brutes, and
'ſuffered many Inconveniences from thoſe ſalvage
'Creatures, and the Rigour of the Seaſons, ſome
'natural Inclination which they had for one ano-
'ther, by reaſon of the ſimilitude and mutual Re-
'ſemblance of Bodies as well as Souls or Manners,
'inclined 'em to unite together in ſmall Societies,
'the better to prevent in ſome meaſure ſuch like
'Inconveniences, by Building Cottages, and ſo
'thereby ſtrengthning themſelves againſt the Cruelty
'of wild Beaſts and the Severity of the Weather.
'But becauſe every one more regarded his own
'private Benefit than that of another, this begot
'many Quarrels in reference to Eating and Drink-
'ing, and upon the account of Women, and other
'Conveniences of Life, which they daily robb'd
'and forcibly depriv'd one another of, until ſuch
'time as they began to conſider that they could not
'ſubſiſt quietly, or live ſecurely and conveniently,
'unleſs they made ſome Contracts, and agreed
'among themſelves to do no Injury one to ano-
'ther; ſo that if any wrong'd his Neighbours, the
'reſt were to puniſh him for it.

This

'This then was the firſt Knot or Tie of Societies, which as it ſuppoſed that every Perſon might 'have ſomething belonging to him, or what he might 'call his own, either becauſe he was the firſt poſſeſſor of it, or becauſe it was given him, or becauſe 'he had it by way of exchange, or becauſe he acquir'd it by his Induſtry; I ſay, this was the firſt 'Knot which confirmed to every private Perſon the 'poſſeſſion of that which he thus challeng'd as his 'own. Now this Knot or Agreement was nothing 'elſe but a common Law which all were bound to 'obſerve, and which was to ſecure to every one his 'Right or Power to make uſe of that which thus appertained to him. And thus upon this account the 'Law became the common Right of Societies. I ſhall 'not here mention how a whole Society at length 'transfer'd their power of puniſhing to a certain ſelect number of the wiſeſt and honeſteſt Men, or it 'may be to one Perſon, who was look'd upon as the 'wiſeſt of all the reſt. I ſhall obſerve only two 'or three Things. Firſt, That ſuch in the Society 'were eſteemed Juſt or obſervers of Juſtice, who 'contenting themſelves with their own Rights, never invaded the Goods of others, and by this 'means wronged no Body. And ſuch were deemed 'Unjuſt or doers of Wrong, who being not ſatisfied 'with what was their own, uſurp'd the Rights of 'others, and thus wronged 'em either by Robbing 'of 'em, Beating, or by Killing 'em, or the like.

'The Second relates to the preſervation of Life, 'as the thing that was the deareſt to 'em of all, and 'the ſtrong confirmation of their Agreements, or 'of their common Laws; for the wiſe Legiſlators 'taking a particular Care of what beſt ſecur'd their 'Lives, and minding alſo what uſually happen'd 'among Societies, declared, That it was an horrible 'and abominable Crime to kill a Man, and that a

Mur-

'Murderer ſhould be look'd upon as a moſt infa-
'mous Perſon, and be ſhamefully put to Death; for
'there was nothing more unreaſonable than to kill
'his Fellow Creature; for which Act we ought to
'have the greateſt averſion, and the rather, becauſe
'thereby accrued no advantage to Life, and that this
'Deed could not proceed but from a Wickedneſs in
'Nature.

'Thirdly, That thoſe who at firſt took care to
'promote the Utility of the Laws, had truly no
'need of any other Ground but to hinder them from
'doing Evil, or from Tranſgreſſing: But thoſe who
'had not ſo much Ingenuity as to take notice of
'the importance hereof, deſiſted from Murdering
'one another, meerly out of the fear and appre-
'henſion of the grievous Puniſhments to be inflicted
'on Offenders, which we ſee ſtill at preſent to be
'our Caſe.

Between whom Right and Juſtice takes place.

'AS after all that hath been ſaid, it may be
'queſtioned among whom Right and the vi-
'olation of Right, and conſequently Juſtice and
'Injuſtice, which are Oppoſites, take place: This,
'in my Judgment, is to be underſtood by compa-
'ring Men with other Animals.

'Therefore as there is no kind of Right and In-
'jury, of Juſt or Unjuſt between the reſt of Ani-
'mals, becauſe it was not poſſible to make any
'agreement between them, that they ſhould do no
'Miſchief to one another: So there ought not to
'be between the Nations which could not or would
'not make any ſuch Compact, to do no wrong one
'to another.

'For

'For Juſt or Right, the obſervance whereof is 'named Juſtice, is only in a mutual Society, there-'fore Juſtice is the Tie of that Society; ſo that 'every one of its Members might live in Security, 'and free from the apprehenſions of Dangers and 'Diſturbances that a continual fear of being Aſſault-'ed or recieving damage may raiſe in us. So that 'all Animals, whether Men or others, who can-'not or will not enter into a Society, and conſe-'quently be concerned in ſuch Agreements, are de-'prived of this advantage, and have not among them-'ſelves any obligation of Right and Juſtice, to make 'them live in Security. So that there remains to 'them no other means of Security than to prevent 'one another, and to treat them ſo hardly, that 'they may not have Power to do them any Miſ-'chief.

'For this Cauſe, as among thoſe Animals that 'have agreed upon nothing among themſelves, if 'it happens that one injures another, one may ſay 'that he who does the Evil to the other is Miſchie-'vous, or hurts the other who is injured, but not 'that it is unjuſt in this reſpect, or that it does 'wrong, becauſe there is no manner of Right, no 'Agreement, no Law precedent to reſtrain 'em from 'doing Miſchief; ſo among Men who have made no 'Compact, nor are not enter'd into any Society, if 'any treats another rudely or barbarouſly, one may 'ſay that he doth him Damage, or doth him Miſ-'chief, but not that he is unjuſt to him, or that he 'wrongs or injures him, becauſe there is no Law 'to bind him to do no Miſchief to ſuch an one.

'But between Men and other Animals can there 'be any Juſtice? None at all. 'Tis true, That if 'Men could with other Animals, as with Men, make 'Agreements and Contracts not to kill one another, 'we could then between them and us demand Ju-

'ſtice,

'ſtice, for that would tend to a mutual Security; 'but becauſe it cannot be, that Animals that are 'without Reaſon ſhould be obliged or tied to us by 'any common Laws, therefore we cannot take any 'more ſecurity from the other Animals, than from 'the inanimate Creatures. So that to ſecure our 'ſelves, there remains for us no other means 'than to make uſe of that Power that we have, 'either to kill them, or to force them to obey 'us.

'You may perhaps here by the by ask why we 'kill thoſe Creatures alſo, which we have no rea-'ſon to fear? I confeſs we may do this ſometimes 'through Intemperance and Cruelty, as by Inhu-'manity and Barbarity we often abuſe ſuch ſome-'times who are out of our Society, and of whom 'tis not poſſible that we ſhould apprehend any dan-'ger of Evil. But 'tis one thing to offend againſt 'Temperance, or any of its Species, *viz.* ſuch as 'Sobriety, Gentleneſs, or Humanity and a natural 'Goodneſs, and another to offend againſt Juſtice, 'which ſuppoſeth Agreements and Laws. Beſides, 'of all Animals which are not injurious to humane 'Race, there is no kind but may be ſo if we ſuffer 'em to increaſe and multiply beyond meaſure.

As to what at preſent concerns the pretended ſavage Life of the firſt Men, 'tis not *Epicurus* who was the firſt Broacher of this Fancy, for the moſt ancient Poets make mention of it, and ſay, That it was *Orpheus*, that ſacred Interpreter of the Gods, and *Amphion*, the Founder of the City of *Thebes*, who by their ſage and eloquent Diſcourſes, withdrew thoſe Men from their unſettled and wandring way of Living, changing their cruel and barbarous Cuſtoms and Manners.

Orpheus, *inſpir'd by more than Human Power,*
Did not (as Poets feign) tame ſavage Beaſts;
But Men as Lawleſs and as Wild as they,
And firſt diſſuaded them from Rage and Blood.
Thus when Amphion *Built the* Theban *Wall,*
They feign'd the Stones obey'd his Magick Lute.

Cicero himſelf, as if having almoſt forgotten that he had ſo highly exalted the dignity of the human Nature, declaring it to be altogether Celeſtial and Divine, yet acknowledges, *That there was a time when Men were wandring like Vagabonds about the Fields, in ſome manner reſembling the Brutes; That neither Reaſon, Religion, Piety nor Humanity were then known among them; That they were Strangers to Wedlock and a lawful Iſſue; That they neither uſed natural nor civil Right; That they were in a groſs Ignorance, and that their unbridled Luſt put 'em upon exerting the Powers and Abilities of their Bodies, to ſatiate it ſelf, every one poſſeſſing more or leſs, according as he was able to take away and keep from another. But,* ſays he, *afterward ſome Men were found to be of a better Temper and more Judgment and Reaſon than the reſt, who reflecting on this miſerable way of Living, and withal conſidering the tractableneſs of Mankind, were reſolved to repreſent to their Companions how advantageous it would be to joyn together in Societies. And by this means, by degrees, they reclaimed them from their firſt barbarous manner of Living, and reduc'd them to a civil Behaviour; who inventing both divine and humane Rights, gathered Men into Companies, erected Towns and Cities, made Laws, and afterwards conſtituted Kings and Governours to check the Inſolent and to protect the Feeble and Week againſt the Stronger.*

Others

Others are of Opinion that the firſt Age began with the famous Golden Age, which was ſo happy, that Men were not then bound up by any Laws, nor frighted with the fear of Puniſhment, but lived together innocently, having regard to Piety, Juſtice and Equity.

———*When Man yet new,*
No Rule, but uncorrupted Reaſon knew;
And with a native bent did good purſue,
Unforc'd by Puniſhment, unaw'd by Fear,
His Words were ſimple and his Soul ſincere.
No ſuppliant Crowds before the Judge appear'd,
No Court erected yet, no Cauſe was heard,
But all was ſafe, for Conſcience was their Guard.

Seneca renders it thus, according to *Poſidonius*, *They were not yet Corrupted nor Debauched in their Principles, but followed the dictates of Nature, which directed and awed them from doing ill. In the Choice of their Governour they neither reſpected his Strength nor outward appearance, but his Temper and Goodneſs. O happy Nations! where none but the honeſteſt Man was to bear ſway, for he can do what he pleaſeth, who doth nothing but what he thinks he ought to do; 'Twas therefore in this Golden Age that the Government was committed to the Wiſeſt. They prevented Quarrels, protected the Weak againſt the oppreſſion of the Stronger; they adviſed, diſſuaded and repreſented what was moſt uſeful, and what not. Their Prudence provided for the neceſſities of thoſe who were under their Conduct, their Valour drove away all Dangers, and their good Deeds purchaſed daily new Subjects. To Command was more a Burden than a Profit, and the greateſt threatning that a King could then offer to ſuch as were not Obedient, was to forſake them and depart the Kingdom. But ſince Vice and Corruption had changed Rulers into Tyrants,*

hence ſprung the neceſſity of having Laws, and wiſe Men were the firſt contrivers of them.

But without ſtanding to examin theſe ſeveral Opinions which *Lactantius* looks upon as frivolous. *O ingenia hominum indigna quæ has ineptias protulerunt! Miſeros atq; miſerabiles, qui ſtultitiam ſuam literis memoriæq; mandaverunt*: Let us rather conſider, That the Laws according to *Epicurus*'s Judgment being eſtabliſhed for the publick benefit of Mankind, that every one might enjoy his Right, might live peaceably and ſecurely; and ſeeing there is nothing more agreable to Nature than this, I think none has reaſon to upbraid him, *quod Leges & Jura a Natura ſejunxerit*, That he ſeparated from Nature the Laws and Right, ſeeing that he had rather join'd them inſeparably together, by the Tie of common Intereſt, which is the firmeſt Bond, according to the Rules of Nature. Nor does there ſeem any reaſon to blame him becauſe he hath rather derived the Laws and Right from Profit than from Nature, ſeeing he could never have derived them from Profit, but at the ſame time he muſt needs derive them from Nature. Nay, let us go further, What cauſe have we to reprove him, ſeeing there is no Perſon but will allow that both the primitive and modern Legiſlators had always this thing of Profit or publick Advantage ſtill in their Eye, and that no Laws can be juſt and uſeful but what tend to the publick Benefit and Advantage? *Civil Societies*, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, *ſeem to have not only their Riſe, but their Continuance alſo, in this Foundation of Profit; the Law-givers ſtill aimed at this End, and generally termed that Right, which was found to be uſeful.* *Cicero* retain'd the ſame Opinion, *We muſt*, ſaith he, *intend all our Laws for the publick Good, not interpreting them according to the ſtrict Letter, but what ſuits beſt with the publick Good and common Benefit. For our Anceſtors always uſed*

uſed this Wiſdom and Prudence, that in making their Laws they ſtill chiefly propoſed to themſelves nothing more than the Safety, Welfare and Advantage of the Publick. The Safety of the People, ſaith he in another Place, *is the ſupreme Law*, Salus populi ſuprema lex. He ſaith further, *That all Magiſtrates and Rulers ought to ſtick cloſe to theſe two Maxims of* Plato; the Firſt, *To be ſo careful of the benefit of their Subjects, that they ought chiefly to aim at it in all their Proceedings, forgetting even their own private Profit and Advantage, when it comes in Competition.* Secondly, *To take heed in their Governments, that they loſe not one part, by endeavouring to preſerve the other.*

Truly *Cujas* acknowledges that the civil Right, or the Right of every particular Government, is derived from the common Benefit; but he denies it to be ſo in relation to the Right of Nations, or of all Mankind in general, for he ſuppoſeth that proceeds from Nature. But ſince he owns that this Right, which is common to particular Places, proceeds from Intereſt, which alſo is common to them all, why may not he admit that the Right which is common to all Men, is derived alſo from that Profit which is common to all Men? So that natural Right is as it were the *Genus Generaliſſimum*, of which the Right of Nations or of Men is an inferior Species, and likewiſe this Right of Nations, as a *Genus* more contracted, whereof the civil Right or the Right of every City is a Species.

As to what *Epicurus* ſays, *That a true Law ſuppoſeth a mutual Compact, or every Law is a kind of an Agreement*, 'tis no more than what *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Demoſthenes*, *Ariſtides* and ſeveral others aſſert. Nay, the divine Law it ſelf (ſo far as it concerns our Fellow Subjects, may be reputed the nobleſt part of the civil Right) is nothing elſe but a Covenant between God and Man. There is nothing more com-

mon in Holy Writ, than to hear them ſpeak of the Firſt and Second Law, both the Old and the New, as of a Covenant and an Agreement. There is nothing more frequent in the Holy Scriptures, than to read that God makes a Covenant, as with *Noah*, *Abraham* and *Jacob*, who likewiſe engage reciprocally to God who had made this Promiſe to him; *I will be with thee and keep thee whereſoever thou goeſt, and I will bring thee back into thine own Country*, &c. Unto which *Jacob* anſwered, *If the Lord be with me, and will keep me in the way that I go, and will give me Bread to Eat, and Raiment to put on, ſo that I come again to my Father's Houſe in Peace, then ſhall the Lord be my God*, Erit mihi Dominus in Deum.

We need but mention the mutual Compact and Agreement between God and the People of *Iſrael*, when God was pleaſed by the Mediation of *Moſes*, to proclaim the antient Law. Thus God ſpeaks, *If you hear my Voice and keep my Covenant, I will look upon you as my peculiar Treaſure, and will have more care of you than of all other People.* And the People anſwered, *We will do all that the Lord hath commanded.* In relation to the new Law, this is the Propheſy of *Jeremiah*, *The Days ſhall come, ſaith the Lord, that I will make a new Covenant with the Houſe of* Iſrael, *and with the Houſe of* Judah; *not according to the Covenant that I made with their Fathers, in the Day that I took them by the Hand to bring them out of the Land of* Egypt, *which my Covenant they brake*, &c. *But this ſhall be the Covenant that I will make with the Houſe of* Iſrael *after thoſe Days, ſaith the Lord, I will put my Law in their inward Parts, and write it in their Hearts, and will be their God, and they ſhall be my People.* But not to inſiſt longer on this, let us only obſerve, That tho from what hath been ſaid we may conclude, that to ſpeak properly, There is no Law of Nations, and conſequently no Right of Nations, becauſe there never

never hath been any Covenant or Agreement between all Nations; nevertheleſs we may ſay that this common Precept, *Thou ſhalt not do to another, what thou wilt not that another ſhould do to thee*, ought to be eſteemed as the firſt natural Law, or according to Nature; not only becauſe there is nothing more Natural, or more according to Nature than Society, and Society being not able to ſubſiſt without this Precept, it ought alſo to be eſteemed Natural: But alſo becauſe God ſeems to have imprinted it in the Hearts of all Men, and that this Law contains in ſuch a full manner all the other Laws of Society, that no Man can invade the Right of another, but he muſt violate this Law; Therefore this Law alone ought to be look'd upon as the Rule of all our Actions that concern our Neighbour.

And truly as every one deſires that his Right may be Religiouſly preſerved to him, ſo that no Man may attempt upon it, he need but think the ſame thing of others, and to put himſelf in their Place and Condition, to underſtand what he ought or what he ought not to do.

Therefore as there is nothing nearer at Hand, and more ready nor more infallible than our own Conſcience, every one may conſult himſelf, and he alone may be his own proper and true Caſuiſt. So that he who ſeeks for others, ſeems not ſo much diſpoſed to be willing to do to another, what he would not have done to himſelf, as to not dare to do it if he hath not ſome Body upon whom he may caſt the Blame. And upon this Point *Cicero* treats very well in his Offices, That thoſe who prohibit any thing to be done, whereof there is a Queſtion whether it be Juſt or Unjuſt, cannot preſcribe any Rule nor Precept more uſeful and reaſonable, becauſe Equity here appears and is plainly diſcoverable, and that our doubting is a ſign that we think or deſign

to do Evil. *Bene præcipiunt qui vetant quidquam agere quod dubites æquum ſit an iniquum; æquitas enim lucet ipſa per ſe, dubitatio autem cogitationem ſignificat injuriæ.* Upon this Subject I remember what Monſieur de la *Moignon*, firſt Preſident of the Parliament of *Paris*, a wiſe and learned Judge, ſaid to us one Day as we were walking in his ſhady Retirement, in the Wood *de Baville*, *That that Maxim of* Cicero, *if it were duly practis'd among Men, would be of a wonderful uſe, and that for what concerns thoſe who have ſuch ſort of doubts, and trouble themſelves to ſeek for* Caſuiſts *to ſupport them, he had read an excellent Saying in a Spaniſh Author, That ſuch Perſons ſeek to pick a Quarrel or to play the Cheat with the Law of God.* Quieren pley tear contra la lay de Dios.

Let us obſerve more-over that the Holy Scriptures have ſaid very well, That the Law was not made for the Juſt; becauſe he who is truly Juſt obſerves it, not out of fear of the Puniſhments that the Law threatens, but out of a love for Juſtice it ſelf, and out of a reſpect for it; ſo that if there were no Law nor Magiſtrates, he would notwithſtanding ſtill live in Obedience to Law and Juſtice. Therefore that excellent Expreſſion of *Menander* is thought praiſe-worthy, *If you be Juſt, your Manners will be to you inſtead of Laws.* And the Anſwer of *Ariſtotle* is remarkable when he was queſtioned, what Profit he had found and received from the ſtudy of Philoſophy? *To do*, ſaid he, *of my own accord and without conſtraint, what others do for fear of the Laws.* This obliged *Horace* to ſay, *That we ought not to do any thing for fear of Puniſhment.* Nihil eſſe faciendum formidine pœnæ. From whence we may remark, that Corrections and Puniſhments are not only ordained for the Wicked and Criminals, that they may periſh and be extinct, but that by their Deſtruction, they may alſo terrify

and

and reſtrain others, as *Seneca* obſerves; and according to *Lactantius*, who brings in *Plato*, ſaying, *That a wiſe and prudent Man puniſhes not becauſe 'tis a Crime, for he cannot make that which is already done to be undone, but that others may not commit the ſame Crimes.* But let us hearken to *Epicurus*, diſcourſing of the great Advantages that there are in obſerving Juſtice.

That there is great Reaſon to live up to Juſtice.

JUſtice having been eſtabliſhed by a common Agreement, every one ought to think that he is born and admitted into the Society whereof he is a Member, upon this Condition, either expreſs or underſtood, That he ſhall do wrong to no Man, nor no Man to him; and thus we muſt either keep to this Agreement, or depart out of the Society, ſeeing that he is ſuffered there but upon the ſame Condition that he was admitted: From whence it follows, that as naturally he don't deſire to be evilly dealt withal, he ought not to deal ill with others, nor do to others what he would not that others ſhould do to him.

This being granted, we may ſay, that the Laws have been eſtabliſhed in favour, and for the ſake of wiſe Men, not to hinder them from committing Injuſtice, but to prevent others from doing them wrong; for of their own accord they are ſo inclined, that if there were no Laws they would injure no body; for they have limited their Deſires, and confined them to the neceſſities of Nature; to ſupply which there is no need of doing Injuſtice, for there is no Pleaſure Nature allows of which will cauſe us to wrong any body; for thoſe exorbitances and irregular Deſires which proceed from our vain and unruly Paſſions and Luſts, are the only Cauſes of Miſchief.

The

The Truth is, the Products of the Earth, such as Corn, Fruits, Water, &c. are to be obtain'd without any great difficulty, and the enjoyment of these as often as Hunger and Thirst excite us, afford us no small Pleasure and Satisfaction, without being hereby tempted to Riot and Excess, or to commit Robberies or other enormous Crimes upon our Neighbours, which Men are more apt to become liable to and guilty of, when they indulge their extravagant Lusts in living splendidly and sumptuously, and by unjustly heaping up of Riches to maintain such their Extravagances. Nor shall I here stand to take notice of Particulars, such who are not satisfied with decent Habits, with one Habitation, nor one Wife, and so of the like, who passing the Bounds that Nature hath appointed, are daily hurried away by their Passions and endless Desires beyond all Limits.

Moreover, as the wise Man acts all things for himself, and for his own Good and Satisfaction, there is nothing that will contribute more to this purpose than in carefully observing the Rules of Justice; for when he renders unto every one what belongs to him, and that he does wrong to no Man; he preserves and supports as much as in him lies the Society in which his own Safety is involved; he provokes no body to do him Injury, neither doth he fear the Penalties and Punishments which the Publick Laws threaten: So that his Conscience being free from Guilt, he is at quiet and ease within himself, without any private Checks or Gripes, which is one main design of Justice to procure, and the most excellent and greatest Advantage that we can reap from it.

But we must not fancy that he who hath secretly broken the Laws, unknown to Men, may enjoy as much Peace and quiet of Mind as he who is truly Just. For, as I have already said, tho' he hath acted in the dark, yet he cannot be assured that the Fact shall always remain concealed. Tho' Crimes may indeed be done secretly,

cretly, yet this is no Security; neither doth it advantage a Man who commits a wicked Deed, to conceal himſelf, for tho' he has had the good fortune of keeping the Fact conceal'd hitherto, yet he hath no Aſſurance that it ſhall always ſo continue.

Tho' a wicked Act may at preſent ſeem to be quite forgot, and as it were buried out of ſight; yet it is uncertain whether it will remain ſo till death; few Wickedneſſes are ſo ſecretly acted, but they give ſome cauſe of Suſpicion; for tho' at firſt they are only privately whiſper'd, yet ſoon after they are publickly talk'd of, and then Fame ſpreads them, and then a Proceſs is begun and the Sentence ſuddainly follows: Nay, many there have been who have diſcovered themſelves, either in a Dream or in a Frenzy, or in Drink, or by letting fall an unadviſed Word by the by. So that tho' a wicked Man deceives (as we ſay) both the Gods and Men, yet he muſt always remain uneaſie and in a fear that his Wickedneſſes will at one time or another be detected.

From hence it is, that tho' Injuſtice of it ſelf, and in its own Nature, be no Evil, becauſe what is Juſt here is reputed Unjuſt elſewhere; nevertheleſs, 'tis an Evil becauſe of that Fear that it ſtirs up in us, which cauſeth a wicked Man to be continually tormented with remorſe of Conſcience; ſo that he is ſtill ſuſpicious of ſomething, and apprehenſive that his Wickedneſſes will come to the Knowledge of thoſe who are appointed to puniſh them. Wherefore there is nothing more conducive to our Security and our living Happily, than to live honeſtly and obſerve inviolably thoſe Contracts which we have entred into for the Preſervation of the publick Peace.

Therefore a juſt Man ſeems to ſtand in Oppoſition to an unjuſt; for as the one is free from Troubles and Apprehenſions of Evils, ſo the other on the contrary is continually allarm'd by 'em. What is it therefore that can be more convenient and profitable to us than Juſtice,

and

and more hurtful than Injuſtice? Can conſtant Troubles and perplexing Fears be pleaſant and diverting to any Man?

Since therefore that Juſtice is ſo great a Good, and Injuſtice ſo great an Evil, let us ſincerely love and embrace the former, and altogether abominate the latter. And if by chance our Mind ſhould happen to be ſometimes in an even Balance and doubtful what to do, let us have always before our Eyes, and in our Thoughts the Example of ſome good Man whom we may propoſe to imitate, as a Pattern, and ſo live as if he were a conſtant Inſpector of our Actions, and Privy to our moſt intimate Deſigns.

This Advice will be of uſe to us, not only to keep us from committing Injuſtice, but alſo from doing any thing in ſecret inconſiſtent with honeſt Dealing. This juſt Man that we plac'd before us, will ſerve to keep us in ſome awe, and make us more watchful over our Actions; we ſhall continually have ſome regard to him, and ſay to our ſelves, I would not do ſo if he ſaw it, and why ſhould I dare to do ſo in his abſence; he would blame me for it as a wicked thing, why ſhould I not fly from Evil of my own accord? Do then every thing as if ſome body ſtill look'd upon you; for if you have this Veneration for any Perſon elſe, you will quickly have it for your ſelf.

Cicero treats excellently upon this Subject: *If every one,* ſaith he, *for his own particular Advantage, ſhould be always ready and prepared to intrench upon his Neighbour's Right, and ſtrip him of his Goods, we ſhould quickly perceive the ruin of human Society, which is ſo agreeable to Nature, juſt as if each particular Member ſhould fancy that by attracting the Blood and Spirits from its Member, it would be the better able to ſupport it ſelf; but hereby we ſhould find our ſelves much diſappointed; for certainly this would at length much weaken and decay the whole Body. And*

thus

thus all Societies and Communities of Men muſt needs be deſtroyed, if every one, the better to ſupport his own Intereſt, ſhould violently take from, and ſtrip his Neighbour of what is his.

Indeed, this may be ſaid to be lawful, and no ways to infringe the Bonds of Society, viz. *to be more careful and induſtrious in acquiring the things neceſſary and uſeful for the conveniency of Life; but to uſe Fraud or Violence, to diſpoſſeſs another, and endeavour to enrich our ſelves by our Neighbours miſeries, is more contrary to the Laws of Nature, even than Death it ſelf, than Poverty, than Pain, than all the moſt dreadful things that may befal us.*

There is nothing truly uſeful but what is Juſt and Honeſt, and nothing Juſt and Honeſt but what is truly uſeful; theſe are reciprocal, and whoſoever endeavours to ſeparate 'em offers at the moſt pernicious thing that can befal human Life; for from thence ſpring Murders, falſe Witneſſes, Thieveries, and innumerable other Miſchiefs. They judge of the uſefulneſs of things by a wrong Medium, and tho' they eſcape the Penalties of the Laws which they break, yet they eſcape not the Diſgrace and Infamy which, to a generous Mind, is far more grievous and intolerable. They conſider not that of all other worldly Goods, the moſt important and conſiderable is the Reputation of an honeſt, of a juſt and of a good Man, and that there is no Profit or Advantage that can recompence this loſs.

The Life of an unjuſt Man is full of Troubles, Jealouſies and Fears, Gripings of Conſcience and Anxiety of Mind; and what Good, what Profit can there be in ſuch a Way, that if he were depriv'd of it, he would be honoured and reſpected by all the World? 'Tis therefore impoſſible that true and real Profit ſhould be ſeparated from Juſtice, and that it ſhould accompany or be joined to Injuſtice. Now as Juſtice and Injuſtice are contrary, the firſt being free from Trouble, the other always

ways encompaſs'd with it, what greater Advantage can an honeſt and good Man deſire to attain to than that which Juſtice affords him? And what greater Miſchiefs can a wicked Man dread than that which Injuſtice is attended with? For what Profit or Satisfaction is to be had from Cares, Fears and perpetual Inquietudes?

Whether we may wrong any Man without doing him an injury.

AS 'tis one thing to do an unjuſt Act, another to do an injury, ſeeing that a Man may do an unjuſt Act, and not believe it, or perhaps fancying it to be Juſt: So it is moſt certain, that we can do no injury but when we have a deſign to do it, and ſo he who doth it hurts wilfully; that is to ſay, knowing to whom, in what manner, and how he injures. From whence it follows, that becauſe 'tis one thing to ſuffer an unjuſt Act, or to receive Damage, and another to ſuffer an injury, a Man may willingly ſuffer an unjuſt Act but not ſuffer an injury. For that Reaſon *Ariſtotle* obſerves that we define a Man who doth an injury; He who hurts, knowing to whom, in what manner, and how he hurts; yet that is not ſufficient, but we muſt add this particular, *Againſt the Will of him whom he hurts.* This being ſuppoſed in the firſt place, 'tis impoſſible that we ſhould do injury to our ſelves, or that a Man ſhould receive an injury from himſelf; for a Man may do a damage to himſelf and act againſt his own advantage, but not do an injury, becauſe the ſame Perſon is both Agent and Patient, he acts and ſuffers willingly. But we muſt nevertheleſs remember what we have already ſaid, and ſhall have occaſion to mention again hereafter, That he who wiſhes Evil to himſelf, as he who deſires his own death

death or kills himſelf, wiſhes for it not as an Evil; he deſires not death, as it is the deſtruction of Life, but as it is ſome Advantage; that is to ſay, as 'tis the end of the Evils from which he deſires to be delivered, and ſo he looks upon it as a conſiderable Benefit. It is likewiſe certain, according to that kind of Maxim, *Volenti non fit injuria*, that no injury can be done to him who conſents and approves of it. For as we have already ſaid, no man can ſuffer an injury but againſt his Will, becauſe as the injury is in it ſelf an Evil, it cannot be look'd upon as Good or the cauſe of any Good. 'Tis true, it may be a Crime in him who takes the Goods of another, though this other by miſtake may ſeem to be conſenting to it; as for Example, If he be frightned into a Conſent under ſome pretence, if he be deluded into it by fair Promiſes, if he be flatter'd into it by Craft, if he works upon his Weakneſs or the eaſineſs of his Temper, or if he conceals from him the true Value of the thing, without afterward informing him of his Error, and ſo of the reſt; but as for him who knowingly and willingly gives away his Goods, conſents that they may be taken; this Man cannot be judged to receive an injury, but a damage.

But ſince both doing and ſuffering injury is an Evil, if you inquire which of the two is the worſt, *Ariſtotle* will readily reſolve you, that it is in doing an injury, for that cannot be done without Injuſtice. Therefore *Plato* gives us this Advice, *That we ſhould be more careful to avoid doing an injury than ſuffering it.* Beſides, tho' he who receives any damage, tho' he receives it not againſt his Will, he who doth the miſchief or wrong, if he deſigns to do an injury, is not in ſuch a caſe excuſable, becauſe it was not for want of his Will that the damage did not prove an injury. *Seneca* explains this

this matter very well: 'It may happen, ſaith 'he, that a Man may offer me an injury, and that 'I may not receive it; as if any one ſhould put in-'to my Houſe what he had taken out of my 'Farm, he had been guilty of a Theft, and yet I 'may have loſt nothing thereby. If any one lies 'with his own Wife, and believes her to be the 'Wife of another, he is an Adulterer though 'the Woman be not. Some body hath given 'me Poiſon, but as it happens to be mixed with 'other Ingredients, it hath loſt its Operation; he 'who hath adminiſtred the Poiſon is a Murderer, 'though no miſchief is done by it. All deſigned 'Crimes are in reſpect of the Sin, done and effected 'before the act is accompliſhed.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Virtues which accompany Juſtice, namely, of Religion, of Piety, of Obſervance, Love, Bounty, Liberality, Gratitude: And firſt of Religion.

THere are two main Cauſes or Reaſons why God ought to be Worſhip'd and Ador'd; the Firſt is the ſupreme excellency of his Nature; the Second his Bounty to us: Firſt, they who ſtile him moſt Good and moſt Great, *Optimum*, *Maximum*, had doubtleſs theſe two Reaſons in view, becauſe as he is moſt Good, he is the moſt liberal and ſovereign Benefactor; and as he is moſt Great, he is ſupremly Excellent. So that we may very well approve of *Epicurus*'s Maxim, and ſay, *That God ought to be Honoured purely for himſelf without any further Expectation, but only becauſe of his ſupreme Majeſty, and of his ſovereign Nature; for that that is moſt Excellent deſerves to be Reverenced and Honoured.* But yet with him to acknowledge no other Cauſe, and notwithſtanding to diſown his Bounty, is what cannot be too much blamed; for as *Seneca* tells him very well, 'Thou doſt not acknowledge the Favours and Bleſ-'ſings of God, but ſuppoſeſt that as it were at a far 'Diſtance and out of the noiſe of the Affairs of the 'World, he enjoys a profound Reſt and interrupt-'ed Felicity, without being concerned for the good 'Deeds of Men any more than for the evil. He 'who teacheth this Doctrin, does not conſider the 'Sighs and ardent Deſires of thoſe who pray from 'all parts of the World, and with Hands lifted up

'towards Heaven, make Vows either publick or 'private, which certainly would not eaſily be, nor 'is it eaſily to be ſuppos'd, that the generality of 'Mankind would of their own accord fall into ſuch 'a ſtupid Madneſs, as to addreſs themſelves to deaf 'and ſenſeleſs Divinities, to no purpoſe. They 'ought to have underſtood that the Gods ſometimes 'deny and ſometimes grant our Requeſts out of 'their bountiful Goodneſs; and that often they aſ-'ſiſt us ſo powerfully and ſo ſeaſonably, that they 'divert the great Miſchiefs and Calamities that 'threatned us: Where is that Man ſo miſerable, ſo 'forſaken and under ſuch unhappy Circumſtances, 'who hath not at ſome time experienced this great 'Bounty and Liberality of the Gods? If you look 'upon them who lament and grieve for their ill 'Fortune, and tire themſelves in complaining, you 'will meet with none but Heaven hath beſtowed 'upon him ſome Favours, ſome Drops of that large 'Fountain of Goodneſs have fallen upon him. *Ay* '*but*, *God*, ſaith he, *does us no Good.* From whence then 'comes all thoſe things that thou poſſeſſeſt, that 'thou beſtoweſt, that thou refuſeſt, that thou keep-'eſt, and that thou receiveſt? From whence pro-'ceed that vaſt number of grateful Objects that de-'light thine Eyes, thine Ears, and thy Mind? He 'hath not only provided things needful, his Love 'hath proceeded farther, to furniſh us with things 'Pleaſant and Delightful; with many pleaſant 'Fruits, wholeſome Herbs and nouriſhing Meats 'for Food, which ſucceed one another, according 'to their Seaſons. The moſt careleſs ever and anon 'ſtumble upon ſome of 'em, without labour or 'toil. 'Tis God who hath created for us all the 'ſeveral ſorts of Creatures, either upon the Earth 'or in the Waters, or in the Air, that all parts of 'the Creation might yield and pay to us a Tribute.

'Tis

'Tis by his Appointment that Rivers, like Ser-
'pents, do ſometimes wind and turn about the
'fruitful Vallies, for the more eaſie Tranſportation
'of things neceſſary for our Life; and that others,
'by an unaccountable wonder, ſwell ſuddenly, but
'regularly, in the height of Summer to water the
'Grounds, which otherwiſe would be ſubject to be
'parch'd up by the ſcorching Beams of the Sun.
'What ſhall we ſay of all thoſe Medicinal Springs,
'both Hot and Cold, which iſſue from out of the
'Bowels of the Earth; in ſuch a manner, that the
'Hot ſeem ſometimes to proceed from the very Bo-
'ſom of Coldneſs it ſelf?

'If any Friend ſhould beſtow upon you ſome
'Parcel of Land, or a Sum of Mony, you would
'preſently call this a liberal Act, and think your
'ſelf oblig'd; And cannot you acknowledge that
'theſe vaſt extents of Earth, and all the Mines of
'Gold and Silver, are alſo Liberalities and good
'Deeds? O ungrateful Wretch! From whence
'comes to thee this Air that thou breatheſt in, this
'Light which ſerves to guide thee, this Blood
'which runs in thy Veins and contains the vital and
'animal Spirits, theſe exquiſite Favours, and this
'Reſt, without which thou would'ſt periſh? If thou
'had'ſt the leaſt ſenſe of Gratitude, would'ſt thou
'not ſay, That 'tis God who is the Author of this
'thy Reſt and Eaſe?

——*Deus nobis hæc otia fecit.*

'We have within us the Seeds of all Ages, and
'of all Arts, and God the Sovereign Lord, draws
'them out ſecretly, and produceth them as he plea-
'ſeth. You'll pretend 'tis Nature that gives you
'all theſe things; alas, don't you perceive that this
'is only changing of Names, *viz.* that of God in-

'to that of Nature. For what can you imagin this 'Nature to be, if not God himſelf, and the di-'vine Underſtanding which is infuſed and ſpread 'over all the World and in every Part? You may 'give him what other Name you pleaſe, *Jupiter* 'moſt Good, *Jupiter* moſt Great, Thundering, 'Lightning, *&c.* You may if you pleaſe give him 'the Name of Deſtiny or Fortune, ſeeing that De-'ſtiny is nothing elſe but a Concatenation of Cau-'ſes that ſucceed one another, and that God is the 'firſt cauſe upon which all the other depend. You 'get nothing thefore by ſaying, That you are not 'indebted to God for any thing, but to Nature, 'ſeeing that Nature cannot be without God, nor 'God without Nature, and that God and Nature 'are the ſame thing, the very ſame Being; for 'theſe different Names are only different Titles of 'the ſame God, who exerts his Power after ſeveral 'manners.

But here let us leave *Epicurus*, and withal let us ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of God, his Providence, and all his Attributes, which are the Foundation of the higheſt Acts of religious Worſhip; here it ſeems to be proper and ſeaſonable to demonſtrate, that the Holy Religion that we profeſs, is the only true and lawful Religion. But as this is a particular Subject which ought to be handled ſolidly and to the purpoſe, we ſhall leave it to the Divines, who are beſt able to manage it in its due Circumſtances, ſuitable to the Dignity that it requires. It ſhall ſuffice here to mention only what the Light of Nature diſcovers: 'God, ſaith *Lactantius*, hath made the Nature of 'Man to be ſuch, that he hath an Inclination and 'a Love for two things, which are, Religion and 'Wiſdom. But Men are deceiv'd, either becauſe 'they embrace Religion, leaving Wiſdom, or be-'cauſe they ſtudy Wiſdom alone and leave Religion.

'Whereas

'Whereas the one cannot be true without the other. They follow divers Religions, but which 'are falſe, becauſe they have forſaken Wiſdom, 'which might direct and teach them, that 'tis im- 'poſſible that there ſhould be many Gods; or they 'apply themſelves to Wiſdom, which is falſe and 'miſtaken, becauſe they have left the Religion of 'the Sovereign God, which would have inſtructed 'em in true Wiſdom. Thus they who embrace 'one or t'other ſimply, err from the right way and 'run on in that which is full of grievous Errors, 'becauſe the Duty of Man, and all Truth is inſe- 'parably ſhut up in theſe two Heads. After that *Lactantius* hath thus explained himſelf, and afterwards taught in what manner, and with what Sacrifices we muſt honour God; he continues to tell us, 'This Holy and Sovereign Majeſty requires 'from Man nothing elſe but Innocency; he [who] 'who preſents it to God, offers a Sacrifice Pious 'and Religious enough. And after he hath diſapproved of divers ſuperſtitious Ceremonies, he adds, 'The Celeſtial Religion conſiſts not in things cor- 'ruptible, but in the Virtues of the Mind, which 'proceed from Heaven. The true Worſhip is that 'in which a clean Soul, without blemiſh, offers it 'ſelf in Sacrifice; whoſoever is obedient to his hea- 'venly Precepts, he honours God truly, whoſe Sa- 'crifices are Meekneſs, Innocency and good Works: 'And as often as he does good and pious Acts, ſo 'often does he perform his Sacrifices to God; for 'God requires no Offerings of Beaſts, their Death 'and Blood, but he will have the Heart and Life 'of Man for an Offering. This Sacrifice is to be 'performed without Herbs, without the Fat 'and Sinews of Beaſts; vain and fooliſh things; but 'with Expreſſions that proceed from a ſincere 'Heart. God's Altar is not to be adorn'd with

'Man's Blood, but the Heart of Man is to be a-'dorned with Juſtice, Patience, Faith, Innocency, 'Chaſtity and Abſtinence. This is the true Wor-'ſhip, this is the Law of God, as *Cicero* hath ſaid, 'that excellent and divine Law which never Com-'mands any thing but Juſt and Honeſt, and Prohi-'bits what-ever is Wicked and Diſhoneſt. The 'chief Worſhip of God is the Praiſe that is offered 'to him by the Mouth of a juſt Man; but that this 'Praiſe may be pleaſing to him, it ought to be 'accompanied with Humility, with Fear and with 'a great Devotion, leſt Man ſhould rely upon his 'own Integrity and Innocency, and fall by that 'means into Vain-glory and Pride, and ſo loſe the 'Reward of Virtue. If he will be favoured of God, 'he muſt have a Conſcience clear from all Guilt, 'he muſt implore continually his Mercy, and muſt 'ask of him nothing but the pardon of his Sins. If 'any Good befals him, let him return God thanks; 'if any Evil, let him bear it patiently, acknow-'ledging that it happens becauſe of his Sins. In 'Calamities let him not fail to be thankful, and in 'Proſperity humble and contented; that ſo he may 'have always the ſame ſettled and unſhaken Mind. 'Neither is it ſufficient to perform this in the 'Church, let him remember to do it in his Houſe, 'in his Chamber, in his moſt ſecret Retirements. 'By this means he will always have God conſecrat-'ed in his Heart, for he himſelf is the Temple of 'God. If in this manner he ſerves God, his Fa-'ther and Sovereign Lord conſtantly and devoutly, 'he will attain to an entire and compleat Perfe-'ction of Juſtice, for he who remains unſhaken in 'Juſtice, hath obeyed God and followed the Rules 'of Religion and fulfilled his Duty.

Cicero alſo diſcourſes admirably upon this ſubject, thus, 'Right Reaſon doubtleſs is a true Law agree-

'able

'able with Nature, and beſtowed upon all Men; 'a conſtant, immutable, eternal Guide, inclining 'us by an inward impulſe to our Duty, and by ſe-'cret Prohibitions turns us out of the way of that 'which is evil and deceitful. 'Tis a Law that needs 'not be proclaimed, nothing can be retrench'd 'from it, nor can it be aboliſhed. Neither the Se-'nate nor the People can free us from our Obedi-'ence to this Law, nor need we any other Inter-'preter but our ſelves: It varies not at *Rome* from 'that at *Athens*, nor does it differ at preſent from 'that which ſhall be hereafter, but ſhall always be 'conſtantly and unchangably the ſame amongſt all 'Nations and in all Times, and God alone ſhall be 'the common Lord and chief Commander of all 'Men: He is the Contriver and Maker of this Law, 'the Interpreter and Law-giver. He who will not 'be obedient to this Law, muſt act againſt him-'ſelf, and deſpiſe the Nature of Man; and tho' he 'may eſcape outward Puniſhments, yet ſhall be 'grievouſly tormented inwardly.

Seneca ſpeaks no leſs excellently well, 'There is, 'ſaith he, ſomething greater which we cannot con-'ceive. There is a Divinity that we acknowledge 'by our living; let us obey his Will and Command-'ments. A ſecret and reſerv'd Conſcience is of no 'uſe, all things are open before God. Will you, 'ſaith he afterwards, repreſent to your ſelves God 'great, as he is full of Majeſty, and withal kind, 'tender and affectionate, and always ready to ſuc-'cour you? 'Tis not with the bloody Sacrifices of 'Beaſts, and with the abundance of Blood that you 'muſt honour him, for what pleaſure can there be 'in cutting the Throats of innocent Creatures? but 'by a pure Conſcience, which hath always a reſpect 'to what is Good and Honeſt. The Sacrifice that 'every one performs in his Heart, is more accep-

'table to him than all theſe glorious Temples and 'large Edifices of Stones heaped one upon another. After this manner he ſpeaks in another place; 'The firſt Worſhip of the Gods is to believe that 'they are, and that they have one Exiſtence. We 'muſt next acknowledge their Sovereign Majeſty, 'and aſcribe unto them the Attribute of Goodneſs, 'without which there would be no Majeſty: We 'muſt believe that they Govern the World, that 'by their Power they rule and diſpoſe of all things; 'take care of Human Race; inſomuch, that ſome-'times they concern themſelves with the Affairs of 'particular Perſons: That they do no Evil; that 'they have no Evil in them, but that they chaſtiſe 'and puniſh Mankind under an appearance of 'Good. Would you have the Gods propitious to 'you? ſtudy to be good: He honours them ſuffi-'ciently who imitates them. As for what concerns Prayers, *Seneca* truly is not of the number of thoſe who believe that we ought not to pray to God: But he will have us pray to him in ſuch a manner, as if all the World heard what we ſaid, and that no body but would approve of our Prayers; 'Know, ſaith he, that you ſhall be free from all 'vain and idle Deſires. When you ſhall come about 'this, ask nothing of God but what you may ask 'before all the World: This is what you ought to 'pray for, that he would beſtow upon you the 'Health of the Mind with that of the Body.

'To what does not the Fury and Folly of Men 'proceed! They ſecretly offer up to God ſuch fil-'thy and corrupt Prayers, that if they ſhould per-'ceive any to liſten to, or underſtand 'em, they 'would ſtop and be ſilent, filled with Shame and 'Confuſion. They have the impudence to ask of 'God, what they are aſham'd that Men ſhould 'know. Follow therefore this wholſome Advice,

'Live

'Live with Men as if God ſaw you, and ſpeak unto 'God as if Men underſtood you. 'Tis ſufficiently known how Satyrically the Poets have expreſſed themſelves againſt theſe Whiſperers and ſecret Deſirers of others harms.

In private thus he Prays,——When wilt thou Jove,
My wealthy Uncle from this World remove?
Or—— O thou Thunderer's Son, great Hercules,
That once thy bounteous Deity would pleaſe
To guide my Rake upon that chinking Sound,
Of ſome vaſt Treaſure, hidden under Ground!
O were my Pupil fairly knock'd 'oth' Head!
I ſhou'd poſſeſs th' Eſtate if he were Dead.

The famous Satyriſt of our time could not but mention them in that learned Epiſtle which he directs to his ſpiritual Friend, Monſieur *Guilleragues*.

Que ſi cet hyver, un rhume ſalutaire,
Gueriſſant de tans maux mon avare Beaupere, &c.

O would ſome Rhume from theſe kind Winter Rains,
Cure my good Father-in-Law of all his Pains;
Wrap him in Lead well ſhriev'd and full of Prayers,
And grace the Miſer's Houſe with welcome Tears!
How gladly my laſt Gifts would I beſtow,
Nor grudge the Charges of the pompous Wo!
This ſome Months ſince was all the Talk and Care,
Of the King's Farmer's honeſt, humble Heir;
Who plagu'd with Hunger and unkind delay,
Spent Forty wretched Years in haſtning one good Day.

As concerning theſe unworthy and ridiculous Prayers, the Anſwer that *Socrates* made when ſome inquired why the Oracle was more favourable to the *Lacedemonians* than to the *Athenians*, is not to be omitted.

omitted. 'Becauſe, ſaid he, the Prayers of the *Lacedemonians* are more pleaſing to the Oracle than thoſe 'of the *Athenians*; and they are more pleaſing, becauſe they deſire nothing elſe from the Gods, neither in publick nor private, but that they would 'grant them what is Good, Honeſt and Juſt. Laſtly, 'tis well known what *Epicurus* ſaid to this purpoſe, 'That If God granted all the Prayers that 'were made to him, Mankind would quickly Periſh, becauſe they are continually asking Things 'which are uſeful to ſome, but pernicious to others.

As for Superſtition, *Cicero* adviſeth us to diſtinguiſh it from true Religion. 'For we muſt not, 'ſaith he, imagine that by taking away Superſtition we take away Religion. It belongs to a wiſe 'Man to keep to the Inſtitutions, to the Myſteries 'and Ceremonies of his Anceſtors, and to acknowledge this excellent, everlaſting and wonderful 'Nature, which the beautiful Fabrick of the World, 'and the order and regulation of celeſtial Things 'force us to own. Therefore as we ought to endeavour to increaſe Religion, which is unſeparable 'from the knowledge of Nature; ſo ought we to 'root out Superſtition, and to caſt away all its Relicks, for it followeth and purſues us every where, 'and to what ſide ſoever you turn, you will always 'meet with it; whether you hearken to a Diviner, 'or to a Diſcoverer of Things to come, or whether 'you ſacrifice a Beaſt, or whether you obſerve the 'flying of a Bird, or whether you look upon a Fortuneteller, a *Chaldean*, or thoſe who Propheſy by 'the inſpection of the Intrails of Animals, or whether it Lightens or Thunders, or the Thunderbolt 'falls from Heaven, or whether ſome Monſtrous 'Creature is born, or whether ſome thing hath 'been done, or happned, which commonly and neceſſarily ought to come to paſs. So that we can

'never

'never have our Mind well at Reſt. Our very Sleep 'the uſual retreat of all the Labours of the Mind, 'by its extravagant Viſions and Dreams Frights us 'with terrible Apprehenſions and Inquietudes.

What we have now mentioned of Superſtition, minds me of a Scruple of ſome of the Antients, who blamed the old Philoſophers of their time, who countenanced the ſuperſtitious Ceremonies of Religion, tho in their Heart and Mind they did not approve of them, which practice of theirs ſeems to be contrary to the ſincerity and uprightneſs of the Profeſſion of a Philoſopher. 'Tis true, ſaith our Author, ſpeaking of *Epicurus*, and endeavouring in ſome reſpect to excuſe him upon that Account, 'That Sincerity in Actions as well as in Words is 'commendable; but what ſhall we ſay if we conſider 'a Man out of the true Religion, in which we 'ought to have a perfect Conformity in Thoughts, 'Words and Deeds? At that time it ſeems to be 'the Duty of Wiſdom and of Philoſophy not to 'think as the common People, but yet to ſpeak and 'act as they do. *Epicurus* was preſent at the ſuperſtitious Ceremonies, becauſe the civil Right and the publick Tranquility oblig'd him to it. He approved not of them, becauſe there is nothing that can conſtrain the Mind of a wiſe Man to believe whatever the Vulgar believes. Inwardly he was free, but outwardly bound to the Laws of humane Society. By this means he acquitted himſelf at the ſame time of that Duty he owed to others, and of that which he owed to himſelf.

Of

Of Piety.

WE muſt next ſpeak of Piety, which relates to our Parents, as Religion relates to the worſhip of God: For as God is ſaid to be the Father of all Things, becauſe he hath made all Things, ſo Children ought to conſider their Parents as the Inſtruments of God to bring them into the World. And truly next to that Obligation that we owe to God, there can be none greater, or of more force, than that which unites us to our Parents: As to other Perſons, we may be indebted to them for ſome ſorts of Benefits, but to our Fathers and Mothers we are indebted for our ſelves, and for what we are. And if it be ſo agreeable with Nature to love our ſelves, how agreeable ought it to be with the ſame Nature to love thoſe by whom we, who thus love our ſelves, ſubſiſt, and from whom we have received that which we love, namely our ſelves? If it be ſuitable to the Rules of Nature to love thoſe who love us, can there be a more fervent Love than that of Parents to their Children? And can provoked Nature conſequently produce a more abominable Monſter, than a Son who loveth not his Father or Mother, or is ungrateful to 'em? Truly, if ſuch there be, what quiet of Conſcience can they enjoy? Nay they muſt certainly be very uneaſy and torment themſelves Day and Night for ſuch a Crime. Whereas on the contrary, how much Satisfaction doth a dutiful and affectionate Child enjoy, who from his Heart ſincerely Honours his Father and Mother, and is not tranſported with any thing ſo much as to ſhew to them his Gratitude, by all manner of good Deeds, either by expreſſing to them his Reſpect, or by evidencing to them his Love,

and

and who enjoys no greater Content, than to give them ſome Satisfaction, and principally in this, to be glad of having begotten ſuch a Son. O how Delightful and valuable was the Burthen of him, who in a publick Conflagration, deſpiſing all other Things in compariſon of his Father's Life, carried him away ſafe and unhurt upon his Shoulders through all the Flames and Darts of the Enemy!

For Him a thouſand Dangers have I ſought,
And ruſhing where the thickeſt Grecians *fought,*
Safe on my Back the ſacred Burthen brought.

Which the Poets have related of *Æneas*. And *Elian* tells us of two Brothers of *Catania*, who in the furious Burning of Mount *Ætna*, ſaved their Father from the ſcorching Flames, which caſually, or by a divine Appointment, open'd a way, as they ſay, to let them paſs through. 'Tis with great reaſon that *Solon* judged *Cleobis* and *Biton* happy, not only becauſe of the happy end of their Life, but chiefly becauſe of that great Joy, that they felt when for want of Oxen they freely Yoak'd themſelves, and drew the Chariot where their Mother was ſitting.

I cannot but make here a little Digreſſion, and wiſh with *Martinus* (who hath left us a rare and excellent Hiſtory of the Kings of *China*) that the Piety of Chriſtians to their Fathers and Mothers, were equal to that of the idolatrous *Chineſes* to theirs. 'This Piety, ſaith he, is yet obſerved among the '*Chineſes* with an incredible Reſpect, and moſt wonderful Expreſſions of Grief. Three Years compleat Children lament the Death of their Fathers. 'They firſt begin by retiring from thoſe publick 'Employments which at other times they follow; 'they never go out of their Dwellings; they change

'their

'their Apartments, their Food and Furniture, to 'make uſe of ſome plainer; they never ſit but upon 'ſome low Form; they drink no Wine, nor eat any 'delicious Meats, but confine themſelves to feed 'upon certain Herbs; their Cloathing is very courſe, 'of ſome thin Linnen Cloath of a white Colour, (for 'that is the Colour they mourn in) their Bed is ve-'ry uneaſy; nay they change their very Tone and 'manner of Speaking, the better expreſſing thereby 'their Grief and Affliction. He who thus Mourns 'takes no other name but wretched and ungrateful 'Son, as if he had neglected by his good Offices 'and Care to prolong the Life of his dear Father, 'or as if he had haſten'd his Departure by his 'negligent and undutiful Behaviour. If he writes 'tis only upon Yellew or Blew Paper, both which 'among them are Colours betokening Sadneſs. 'But this we cannot too much commend, that this 'wonderful Piety of the *Chineſes* appears not only in 'their Mourning thus after the Deceaſe of their Pa-'rents, but alſo in the Reverence, Obedience and 'good Deeds which they perform to them during 'their Lives. Inſomuch that many ſeeing them de-'crepit with old Age, leave all to afford them their 'perſonal aſſiſtance; they reſign their Employments 'to the Emperor; who ſeldom refuſeth to accept of 'em, and grant them this Favour, for they know 'that in ſuch a Piety there is nothing of Ambition, 'Pride or vain Glory. But this by the by: Let us now return to our Author, and to the indiſpen-ſable Duties of Children to their Parents.

The Firſt is to have not only a great eſteem for them, and to look upon them as the Authors or Inſtruments of their Being, and ſupplying God's ſtead in relation to them; but alſo to ſhew that Eſteem and inward Veneration which they have for them by outward ſigns of Honour and Reſpect, and evi-

evidence to all the World that they really reſpect them, and conſider them as infinitely above them. 'Tis in this manner that pious *Cimon* behaved himſelf, who, when he had not wherewithal to obtain leave to bury his Father, ſold himſelf, purchaſing that Liberty with the loſs of his own.

The Second Duty is to comply with their Wills and be obedient to their Commands, for that is the chief part of the Reſpect and Reverence that we owe them; and on the contrary, to be Diſobedient is a ſign of Diſreſpect and Contempt. I confeſs, we are not bound to obey them when they command any thing againſt God, againſt the welfare of our Country, and contrary to Right and Juſtice; but 'tis very ſeldom that Fathers or Mothers lay any ſuch Commands on their Children: Nor ought a Child raſhly and inconſiderately to make an uncharitable Conſtruction of his Father's Commands; but if for plain and convincing Reaſons he finds himſelf forced to diſobey him, this ought to be done with ſuch reſpect and Deference as becomes him. From hence it follows that Children ſhould undertake nothing of moment againſt their Wills, but in all Matters of the greateſt Concern, ſuch as Matrimony, *&c.* they ſhould be directed by 'em; for as it is ſuppoſed they beſt underſtand, ſo likewiſe they moſt deſire their Childrens Welfare and Happineſs. We muſt alſo conclude from hence, that if there be any thing in the Behaviour of Parents to their Children that ſavours of Auſterity or hard Uſage, they ought to undergo it patiently, and to be ſo far from aggravating or complaining of it, as not to endure their Names to be reproached or ill ſpoken of by others.

The Third Duty is, to help them in all their Neceſſities, and to remember the Cares, Pains and Trouble which we gave them in our Infancy, and in the following courſe of our Life, and not to forget

get that excellent Sentence of *Ariſtotle*, *That there is more Honour and greatneſs of Mind to think upon the Authors of our Being, than upon our ſelves; and that we are bound to Honour them, as we do the immortal Gods.* Let us remember the Divine Commandment, which promiſeth a long and happy Life to Children who ſhall Honour their Fathers and Mothers. *Honora Patrem & Matrem ſi vis eſſe longævus ſuper terram:* Which we may call a Commandment, and a moral Precept proper to all Ages.

Senes Parentes nutriens diu vives.

'Tis not improper here to mention a Word of that Piety and Love we owe to our Country, which doubtleſs ought to be yet dearer to us than our Parents themſelves: We cannot excuſe our ſelves from ſpeaking of it, and the rather, becauſe we have already taken notice, that it is even lawful to accuſe our Parents themſelves, where they have been found guilty of betraying our Country, or endeavouring to invade it and become Conquerours of it; when all our Prayers and Intreaties to deſiſt from ſuch a wicked Purpoſe prove ineffectual, and we cannot perſuade them to right Reaſon. 'Tis not without juſt Cauſe doubtleſs that we have mentioned and maintain this Opinion, for as the Love that we bear for our Country is named Piety, becauſe our Country is as the common Mother that brings us forth, nouriſheth and maintains us, 'tis plain that our Country, which is as the Parent of our Fathers and Mothers, of all our Relations and Friends, ought to be dearer to us than all the reſt. 'Tis what *Cicero* proves very well; 'Can there be any Parentage 'nearer to us than our Country, in which all Pa- 'rents are comprehended? If our Fathers, our Mo- 'thers, our Children, our Relations and Friends are

'are dear to us, how much more ſhould our Coun-
'try be dearer, which contains them all? Is there
'any honeſt Man that ought not to venture his
'Life for his Country, if he can render to it thereby
'any Service? Is there any Evil more abominable
'than to deſtroy it, or to endeavour to ruin it, as
'ſome have attempted to do?

Of Obſervance, or Reſpect.

THE Third Virtue that belongs to Juſtice, is that which *Cicero* calls Obſervance, by which we are inclined to reverence and reſpect thoſe who are raiſed above us in Dignity, exceed us in Age, or excel us in Wiſdom. For as Dignity or Beneficence are the occaſion of Reverence and Honour, and that thoſe who are promoted to Dignities are deemed worthy, and ſeem as it were born and deſigned for the publick Good, either by governing or conducting the People, or by compoſing their Differences and Sutes, or by defending them from the Enemy, or by procuring the publick Safety or Plenty; by this 'tis certain that we ought to Honour and Reſpect them, and the rather, becauſe if this were not performed, there would be no body to take upon 'em the neceſſary Cares and Troubles of managing the publick Concerns, which would be at length the cauſe of confuſion and diſorder, which in this caſe by paying a due deference and reſpect, may in a great meaſure be prevented.

'Tis unqueſtionable alſo that old Age is of it ſelf Venerable, becauſe it hath the experience of Things, and conſequently hath that Prudence, that it is able to adviſe young People, and direct 'em for their good. *Young Folk*, ſaith *Sopater* in *Stobæus*, *ought to Honour them who are their Elders, make choice of the*

honeſteſt and moſt experienced, follow their Counſel and rely upon their Authority. 'Tis for this Cauſe that the great Captain of the *Greeks* had always a greater reſpect for *Neſtor* than for the reſt, and rather wiſhed to find out Ten like *Neſtor* than like *Ajax*. But old Age will be ſo much the more worthy of Honour and Veneration, when it ſhall not only be adorn'd with gray Hairs, but with Wiſdom and Prudence; when it is able to afford good Advice, and that it is become commendable by its Virtues, and by its good Deeds.

Laſtly, It is manifeſt that we ought to have Reſpect and Veneration for thoſe who are Wiſe or Virtuous, ſeeing that Wiſdom or Virtue is the true and ſolid Foundation of all Honour that is rendered. Indeed Virtue alone, as they ſay, is its own ſufficient Reward: But tho thoſe who are Virtuous ſeek not to draw from thence Honour and Reſpect, yet they who know them to be ſuch, are obliged to pay this Deference to 'em, otherwiſe they would not do Right and Juſtice to their Merits, and give a due eſtimate to that which of all Things in the World is the moſt valuable, *Potiòr eſt illa Argento Auroq; puriſſimo.* This the wiſe Man aſcribes to Virtue; 'tis of more worth than Gold and the fineſt Silver; 'tis more precious than all the Pearls and Jewels; yea, than all that is deſirable: There is nothing to be compared with it.

Of Friendſhip.

WE cannot but ſay ſomething of Friendſhip, unto which ſuch are obliged who are reciprocally beloved. *Of all the things*, ſaith *Cicero*, according to *Epicurus*, *which tend toward the making our Lives happy, there is nothing more conſiderable and advantageous than Friendſhip:* For indeed there is nothing in the Life of a wiſe Man more pleaſing, than when, like a Philoſopher, he may ſay to a Friend, of whoſe Sincerity he is fully perſuaded, as *Cicero* in another caſe ſpoke one day to his Brother *Quintius*, *We are alone; we may without Envy go on in purſuit of Truth:* Or that which *Lelius* relates of the Friendſhip he enjoy'd with *Scipio*, *Of all the things that Fortune or Nature hath beſtowed upon me, I have nothing that I can compare with the Friendſhip of* Scipio; *we can freely unboſom to each other our moſt intimate Thoughts and ſecret Deſigns: I never offended him, that I know, in the leaſt, neither did I ever hear him ſpeak any thing to diſpleaſe me; we lived under the ſame Roof, we eat and drank together, and we enjoyed all the Sweets and Pleaſures of Life: For what ſhall I ſay of that common Paſſion of always deſiring to know and underſtand things? What ſhall I ſay of thoſe retir'd Studies, where, at a diſtance from the troubleſom Crowd, we ſpent many pleaſant Hours in ſearch after Truth? If the remembrance of all our Diſcoveries and Diſcourſes had periſh'd with him, I could not eaſily undergo the loſs of ſo dear a Friend; but theſe things are ſo far from being dead, that on the contrary they revive and daily increaſe in my Mind.*

Epicurus ſpeaks excellently well to this Point, and I think none goes beyond him: 'Friendſhip, 'ſaith he, is a very great Support, a ſecure Bul-'wark againſt Injuries and Affronts, and is that 'which gives the greateſt Pleaſure and Satisfaction 'of our Life; for as Hatred, Envy and Contempt 'are very Offenſive, and interrupt the courſe of 'our Pleaſures, ſo Friendſhip raiſes the Pleaſures of 'Life, and cauſes us every day to find ſomething 'new and pleaſing. Indeed, Solitarineſs, or one 'who lives without Friends, is ſubject and expoſed 'to a great many private and unforeſeen Dangers, 'and is never free from Fears: Reaſon it ſelf ad-'viſeth us to procure ſuch Friends as may ſettle 'our Mind, confirm our Hopes, baniſh from us all 'Fear, and eſtabliſh in us Joy and Quiet.

And becauſe ſome pretend that Friendſhips are contracted for the Advantages that we receive from them, as we uſually ſow the Ground in hopes of a Crop or Harveſt; he therefore thus proceeds, 'Tis true, that the firſt beginnings of Friendſhips 'are made in conſideration of the Advantage and 'Benefit that are expected from them; but after 'a long ſetled Acquaintance and Familiarity, 'there is nothing but Love that prompts us on; ſo 'that tho' there be no farther Advantage, Friends 'nevertheleſs ſtill love one another for their own 'ſakes. In truth, if we love and affect certain Pla-'ces, Temples, Towers, Colleges, a Country-'Houſe, Dogs, Horſes, *&c.* For having been long 'acquainted with or accuſtomed to theſe things, 'how much more will this Uſe and Coſtom work 'upon us and prevail with us in relation to Man-'kind?

'But, ſaith he, we ought to make a diſcreet and 'wiſe Choice of Friends; for according to the 'Proverb, *We ought to take more care with*

'*whom,*

'*whom, than what we Eat:* And tho' eating and 'filling our Paunch alone, is, if I may ſo ſay, to 'live like a Lion or a Wolf, or ſome other Beaſt 'of Prey; nevertheleſs, we ought not to yield or 'admit of the next that comes, but we ought to 'chuſe ſuch a Friend whoſe Diſcourſe and Conver-'ſation is pleaſing; one, who eſteems nothing 'more than Sincerity, Integrity and Fidelity; who 'is not of a moroſe and uneaſie Temper, always 'full of Complaints, but ſuch a one whoſe ſweetneſs 'and eaſineſs of Converſation, whoſe pleaſant and 'agreeable Temper of Mind hightens our Expecta-'tions, and adds to the Pleaſures of our Life.

Now tho' Friendſhip conſiſts in a mutual Participation of Pleaſure, and of ſuch Goods which we are permitted to enjoy while we live; nevertheleſs, it is requiſite that the Riches of Friends ſhould be depoſited in Common, as he imagin'd who ſaid, 'That all the Goods of Friends are Common, be-'cauſe that excludes all Jealouſie; for ſuch as are 'Jealous can never be Friends; they ought there-'fore to have a confidence in each other, ſo that 'either may take what his Occaſions require, being 'perſuaded that what they have thus in Common, 'is not leſs theirs than if they were each in Poſſeſ-'ſion of the whole.

'I confeſs, that mean Souls are apt to wonder 'at this; but we muſt not trouble our ſelves with 'ſuch, for there is neither Aſſurance nor Conſtan-'cy in the Friendſhip of this ſort of People; they 'are not at all capable of theſe things, nor of any 'part of Wiſdom which deſerves Praiſe; they un-'derſtand not what is uſeful either to themſelves, 'in particular, or to the generality of Mankind; 'they cannot well diſtinguiſh between good 'and evil Actions: We here therefore ſpeak only 'of wiſe and honeſt Men, among whom there is a

'kind of an Agreement to love their Friends, no 'leſs than they themſelves, which we know to be 'feaſable and practicable in the courſe of our lives. 'So that it is plain, that if we intend to live plea-'ſantly, there is nothing more conducible to to it 'than this Union: We are therefore to conclude 'from hence, that not only Reaſon is not contra-'ry to Friendſhip, if we place the ſovereign and 'chief Happineſs in Pleaſure, but that without 'Friendſhip it ſelf this chief Happineſs is not to be 'attained.

'The reaſon of this is, that without Friendſhip 'we cannot at all times keep up a conſtant plea-'ſantneſs of Life, nor preſerve Friendſhip if we 'love not our Friends as much as our ſelves: 'Friendſhip indeed is inſeparable from Pleaſure, 'and we rejoyce at the Welfare of our Friends as 'much as at our own, and are as much grieved at 'their Afflictions.

'Therefore the wiſe Man will treat his Friend 'after the ſame manner as he would himſelf, and 'the Labours that he would undergo for his own 'Pleaſure, he will undertake for the Pleaſure of his 'Friend. And as when he is ſick, he would be 'glad to have ſome body preſent to help him, and 'when in Priſon or under Poverty, to have ſome 'good body to relieve and aſſiſt him; ſo he will re-'joyce when he hath ſome body that he may afford 'help to when ſick, and relieve when caſt into Pri-'ſon, or become indigent: Nay, he will go be-'yond all this, for he will be ready to endure very 'great Extremities, and perhaps Death it ſelf, 'if occaſion ſhould require it.

And here we muſt obſerve, that 'tis not with-out reaſon that *Ariſtotle* will have Friendſhip re-late to Juſtice; for Friendſhip is a kind of Equality; for where there is a true Love and Friendſhip, can there

there be a greater Equality, ſeeing that the Affections of Friends are alike amongſt themſelves; and that Friendſhip, as *Cicero* ſaith, is a participation or Community of all things, of Counſels, Studies, Opinions, Wills, *&c.* 'Tis true, there are ſome Friendſhips, where one of the Friends may be of a higher Rank and Degree than the other; but either theſe are not true Friendſhips, or if they be, he who is above the other in Power and Dignity, will out of a generous and virtuous inſtinct humble himſelf to make ſome Equality. Scipio, *in our time*, ſaith *Lelius*, *how high ſoever he was in Power and Authority, and exalted in Dignity, would never preſume upon that account to take place above* Philus, Raphilus, Mummius, *and other his Friends of a meaner Degree.* But as *Ariſtotle* obſerves, *It is a rare thing to find ſuch kind of Souls.* Nevertheleſs, ſaith *Cicero*, we are to conſider that as Superiors among real Friends ought to equalize themſelves with their Inferiours; ſo Inferiours ought not to be troubled or concern'd that they are exceeded in Riches, Fortune, Wiſdom or Dignity by their Friends; I ſay, where there is a real Friendſhip; for there are certain falſe and deceitful Friendſhips, or as *Ariſtotle* ſays, ſuch as cannot properly be termed Friendſhips, but rather reſemblances or likeneſſes of Friendſhip: For true Friendſhip depends not upon a ſordid Gain, or upon filthy and diſhoneſt Pleaſures, but is grounded upon Juſtice and Virtue.

We muſt likewiſe obſerve, that Friendſhip being only truly found among virtuous Men, 'tis not without reaſon that *Ariſtotle* does hence infer, that the firmneſs and conſtancy of Friendſhip does conſiſt in this, That they never act nor deſire any thing that may be prejudicial or inconvenient to each other, but on the contrary they prohibit and op-

poſe it; for it is the part of a truly honeſt and good Man not only to do no ill himſelf, but alſo not to ſuffer his Friend to do any. *Let the firſt Rule of Friendſhip*, ſaith *Cicero*, *be to require nothing baſe nor diſhoneſt from his Friend, and likewiſe never to perform any ſuch thing if his Friend require it.* The Second, *To do for a Friend all that honeſty can require, and not to ſtay till he be deſired and intreated.* The Third, *That there be no Hypocriſie nor Diſſimulation between Friends, becauſe there is more ingenuity in an open hatred than in a feigned Friendſhip.* The Fourth, *That we ſhould not only ſlight and reject all evil Reports of our Friends as falſe and malicious, but alſo ſhould not ſo much as entertain the leaſt Suſpicion of their being guilty of ſo much baſeneſs and unworthineſs.* The Fifth is, *That there be a moderation and ſweetneſs of Temper among Friends, which does very much promote and encourage Friendſhip; and let all Sadneſs and Severity be totally baniſhed,* The Sixth, *That we take heed that there be not too much reſervedneſs in our Friendſhip, for that is apt to hinder that freedom and pleaſantneſs which is, as it were, the chief Tie.* The Laſt is, *That Friends may ſometimes reprove one another, and mutually bear with each others Reproof, becauſe this proceeds only from a fervency of Affection.* Nevertheleſs, we muſt take notice of what *Cicero* remarks upon this Saying of *Terence*,

Obſequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

That Complacency begets Friends, but Truth begets Enemies. 'Truth, ſaith he, is uneaſie and 'diſpleaſing; for from hence ariſeth Hatred, which 'is the Poiſon of Friendſhip; but yet ſuch Com-'placency, as by winking at his Friend's Faults, 'ſuffers him to fall into a Pit, is much more 'intollerable. Therefore in this caſe it behoves

'us

'us to behave our ſelves with a great deal of Can-
'dour and Circumſpection, and take care that our
'Advice be moderate and diſcreet, and that our
'Reproof be not too ſharp and cholerick. As to
'what concerns Complacency in Friendſhip, there
'ought to be a goodneſs and ſweetneſs of Temper,
'but no Flattery, which nouriſhes and encourages
'Vice; for we muſt not treat or deal with a
'Friend as with a Tyrant. But there is no longer
'any Hopes of him whoſe Ears are ſtop'd to Truth,
'when it proceeds from a true Friend.

Why might not we here make uſe of the Counſel that a famous Author among the *Perſians* thought of great moment to preſerve Friendſhip? 'We are
'commonly, ſaith this Author, unjuſt to our
'Friends; we uſually deſire from a Friend more
'than, according to the Laws of Human Nature,
'we ought; we will have him in all things, at all
'times, and on all occaſions, that he ſhould be what
'we our ſelves are not; that he ſhould be firm and
'faithful, and never alter in the leaſt; as if we
'were not all naturally moulded up with Weak-
'neſſes and Imperfections, and equally ſubject to
'changes. There is no Diamond, ſaith he, with-
'out its Flaws, and there is no Man but hath his
'Infirmities: Let us be indulgent and favourable
'to our Friends; in a word, let us purchaſe a Friend
'with all his Failings. However, let us not here omit a Queſtion which hath been much controverted among the Ancients.

The Philoſopers have made it a doubt, whether in favour of a Friend, we may not ſometimes forſake or recede from Right and Juſtice, and in what Caſes, in what Circumſtances, and how far? *Cicero* in his Offices, ſaith, 'That if a miſchance ſhould
'happen, whereby we ſhould be oblig'd to yield
'Aſſiſtance to the unjuſt Deſires of a Friend, we
'may

'may in ſuch a Caſe ſwerve from the Rules of 'Right, where a great Shame or Loſs is like to 'enſue upon it; and this the Laws of Friendſhip 'ought to pardon. But *Agellius* is of Opinion, that *Cicero* paſſeth over this Matter too haſtily, and that *Pericles* ſpeaks more fully and to the purpoſe; Who, when he was deſired by a Friend to take a falſe Oath for his ſake; he anſwered him, That he ought to ſerve his Friend as far as the Gods, or, as we ſay, as far as the Altars. *Opitulari me Amicos oportet, ſed ad uſque Deos, ſed uſque ad Aras.* He adds, that *Theophraſtus* ſpeaks plainer, 'That we may in-'cur a high Shame or Infamy if any great Advan-'tage will thereby accrue to a Friend, becauſe the 'inconſiderable Loſs of the wronged Juſtice is 'recompenced by a greater and a more important 'Act of Juſtice, which is to give Aſſiſtance to a 'Friend. That when the Advantage of a Friend, 'and our Honeſty and Juſtice ſtand upon a Level, 'in ſuch and the like Caſes, doubtleſs, Honeſty 'and Juſtice ought to be preferr'd; but if the Ad-'vantage of a Friend be very great, and that which 'concerns our Honeſty, be about a thing of ſmall 'importance, that which is uſeful and advantageous 'to a Friend ought then to incline us.

There is another Queſtion that is commonly propoſed, which *Agellius* ſaith is ſomewhat difficult. If new Friends, which are otherwiſe worthy of our Friendſhip, are ſometimes to be preferr'd to our ancient Friends, as we prefer uſually a young Horſe before an old? *Agellius* anſwers in a word, *That 'tis a ſcruple or a queſtion unworthy of an honeſt Man.* That we are not to be tired with Friendſhip as with other Things; for 'tis with Friendſhip as with Wine, the older the better: And tho' Novelties give fair Hopes of ſome Advantages, yet we ought not to ſlight our old Friends, but ſtill reſpect 'em.

Of

Of Beneficence and Liberality.

BEneficence is uſually and generally taken for that goodneſs of Nature which is employed in giving aſſiſtance to others, either by our Care, or by our particular good Offices, or by our Eſtate and Wealth; whereas Liberality is underſtood in a ſtricter Senſe, and more eſpecially for that which conſiſts in beſtowing particular Gifts of Goods and Mony. We have already ſeen before, that *Ariſtotle* underſtands Liberality in that Senſe, and *Cicero* ſeems alſo to reſtrain it commonly to the free and liberal Gifts of Mony and Riches; but nevertheleſs he ſometimes joins Beneficence and Liberality together, ſo that he takes them for one and the ſame thing, *But*, ſaith he, *he who hath a double intent of aſſiſting the Neceſſitous, either by good Offices or by Mony; the latter*, ſaith he, *is the eaſier for ſuch as are Rich, but the firſt is more commendable, more glorious and worthy of a generous Mind. For tho in both there is a free and liberal Diſpoſition to gratify or do good, nevertheleſs there is this difference, that the one is taken out of the Coffer, and the other proceeds from Virtue; that the Gifts that are made out of a private Eſtate, drains the very ſource or Fountain of Beneficence, ſo that the oftner we practiſe it, the leſs we are capable of continuing it. Whereas ſuch as are liberal of their Cares, and do Service by their Virtues and by their Induſtry, the more they beſtow upon others, the more they have ſtill in Stock. Beſides, by often giving they get an Habit, and are more ready and prepared to oblige all the World.*

Now *Ariſtotle* is of Opinion, That there is nothing to hinder us from taking Liberality to be a Medium between Covetouſneſs and Prodigality, tho he ſuppoſes Covetouſneſs to be much more contrary to Liberality

Liberality than Prodigality. Therefore he Eſteems a prodigal Perſon to be little better than a Covetous one, not only becauſe the Prodigal does good to many, and the Covetous to none, no, not to himſelf; but becauſe the Prodigal may be eaſily perſuaded to Reaſon, either by Age or Time that may correct him, or the neceſſity unto which he may be reduced may conſtrain him, whereas the Covetous is ſo far from being cured by Time, that with his Years his Diſtemper increaſes; like a Dropſy, which inſtead of extinguiſhing his Thirſt, increaſeth it. So that 'tis not without cauſe that *Ariſtotle* ſaith, *That a covetous Man is Sordid, Baſe*, &c. *Parcus, Tenax, Sordidus, Turpis, Lucri Cupidus, Parvas impenſas faciens, Deceptor, Depilator.*

I ſhall not concern my ſelf about what *Ariſtotle* holds, *That the property of Virtue is rather to do good than to receive, and generally to do Things juſt and honeſt, than to avoid the doing Things vile and diſhoneſt.* I ſhall only take notice of the three Cautions or Conditions which *Cicero* requires in Beneficence and Liberality. The Firſt is, That our Beneficence be neither hurtful to thoſe whom we ſeem to gratify, nor to any other: For to do a Pleaſure which may be prejudicial to the Party, this belongs not to the part of a Man who really deſigns to do good, but rather of a dangerous Flatterer. And to hurt ſome to gratify others, which very often happens, that is as unjuſt as if you took another Man's Goods to appropriate them to your ſelf. The Second is, That our Beneficence muſt not exceed our Abilities; for otherwiſe the Fountain of our Goodneſs may be ſoon exhauſted; an Injury may be done to our Parents, whom we are rather bound by Juſtice to aſſiſt, or to whom we have a greater reaſon to leave our Goods; and often Men are thereby provoked to graſp at all Things by indirect means,

means, that they may have wherewith to ſupply and furniſh their extraordinary Bounties. The Third is, That their good Deeds be according to Diſcretion conferred on due Objects, for if they be beſtowed on the wicked and undeſerving, then, that which *Ennius* ſaid may here hold true, *That good Deeds miſplaced, will become evil Deeds*, as he expreſſes it, *Benefacta male locata, malefacta arbitror.* And as 'tis better to do good to honeſt and good Men, who are under ſcanty Circumſtances, than to thoſe who have Plenty; Beneficence doubtleſs ought rather to look upon thoſe who are in neceſſity, than thoſe who do abound, and whoſe plenty has no need of a further ſupply. *'Tis chiefly the Duty a generous Perſon*, ſaith *Cicero*, *to help him who ſtands moſt in need.* Yet moſt Men act otherwiſe, for the more they expect from a Man the more they will endeavour to oblige him, and ſhew themſelves moſt officious, tho he ſtands in no need. I will add what *Seneca* very judiciouſly expreſſeth, *That there is a great difference between the matter of the good Deed, and the good Deed it ſelf.* For the good Deed is neither the Gold nor the Silver nor any ſuch like Thing, but it conſiſts in the Will of the Giver; for if any, as *Ariſtotle* obſerves, gives by chance, or by conſtraint, or in hopes of receiving thereby ſome advantage, or if he prevents not the indigent, or if being deſired he performs not the Deed willingly, ſpeedily and without heſitation, without Witneſſes to report it abroad, which rather leſſens than amplifies a good Deed; how can ſuch a Man be ſaid to be Bountiful, and a doer of Good? 'We meet, ſaith *Seneca*, with a 'great many ungrateful Perſons, and make many 'more, becauſe we upraid and require back again 'our good Deeds in a rude manner; ſometimes we 'are ſo inconſiderate, that we have no ſooner done 'a good Act but we are ready to repent of it, and

'ſome-

'ſometimes we complain of, and exclaim againſt 'Things of the leaſt Moment. So that we not on-'ly ſpoil all our Kindneſs in doing a good Deed, but 'likewiſe after it is done; for which of you, I be-'ſeech you, is ſatisfied by a ſlender or ſingle intrea-'ty? Who is there, who when ſuſpecting a Courteſy 'to be asked of him, hath not ſhewed a diſpleas'd 'Countenance, turned aſide his Head, pretending 'ſome other weighty Buſineſs? Is it poſſible that 'you can be grateful to a Man who in a diſdainful 'manner hath made you ſtoop to take up his Cour-'teſy, or colerickly thrown it at your Head; or 'who being tired by your Intreaties hath yeilded to 'your Importunities?

Of Gratitude.

NOW let us ſay ſomething in the laſt Place of Gratitude: 'Tis not without cauſe that *Cicero* inſinuates, that it alone comprehends Religion, and the other Virtues that we have mentioned; for this Paſſage we read in his Oration for *Plantius*, 'Truly, ſaith he, I would willingly be endowed with 'all the Virtues, but there is none that I would more 'earneſtly deſire than to be Thankful. This Vir-'tue is not only the principal, but alſo the Mother 'of all other Virtues; for what is Piety but a kind 'and grateful Inclination towards our Parents? 'Who are the good and generous Citizens, who 'in times of War and Peace offer themſelves for 'their Country's ſake, but they who are mindful of 'the Obligations they owe to their Country? Who 'are the true and real Saints, the obſervers of the 'Laws and Religion, but thoſe who never forgetting

'the

'the favours of the immortal Gods, yeild to them 'the Worſhip and Honours due to 'em? What 'Pleaſure can there be in Life when Friendſhip is 'baniſhed, and what Friendſhip can there be among 'the Ungrateful? This being granted, we muſt conſequently ſuppoſe Gratitude to be our chief Duty: For tho he who gives pretends to nothing elſe than giving, nevertheleſs he ſeems to expect that he who is thereby obliged ſhould acknowledge the Favour; and if he don't, he will be unjuſt. In Truth, tho the Donor expects no reward, yet he who receives the Kindneſs is not therefore free from the Ingagement that lies upon him to recompenſe his Benefactor by all good Offices. Certainly if *Heſiod* will have us return, as we ſay, with Uſury, the Things that have only been lent us for a time, 'With how much greater Reaſon, ſaith *Cicero*, 'ought we to be thankful when we have received 'more ſignal Obligations? Ought we not to imi-'tate thoſe fruitful Fields, that return much more 'than they receive? And if we are Officious to them 'from whom we expect good Deeds, how much 'more ought we to be to them who have already 'been kind to us and obliged us? There are two 'ſorts of Liberality, the one is to give, the other 'to reſtore; 'tis in our Power to give or not to 'give; but not to reſtore, is a thing not to be 'allowed of in an honeſt Man. But ſuppoſe a Perſon is incapable you'l ſay: *Seneca* anſwers, 'That 'he who is willing to return a good Deed, does in 'effect do it, for his good Will is a ſufficient diſ-'charge of his Obligation. He ſaith moreover, 'That they who are obliged, may not only equal 'but alſo ſurpaſs in good Will and Generoſity, thoſe 'who give; we may reward alſo the greateſt Princes, 'Lords and Kings; either by affording to them 'faithful Counſel, or by a conſtant attendance, and

'by

'by a pleaſing Converſe free from Flattery, and 'yet delightful, or by a ſerious Attention to what 'they propoſe when they conſult about difficult 'Affairs, or by a conſtant Fidelity when they intruſt 'any Secret. Propoſe the richeſt and the happi-'eſt Man in the World, I will tell you what he 'wants, *viz.* a cordial Friend to whom he may im-'part his moſt ſecret Thoughts. Don't you per-'ceive how great Men by confining the liberty of 'thoſe who attend 'em, and limiting their Truſt to 'certain ſlaviſh Offices, loſe and caſt themſelves 'away, becauſe no Body about 'em dares freely 'impart their Thoughts, either to incline them 'to what is for their advantage, or to perſuade them 'from what tends to their hurt. There is no Miſ-'chief nor Calamity but they are liable to, from 'the very Moment that they are barr'd from hear-'ing the Truth. You may ask, What good you can 'do to a proſperous Perſon? Perſuade him not to 'truſt to his Proſperity. Will it not be a good 'Office that you do him, when you ſhall cauſe him 'to quit this fooliſh Confidence, and let him ſee that 'this Power that he has, may not always continue 'the ſame. And that the Things that Fortune be-'ſtows are flitting and inconſtant, oftner flying 'away faſter than they come. You don't under-'ſtand the value and true worth of Friendſhip, if 'you don't perceive that in beſtowing a Friend, you 'beſtow the moſt excellent Gift the World can af-'ford, and who is never more uſeful and neceſſary 'than where all Things are in great plenty and 'abundance.

But not to inſiſt longer upon this: *Ariſtotle* offers two or three Queſtions upon this Point. Firſt, *Whether Beneficence is to be eſteemed or valued according to the advantage of him who receives, or according to the Liberality of him who beſtows it.* He Anſwers, That

That in the Kindneſſes that are done for advantage, and which are grounded upon Profit, theſe are to be valued by the advantage of him who receives 'em, becauſe he is in want, and he who does them performs 'em but upon Condition to have the ſame returned. But in Friendſhips and Kindneſſes that are eſtabliſhed upon Virtue, we muſt meaſure or compute the good Deed by the good Will of the Donor, becauſe where Virtue is concerned, the intention is chiefly to be conſidered; therefore whether any gives much or little, the Gift or Kindneſs is to be eſteem'd great, for the great Affection or extraordinary good Will of the Party giving.

The Second Queſtion, *Why thoſe who give, have a greater affection for the Party they give to, than the other hath for the giver.* To this he Anſwers, That the cauſe is not as ſome ſuppoſe, for that the Donor is as the Creditor, and the other as the Debtor, and becauſe the Debtor wiſhes for the Death of the Creditor, but the Creditor the Life and Health of the Debtor; but becauſe the Benefactor is as the Artificer, who loves more his own Works than they ſhould be otherwiſe beloved again if they were alive, which is to be ſeen among Poets, who love the Offspring of their Brain as tenderly as the Offspring of their Body. And they who receive a good Deed, are as it were, the handy Work of him who gives.

The Third, *Why there is no Law to indite an ungrateful Perſon?* This Crime, ſays he, which is univerſal, is truly puniſhed by none, tho diſapproved by all. But as the valuation of an uncertain Thing would be very difficult, we have only condemned it to an univerſal diſlike and hatred,

leaving it among thoſe Things which we have referred to the Juſtice and Vengeance of the Gods. Beſides, 'tis not convenient that all ungrateful Perſons ſhould be known, leſt the vaſt number of thoſe who are ſtained with this Vice, ſhould leſſen the Shame of the Crime; and laſtly, 'tis no ſmall Puniſhment, that an ungrateful Perſon dares not deſire a good turn from another whom he has diſobliged, and that he is taken notice of, and condemn'd by all the World.

As to what remains to be treated of here concerning Affability, ſweetneſs of Temper, Civility and ſuch like Virtues, they may be ſufficiently underſtood by what hath been mentioned already about Gentleneſs and Mildneſs. We ſhall finiſh this Treatiſe with a Paſſage out of *Seneca*, which contains the Sum of all moral Duties. 'What do we do, 'ſaith he, what Precepts do we enjoyn? What a 'ſmall matter is this, not to hurt him whom we 'ought to ſerve! This is a worthy buſineſs indeed, 'for a Man to be kind and loving to his Fellow-'Creature! Shall we make Laws for a Man to hold 'out his helping Hand to one Shipwreckt and ready 'to ſink; or to direct him that is wandring and 'hath loſt his Way; or to divide our Bread to him 'that periſheth for Hunger? To what purpoſe is 'it to reckon at large what is to be done, ſeeing I 'can comprehend the whole Duties of Mankind in 'few Words? This great *All* which thou ſeeſt, and 'which contains all Things divine and human is 'but One; we are the Members of this great Bo-'dy. Nature hath made us all Related and a Kin, 'by bringing us forth from the ſame Principles and 'of the ſame Elements. 'Tis Nature hath given 'us a mutual Affection and Love, and for the ſame 'Ends. 'Tis Nature hath eſtabliſhed what is right,

'juſt

'juſt and equitable to its Law. 'Tis a greater Evil 'to be the cauſe of Wrong than to ſuffer it. Na- 'ture commands that our Hands ſhould be always 'ready to afford aſſiſtance. Let this be always 'in our Heart, and at our Lips, *Homo ſum, huma- 'ni nihil à me alienum puto.* I am a Man, and 'think my ſelf obliged to all the Duties of Hu- 'manity

THE Third BOOK OF Liberty, Fortune, Deſtiny and Divination.

CHAP. I.

What Liberty or Free-Will is.

AFter we have examined the moral Virtues, we muſt ſpeak ſomething of Deſtiny, Fortune and of Free-will, which ſome eſteem to be Cauſes, others to be Modes or manner how certain Cauſes act, and others to be nothing but empty Names, vain and imaginary Notions; we muſt, I ſay, ſpeak ſomething, and the rather, becauſe according as they are received or rejected, Virtues and Vices will be allowed or not allowed, and conſequently our Actions may deſerve praiſe or blame, rewards or puniſhments; for 'tis moſt certain that there is nothing either commendable or blame-worthy, but what is done

done freely and with deliberation; and that what ever is done by Chance or out of Neceſſity, is neither to be commended nor condemned. This being unqueſtionable, the firſt thing that we have to do, is to examin wherein Liberty or Free-will conſiſts, what is Fortune and Deſtiny, that ſo we may the better underſtand how Fortune and Liberty either contradict, or may agree with Deſtiny.

To begin therefore with Liberty: And here 'tis to be underſtood, that we mean not preciſely ſuch a Liberty as is taken in oppoſition to Slavery, that which relates properly to the Body, and is deſcribed a power of living as we pleaſe; but we mean that which the Greeks were wont to name τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς, *id quod in nobis, ſeu penes nos, noſtrove in arbitrio poteſtateque ſuum eſt*, that which is in us, within our Power or Free-will; namely, ſomething which is in the Soul, and is not under Bondage to any external Maſter; or if I may make uſe of the words of *Epictetus*, *That which cannot by any means be hindered*, ἀνεμπόδιστον, as if we ſhould ſay, *A full and entire Power or Liberty to do any thing*. The Latins, and chiefly the Divines, call it commonly *liberum aribitrium*, Free-will, and ſometimes *liberale arbitrium*.

Upon which we muſt obſerve, Firſt, That this is given to Reaſon, or which is the ſame thing, to the Underſtanding; becauſe Reaſon is look'd upon as an Arbitrator between Parties, or as a Judge, to examin, to conſult and deliberate, and at laſt to decide as the Judgment is ſway'd, upon what we ought or ought not to do in a doubtful Caſe.

Secondly, That as ſoon as the Conſultation and Deliberation are concluded, Reaſon hath indeed elected and choſen one thing preferrable before another, which ſhe hath conceived or believed to

be the beſt; the Appetite or the Function of the Appetite, will immediatly follow.

Thirdly, That by this word Appetite, I underſtand the reaſonable Appetite, and that which is peculiar and proper to Man alone, as Reaſon is, becauſe we ſhall hereafter indifferently make uſe of theſe Terms, Will and Appetite, meaning the reaſonable Appetite.

Fourthly, That becauſe the Action of the moving Faculty, which is properly the purſuit of that which is good, follows the Appetite, or as we commonly ſpeak, the Will, the Faculty being taken for the Action; that Action of the moving Faculty is for that reaſon termed Voluntary, as if one ſhould ſay, willingly undertaken; that is, with Deliberation and Conſultation.

Fifthly, That Reaſon or Free-will is ſuppoſed in Man to be ſo free, that of the ſeveral things which come under his Deliberation, there is nothing he chuſeth but he hath at the ſame time an equal liberty of refuſing it and making choice of ſomething elſe.

Truly, we uſually aſcribe this Liberty to the Will, or to the reaſonable Appetite, which ſignifies the ſame thing; for we all agree, that the Original of Liberty is in Reaſon, which we commonly call Underſtanding, that is to ſay, in the intellective Power; for we uſually hold, that the Will is a Faculty or Power of it ſelf blind, which cannot incline to any thing till the Underſtanding goes before and holds forth, if I may ſo ſay, a Light before it: So that 'tis the Property of the Underſtanding to precede and enlighten, and of the Will to follow. So that it cannot eaſily be turned out of the Path it hath taken, until the Underſtanding firſt turns the Light, which directs it, that way. Liberty therefore ſeems by conſequence to be

be firſt and primarily in the Underſtanding, and ſecundarily or dependantly in the Will.

To open the Matter a little more clearly. The Nature of Liberty ſeems, firſt, to conſiſt in an indifferency, by which the Faculty which is named Free may incline or not incline to any thing; and this is called Liberty of Contradiction; or incline in ſuch a manner to any thing, as it may equally incline it ſelf to the contrary; and this is called Liberty of Contrariety: And in truth, as we cannot imagin any Liberty without a Faculty, free to chuſe, 'tis certain that there neither is nor can be any Choice but where there is an indifferency, becauſe where there is but one thing propoſed, or where the Faculty is reſolved and determinated to act or to purſue any certain thing, there can be no Choice nor Election; which ſuppoſeth at leaſt two things, whereof the one is to be preferr'd before the other.

I know ſome are of Opinion, that the Will is then principally and altogether free, when it is ſo fixed and reſolved on any certain thing, ſuppoſe, for Example, the ſovereign or chief Good and Happineſs, that it cannot be bent or diverted to any other thing, that is to ſay, to Evil; becauſe, ſay they, the actual love, the purſuance, the enjoyment of this Good or Happineſs is altogether Voluntary, and by conſequence altogether Free. But I know not whether they take notice enough, that there is this difference between a willing Action and a free Action; for a willing or ſpontaneous Action is nothing elſe but a certain propenſity or impulſe of Nature, which impulſe may be effected without any Reaſoning; whereas the free Action ſuppoſeth and depends upon ſome Reaſoning, Examination, Judgment or Choice preceding.

And to prove that a ſpontaneous Action is a certain impulſe or propenſity of Nature, they inſtance in Children and Brutes, unto whom they never attribute the uſe of Reaſon or Liberty, yet they perform many things *ſponte*; and this is ſaid alſo of things inanimate, as of a Stone, that it falls down *ſponte*, of its own accord; or of Fire, that it aſcends *ſponte*; ſo that *fieri ſponte* and *fieri natura* ſeem to be the ſame thing.

Thus as the Appetite inclines of its own Nature to Good, 'tis no wonder that we ſhould ſay that 'tis carried *ſponte* of its own accord: For as a Stone, becauſe it falls *ſponte*, or of its own Nature downward, cannot of it ſelf riſe upwards: So becauſe the Appetite is carried of its own Nature to Good, it cannot of it ſelf incline nor lean to Evil: Beſides, as the Stone, becauſe 'tis ſettled to a Motion downwards hath not an indifferency for ſuch a Motion, or for a Motion upwards: So the Appetite, becauſe 'tis fixed on Good, is not indifferent to what is Good, nor indifferent to what is Evil. Laſtly, as the Stone, for want of that indifferency to either of the Motions, is truly ſaid to move *ſponte*, of its own accord, but not freely or with liberty downward: So the Appetite, for want of this indifferency to Good or Evil, is truly ſaid to move *ſponte*, of its own accord, but not with liberty to what is Good in General.

Therefore if you ſuppoſe that the Will is in ſuch a manner fixed, for Example, on the Sovereign Good or Happineſs, that it cannot by forſaking it, be turned aſide to follow another Object, it will be truly reputed to be inclined to it *ſponte*, but not freely, becauſe 'tis not indifferent to that Good or to another; and that 'tis not in its Power to incline to another and forſake that.

'Tis

'Tis certain, that it inclines willingly, *volens* and without Reluctancy and Oppoſition; but this kind of Will which we might name *Volentia*, if it were lawful to make uſe of this word, beſpeaks not Liberty, but Propenſity, Complacency, *libentiam*, *collubeſcentiam*, and conſequently an excluſion of all Conſtraint, Violence, Repugnancy or Oppoſition. So that if the Purſuit or actual Love and Affection for this Good is ſaid to be altogether Voluntary, we muſt not therefore infer, that it is altogether free, but only that 'tis *ſummè libitus*, if I may be permitted to make uſe of this Term, or *libens* altogether willing, becauſe *libentia* may be without any indifferency, but not *libertas*.

Now it behoves us to conſider that what is uſually ſpoken among the Divines, That 'tis impoſſible that the Will, ſuch as is that of the glorified Saints, which enjoys fully and knowingly the Sovereign Happineſs, ſhould forſake that Good to embrace another; it concerns us, I ſay, to make this Obſervation, becauſe it ſeems this may diſcover to us what that indifferency is, in which the Nature of the Liberty or Free-will of this mortal Life conſiſts.

We took notice before, that the Underſtanding bears the Light before the Will; and it is certain, that this Torch or Light is nothing elſe but the Judgment that the Underſtanding makes upon things that are Good or Evil, declaring that this is Good and that Evil; that of theſe two Good or Evil things, this is the greater, that the leſs. So that when the Will is ſaid to be diverted from the one and inclined to the other, this happens becauſe the Judgment is ſometimes for one and ſometimes for th' other, and that the Flection of the Will is conformable to that of the Underſtanding.

Thus,

Thus, becauſe the Underſtanding is often unconſtant in its Judgment, the Will is often unſetled and wavers in its Inclination or Appetite; ſo that as the Underſtanding judges to day that one thing is Good and to morrow Evil, the Will to day loves this thing and to morrow hates it: And as it judges to day that we ought to embrace a certain thing becauſe it is Good, and to morrow it eſteems that we ought rather to embrace another, becauſe that other appears to it better; thus the Will is inclined to day to one thing and to morrow to another. In a word, it ſeems that according to the Notions that the Underſtanding hath of things, or according to the Judgment that it makes of them; ſo the Will either purſues or avoids the ſame.

In the ſame manner, becauſe among the Good things, as among the Evil, ſome are true and real, others ſeeming or apparent, Good is ſometimes diſguis'd with the Appearance of Evil, and Evil with that of Good. By this means the Underſtanding often makes a wrong Judgment; for being moved with the Appearance of Good, it judges Evil to be Good; or being moved with the Appearance of Evil, it judges Good to be Evil. In the ſame manner, the Will often miſtakes its End, becauſe in aiming at Good and purſuing after it, it happens upon Evil; and in flying from Evil, it is diſappointed of ſome Good. Thus alſo the Underſtanding miſtakes the leſſer Good for the greater, and the greater for the leſſer; the Will by following after the greateſt Good gets the leſs, and in flying from the leſſer Evil falls into the greater.

Seeing then the Will is thus bound to follow the Underſtanding or its Judgment, there is no queſtion but that the indifferency which appears in the Will, proceeds meerly and abſolutely in the ſame manner as the indifferency of the Underſtanding.

Now

Now the indifferency of the Underſtanding ſeems to conſiſt in this, That it is not ſo much tied up to any Judgment that it has made of a thing which hath appeared to it true, but that it may leave it and incline to make another Judgment of the ſame thing if there appears in it a greater likelihood of Truth: For the Underſtanding is not of the number of thoſe Faculties that are fixed to a thing, as weight in things without Life, the Faculty of Generation in the living Creatures, and ſo of the reſt, but is naturally ſo flexible, that having nothing elſe for its Object but Truth, it may judge of things now in this manner, anon in another; and according to the Judgment it makes, may ſometimes take this, ſometimes that for Truth.

Therefore the Underſtanding may be look'd upon as a Balance; for as a Balance is indifferent to incline either of the Scales, and bends towards that which is moſt loaden; ſo that where there is the greater Addition of weight, it ſtill inclines that way; thus the Underſtanding is indifferently inclined to one or other of theſe contrary Opinions, but is ſtill overpoiſed according to the greater or leſs apparency of Truth. This Compariſon is borrowed from *Cicero*, where he ſays, *That in the ſame manner as the Scale of a Balance is weighed down by the weight that is put into it, thus the Mind yields to things that are plain; we cannot approve of a thing that is not plain nor manifeſt.*

This is deſigned to make us comprehend that the Underſtanding being indifferent to follow one Judgment or another, it is not nevertheleſs indifferent to ..ve a plain manifeſt Truth to follow after another leſs manifeſt, or to leave the Judgment that ſeems the trueſt, to embrace that which hath the leſs likelihood of Truth; becauſe as a Scale weighed down by a greater weight, can never be raiſed by a leſs

leſs weight put into the other Scale, but only by a heavier, which weighing down this, ſhall cauſe the other to be lifted up: Thus 'tis not poſſible that when ſome evident and experienc'd Truth hath prevail'd upon the Underſtanding to conſent, that it ſhould alter its Judgment unleſs upon ſome more weighty Reaſon ſucceeding. This chiefly appears in that we ſometimes remain in ſuſpence, pondering in doubt and in uncertainty; for this happens only becauſe on both ſides there ſeems to us as it were an equal weight of Truth, the equal Balance of th' one Scale hindring the riſing or falling of th' other, which cauſeth that the Underſtanding leans no more to the one ſide than the other.

Thus if it ſeems to bend ſometimes more to one ſide and ſometimes to the other, this is cauſed by the greater Attention that it gives ſometimes to one weight and ſometimes to the other; and that the one draws to it as long time as the other appears not the ſame, but this other nevertheleſs draws in the ſame manner when it appears more ſtrong; juſt as when we have pois'd a Balance even with equal weights, if you now add to one and anon take away from the other ſome little weights. So if the Underſtanding leans at laſt more to one ſide than the other, this muſt needs be, becauſe ſomething hath moved it more of that ſide than of the other, or rather becauſe the Attention alone, more conſtant, aſſiſted by impatience, may have procured a greater weight.

'Tis true, that ſometimes the Underſtanding leaving the Judgment, which of it ſelf is the trueſt, or abſolutely true, embraces that which of it ſelf is not ſo true, but abſolutely falſe; yet that which moves the Underſtanding, is always the Appearance of Truth which it conſiders in every thing; and becauſe this Appearance may be either true or falſe,

falſe, it happens that what is true in it ſelf is capable of being diſguiſed by the Appearance of Falſhood, or not ſo true, and that which is falſe of it ſelf may be covered over with an Appearance of Truth, or not ſo falſe: It happens, I ſay, that the Underſtanding may be alſo carried to Falſhood or to that which is not ſo true, whiles the Falſhood is veiled over with an Appearance of Truth, or of not ſo falſe, where the Truth is covered over with an Appearance of Falſhood, or not ſo true. Therefore as often as the Underſtanding being tied to a true Judgment, leaves this Judgment to follow a falſe one, there muſt have interven'd ſomething which hath taken from the Truth its true and natural Guiſe, and which hath given to the falſe a counterfeit Luſtre, which hath cauſed the alteration in the Judgment.

And if it be generally ſo, it is certain that this confirms what hath been particularly ſpoken of the alteration of our Conſent or of our Judgments, whether in reſpect of the Good or in reſpect of the Evil; and conſequently that the Judgment that we make that a thing is good or better, remains in the Underſtanding as long as the Appearance either true or falſe, which cauſeth the thing to be reputed ſo, is in being and admitted, and that it is altered as ſoon as this Appearance is changed.

'Tis Likewiſe certain, that there being a neceſſity that the Underſtanding ſhould precede the Will, 'tis in vain to endeavour that the Will ſhould change its Inclination, unleſs we firſt endeavour to oblige the Underſtanding to alter its Judgment; as we labour in vain that the Will ſhould continue in its Inclination or Appetition, if we take no care that the Underſtanding ſhould perſiſt in the ſame Judgment.

Alſo

Alſo 'tis for this cauſe that he who deſigns to embrace Virtue and prefer it before all other Excellencies, ought to take heed that no Deceit creeps in, which impoſing upon the Underſtanding may make him imagin there is ſomething more excellent than Virtue. And as he ſhall have eſteemed the higheſt Virtue to conſiſt in cauſing his Will to be agreeable with the Divine Will, he ought to imprint deeply in his Mind that he cannot deſire any thing more excellent than what God will have. Saying to himſelf with *Epictetus*; *I have brought my Deſires in ſubjection to the Will of God*; *if he will have me Sick, I am content*; *if he will have me undertake any Thing, I will undertake it freely*; *if he will have me accompliſh any Thing, I will effect it accordingly*; *wont he have it ſo, neither will I*; *will he have me to Dye, I am willing.*

Finally 'tis certain that while we live here below, we are very Feeble and very Weak, and that we cannot promiſe to our ſelves a conſtancy, either of Judgment or of Will, and of Reſolution; becauſe of that Indifferency by which the Underſtanding and the Will may paſs from a Thing that is true, to another that may appear more true; from a Thing that is good, to another that may appear better. 'Tis certain that only in the Life to come this Indifferency ſhall have an end, becauſe in our future State the higheſt and moſt perfect Truth, and the ſovereign Good are eaſily known without miſtake; and becauſe nothing truer will offer it ſelf to the Underſtanding, nor nothing better to the Will towards which it might bend, 'tis impoſſible but that we muſt continue fixed moſt conſtantly, unchangeably, moſt neceſſarily, and moſt willingly; *Summa cum libentia.* And this is what we have undertaken to explain.

Now

Now that we may not ſeem to inſiſt too long upon Things ſupernatural, let us return to our Matter in Hand, and ſay again, That Liberty or Free-Will is in Man no longer than this Indifferency that we have mentioned continues in him. For he is Free or at Liberty, Firſt, That when Good or Evil be offered to him he may chuſe either the Good by that appearance which inclines him, or the Evil if it be diſguiſed and covered over with the appearance of Good, which ſeems more inviting, and conſequently draws and moves him more powerfully than the appearance of real Good. Secondly, That when two Advantages are offered to him, he may follow the greater, if its appearance moves him, or the leſs if its appearance be more attractive and tempting than that of the greater. Thirdly, When he hath two Evils before his Eyes, he may avoid the greater, being diſſuaded from it by its appearance, or the leſſer, if its appearance ſeems more troubleſome and grievous.

This being ſuppoſed, this Paſſage out of *Plato* makes very much for our purpoſe, 'That no Per-'ſon of his own accord is inclined to Evil, and that 'it is not in the power of Man's Nature to be wil-'ling to incline towards that which he judges to be 'Evil, and decline that which he judges Good. So 'that if of two Evils it be needful to chuſe one, 'there is no Perſon when he may chuſe the leaſt 'will take the greateſt.

But becauſe what *Ovid* makes *Medea* ſpeak ſeems to be an Objection, *viz. I ſee what is better, and approve of it, yet I embrace what's worſe.*

——————Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora ſequor.

For

For this Reaſon we muſt obſerve the Queſtion that *Ariſtotle* makes when he inquires whether it is poſſible, that he who knows Things well and hath a juſt eſtimate for them, ſuch as they may deſerve, cannot forbear; *Qui fieri poſſit ut qui de rebus recte æſtimat, incontinens ſit?* For 'tis not without cauſe that *Socrates* ſaid, 'That it is not poſſible that in him 'who hath Knowledge, any other thing ſhould bear 'ſway contrary to that Knowledge; and ſo it is im-'poſſible but that he who knows and values Things 'as he ought, ſhould do that which is beſt to be 'done, becauſe if he acts otherwiſe, this proceeds 'from Ignorance. From whence it ſeems that that common Saying is taken and uſed in anſwer to the Words of *Medea*, viz. Every Man that Sins is Ignorant. *Omnis peccans eſt Ignorans.*

To reſolve the Doubt, and anſwer the Queſtion *Ariſtotle* makes a good diſtinction. 'For, ſaith he, 'we may know Things either habitually or actually, '*Habitu aut actu*; For a Man may have a Know-'ledge that he makes no uſe of, as when his Mind 'is employed about other Things than what he 'knows, if he be aſleep, in a Paſſion, or in Drink, and 'he may have ſuch a Knowledge which he exerci-'ſeth, as when his Mind is buſy about what he un-'derſtands. Now if a Man, ſaith he, knows a Thing 'actually, and hath his Mind fixed on the Thing 'he knows, and that his Thoughts are not other-'wiſe at that time diverted, it is impoſſible that 'he ſhould act any thing contrary to his Know-'ledge, and conſequently when he percieves the 'excellency of Virtue, for example, and the folly of 'Vice, that he ſhould forſake Virtue and follow 'Vice. But if he knows any Thing only habitual-'ly, or if he makes no uſe of his Knowledge, in 'ſuch a caſe he is in the ſame Condition as if he had 'no Knowledge at all, or were Ignorant of the 'Thing;

'Thing; and then he may do Things contrary to 'his Knowledge, and thus tho he knows habitually 'how beautiful Virtue is, and how abominable and filthy Vice, yet that hinders him not from neglecting 'Virtue and embracing Vice.

But you may ſay, Doth it not often happen, that he who Sins, really ſees and conſiders the beauty of that Virtue which he ſlights, and the filthineſs of that Vice which he purſues? *Ariſtotle* anſwers, 'That ſuch a Man is like one full of Wine, who by 'a certain Cuſtom repeats ſome Verſes out of *Em-* '*pedocles*; or like Children that read what they un-'derſtand not, or but very little; or like Stage-'Players that repreſent Perſons unto whom they 'are not like; for in every one that Sins there a-'riſeth a Paſſion either of Luſt, or Anger, or Am-'bition, or Covetouſneſs, that diſturbs and diſorders 'the Mind and Knowledge in ſuch a manner, that 'all the good that there is in Virtue, and all the 'evil that is in Vice is obſcured and covered over 'with a kind of Miſt, ſo that 'tis hid or ſcarce ap-'pears; whereas all that is Evil, that is to ſay, Pain-'ful in Virtue, and all that is Good, that is to ſay, 'Grateful in Vice, is diſcovered, and appears clear 'as at noon Day. By this means what is good in Virtue works but feebly upon him who is viciouſly inclined, and the evil which is in Vice does but faintly diſpleaſe him who is virtuous. Thus a Man that Sins may very truly ſay, that he perceives and ſees the Things that he quits are better, and what he chuſes are worſe, for that at another time according to the Habit which makes him remember but confuſedly and lightly, yet he was ſometimes of another Opinion. But yet at that very time that he Sins he cannot ſay ſo, for then he holds for beſt what he embraces, and that for worſe which he leaves. So that if he ſhould ſay that he approves

then as beſt the Things that he had formerly approved of, he would tell an apparent untruth, and would contradict himſelf, for he certainly approves and allows as beſt the Things that he then purſues.

And tho he does this not without ſome kind of remorſe and diſpleaſure, yet that proceeds doubtleſs from a Senſe of the loſs of ſome advantage thereby, or of drawing upon himſelf ſome Evil. But that which nevertheleſs ſhews that this diſpleaſure is inconſiderable in compariſon of the pleaſure that prevails upon him, is that he does not ſeriouſly, but only lightly conſider the loſs of the Good, and the purchaſe of the Evil. This is ſo much the more eaſily to be underſtood, if the Puniſhment, the Pain, the Shame, and the other Evils, which he neither ſees, nor perceives, nor fears, but only lightly and confuſedly, were more ſeriouſly and plainly conſidered; not as at a diſtance, or abſent, or to come, or doubtful, but ready to fall upon his Head preſent and certain, and as if they were immediately to ſucceed and follow the wicked Action at the Heels; he would certainly then forbear and deſiſt from doing it, and would not periſh in the Vice.

Again, tho he that Sins and chuſes the worſt, ſhould ſay, that he ſees and approves the beſt, nevertheleſs the want of conſideration, or his inadvertency which hinders him from ſeeing or conſidering all the Circumſtances that are in the Thing, or from ſeeing them as they ought to be, and ſhould be, is Ignorance. For this Reaſon, he that Sins is ſaid to be Ignorant, for he would not Sin if he were not ſo, and acted in that manner.

We muſt nevertheleſs conſider, that he ought not therefore to think himſelf excuſable when he acts ignorantly, becauſe he follows after that which appears to him Good, and becauſe 'tis not in his Power to hinder it from appearing in that manner to him,

him, under a pretence, that we are not the cauſes of the appearance of Things. For tho among the common excuſes for Sins, Men are wont to reckon Ignorance, yet that Ignorance is, or ought to be a ſimple, abſolute and invincible Ignorance, ſuch as was for Example that of *Cephalus* when he kill'd *Procris*, who was lurking among Brambles and Thorns; I ſay, when he kill'd *Procris*, whom he took for a wild Beaſt, and could not imagin that it was his dear Wife. Whereas that Ignorance that is here pretended, proceeds from neglect and a want of due Care and Conſideration, as *Ariſtotle* tells us, *Per incuriam negligentiamve paritur*, and for that reaſon is named a groſs and willful Ignorance, *Affectata, ſupina:* For he that Sins is ignorant, either becauſe he is himſelf the real cauſe of his Ignorance, or becauſe he never troubles himſelf, nor endeavours to know more; that is to ſay, becauſe he does not take ſufficient care to conſider every thing as he ought.

'A drunken Man, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, is Ignorant ac-'cording to the firſt Caſe; for he himſelf is the 'cauſe of his Ignorance, and of his Drunkenneſs, 'and 'twas in his Power not to be Drunk, and ſo 'not to be Ignorant of what he doth; therefore, 'ſaith he, this Ignorance dont excuſe him, but on 'the contrary it deſerves a double Puniſhment. Firſt, 'Becauſe he made himſelf Drunk. Secondly, For 'Sinning when he was Drunk. The ſame Thing may 'be ſaid of him who from the beginning makes no 'reſiſtance to a light Paſſion, but ſuffers it to gather 'Strength, ſo that it prevails more violently: And generally ſo it is of thoſe who ſuffer things to come to an Habit, which at the beginning they might eaſily have overcome, but afterwards 'tis beyond their Power to reſiſt 'em. 'Tis in this Caſe, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, 'as with him who caſts a Stone which he cannot re-

call nor cauſe to come back, but 'twas in his Power not to caſt it; or, as with him, who living like a Glutton, becomes unavoidably ſick, yet 'twas in his Power alſo to have lived more abſtemiouſly.

Again, a Man who is hurried and tranſported by his Paſſions, may alſo ſay, *Video meliora, proboque*; becauſe 'tis then likewiſe in his Power to mind the Evils, or to conſider ſeriouſly what and how great Miſchiefs will attend; which if he did, he would not be guilty of 'em: I ſay, that it is in his Power, for it often happens that when he is juſt going to commit an Evil, and there comes a Perſon of Wiſdom or Note, or one of Authority, in whoſe Power it is to revenge and puniſh this evil Action; upon this he preſently forbears; nay, there are ſome who ſtop in the midſt of their Paſſion, and have ſo much Power over themſelves, as not to ſuffer themſelves to be over-come. Beſides, the uſe of the Laws, of Precepts and Exhortations, are not in vain. We may take heed, and if the Mind be attentive, it may over-come the appearances of Things, and proceed in ſuch a manner that they will appear really ſuch as they ought to appear.

Truly, every time that we may ſay, *Video meliora, proboque*, 'tis manifeſt that the Action is not done without Deliberation, and that conſequently 'tis in our Power; for we cannot ſay ſo when 'tis done raſhly and unadviſedly, as when at the firſt moving of Anger, we are carried away with Revenge; from whence proceeds the ordinary Excuſe, That the firſt Motions are not in our Power.

And we cannot ſay as the Hegeſiacks in *Laertius*, That Sins ought to be pardoned, becauſe no Man ſins but he is forced thereunto by ſome Paſſion which diſturbs his Mind, *Neque enim quemquam volentem, ſed pertubatione aliqua coactum peccare:* For at

at leaſt it is certain that till we give an occaſion of the Diſturbance, there is no conſtraint nor force.

Nevertheleſs, becauſe there are certain natural Diſturbances, and certain Deſires which proceed from our ſelves, and ariſe againſt our Wills, *Ariſtotle* holds that they are ſo much the more pardonable, becauſe they are commonly incident to all Men: And to ſhew that there are ſome Paſſions that are born in us, and that we derive from our Anceſtors; he cites the Example of him that excuſed himſelf for beating his Father; *For my Father*, ſaith he, *beat his before me, and his Father beat his, and here is my Son will beat me when he comes to be of Age.* He alledgeth again the Example of him who being drag'd by his Son, commanded him when he was come to the Door to drag him no farther, *becauſe*, ſaid he, *I never drag'd my Father beyond this place.*

But here I find my ſelf obliged to take notice, that whatſoever hath been hitherto ſaid concerning the great Inclination of the Will to follow the direction of the Underſtanding, ought to be underſtood with ſome Caution and Circumſcriptions: For tho' it be certain that we never deſire what is unknown, *ignoti nulla cupido*; and ſo the Will never acts until the Underſtanding inclines it beforehand; and as we commonly ſay, holds a Torch before it to enlighten it: And tho' it is alſo no leſs certain, that the Will is ſo depending upon the Underſtanding, in following it, that of two unequal Advantages propoſed, it uſually takes the moſt beneficial; yet, nevertheleſs, when 'tis juſt ready to act, it may notwithſtanding this direction, and without the intervention of any other, leave that which is more, and embrace or follow that which is leſs profitable.

It ſeems alſo that the Will does ſometimes exerciſe this Power; for if we will conſult our ſelves, we ſhall find it true, that there are ſome Moments wherein we mind and take notice of the goodneſs and excellency of Virtue; that we diſcover it plainly, and agree, that it is to be preferred before the Pleaſures and Delights that Vice can afford us: So that if we did really drive at our own Intereſt, we ſhould decline Vice and embrace Virtue: Do we not experience, I ſay, that ſometimes notwithſtanding we have theſe Notions and Conſiderations, yet ſtill we cling to Vice and forſake Virtue, forego the greater and make choice of the leſs good? In a word, we ſee what is better, but take up with what is worſe, as *Medea* ſaith,

Video meliora, proboque; deteriora ſequor.

Now this being ſo, it ſeems we ſhould give more ſcope to the Power of the Will, and that we ought not to ſuppoſe it ſo bound up or enſlaved to the directions of the Underſtanding, but that it may forſake them; and that if we will ſave our Liberty without ſuffering any ſcruple to remain, we ought not to make it ſo much to conſiſt in the indifferency of the Underſtanding, that limits the Will, as in the indifferency of the Will that limits it ſelf: So that when all things needful to act are ſuppoſed, it may either act or not act, follow what is good or not follow it, embrace that which appears more or leſs advantageous: So that 'tis not with the Will as with a Balance or Beam, which is forced to lean on that ſide where there is the greateſt weight; but like a Balance that determines and inclines it ſelf by its own Strength, ſometimes on that ſide where there is the leaſt weight, where there is the leaſt reaſon, and leaſt appearance of advantage.

Let

Let no Man object, that a leſſer advantage, in compariſon of a greater, is reputed an Evil; and as the Will cannot incline to Evil as Evil, it cannot by conſequence incline to a leſs advantage: For we may abſolutely deny that a leſs advantage is an Evil, in compariſon of greater; for let it be never ſo little, 'tis always an advantage: Beſides, we may anſwer and ſay, That when the Will leaving a greater Good inclines to a leſs, it inclines not to Evil as Evil, becauſe it looks not upon it as Evil but truly as Good, tho' by chance it may be found to be a leſs Good; certainly if when two advantages are propoſed to the Will, it hath Power to refuſe 'em both; it will doubtleſs have the ſame Power to take th' one or th' other, and conſequently to chuſe the leſs.

However, it is certain that tho' we ſhould appeal to the Judgment of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* (which is what our Author ſeems to have the greateſt eſteem for) ſo that we ſhould make Liberty to conſiſt in the firſt place and originally in the indifferency of the Underſtanding; yet, I ſay, it is certain, that in this Suppoſition, we may ſtill ſave our Liberty, in that, when we are ready to act and prepared, 'tis always in our Power to ſtop and deſiſt from acting, and to conſider ſeriouſly of things; ſo that if we diſtinguiſh the real advantages from thoſe that are counterfeit, we ſhould cauſe the falſe Reaſonings in the Underſtanding to be rectified; and by that means cauſe this Propenſity that is in the Will to be inlightned, and ſo conſequently not to ſeek after an apparent good inſtead of what is real, Vice inſtead of Virtue.

CHAP. II.

Of Fortune and Deſtiny.

THO' according to the Opinion of *Cicero*, Folly, Miſtake, Error, Blindneſs and Ignorance of Things ſeem to have introduced and brought in faſhion the Names of Nature and Fortune, and that therefore Fortune cannot be without Ignorance: Nevertheleſs, 'tis not generally agreed upon, that this is only a fooliſh, vain and imaginary Name, ſeeing there are many that hold that 'tis not only a Cauſe, but a Divine Cauſe; which occaſioned theſe Verſes of *Juvenal.*

Fortune was never Worſhip'd by the Wiſe;
But, ſet aloft by Fools, uſurp'd the Skies.

That it is not really ſo, *Plutarch*, according to *Plato*, holds, That it is a Cauſe by accident, which unexpectedly follows things acted according to Counſel. And agreeable with this is *Ariſtotle*'s Opinion, That it is a Cauſe by accident in things done for a certain End, and that this Cauſe is uncertain and changable. For this example is alledged as a common Inſtance; he who digging in the Ground with an intent to Plant a Tree, found a Treaſure which he never thought of; now, the Diſcovery of the Treaſure is an Effect by accident, that is to ſay, that it happen'd beyond the Expectation and Intention of him that acted: So that he who digged being the cauſe of the Pit made in the Earth, is alſo the cauſe by accident of the Diſcovery of the Treaſure.

'Tis

'Tis in this manner that the Notion of Fortune is commonly explained. Nevertheleſs it may ſeem by this Name that ſomething elſe, I know not what, is underſtood, and that they call not properly Fortune, either him who digs, or his action. Therefore often we call a caſual thing by the name of Fortune, or that which happens unexpectedly. And it ſeems by this Name of Fortune, we are to underſtand, 'The concurrence of ſeveral Cauſes 'that happen without any mutual dependence or 'advice; ſo that from them proceeds an event or 'an effect called Caſual, which all the Cauſes, or 'ſome of them, or at leaſt he to whom it happens, 'had never in his Mind and Intention. So as by the caſual Diſcovery of the Treaſure, 'tis not only requiſite that ſome ſhould dig in the Earth, but that ſome other body ſhould firſt hide the Mony: 'Tis manifeſt, that Fortune or the cauſe of the Diſcovery, is the concurrence of the hiding of the Mony and of the diging in the Earth in that place.

I ſay, without any mutual dependence or advice, and beyond or beſides the Intention of all or ſome of the Cauſes: Becauſe, tho' one or many of the Cauſes may have deſigned it and intended it, 'tis no leſs Fortune in reſpect of that Cauſe that never was thought upon: As if one hides a Treaſure, with a deſign that he whom he foreſees will dig in the Earth, ſhould find it. In this Caſe, the Event is not truly Caſual, in regard of him who hid the Treaſure; but it will be nevertheleſs in regard of him who was ignorant that any thing had been there concealed. Thus that which happened at the opening of the Sepulcher of *Nitocris* was not abſolutely a Hazard or Caſual, in reſpect to *Nitocris*; for he imagined that ſome King would come to open it, being induced by this Inſcription; *If any*

of

of the Kings of Babylon *that ſhall come after me be in want of Mony, let him open this Sepulcher, and let him take as much as he pleaſe; but let him not open it unleſs he hath need, for in ſuch a Caſe it will avail him nothing.* But the Event was a Hazard or Caſual, in relation to *Darius*, becauſe inſtead of Mony he found this written within. *If thou wert not unſatiable of Mony, thou would'ſt not have opened the Sepulchers of the Dead.* We muſt nevertheleſs acknowledge, that we call that properly Fortune, that of all the Cauſes which concur together, not one of them foreſees what will happen from thence. An eminent Example of this is inſtanced in delaying the death of *Socrates*, after Sentence had been pronounced: For the cauſe of this delay hapned thus; 'The day before the Sentence was given, it hap-'ned, according to the yearly Cuſtom, a Ship was 'Crowned in order to be ſent to *Delos*; and in the 'mean while, till its return, it was not lawful to 'execute any Perſon. But here, neither the Prieſt 'in Crowning of the Ship, nor the Judge in Pro-'nouncing the Sentence ever thought, by this ac-'cident, to delay the death of *Socrates*.

Now 'tis not without cauſe, that *Epicurus* perſuades us ſo much, that we ſhould not acknowledge Fortune as a Goddeſs; for the weakneſs of Men is ſuch, that they don't only admire that which they underſtand not, but they fancy it alſo as ſome divine Thing, and above Nature: So that when they had perceived that ſometimes Fortune was favourable and ſometimes adverſe and contrary; they adored it under ſeveral Shapes, and erected Temples to it under theſe ſeveral Titles, *Fortunæ Bonæ, Malæ, Blandæ, Averruncæ, Calvæ, Equeſtri*, &c. This hath given occaſion to the Complaints of *Pliny*, 'That all over the World, and at all times, Men 'addreſs themſelves to Fortune; ſo that ſhe alone

'is

'is called upon, ſhe alone accuſed and condemned; 'ſhe alone is praiſed and blamed; that ſhe alone 'is worſhiped with Scoffs. Many fancy her uncer-'tain, unconſtant, blind, favouring thoſe who de-'ſerve it not, *&c.* From hence is that common Expreſſion; *The May-game, or Sport of Fortune.* And this hath cauſed the life of Man to be likened to playing at Dice or Cards, which is equally hazardous to the Gameſter, whether he underſtand the Game or not.

'Tis true, that as the Play and the Life of Man are managed by Induſtry, a skilful Gameſter and a a wiſe Man commonly ſucceed beſt; but this happens not always, for often the ignorant Gameſter, is more fortunate than the skilful, and the weak Man more ſucceſsful than the wiſe; and very frequently Fortune hath as much or more a hand in things than Wiſdom. This cauſed *Plutarch* to ſay, *That Fortune and Wiſdom, tho' very much differing, often bring forth very unlike Effects.* And as there are but few Men who make Profeſſion of Wiſdom, that know well how to manage and govern the Proceedings of Fortune, *Theophraſtus* hath been ſo bold as to ſay, That *'tis Fortune, and not Wiſdom that governs our Life.*

Vitam regit Fortuna, non Sapienta.

And *Lucretius* ſpeaking according to the Vulgar, ſaith, That Fortune often attends thoſe who do not greatly ſeek it, and as often flies from thoſe who eagerly purſue and hunt after it: So true is it, ſaith he further, That there is ſome ſecret hidden Power that over-rules human Affairs, and ſeems to delight and ſport it ſelf with over-turning Crowns and Dignities, and trampling 'em under Feet.

Uſque

Uſque adeo res humanas vis abdita quædam
Obterit, & pulchros faſces, ſævaſque ſecures
Proculcare, & ludibrio ſibi habere videtur!

Of Deſtiny.

AS to what concerns Deſtiny, *Homer* ſpeaks more plainly of it than of Fortune; for he makes *Hector* ſay, That if the Deſtinies don't appoint nor order it, nothing is able to take away his Life beſide; but no Man can avoid his Deſtiny.

Nam niſi Fata vocent, nemo me mittat ad Orcum:
At Fatum vitat nemo, mihi crede, virorum.

Now tho' *Cicero* fancies that Fate and Deſtiny is but a fooliſh, idle, and ſuperſtitious Name, *Anilis plenum ſuperſtitionis fati nomen*; and *Epicurus*, That *'tis only a fantaſtical Name, and that nothing is done by Deſtiny:* Nevertheleſs, as there have always been Maintainers of Deſtiny, ſome taking it in one ſenſe, others in another, we muſt here endeavour to underſtand the ſeveral Opinions into which they have been divided.

Among theſe Opinions there are two Principal; for ſome will have Deſtiny to be Divine, others a meer Natural thing. The Firſt, were the Diſciples of *Plato*, and the Stoicks; according to whoſe Opinion, *Plutarch*, *Chalcidius*, and ſome others, look upon Deſtiny or Fate in two manners; Firſt, *As a Subſtance*, which they took for God himſelf, or for that eternal Reaſon, which from all Eternity hath ordered all things, and hath ſo joined all Cauſes, both Superior and Inferior together, that all

all that happens, either Good or Evil, happens perſuant to theſe Cauſes. They beſtowed ſeveral Names upon this Divine Subſtance or Reaſon; for ſometimes they termed it, as *Plato*, *The Soul of the World*; *The Reaſon and the eternal Law of the Nature of the Univerſe.* And ſometimes, as *Zeno* and *Chryſippus*, *The moving Virtue of Matter, a ſpiritual Virtue, and the Reaſon of the Order that Governs and Rules all Things.* Sometimes God, Jupiter, Underſtanding or Intellect, as *Ariſtotle* and *Seneca*; And ſometimes with *Heraclitus*, *The Reaſon that penetrates into all Things*; And ſometimes, as *Pythagoras*, *The governing and ruling Cauſe of all Things, both Univerſal and Particular.*

Secondly, *As an Act*; namely, in part for the Decree it ſelf, or for the Command by which God hath eſtabliſhed and ordained all things, and partly for the Order it ſelf; that Conſequence and Concatenation of Cauſes at firſt appointed, in which it purſues its courſe without varying in the leaſt from the Rules and Methods at firſt preſcribed: For thus they ſpoke of it when they called Deſtiny, *The Law of Nature*, *The Companion of the Whole*, *The Daughter of Neceſſity*, *The Order that includes and comprehends all other Orders*; Or, as *Chryſippus* ſaith, A certain eternal and immutable ſequel of Things, *&c. Sempiterna quædam & indeclinabilis ſeries rerum, & catena volvens ſemetipſa ſeſe, & implicans per æternos conſequentiæ ordines in quibus apta, connexaque eſt.* To which *Lucan* ſeems to allude in theſe two Verſes,

At ſimul à prima deſcendit origine Mundi
Cauſarum ſeries, atque omnia Fata laborant.

And *Heſiod*, when he ſpeaks diſtinctly of the three *Parcæ* which Spin the Life of Man, the firſt is

is named *Atropos*, becauſe the Time paſt is irrecoverable, which is as the Thread ſpun and wound in the Spindle: The ſecond is called *Clotho*, becauſe of the Time preſent that runs, which is as the Thread in the hand of her who Spins: The third is *Lacheſis*, becauſe of the Time to come, or the hazard, which is as the Wool or Flax that is not yet twiſted. *Lacheſis*, in *Plato*, is ſaid to govern the Time paſt, *Clotho* the preſent, *Atropos* the future: That which is added of *Lacheſis*, that ſhe receives the celeſtial Actions of the two other Siſters, that ſhe joyns them together, and that ſhe diſtributes them here below upon the Earth; ſhews the Opinion of the Aſtrologers, who bind the Fate of Mankind to the Stars, and make it to depend upon them, and come from them, according to *Manilius*;

Fata quoque & vitas hominum ſuſpendit ab Aſtris.

An Opinion among the Aſtrologers more certain than that of the Sybils, and the Oracles which were ſaid to utter forth the Deſtinies: For to hear them ſpeak, they ſeem to be no leſs acquainted with the Deſigns and Decrees of Heaven, than the Oaks, which *Plato* tells us came forth from Voices of the Enchantreſſes, as *Virgil* obſerves,

Quam comitabantur fatalia carmina quercus.

Moreover, as the Diſciples of *Plato*, the Stoicks, and the other Patrons of Deſtiny, ſeem conſequently to defend Neceſſity, which *Seneca* ſtiles a Neceſſity of all Things, and of every Action, which no Violence can break or alter: 'For the Deſtinies, 'ſaith he, exerciſe their Right and their abſolute 'and uncontrolable Power, without favouring any,

'and

'and without being moved either with Prayers or 'Compaſſion, they obſerve their fatal courſe ap-'pointed and irrevocable; like as the ſwift and fu-'rious downfal of the Waters from ſome ſteep 'Places which neither go back nor ſtop for thoſe 'Waters which follow, but continually thruſt down 'the firſt; thus the conſtant ſequel of Deſtiny makes 'the order of Things under this firſt and eternal 'Law, to ſubmit to the irrevocable Decree. As therefore they ſeem to maintain, I ſay, a Neceſſity, which altogether deſtroys the Liberty of human Actions, and leaves nothing in our Free-will; for that reaſon theſe Objections are oppoſed, proceeding from the Inconveniences that will enſue.

The Chief of theſe Inconveniences, is, That if our Souls, as they are placed and ranked in the ſequel of Things, be governed by the Deſtinies, and being deprived of all Libery, they act always out of an immutable and unavoidable Neceſſity; the Liberty and ordinary Conduct of the Affairs of human Life fails, and all Conſultations are uſeleſs; for whatever you reſolve upon, there ſhall nothing happen but what hath been decreed by the Deſtinies. Thus Prudence will become idle and needleſs, the ſtudy of Wiſdom frivolous, Legiſlators and Tyrants will be equally ridiculous; becauſe they command things that we muſt unavoidably do, or what we can by no means perform: So that there will be neither Vice nor Virtue, nor any thing that will deſerve either Praiſe or Blame, ſeeing that they alone are reputed worthy of Praiſe who might do ill but behave themſelves well, and thoſe worthy of Blame who might do well but behave themſelves ill. In this caſe, no body will deſerve Reward for any good Deeds, as no body will deſerve Puniſhment for any bad, becauſe the firſt cannot but act well, and the latter hath not the

Power

Power to forbear and abſtain from what is ill: Finally, if all things proceeded from an unavoidable Neceſſity, in vain ſhould we offer up our Prayers, our Vows and Sacrifices, *&c.*

'Tis therefore upon occaſion of this Doctrin of the Stoicks, that *Lucian* brings in *Cyniſcus* very pleaſantly, upbraiding Jupiter: 'That he dreads not 'his Thunder-bolts, if the Deſtinies have not de-'ſigned that he ſhould periſh in that manner, ſee-'ing that Jupiter himſelf, and the other Gods, are 'bound and ſubject to Deſtiny: So that both Gods 'and Men are but the Servants and Miniſters of the '*Parcæ*, or rather meer Tools or Inſtruments, as 'an Ax or a Sythe; inſomuch, that Jupiter with 'his great Power was not able to deliver his own 'Son from Death, his beloved Son *Sarpedon.*

Tot nati cecidere Deûm, quin occidit unà
Sarpedon mea Progenies.

This Doctrin of the Stoicks made *Seneca* to ſay, That God truly preſcribed the Deſtinies, but that he himſelf is bound to obey them: *Ille ipſe omnium Conditor & Rector ſcripſit quidem fata, ſed ſequitur; ſemper paret, ſemel juſſit.*

That we are carried away by the force of Deſtiny, unto which we muſt willingly yield; That nothing is able to prevail upon the inexorable *Lacheſis*, or to make her unwind her Spindle; That all that the Mortals do or ſuffer comes from above; That all things proceed in a certain ſetled and appointed Courſe, and that each Day preſſes on the former.

Fatis agimur; cedite fatis.
Non ſollicitæ poſſunt curæ
Mutare rati ſtamina fuſi

Quid-

Quidquid patitur mortale genus;
Quidquid facimus venit ex alto;
Servatq; ſua decreta colus.
Lacheſis dura revoluta manu,
Omnia certo tramite vadunt,
Primuſq; dies dedit extremum.

Manilius ſpeaks almoſt the ſame Things, and ſaith plainly, That the Deſtinies govern the World, that we Dye as ſoon as we are Born, and that our End takes its date from our firſt Beginning.

Fata regunt orbem, certa ſtant omnia lege,
Largaq; per certos ſignantur tempora curſus;
Naſcentes morimur, finiſque ab origine pendet.

Laſtly, Thoſe Philoſophers who hold that Deſtiny is a thing altogether natural, and that it depends not upon any Decree, are divided into two Sects; The firſt have ſuppoſed a ſequel of natural Cauſes, linked and tied together in ſuch a manner, that the laſt always is depending upon the firſt, and ſo ſucceſſively each by th'other, ſo that they cannot but do what they do; and from hence follows that Neceſſity which can by no means be avoided, and which is altogether agreeable with that which is deduced from the firſt Opinion, or at leaſt differs not much, but only in this, that in the firſt Opinion the ſequel of Things runs and proceeds from an eternal Decree of God, but according to this latter Opinion, they run of themſelves, and of their own accord. The others truly ſuppoſe a ſequel of natural Cauſes, tied and joined together, but yet in ſuch a manner, that the laſt Cauſes depend not in ſuch a manner upon the Firſt, or are not moved by them ſo much, but that they may be hindred from doing that which they would otherwiſe do. I ſay that they may

be interrupted either by Things caſual, or by Things that act freely.

Among the Firſt are reckoned *Heraclitus*, *Empedocles*, *Parmenides*, *Leucippus*, *Democritus* and ſome others; but I ſhall only mention *Democritus*, becauſe he was the moſt famous of 'em all. This Philoſopher maintains, That Nature cannot act otherwiſe than it doth, becauſe the firſt Principles, or as he calls 'em Atoms, from whence all Things have their Beings, and are made, have a natural and an unalterable Motion by which they muſt of neceſſity be carried and moved. The compounded Beings that are all made of Atoms, cannot but be moved by the ſame Motions that move the Atoms. And from thence he gathers this ſuppoſed Neceſſity, by which he will have all Things done, and by which the World it ſelf is made in that manner that it now ſubſiſts; becauſe the Atoms, as he ſaith, which caſually have here met together, have had ſuch and ſuch Motions, that they could not gather together in any other manner, nor make any other Form or Shape; and that when this Form was once laid, they cannot but proceed in that Motion that they are in, and by theſe Motions all Things are accompliſhed: So that this Neceſſity, in his Opinion, is nothing elſe but the motion, the percuſſion and repercuſſion of the Matter, that is to ſay of Atoms, out of which all Things are form'd.

Thus 'tis eaſy to ſee what he means when he ſays, *The neceſſity by which all Things are made, is the Deſtiny, the Juſtice, the Providence and the Contriver of the World*, &c. For he ſuppoſeth that the ſequel of Things, in which the nature of Deſtiny conſiſts, cannot be otherwiſe than it is, and that it depends upon this ſequel that ſuch a thing ſhould be, or ſhould be thought Juſt, and another Unjuſt; that the World ſhould be governed in the manner that it

it is, and that in the beginning it was ſo made, *&c.* He refers all Things to the natural Motion of Atoms. And upon this Suppoſition he believed, Firſt, That the Soul it ſelf, which he fancies to conſiſt chiefly of globular Atoms and well poliſhed, moves ſeveral ways of its own accord, becauſe of their differing Motions, for Example in the Sad and Mournful in one manner, in the Cholerick in another, and otherwiſe in thoſe who have a good and mild Temper. Secondly, That it is diverſly moved and carried by the different movement of theſe Atoms; whereof the Images or ſenſible and intellectual Shapes are joined and intermingled. So that it cannot but be attracted if theſe Shapes be agreeing, and cannot but be repelled if they be diſagreeing. Thirdly, That if at ſome time it is not drawn by ſome alluring Shape, this proceeds from that there are others on the ſame ſide more powerful that reſiſt; likewiſe if it be not driven by ſome that naturally reſiſt, 'tis becauſe on the ſame ſide there ariſe and move ſome more powerful that draw at the ſame moment towards the ſame Place. Fourthly, That conſequently he cannot but be inclined to Good, or to that which intices, and flatters, and attracts, while he perceives it not mingled with any Evil, nor cannot but fly from Evil, or that which hurts and begets an Averſion, while he ſees no Good mingled with it. Fifthly, That of two Advantages propoſed, he cannot but be carried to the greater, becauſe he is drawn to it more powerfully, and of two Evils he cannot but fly from the greater, becauſe he is the more ſtrongly driven away. Laſtly, That through the Ignorance and Blindneſs of the Spirit of Man, he ſees not often all the Evil that is conſequent to the Good, nor all the Good is conſequent to the Evil, he is really deceived, and often carried to an Object from which it were to be wiſhed that he

were diverted, and flies from that which is really to be wiſhed that he ſhould follow after; but in the mean while Things happening in this manner, and not otherwiſe, he cannot but be carried whither he is carried, nor cannot but be driven from what he is driven. So that there remains nothing elſe for him to deſire, but that the Shapes of Things might come to him ſuch as they ought, to make them appear as really they are, and that the Evil might not impoſe upon him under the diſguiſe of Good, nor the Good under that of Evil.

He fancies further, that certain Things ſeem truly to be in our Power, ſeeing that we try, that we adviſe, and conſult, and that we freely chuſe without conſtraint one thing before another: But nevertheleſs that is nothing in reality, becauſe the occaſion of the Conſultation or the repreſentation of ſeveral Things, which make us almoſt equal, and keep the Ballance ſteddy, holding our Spirit in ſuſpence, cannot but be made to us, becauſe of the ſequel of Things which proceeds from a higher Principle; the Mind remaining in an uncertainty until the uſefulneſs of the one appears to exceed that of the other, and then the firſt uſefulneſs draws and fixes it. As if election were no other thing but a purſuance of what is beſt, or of that which ſeems beſt, and which is done without Conſtraint or without Averſion, becauſe we naturally love Good of our own accord, and willingly ſeek after it. So that in his Opinion Liberty is nothing elſe but *Libentia*.

Moreover he holds, as all others do, who are Defenders of this Doctrin of Fatality, and namely *Manilius*, viz. That to treat now of Fate or Deſtiny, and to examine its Laws and Nature as we here at preſent do, that this is according to the Laws and Courſe of Deſtiny.

Hoc

Hoc quoque fatorum eſt legem perdiſcere fati,
Hoc quoque fatale eſt ſic ipſum expendere fatum.

Becauſe if you ſuppoſe any kind of human Action, he will have its neareſt cauſe to have been ſo moved by ſome other going before, and this by another, and that other by one preceeding that, and ſo on to Infinity; that ſuch a Series of Cauſes hath been appointed, and that ſuch and ſuch Actions could not but follow. *Such as is*, ſaith *Cicero*, *the Deſire of* Ennius; *Would to God that never any Ax had cut down thoſe unhappy Trees of* Pelion. He might have taken his Riſe a little higher in this manner, *Would to God that never any Trees had grown upon Mount* Pelion; nay, further yet, *Would to God that Mount* Pelion *had never been*; and ſo by aſcending ſtill higher to wiſh, *That the Ship had never been made, and that* Medea *had never departed from her own Houſe.*

Among thoſe who have truly allowed of a natural Neceſſity, but nevertheleſs not abſolute and unavoidable, the chief are *Ariſtotle* and *Epicurus*. In reſpect of *Ariſtotle*, he will have Deſtiny or fatal Neceſſity to be nothing elſe but Nature it ſelf, or if you pleaſe, every Cauſe as it acts according to Nature, or according to its natural Courſe.

As for *Epicurus*, he was of the ſame Opinion as *Ariſtotle*, and accordingly he took away the abſolute and unavoidable neceſſity of Things, but he hath this Conceit particularly to himſelf, that he hath invented for that purpoſe another Hypotheſis, and hath fancied this long ſeries of Cauſes, or this mixture of Atoms mentioned before, that there might be ſomething to break off the neceſſity of Deſtiny, and might preſerve the liberty of the Will, which he ſaith is free and not ſubject to the Fates.

——— *Et fatis avolſa voluntas.*

That is to ſay, out of that ſequel or ſeries of Moyements, which according to *Democritus* follow one another by an abſolute, everlaſting and unavoidable Neceſſity, as if Experience and Reaſon had drawn this Truth from the Mouth of *Epicurus*, contrary to his own Principles.

Beſides, did all Things move in a direct Line,
Did ſtill one Motion to another joyn,
In certain order, and no Seeds decline,
And make a Motion fit to diſſipate,
The well-wrought Chain of Cauſes and ſtrong Fate;
Whence comes that perfect freedom of the Mind,
Whence comes the Will ſo free, ſo unconfin'd,
Above the power of Fate, by which we go,
When ere we pleaſe, and what we will we do?

But *Democritus*, as *Cicero* hath afterwards done, would but make a Jeſt of that Hypotheſis or Suppoſition, not only becauſe 'tis a meer Imagination, but alſo becauſe 'tis of no uſe to *Epicurus* nor to his deſign; for ſaith he, 'This declining Motion of 'Atoms being as natural as the perpendicular, all 'Things will be done always in the ſame manner 'as by Deſtiny, ſeeing that which will happen will 'happen always by the ſame neceſſity according to 'the difference and diverſity of the Cauſes of theſe 'Motions which follow one another, as in a kind 'of Chain by a certain continued Series; be-'cauſe he ſuppoſing the Spirit of Man to be corpo-'real, or compoſed of Atoms as other Things are 'he draws it not out of that everlaſting Chain of 'Motions, which are of themſelves natural and 'neceſſary, as he makes all the Atoms generally to 'be.

It

It can never be, ſaith *Democritus* to *Epicurus*, That the Mind of Man can ſhew or exerciſe this Liberty, by which he deſires, as ſuppoſe, for inſtance an Apple: He ought firſt to have the Idea or viſible Shape of the Apple in his Imagination, which Idea paſſing through his Eyes, moves his Underſtanding to know the Apple: And that the Apple may be able to tranſmit that Idea to the Eye, it ought to be put into ſuch a place by one who hath gathered it from the Tree, or that he hath had elſewhere. Now the Tree, beſides the Sun-beams, the Moiſture and the Earth, which have made it grow, ought to have had a Grain of Seed from whence it had its beginning: This Grain muſt have proceeded from another Apple, that Apple from another Tree, which Tree was ſet in that place and in that time, and not in another; and thus going back to the very beginning of the World, in which time the Earth and all Earthly Seeds were generated, as he ſays from a general Meeting or Concourſe of theſe Atoms, which that they might be able to meet or gather together in ſuch a place, and in that manner ought to come from thence and not from any other place, from that World and not from another, and ſo of all the foregoing Eternity. Beſides, if, as he pretends, the Spirit is made up of Atoms, theſe Atoms ought to have been continued in the Seed of the Parents; they ought to gather there together, from certain Food, from a certain Air, from a certain Sun: Such and ſuch Food ought to have been taken and no other, their Cauſes and all other Cauſes ought to have been ſo, and to proceed from ſuch Cauſes and from no other, and ſo from all Eternity. So that theſe Cauſes have from all Eternity been ſo bound to the other Cauſes, that when theſe laſt have met together, the

Mind could not but desire and wish for this Apple.

This is what *Cicero* seems to have in his Fancy, when he laughs at this Declension of Atoms, as a thing altogether whymsical and fantastical, and of no use to save our Freedom and remove the absolute Necessity of Things; for if the right and perpendicular Motion of the Atoms proceeds from a Necessity of Nature, that of the Declension will also be of the same Necessity. So that tho' we may say that *Epicurus* deserves to be commended for having endeavoured to preserve human Liberty, we may also say, that he hath not succeeded well in it, and that he could never do it by continuing in his own Principles and Doctrin: Therefore we shall take our leave here of *Epicurus*, with his *Clinamen Principiorum*, and endeavour to explain it by some other Means.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

How Deſtiny may be reconciled, or conſiſt with Fortune and Liberty.

HAving explained the ſeveral Opinions of the Philoſophers, concerning Deſtiny, we muſt now examin whether we are to allow it or not, and in what manner, and how we may reconcile it with Liberty. Firſt, The Opinion of *Democritus* ought to be rejected, becauſe he takes from God the Creation and Government of the World; nor is it conſiſtent with the Doctrin of our Faith: Beſides, it is repugnant to the Light of Nature, which ſhews us by our own experience, that we are Free and at Liberty. That of *Ariſtotle* and *Epicurus* may be allowed, as to this, That it makes Deſtiny and Nature, or natural Cauſes to be the ſame thing, and that it endeavours to preſerve our Liberty; but it ought alſo to be laid aſide as to this, That it allows not in God the Knowledge of Things, and that it ſuppoſeth that there is neither Creation nor Providence: So that there remains none but *Plato*'s Opinion, and that of the Stoicks, unto which we may adhere; and the rather, becauſe they hold, that it is God who hath created and diſpoſes, and governs the World.

But now as the chief Difficulty, which appears here, is to reconcile Deſtiny with Liberty, it will not be very needful that we ſhould reconcile it with Fortune; for in a word, we may ſay, that Deſtiny and Fortune may be allowed, upon Condition that we agree that Deſtiny is the Decree of the Divine Will, without which nothing is done; and

and Fortune, the Concourſe or the Event, which, tho' it is not foreſeen by Men, hath been nevertheleſs foreſeen by God and placed among the Series of Cauſes. We ſhall not therefore ſo much buſie our ſelves to reconcile Fortune, as to make Free-will agree with Deſtiny: It ſeems that we cannot better proceed, than by ſuppoſing, with St. *Thomas*, That Deſtiny, in reſpect of Men, is nothing elſe but that part of Providence that the Divines term Predeſtination; for by this means we ſhall reconcile both Predeſtination and Deſtiny with Liberty. We ſhall ſay, That God hath created neceſſary Cauſes and free Cauſes, and that both are ſo ſubject to the Divine Providence, that they all act after their own manner; the neceſſary in a neceſſary manner, and the free freely: But we meet here with two great Difficulties.

The firſt Difficulty, is that which proceeds from the Fore-knowledge or the Divine Preſcience, which *Ammonius* ſaith is ſo obſcure, that it hath obliged many learned Men to reject that which we name Contingency: For 'tis not only among the Divines, that this way of Argument is in Vogue, *viz.* 'Either God knows infallibly and certainly that *Peter* will deny him, or he knows it not: We cannot ſay, that he knows it not, for he foretold it, and is no Liar; and if he knows it not, he would not know all things, and conſequently he would not be God; he therefore knew it infallibly and certainly. It could not therefore otherwiſe happen, but *Peter* muſt deny him; for if it could have otherwiſe been, and that making uſe of his Liberty, he had not really denied him; we might then ſay, that God's Fore-knowledge had been deceitful, and his Prediction falſe. But if that cannot be, he was not free either to deny or not to deny; he had therefore no Free-will. I ſay,

'tis

'tis not only among the Divines alone, that this way of Reaſoning is uſual; we have the like among the Philoſophers: In this manner they ſpeak in the Writings of *Ammonius*, 'Either the Gods know 'infallibly the Event or Juſtice of things that are 'contingent; that is to ſay, which of the things 'ſhall happen, or they know not: We cannot ſay, *&c.*

Know then that the Divines ſolve this Difficulty by diſtinguiſhing two ſorts of Neceſſities, the one abſolute, the other conditional or upon ſuppoſition; for Example, it is abſolutely neceſſary that two times two ſhould make four, or that Winter ſhould be paſt; but yet 'tis not neceſſary that you ſhall lay the Foundation of a Building, or that you ſhould depart out of Town; however if you will ſuppoſe that you are to Build, or that you ſhould be in the Country, then 'tis required that you ſhall lay Foundations, or that you ſhould go out of Town; but this Neceſſity is ſtill a Neceſſity upon Suppoſition, which takes not away our Liberty; becauſe he who lays Foundations, might chuſe whether he would lay them or no, as he who goes out of Town might not go out if he pleaſed. So in reſpect of *Peter*, 'tis true, ſay they, the denyal of *Peter* which God foreſaw, ſhall be infallible; but it ſhall only be through a Neceſſity upon Suppoſition, which, as we have ſaid, injures not our Freedom. And 'tis doubtleſs no wonder, ſay they, that this Neceſſity is not repugnant to Liberty, becauſe it don't precede or go before it, but follows after, and that it is not ſo much in the Thing as in the Circumſtance of the Time: For when we ſay, that it is neceſſary that *Peter* ſhould have denied, we don't underſtand that there was any thing in *Peter* antecedently, to conſtrain him to act ſo, but only that now there is ſomething in the Time which hath

hath cauſed him to act in the time; I ſay, which as it is paſt and cannot but be paſt: So the thing that hath been done, in what time, in what manner ſoever it hath been done, cannot but be done: So that all the Neceſſity falls upon the Time paſt. Now as God knows all things, he truly foreſees that *Peter* would deny him; but the foreſeeing of this Denyal, follows the foreſeeing of the free Determination: So that he only foreſees plainly that *Peter* would deny him, becauſe he foreſees that *Peter* would determin himſelf, or freely reſolve to deny him: From whence it is, that we commonly ſay, That *Peter* will not deny, becauſe God foreſaw, but God foreſaw becauſe *Peter* will deny.

In truth, all Knowledge is outward and exterior to the thing known, and that a thing borrows not what it hath from that Knowledge, but it hath it of it ſelf, or from its Cauſe. As the Snow is not white, becauſe 'tis known to be white, but it is known to be white becauſe 'tis white.

I confeſs, that there is this difference between the Divine Knowledge and Ours, that ours cannot extend to things that are contingent, but only to the things that are preſent or paſt; whereas the Divine Knowledge reaches to the time to come: Nevertheleſs, as the things that are now paſt were formerly to come, and in the ſame Condition as thoſe that are now to come; and that we underſtand that the things that are now to come ſhall hereafter be paſt, and in the ſame Condition as thoſe that are now paſt; ſo 'tis certain, that as the Knowledge either of God or of Men makes not the things which heretofore have been, to be paſt, becauſe they are known to be paſt, but they are known to be paſt becauſe they are now paſt; and thus thoſe that are to come are not to come, becauſe God knows them, but becauſe they are to come.

Thus,

Thus, for Inſtance, If *Peter* could have not denied, and that upon uſing his Liberty, he had not denied; there would then have been in God's Foreknowledge and Fore-telling a deceit. This we deny; for at the ſame time we don't agree, that God would foreknow or foretel that *Peter* ſhould deny: For if it had been ſo, he had foreſeen and foretold that he would not have denied; becauſe in this Caſe there would be a Suppoſition contrary, namely, that *Peter* would freely reſolve to not deny: Now we agree, that *Peter* will deny, and that God foreſees and foretels that truly becauſe *Peter* being able to reſolve either to deny or not to deny, he will reſolve rather to deny than not.

The ſecond Difficulty is taken from that kind of Queſtion or Sophiſtical Argument which is called the Slothful Reaſon, becauſe if we obeyed and followed it, ſaith *Cicero*, we ſhould remain always with folded Elbows, and never attempt or endeavour any thing in our Life; 'Either I am predeſtinated, or I am not, that is to ſay, either I am 'elected from all Eternity to an everlaſting Glory, 'or reprobated and deſigned for perpetual Torments. If I am predeſtinated, then whatſoever 'I do, I cannot be damned; but if I am a reprobate, 'then whatſoever means I uſe, and whatſoever 'pain I ſuffer, I cannot be ſaved; now one or the 'other muſt neceſſarily be true: Therefore whatſoever I do, ſeeing I cannot advantage my ſelf, what 'need is there that I ſhould take care about any 'thing? From thence ſome draw this Concluſion, That they may boldly go on in a courſe of Vice and Wickedneſs; for we often hear People reaſoning in this manner; 'If I am predeſtinated, neither 'my Crimes nor my evil Deeds can damn me; If I 'am a reprobate, my Piety and Sanctity will profit 'me nothing, but I am one of them: Therefore I 'need

'need not trouble my ſelf, I may do what I 'pleaſe.

In the ſame manner, in the Works of *Cicero*, we find certain Philoſophers of his time arguing thus; 'If it be your Fate that you ſhould be cured of this 'Diſtemper, whether you deſire the Phyſician's 'Aſſiſtance or no you will be cured. And if your 'Deſtiny be that you ſhall not be cured, call the 'Phyſician or call him not, you cannot be cured; 'but one of theſe two muſt be; therefore it pro-'fiteth nothing to call for the Phyſician's Aſſiſt-'ance: We may alſo, without uſing the word 'Deſtiny or Fate, alter the words in this manner, 'and ſay thus, If from all Eternity this hath been 'true, That you ſhall be cured of that Diſeaſe, call 'for the Phyſician or call not for him, you ſhall be 'cured. And ſo if from all Eternity this hath been 'true, You ſhall not be cured of that Diſeaſe; whe-'ther you have a Phyſician or no, you ſhall not be 'cured.

This Difficulty hath cauſed among the Divines two famous Opinions; in either of which there is always this to be noted, that after they have been both well examined, we are ſtill forced to confeſs, of what Perſuaſion ſoever we are, That this Myſtery is above the reach of human Judgment; and to ſay with the Apoſtle, That the depth of the Riches of the Wiſdom and Knowledge of God is great, his Judgments incomprehenſible, and his Ways paſt finding out: *O altitudo divitiarum ſapientiæ & ſcientiæ Dei; quam incomprehenſibilia ſunt judicia ejus & inveſtigabiles viæ ejus!*

The firſt Opinion maintains, That God from all Eternity hath predeſtinated and choſen out from among the Generations of Mankind a certain number of People, to whom out of his meer Bounty, and without any conſideration of their Merits, nor

any

any foreſight of their good Actions, he hath decreed their everlaſting Happineſs, and that he hath reprobated or condemned all the reſt to everlaſting Torments, conſidering nevertheleſs, and foreſeeing their wicked Actions.

The ſecond holds, That God hath alſo predeſtinated ſome to Glory, but with a reſpect to their good Deeds foreſeen, as he hath reprobated all the reſt, with a reſpect to their evil Deeds foreſeen: For in this manner the Matter being conceived according to Man's Judgment, may be thus explained.

God from all Eternity hath decreed to create the World; and in this World, Men, who being left to the uſe of their Reaſon and Liberty, might be capable of Rewards and Puniſhments. He hath alſo decreed to grant to all Men a ſupernatural Aſſiſtance, that is to ſay, a ſufficient Grace, to the end that thoſe who according to their Liberty ſhould make uſe of this Grace to do well, ſhould be deſtinated or deſigned for Glory; and that thoſe who ſhould abuſe and neglect it, by doing Evil, ſhould be deſigned for Torments. Laſtly, becauſe he hath foreſeen that ſome would make a good uſe of his Grace, and ſhould die in that State; whereas all the reſt would make but a bad uſe of it, and would never reform, not even at the very hour of Death; for that Reaſon, he hath decreed to the firſt Glory everlaſting, and to the laſt everlaſting Puniſhments.

Now either of theſe Opinions anſwer and contradict the ſlothful Arguments or way of Reaſoning; the laſt hath this advantage, that it may anſwer it more eaſily than the firſt; for truly 'tis very difficult for the firſt Opinion to preſerve Liberty or Free-will in thoſe who, by an efficacious decree of God, without any regard had to their good Works foreſeen, have been predeſtinated to Glory; for as this

this Decree preceeds all the Motions of the Will foreſeen, how can the Will be free to do any thing from whence may enſue everlaſting Damnation? For if it ſhould do it, then the Decree of Election would be void and fruſtrated, neither is it leſs difficult to preſerve it in the reprobate; for if we ſuppoſe them not to be elected, they cannot, whatever they do, be admitted among the Elect.

I know there are ſome who offer here a ſeeming difference, when they allow to God a certain conditional Knowlede and that of Means. And they require good Works in ſuch a manner, if not for the Decree of Election, at leaſt for the Execution; ſo that no Body arrives to this Glory without Works and without Merits preceeding, at leaſt without the Merits of a Saviour; but as the difficulty is not thereby removed, the Truth is, that they acknowledge no other Liberty but that which we underſtand commonly by this Word *Libentia.*

Nevertheleſs they bring this reaſon againſt them who would make uſe of this ſlothful reaſoning, That there is a very good cauſe why a Man ſhould endeavour to do Good rather than Evil, becauſe tho the Decree is unknown to us, nevertheleſs 'tis certain that no Man ſhall ever be promoted to Glory if he hath not done good Works; neither ſhall he be baniſhed into Torments if he hath never done Evil.

They ſay moreover, that it concerns us very much to attain as much as we are able to a certainty of our Election by good Works, rather than of Reprobation by Evil, that ſo we may be able to allay the Fears and apprehenſions in which we muſt otherwiſe ſpend our Lives, and that we may act and proceed on with this aſſurance, that while we do well we have no reaſon to dread any Evil from God, who is moſt Good and moſt Juſt.

But

But in the mean while that no Perſon might glory that he ought to be elected becauſe of his good Works, and that none ſhould complain becauſe he was not comprehended in the Election, and that it was none of his Fault againſt him that boaſts they make uſe of this Expreſſion, *O Man! What is it that diſtinguiſhes thee?* If any one happen to complain; They tell him; *Who art thou that dareſt contend with thy God? Shall the Earthen-Veſſel ſay to the Potter, Why haſt thou made me thus? Is it not lawful for the Potter to make one Veſſel of Honour and another of Diſhonour?* And to them who are too curious to ſeek after the Secrets of God, they make uſe of the Words of the Holy Doctor; Judge not why he draws this Man and not that Man, if thou wilt not err; *Noli judicare quare hunc trahat*, &c.

As for the other Opinion, its Defenders ſeem to be better able to refute him who makes uſe of the unactive Argument. Either I am Predeſtinated, ſay you, and elected for Glory, or reprobated and condemned to Torments. This is what muſt be granted; but we muſt at the ſame time add, That now 'tis in your Power either to be Predeſtinated or Reprobated, for now you are in that Condition in which God hath foreſeen that you ſhould be inabled with a ſufficient Grace, and this depends upon your Free-will, whether he hath foreſeen you a good Man or an Evil. So that in conſideration of this foreſight he hath either Predeſtinated or Reprobated you. Thus you ſee that it belongs to you and concerns you to do good now, and to crave aſſiſtance of the Divine Grace, that God foreſeeing from all Eternity this aſſiſtance that you ſhould crave may have Predeſtinated you; for if you act otherwiſe, in conſideration of theſe very wicked Actions, God will have reprobated you.

Pretend not that God knows from all Eternity, if you be Predeſtinated or not, and therefore you muſt needs unavoidably be what you are or ought to be, ſeeing that the Divine Knowledge cannot be deceived nor changed; for God hath truly known it from all Eternity, but conſequently to his Decree, and he hath not made his Decree, but by foreſeeing what you would do. Therefore this Action of your Will preceeds God's Foreſight, both the Divine Decree of your Predeſtination or Reprobation, and the Divine Knowledge of your everlaſting Happineſs or Miſery; not that theſe antecedent and conſequential Decrees ſtill relate to time; but according to our humane way of Speaking, we conceive and declare them to be ſo, when we conſider the Nature of Free-Will and the Nature of God, who is Juſt, and cannot but act juſtly.

And although we might hence infer that there is here no antecedent Will which might hinder our Will from being free, nor do what it pleaſeth, nor be able to carry its Hand either to the Fire or Water, yet you cannot therefore pretend that 'tis in your Power to fruſtrate the Divine Decree, becauſe that Decree was made but upon this Suppoſition of what you were to do, and its unchangeableneſs proceeds from a neceſſity of Suppoſition, which does not in the leaſt deprive Man of his Liberty of acting freely.

But poſſibly you may ſay, if God in conſideration of the good Works that I perform at preſent, hath Predeſtinated me, I ſhall be beholding to none for my diſtinction, but to my ſelf. This dont follow: For 'tis not of your ſelves by the power of your own Virtues and Strength, that you are thus diſtinguiſh'd, but the Grace of God, without which you cannot do theſe good Works. Thus it will not be difficult to ſay, why this Veſſel hath been thus faſhioned,

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this a Veſſel of Honour that of Diſhonour; why this Man ſhould be drawn, and that Man not; ſeeing that ſufficient Grace being allowed to all in general, the Reſolution and Determination purſuant to that Grace is the Canſe.

I confeſs this may ſeem to look a little hard when we conſider how God hath made ſome Men for Honour, and others for Diſhonour; and that all ſuffer not themſelves to be freely and willingly drawn, nor Co-operate with the Divine Grace, ſeeing that he might have made them all in ſuch a manner, that they might have been all deſigned for Honour, and none for Diſhonour and Contempt, and that all might have Co-operated with the Grace of God. And truly as the Choice of Virtue and Vice that we embrace, and that God hath foreſeen in Predeſtinating or Reprobating Men, depends upon the Notions and Repreſentations of Things which appear to us, we have always a great Cauſe to cry out as we before did, *O the Depths*, &c. becauſe it dont depend upon us that ſuch or ſuch Objects appear ſo to us, and conſequently that we ſhould be poſſeſſed with ſuch or ſuch Notions or Imaginations; but from the Series, the Concatenation and diſpoſition of Things, which God hath eſtabliſhed according to the adorable and unſearchable courſe of his Wiſdom. 'Tis therefore alſo that tho this Opinion ſeems to be the eaſieſt, it ſeems nevertheleſs to leave always ſome difficulty or doubt behind, and we cannot ſo plainly diſcover all Things here, but we are obliged again to recur to the Saying of the Apoſtle, *O Altitudo divitiarum Sapientiæ*, &c.

But having Travelled through many Nations where People have been ſtrongly poſſeſſed with the Opinion of Predeſtination, I ſhall freely ſpeak my Thoughts, as to what I have ſeen and known, That the firſt Opinion hath ſtrong Conſequences, and that

it appears to me very dangerous and pernicious to publick Society; for it is either able to oblige Men to all manner of Vices, or to caſt them into Deſpair. But not to inſiſt upon the Reaſons of Divines, nor to liſten to that Perſian Author, who ſuppoſing that by deſtroying Liberty or Free-Will, you at the ſame time deſtroy all Religion, for this is *The Spunge*, as he calls it, *to blot out all Religions.* How think ye that a *Turk*, for example, will excuſe his Vices when a Derviſe undertakes to admoniſh him, *How now Derviſe*, ſaith he, *doſt thou not know as well as I, that all is written above, and that theſe are Characters not to be blotted out, but everlaſting and irrevocable Decrees? Doeſt thou not agree with me, that this ſuppoſed Liberty, this pretended Power, either to act or not to act, to do Good or to do Evil, is a fooliſh Fancy of the Jahours or Infidels, and that conſequently we have in us nothing but the Will, but the Inclination and Propenſity, which is very much differing from that we call Free-Will and Liberty? Are not theſe thy Doctrins as well as mine, and doſt thou yet tell us that God doth Predeſtinate us, and Save us without the conſideration of our good Works, without any regard to our Merits; but that he doth nevertheleſs Damn us with a reſpect to our Crimes and our Demerits? As if this were not a plain Contradiction: As if thou wouldeſt make us believe that we are free to one, but that we are not free nor at liberty to the other: Or as if we could deſerve an everlaſting Puniſhment, but cannot merit the leaſt Reward. Forbear Derviſe, forbear then to ſpeak in this manner; if thou wilt diſcourſe after thine own Principles and mine, God Damns us as he Saveth us. I tell thee again, All Things are written above, and according to thy Doctrin theſe Names of Choice and Liberty are but fooliſh Fancies and Chimeras. If I do Well, 'tis becauſe I cannot do Evil; if I do Evil, 'tis becauſe I cannot Well; If I am deſigned for Happineſs, I ſhall by a meer*

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neceſſity die a Saint, as Ali; *If thou art deſigned for Miſery, Neceſſity will force thee to hang thy ſelf in deſpair, as* Yahoud.

Horrid blaſphemous Expreſſions! which ſhews a wilfull blindneſs and deſpair, a hardneſs of Heart like that of *Pharoah*. Now theſe being the Diſcourſes and Opinions, or rather the Blaſphemies of theſe Mahometans, which have often made me tremble when I have either read their Books or heard it from their Mouths; Pray tell me what Wickedneſſes are not ſuch Men capable of, who argue in this manner; chiefly if they are in Power or of a Temper that inclines them to Cruelty, to Revenge, or any other Vice? Is there any Crime or any act of Tyranny that can offend them? Their poor Subjects and People under them are made too ſenſible of it: And is there any debauched or filthy Pleaſures in which they are not ready to plunge themſelves? 'Tis eaſily to be obſerved by thoſe who have lived but a little while among them.

Beſides, is there any thing more dreadful and terrible than this Doctrin, and theſe ways of Worſhip, to a Man who is naturally tender, and not as yet altogether hardned in a wicked Courſe of life? For according to this Belief, he cannot look upon God any longer but as a powerful and unmerciful Tyrant; he will have no longer any hopes in his Bounty and Mercy, no longer hopes to prevail upon him by Prayers, by Alms-Deeds, or by Repentance; he will have always before his Eyes Hell open to devour him, and if he runs not headlong into Deſtruction, he will lead but a miſerable life, diſtracted by a multitude of dreadful diſmal Thoughts, becauſe he will be deprived of that ſweet Cordial and chief Conſolation that I have juſt now mentioned, *viz.* of the Aſſurance that he

may have in the Bounty and infinite Mercy of God. I have therefore many times ſpoken it, and ſay it again, This Opinion ſeems to me to be ſo dangerous becauſe of its Conſequences, that if it were impoſſible to be true, I know not whether, for the Welfare and Safety of Mankind, it were not convenient to ſuppreſs it, or at leaſt to forbid it to be ſpoken among Men. 'Tis not but that we muſt preſs upon the Minds of the People the fear of God, and to make them ſenſible of his Judgments; but we muſt take great heed not to caſt them into deſpair, by taking from them what I cannot too often repeat, *viz.* the Aſſurance that we have upon God's divine Goodneſs and Mercy, which is the only Relief and Conſolation of the poor, ſick and afflicted Sinner, who is ſenſible of his former Sins and Miſcarriages, and reſolves unfeignedly to repent and return to the right way: Beſides, if we would awe the People and keep them within the Bounds of Duty, it is the higheſt Concernment to inſtruct them that they have a liberty of acting freely. That God's Foreſeeing forces no more than Man's foreſight would do, or that of an Angel, which we might ſuppoſe to be as certain as that of God's; that they are predeſtinated or reprobated only in reſpect of their good or evil Actions, and that they have all the Means and Aſſiſtances needful to do well, and that conſequently they only are in fault if they live otherwiſe: So that if they act wickedly and damn themſelves, they ought not to complain of God but againſt themſelves, againſt their Wills, of their own wilful Neglect or Obſtinacy.

From what we have ſaid, judge whether I have any Reaſon to believe this Doctrin ſo deſtructive to human Society: Certainly when we conſider that they be chiefly the Mahometan Nations who

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are infected with it, and that it is principally among them, that it is now entertained and encouraged; I might very well imagin that it was the Contrivance of ſome of thoſe Tyrants of *Aſia*, as *Mahomet*, *Enguis-Kan*, *Tamarlane* or *Bajazet*, or ſome of thoſe other Plagues of the World; who, to ſatisfie their reſtleſs Ambition, endeavoured to poſſeſs their Souldiers with this Opinion of Predeſtination, that they might more freely encounter the greateſt Dangers, run boldly headlong, on occaſion, into the Breaches of a beſieged Town or City, and ſo ſerve as a Bridge for the reſt to paſs over into it.

I know very well that ſome may perhaps ſay, That this Opinion is miſtaken, and not well underſtood by the Mahometans, and that they have not the true Conſiderations of the Corruption of our Nature by original Sin, ſuch as we ſhould have. But however, what can we reaſonably expect from a Doctrin which may be ſo eaſily miſtaken and ill underſtood, and that may either by miſtake or otherwiſe have ſuch pernicious Conſequences?

For my part, if I could prevail, we ſhould mention it but very ſeldom, or not at all, not buſying our ſelves to ſtir up thoſe Difficulties which are of no uſe, but to intangle the Minds of Men; and which the Apoſtle himſelf eſteems too deep to be ſearch'd into and diſcover'd by our human Underſtandings, but truly to acknowledge our own Ignorance, and be contended to ſay with him, O infinite and unfathomable Depth of Wiſdom and Knowledge, how incomprehenſible are thy Judgments, and thy Ways paſt diſcovery to Mankind! *Quam incomprehenſibilia ſunt judicia ejus & inveſtigabiles viæ ejus!*

CHAP. IV.

Of Divination, or the foretelling of future Contingencies.

AS *Epicurus* could not underſtand how two contrary Propoſitions, which regard a future Contingency, the one could be certainly true and the other infallibly falſe, and that notwithſtanding Man could continue his Free-will and be at liberty to make his Choice; and of two Things propoſed to do one or t' other, tho' there could be but one determined to be done; he therefore was of Opinion, that there could be no Divination or certain Prediction, in relation to things to come, which were of themſelves contingent: And that therefore there was no Art to Divine, nor any true Divination; and if there were, the things that were foretold and ſhould come to paſs would not be in our Power: For if what were predicted were abſolutely true and unqueſtionable, it could not be otherwiſe but it muſt happen accordingly, and conſequently the contrary could not: So that there would be a neceſſity for the doing one, and no liberty left for the other. But we have already proved that the Fore-knowledge and Fore-ſight of God may very well agree with the Free-will of Man, and therefore the Truth of the things which have been foretold by the Prophets, inſpired from above and contained in the Holy Scriptures, remains entire.

Therefore we ſhall only mention that Divination which was ſo famous among the ancient Heathens. *Cicero* ſaith, that of all the Philoſophers, there is none

none that hath more deſpiſed and ridicul'd it than *Epicurus*, *Nihil tam ridet Epicurus quam prædictiones rerum futurarum.* And when he ſpeaks of the Stoicks, who were addicted to, and protectors of this Opinion, he ſays, that he was ſorry that thoſe who were of his Sect had given occaſion to the Epicureans to laugh at them; *Doleo Stoicos noſtros Epicureis deridendi ſui facultatem dediſſe; non enim ignorare quam iſta derideant.* And elſewhere he ſaith, if we ſhould give heed to thoſe Diſcourſes, we ſhould commit an Act of Superſtition, we ſhould adore all thoſe Sooth-ſayers and Fortune-tellers, *Tanta imbueremur ſuperſtitione, ut Haruſpices, Augures, Hariolí & Conjectores nobis eſſent colendi. Epicurus*, ſaith he again, delivered us from all thoſe Fears, and ſet us at Liberty; *His terroribus ab Epicuro ſoluti fuerimus & in libertatem vindicati*, &c.

Epicurus gave no Credit to Dreams, as *Eumolpus* ſaith in *Petronius*, *This gives us to underſtand*, ſaith he, *that* Epicurus *was an excellent Man, for he ridiculed all thoſe ſorts of Fooleries.* And *Tertullian*, *Vana in totum ſomnia Epicurus judicavit.* Cicero, *Inſolenter credo ab Epicureo aliquo inductus diſputat ſomniis credi non oportere.*

He laughs in *Lucretius* for the Interpretation that was made of thoſe Prodigies.

But not by reading Tuſcan Books enquire
The Gods Deſign by this celeſtial Fire.

He had no greater Opinion of the Oracles; if we may credit *Origen* and *Euſebius*, who inform us that *Epicurus* and all his Diſciples laughed at 'em. And *Plutarch* brings in a certain Boethian, an Epicurean, who found fault with the Verſes of the Sybils, as weak, ſimple and ſenſeleſs, without quantity or meaſure, and as having nothing Divine in them,

them, *Tanquam principio truncos, medio elumbes, fine claudicantes*, &c. and that the Style was ſo flat that there was no Poet that would offer to imitate them. Beſides, the ſame *Plutarch* obſerves, that *Colotes* ſuſpected the Oracle of *Apollo* concerning *Socrates*. And *Lucretius* commends *Empedocles*, and other Philoſophers, for having given Anſwers ſavouring more of Sanctity and Certainty, than thoſe of the Delphick Oracle.

——*For ſome rare Inventions juſtly fam'd*
Which they have left as Oracles more ſure
Than from the Tripod ſpoke, and leſs obſcure
Than thoſe the Ancients from the Pythia heard.

And becauſe *Epicurus* ſaw that commonly Men ſuffered themſelves to be carried away with a perſuaſion, that this kind of Divination was effected by the means of the Gods or of the Demons; and that thoſe who made Profeſſion of this Art, were as it were inſpir'd with a Divine Fury when they were ready to prophecy or foretel future Events, as may appear by theſe Verſes:

Now to the Mouth they come; Aloud ſhe cries
This is the time, enquire your Deſtinies
He comes; behold the God! ——
Greater than Human Kind ſhe ſeem'd to look
And with an Accent more than Mortal ſpoke
When all the Gods came ruſhing on her Soul, &c.

And as may be ſeen in that Paſſage of *Apuleius*, where one may ſee the Relation of all thoſe Fopperies of Antiquity, which the common People received for Truths, and the wiſer for Cheats. 'Among the Demons, every one hath his diſtinct 'Office, ſome have the care to adjuſt and interpret 'Dreams;

'Dreams; others to make certain Remarks on the 'Bowels of Beaſts; others to govern the flying of 'Birds, and to teach them the augurial Notes or 'Chirpings; others to inſpire their Prophets; o-'thers to manage the Thunderbolts, and cauſe the 'Lightning to burſt out of the Clouds; and thus of other Circumſtances, by which we under-ſtand the things to come, which depend only upon the Will and Power of the Celeſtial Divinities; but are diſcovered to us by the Means, Media-tion, and care of the Demons. Thus by a Dream *Hannibal* was advertiſed of the loſs of an Eye. The Soothſayers were Impowered to foretel *Flaminius* the danger he was in of loſing a Battle; *Accius* might by a Miracle cut aſunder a Whetſtone with a Raizor that there might appear the ſigns of the alteration in the Royalty; that an Eagle ſhould continue over the Head of *Tarquin* to ſhadow him; and that the Countenance of *Servius Tullius* ſhould look as if inraged: In a Word, that all the Pre-dictions of the Soothſayers, the appearances of Lightnings, and the Verſes of the *Sybils*, &c. Be-cauſe I ſay *Epicurus* ſaw that Men ſuffered themſelves to be commonly impoſed upon by theſe things which he look'd upon as childiſh and as moſt un-reaſonable; he therefore denied the being of Spirits, and fancied that all thoſe Events were to be aſcribed rather to Fortune or Chance than to any unknown Cauſe; and the rather becauſe if we ſhould agree that there were any Demons, we ought not therefore to believe that their Under-ſtanding is ſo large as to penetrate into things to come, or to foreſee and foretel the certainty of future Events.

By the ſame Reaſon he denied that Divination which they commonly proved by the things that theſe

theſe Spirits foretold, when they appeared to Men; for after that *Brutus* had diſcerned that famous Apparition of his Genius or Ghoſt to *Caſſius*, a Diſciple of *Epicurus*, anſwered him plainly, You are deceived; 'tis not to be believed that there are any Spirits, and if there were, they cannot have any human Shape or Voice, nor any thing anſwerable to our Senſes: Yet I would to God that theſe things were true, that ſo we might not only rely upon our Arms, our Troops and our ſtrong Fleets at Sea, but alſo upon the Succours and Supports of theſe Demons and Spirits, we who are the Generals of ſo Holy and Religious a Party! Now this Opinion of *Epicurus* ought not to be condemn'd, becauſe he laughed at that too great Credulity and Superſtition of the Heathens, as well in Relation to Divination as in Relation to the Demons; but it is to be blamed, in that at leaſt he hath not believed in general the being of Spirits; ſeeing that not only Religion, but Reaſon aſſures us of their Exiſtence, as it did really perſwade thoſe Philoſophers, amongſt whom *Plutarch* reckons principally *Thales*, *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, the Stoicks, beſides *Empedocles* and ſome others, who affirmed that there were Demons who are living Subſtances; and there are alſo Heroes, who are Souls either Good or Evil, freed from their Bodies: For tho' they have erred as well in Relation to their Subſtance as to the Qualities that they attributed to their Demons, yet however they judged aright when they believed that there were ſuch. But ſeeing we are to diſcourſe of Divination, perhaps it will not be amiſs to ſpeak firſt ſomething of the Demons, unto whom it was commonly aſcribed.

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Of Demons or Spirits, according to the Opinion of Antiquity.

LET us ſuppoſe that they are thoſe unto whom the Holy Writ gives uſually the Titles of Angels, and ſometimes Demons, Devils or Satan, when it ſpeaks of the Apoſtate Angels. The Heathens call them not only Demons, but alſo Genii; tho' amongſt them they were reputed to be of a Divine Nature, or of a Nature little lower than the Divine. They were alſo named Gods and Demi-Gods, and Sons of Gods, but yet Baſtards, as being born of Nymphs, *&c.* Not to inſiſt upon the ſaying of *Ariſtotle*, that they were ſeparated Subſtances, becauſe not Corporeal, and according to his Diſciples, Intelligences, becauſe they have Underſtandings, Intelligences in Latin ſignifying the ſame as δαίμων in Greek, if what *Lactantius* and *Macrobius*, after *Plato*, have taught us, is really true.

This being premiſed, now that we may the better underſtand what notion *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and the reſt of 'em had of Demons, we muſt call to Mind what hath been ſaid of the Soul of the World: For they who have received this Opinion have fancied that theſe Demons as well as our Souls, were nothing elſe but Particles or ſmall parcels of the Soul of the World. And becauſe they believed alſo that the Soul of the World was the ſame as God, they imagin'd that the Demons were Particles of the Divine Nature; and from them ſeveveral Heretick have taken occaſion to diſcourſe of Angels in the ſame manner, in the infancy of the Chriſtian Church, for they fancy them to be taken out of the Divine Subſtance.

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These Philosophers therefore thought the Soul of the World to be like a vast and bottomless Ocean, from whence proceeds Angels and the Souls of Men, upon Condition to return back again, and reunite at last, after a time, as so many little Streams that run into the Sea. *Plotinus* seems to compare them to the Body of a Tree, whereof Demons and Souls were as the Branches, the little Twigs, the Leaves, the Flowers and the Fruits: Thus they fancied that in the same manner as the Water that runs through the Earth carries with it something of the Substance of the Minerals through which it passeth, so the Particles of the Soul of the World clothed it often with the Substance of the most subtil Bodies, unto which they remained chiefly fixed and tied.

And as they judged that this Soul though it is diffused through all the World, it resided nevertheless more particularly in the upper Region, and consequently amongst the Stars, and chiefly in the Sun; So they believed that when the Celestial Bodies spread abroad their Influences to revive and entertain the earthly Beings, that they proceed from Heaven as so many Beams from this Soul that revives all things, and that they Incorporate or become Bodies in a differing manner in their Passage, clothing themselves with a kind of Airy Habit, and remaining afterwards some in the Air, and the others proceeding as far as the Earth: So that they have believed that these kind of Substances which are thus composed of a thin Body, such as is the Air, and of a Particle of the Soul of the World, are the Demons and the Souls: Demons when they continue free from any mixture of the grosser Bodies of this Earth.

I shall not examin their other Fancy, That if the thin Body with which the Particles of the Soul of the World

World is clothed, be found to be of a ſweet kind and favourable Compoſure, then in their Opinion they happen to be good Demons or Spirits; but evil when it is ſharp and malicious. Neither ſhall I take notice of their other Imagination, That when our Souls are departed out of our Bodies, they become again Demons, not immediately, nor equally, becauſe retaining ſome Relicks of the Human Body, they could not be Demons until they were entirely ſtript, but only Heroes or demi-Gods. Let theſe be mention'd only in reference to the Opinion of thoſe who chiefly follow *Heſiod*, who as *Plutarch* relates, hath made mention of four ſorts of Beings that are endowed with Reaſon, the Gods, the Demons, the Heroes and Men; I ſay thoſe who follow *Heſiod*, for *Plato*, *Pythagoras* and others, who believe theſe laſt to be the greateſt Protectors of Demons, have divided Rational Beings into three ſorts, namely Gods, Demons and Men.

Moreover we may ſhew by ſeveral Paſſages that they fancied theſe Demons to be of a certain middle Nature, between the Gods and Men, or as they ſpeak, upon the Confines of Immortals and Mortals: But no Man better explained this Opinion than *Apuleius*; for after that he had ſaid that 'tis by their Means and Mediation that there is a Correſpondence between the Gods and Men; and as the other Regions of the World have their Beings to inhabit and live there; ſo the Superiour Region hath the Stars; the Fire the ſmall Animals mentioned by *Ariſtotle*; the Sea Fiſh; the Earth all our Terreſtrial Animals: So the Air ought not to be without its Inhabitants, which are the Demons. In this manner he explains himſelf, 'The Bodies of the Demons, ſaith he, have very little weight which hinder them 'from aſcending to the higheſt Regions; nor are they

'they ſo light as to fall down to the loweſt. 'They are Creatures of a third Nature, ſuitable to 'the middle Region, where they dwell. They are 'between the Gods and Men, being immortal as 'the Gods, but ſubject to Paſſions as Men; for as they 'are, as we, ſubject to Anger and to Mercy, and 'like us ſuffer themſelves to be overcome by Pray-'ers and Intreaties, by Gifts and Honours; ſo they 'are like us ſtir'd up to Wrath by Injuries and Con-'tempt. In a Word ſaith he, *Dæmones ſunt genere animalia, ingenio rationabilia, animo paſſiva, corpore aeria, tempore æterna.*

Where you may obſerve what he ſaith of Eternity, cannot agree with the Opinion of others, who make them ſubject to Generation and Corruption, unleſs we underſtand a long time for Eternity: For as theſe laſt ſay; Man is ſaid to be Mortal becauſe of the Diſſolution of that part by which the Soul is tied and joyned to the Body, tho the Soul by that means never periſheth; ſo the Demons ought to be reputed Mortal, becauſe tho that Beam of the Divinity which makes up the principal and intelligent part of their Being never periſheth, yet this part is ſeparated from the thin Body, unto which when it is united, it is reputed a Demon. This is likely to have given occaſion to what we have before ſpoken of their Opinion, That the Demons did ſometimes become Gods, as heretofore the Egyptians believed concerning *Iſis* and *Oſiris*, *Hercules*, *Liber* and others, as *Plutarch* obſerves. And by that we may underſtand what *Jupiter* ſpeaks in *Ovid*, That he hath Demi-Gods;

Their dwells below a Race of Demi-Gods,
Of Nymphs in Waters and of Fauns in Woods;
Who, tho not worthy yet in Heaven to live,
Let them at leaſt enjoy that Earth we give.

But

But tho all this be full of fabulous Inventions, however we may thereby perceive that the antient Philoſophers allowed the exiſtence of Demons, and that ſeveral have treated about 'em, and declared them to be of a Nature differing from the Divine Nature. But if they have fancied them to have Bodies, this Opinion is to be excuſed among thoſe Philoſophers, becauſe 'tis but of later Ages that we have been better inſtructed, that God alone was a Spirit without Body, they being perſuaded that Angels and the Souls of Men were made of a very fine and thin Subſtance, and for that reaſon there is nothing to hinder the aſſigning to them Images, tho they are perſuaded alſo, that they are Immortal by the ſpecial favour of God.

The Reaſon that induced theſe antient Philoſophers to believe that there are Demons, ſeems to be grounded upon the Notion they had of the Divine Providence; for tho they believed that God takes care of all Things, yet they fancied nevertheleſs that it did not become his glorious Majeſty to extend his Care to every particular Perſon by himſelf, and without ſome Miniſters that might execute his Orders. They therefore imagin'd that God keeps his Court in Heaven, is attended by Miniſters and Servants always ready to obey him, by whoſe means he provides for all the World, but eſpecially for this inferior World: They called theſe Miniſters (whom they acknowledged to be very nimble and active Beings, and to us inviſible) Demons; but they aſſigned the name of Genii to thoſe whoſe chief office is to take care of Men.

Now tho we cannot but acknowledge that they have hit upon a real Truth, ſeeing 'tis certain that there are Spirits and Angels in the World who are God's Miniſters, and who give their aſſiſtance eſpecially to Men; nevertheleſs this Opinion is to be

underſtood with caution; for to ſpeak abſolutely, 'tis not unbecoming the Majeſty of God to do all Things, and provide for all Things of himſelf; for 'tis from him that all his Miniſters have received all their Strength and Power, and 'tis he who is preſent at the doing of every Thing, and aſſiſts every particular Action by his Divine Influence. So that God makes uſe of Miniſters, not becauſe 'tis below him not to make uſe of 'em, or becauſe he is not able to govern otherwiſe: But becauſe, we ſuppoſe the State of the World to be ſuch as he will have it, and that he hath thought it convenient thus to order it.

But let this be as it will, their Fancy appears not only conformable to this diſtinction of the Hierarchies and celeſtial Orders taken out of the Holy Scriptures, but to thoſe Doctors alſo and learned Divines, who hold, That God hath ordained particular Angels to watch for the preſervation of divers kinds of Beings, of ſeveral ſorts of Animals and Plants, *&c.* And who judge that there is no Abſurdity, that there ſhould be ſometimes in the Air Demons or Spirits, who by the permiſſion or command of God do wonderful Things; as to cauſe Showers of Blood, of Stones, Thunder and Storms, or extraordinary Earthquakes. And truly if we may believe *Philo*, *Thoſe which the Philoſophers call Demons, are the ſame with thoſe whom* Moſes *names Angels, namely Souls that fly about the Air, that the Air might have its Creatures, as well as the Earth, the Water and the Fire have theirs.* Beſides in Holy Writ we read of certain Powers of the Air: Nay, ſome uſe Inchantments againſt Demons, who mix themſelves in the black and thick Clouds, from whence we uſually apprehend the coming of Thunders, Hail and Storms.

That

That which these same Philosophers speak of Genii, namely that there is one Chief who governs a whole Nation, and therefore called the Genius of the People or Nation, and a particular Genius for every Man, which is chiefly and properly stiled his Genius, is also agreable with what we say in other Words, The protecting Angel of a whole Nation, and the Guardian Angel of every private and particular Person; *For God*, saith *Epictetus*, *hath given to every Man a tutelar Genius that watches continually, that never Slumbers, and cannot be deceived; O Mortals! when you have shut your Doors upon you, and closed your Windows, and that you are buried in Darkness, never fancy your selves to be alone, and take heed of acting any thing unjust. You are not then alone, God is in your Chamber, and your Angel is there; they have no need of Light to see what you are doing and contriving.* *Plato* speaks almost the very same Thing, and is of Opinion, *That every one of us have our Guardian, from whom we can conceal nothing, and who is a constant Witness of every thing that we do, whether it be Good or Evil, and for whom we are to have a particular Respect.* These Philosophers also were persuaded that there were good and evil Genuii, whom we name good and evil Angels; for they thought that the good Things came from the Good, and the Evil from the mischievous Angels. Now that God suffers evil Angels or Demons to be the Enemies of Men, and to endeavour to destroy them, this relates to the general Providence of God, who hath done nothing but for just and reasonable Ends, tho not known nor discoverable to Men. And we may say in a Word, that God suffers them, as well that good Men might be exercised, and that by their Sufferings and Patience they might deserve more, as that the Wicked by their means might be Punished.

That which we ought here to add is, That tho we are ſometimes tempted by the Devil, that we are not therefore to pretend that to be a ſufficient Excuſe for the Evil committed, as if it were only the Work of the Devil, for the Holy Scripture declares, *That every one is rather tempted and drawn by his own Luſts.* Hereby we ought to underſtand, that we have no reaſon to fear ſo much the Devil as our ſelves, and that we ought to accuſtom our ſelves to allay the Fire of our Concupiſcence and Luſt, by Temperance, that ſo we might the eaſier fruſtrate all the Devils endeavours.

——Or do the Gods inſpire,
This Warmth, or make we Gods of our Deſire?

They have alſo been acquainted with that abominable Art of Inchantment and Conjuration, which is acquired and practiſed by a familiarity with the Devils. I ſuppoſe there may be and are fabulous Relations in this Matter, eſpecially when the Poets Hyperbolize and are upon their high Flights, as when *Horace* makes *Canidia* ſay in Anger that ſhe can at her Command make the Images of Wax to walk, pull the Moon out of the Heavens, and make the Aſhes of the Dead to revive.

An quæ movere cereas imagines,
Ut ipſe noſti curioſus, & Polo,
Deripere lunam vocibus poſſim meis,
Poſſim crematos excitare murtuos? &c.

As when *Ovid* introduces *Medea*, imploring the aſſiſtance of *Diana*, of the Gods of the Foreſts, and of the Night, by whoſe help ſhe made the Rivers to turn back to their Spring Heads, ſcattered the Winds,

Winds, made the Vipers to burſt, the Foreſts and Trees to walk, *&c.*

Thou Night, my Spells too faithful to betray,
Ye Golden Fires, whoſe Reign ſucceeds the Day;
Thou triple Hecate *with all thy Forms,*
The Witneſs and the Partner of my Charms.
Ye ſecret Arts, Ye magick Lays we ſing,
Ye Potent Herbs, Ye Countries where they ſpring;
Ye Mountains, Lakes and Streams, Ye Winds and Airs,
Ye Gods of Woods and Night, come all and aid my Cares.
By your Aſſiſtance, to their Fountain's Head,
Oft from their wondring Banks have Waters fled.
Winds at my Will and Clouds, I raiſe or lay,
And move the ſmooth, and ſmooth the moving Sea.
My Verſe ſeals up the Vipers poiſonous Jaws,
And living Rocks, and Earth's wide Entrails draws,
And Foreſts at my Call, the groaning Ground,
Improves the Voice, and trembling Hills reſound.
The frighted Ghoſts forſake their dark Abode,
And thou, O Moon, forget'ſt thy Heavenly Road.

The ſame thing may be ſaid of a great many Stories that we continually here concerning the like Matters. If you remove the Cheats and Coſenages of Impoſtors, the Miſchiefs cauſed by Poyſonings, and the Tales and Dreams of old Women, and the eaſy credulity of the common People, you'll ſcarce find any Truth remaining.

And here it ſeems we might ſpeak in like manner of that abominable Magick, by which ſome wicked Wretches fancy themſelves to be carried about the Air upon Goats, or tranſported by flying Serpents, after that they have anointed themſelves with Narcotick Ointments, and thus by a ſtrong Imagination, have thought themſelves conveighed to, and

preſent at the wicked and dreadful Aſſemblies of Devils and Witches.

Thus 'tis with them who fancy themſelves turned into Hobgoblins. When the melancholy Humour is Predominant, and works upon them, they become fanciful and froward, and are poſſeſs'd with divers fooliſh Fancies of the like nature.

As for thoſe who are ſaid to be really tormented or poſſeſs'd by the Devil, we muſt acknowledge that there are ſome ſuch, ſeeing that Holy Writ teſtifies as much, and that the Practice of the Exorciſts proves the ſame: But we know alſo what Caution we muſt uſe to diſtinguiſh between a real Poſſeſſion and a deluded Imagination; what may proceed from Weakneſs or the Malice of the Sex, the Effects of a Diſeaſe or a deſign'd Coſenage among Men, who commonly underſtand one another, *&c.*

But now let us return again to Divination, whereof we muſt ſpeak ſomewhat.

The Gentiles believed that ſometimes there was a Divination by the aſſiſtance of the Demons. Truly, tho' in this particular, there hath been a great deal of Superſtition and Coſenage; nevertheleſs, there muſt needs have been ſometimes ſomething of Truth to have obtained Credit, and given Birth to ſo general a Belief; for as *Cicero* ſaith, 'I 'find no Nation whatever, whether Learned or Ig'norant, Civil or Barbarous, but hath been per'ſuaded that there are ſome Signs and Prognoſticks 'of future Events; and that ſome Men have been 'able to underſtand and interpret them. The Difficulty conſiſts in this only, when the Prediction hath been performed by the means of the Devil, or by the cunning and ſubtilty of the Sooth-ſayers, or by the credulity of thoſe who make the Inquiries: For as God hath foretold many things by the Angels,

Angels, which are contain'd in the Holy Scriptures; likewiſe he hath ſuffer'd that many things ſhould be foretold among the Heathens by the means of the Devil: This hath cauſed the Fathers and the holy Doctors to exclaim againſt the Heathens, becauſe they ſuffer'd themſelves to be perſuaded and cheated by the Devils. And Hiſtorians as well as Poets, tell us, That ſome of theſe Devils were become Dumb, and were forced to be ſilent, as well at the appearance of Chriſt in the World, as at the Preſence and Command of certain holy and religious Perſons. But ſometimes theſe things were only meer Fancies, Dreams, Deluſions and Impoſtures, which were aſcribed to the Demons. But let us inſiſt upon this no longer.

Let us rather obſerve, that when it concerns Divination or the Fore-knowledge of things to come, we underſtand not that Divination, by which we foreſee and foretel things; whereof the Cauſes are natural neceſſary and not to be hindered, as are the Eclipſes, the riſing of the Stars, and ſuch like Phænomena that depend upon a certain diſpoſition and a conſtant Motion of the Celeſtial Bodies. Neither do we underſtand that which is taken for a ſimple Conjecture grounded upon likely Cauſes, that every one according to his Capacity, and according to his Cunning or happens in gueſſing well to foretel. In this ſenſe *Euripides*, and after him *Cicero* have ſaid, That he is the beſt Prophet whoſe Conjectures come to paſs.

Qui conjicit bene, ille Vates optimus.

Thus *Thales* might have been look'd upon as a Prophet, when he foretold the great quantity of Olives, by natural Prognoſticks, which we have mentioned before. In the ſame manner *Pherecides*,

when he ſaw the Water that was newly taken out of the Well, declared that an Earthquake would ſpeedily enſue: And generally whoſoever is expert in his Art may be eſteem'd for a Prophet; for we may ſay with *Cicero*, 'No Man can 'better tell by what Tempeſt the City is threatned 'than the Governour, nor what is the Nature of 'the Diſeaſe than the Phyſician, nor how we muſt 'behave our ſelves in the War than the General 'of an Army. We mean not therefore that kind of conjectural Divination, but ſuch as relate to things meerly caſual, that is to ſay, thoſe kind of Events that have no Cauſes that may be ſeen, and that are ſuch that their dependence upon their Cauſes is not known; as that *Eſchylus* ſhall be killed by the fall of a Tortoiſe, which an Eagle ſhall caſt upon his Head, and ſuch like Events.

This being pre-ſuppoſed, it follows, that all Divination is performed either artificially or naturally. The artificial is that which glories to have taken its riſe from Experience and long Obſervation, tho it can give no Reaſon, nor tell the Cauſes of thoſe things that are foretold; ſuch is that unto which the *Augures*, among the *Romans* pretended, who predicted by the flight or chirping of Birds; The *Haruſpices* by looking into the Bowels of Animals; The *Sortilegi* by Lot; The Interpreters of Dreams that were dubious and obſcure; The Interpreters of Thunders, Monſters and Prodigies; Thoſe skill'd in Phyſiognomy and Palmeſtry, and ſuch as pretend by the Lines of the Hand to foretel certain particular Events, attended with the Circumſtances of Places, of Times, of Perſons and Things. As to what concerns the Temper and natural Inclinations, no doubt but there are ſigns of them in the Body; but yet theſe ſignifie not, that ſuch and ſuch things ſhall come to paſs at ſuch

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and ſuch a time, and that in ſuch and ſuch a manner.

As to that other ſort of Divination, which is not performed by Art or by the help of Signs or long Obſervation, this is effected by ſome Apparition, or a diſcourſe with Ghoſts or Spirits, or by a certain Agitation or Fury of Mind, either ſupernatural or cauſed by the Devil: Such is that which we believe to have been in the Sybils, and ſuch as have been in an Extaſie, of thoſe whoſe Underſtanding, ſometimes when they have been awake and other times in their ſleep, hath been ſo moved and exalted beyond its ordinary Station, that it ſees many things that in a natural and peaceable Temper it ſees not.

As for artificial Divination, 'tis not needful that we ſhould buſie our ſelves to refute it, ſeeing by that what we have ſaid concerning judicial Aſtrology, 'tis certain, that if this Art, which among all the Arts of Divination is the Chief, and yet is but vain and fantaſtical; the reſt ought not to be otherwiſe eſteem'd: And truly if there were any reality in theſe Arts, why at preſent, ſince they are of no uſe in any Religion, ſhould they be looked upon as of worth, ſeeing that heretofore when their Religion ordered them to be taken notice of, the learned and moſt intelligible Men of thoſe Times ſlighted them? For we know what Advice *Thales* gave to *Periander*, when a Monſter, half Man and half Beaſt was born of a Mare, from whence the Chief Prieſt concluded that there would be a dangerous Sedition that would follow: 'Tis alſo known what *Cato*, as *Cicero* tells, uſed merrily to ſay, That he wondered that when a Fortune-teller or Cunning Man met with another of the ſame Trade, that is to ſay, one Cheat met with another, how he could contain himſelf from ſmiling; *Mira-*

ri

ri ſe quod non rideret Haruſpex Haruſpicem cum vi-diſſet. 'Tis the ſame thing which was ſaid upon the occaſion of a Serpent that had wound it ſelf about a Lever; that it had been indeed a wonder if the Lever had been wound about the Serpent. Thus *Hannibal* ſpoke to King *Pruſias*, who was loath to fight, becauſe the Bowels of the Beaſts were not favourable; *Had you rather give Credit to the Entrails of a Calf, than to an able and experienced General of an Army, as* Hannibal? Such another Story is related of *Claudius Pulcher*, who was reſolved to ingage in a Sea-Fight, tho' the Chickens would not come out of their Coup: Well, ſaid he, to the Keeper who told him that it was but an ill Sign, caſt them into the Sea; for ſeeing they will not eat they ſhall drink, *Quia eſſe nolunt, bibant. Marcellus* alſo ſaid pleaſantly, That when he would perform any thing he was willing to, the better not to be hindered by theſe Men of Art, was wont to march with his Litter ſhut. And *Moſamac*, who kill'd a Bird that hindered a whole Caravan from marching on their Journey, becauſe they ſaw it flying ſometimes this way ſometimes that, ſpoke thus to 'em; 'Are 'you ſuch Fools as to believe that this Bird that 'knew not how to preſerve its own life, ſhould 'know any thing of our Journey?

We may alledge our daily Experience; certainly when Experience is conſtant, there is nothing but ought to yield to it. But how often do things happen contrary to what is foretold? '*Flavinius*, ſaith '*Cicero*, obeyed the Sooth-ſayers, and periſhed with 'his Army. A year after *Paulus*, who was alſo 'perſuaded by them, was alſo killed with all his 'Army at the Battel of *Cannæ*. What ſhall we ſay 'of the Anſwers of the *Augures?* I know of a 'great many that have had no Events, or ſuch as 'were contrary to their Predictions. Theſe Di-

'viners

'viners, forbid *Cesar* to pass over into *Africa* before 'Winter; yet he passed over and Conquered. If what we Dream of happens sometimes, how often doth it never come to Pass? and because sometimes it never happens, ought we not to conclude, that if it happens 'tis Chance, rather than to think that there is any Art in it? Who is it that shoots every Day with a Bow, and will not sometimes hit the Mark? We sleep every Night, and there is scarce any of us but Dream, and we seem surprised when what we have dreamt of sometimes comes to pass: You will say 'tis an effect of the Providence of the Gods to intimate to us before hand by Signs, the things that may befall us; for there is nothing more useful to us. But to what end should the Gods give us Signs of the Mischiefs that must fall upon us? Why should they give us such Signs that we cannot understand without Interpreters? Why should they signify to us what we cannot avoid? and if the Signs are of a Divine Original, why are they so obscure? Is it probable that the Immortal Gods those Divine and Excellent Beings, should busy themselves to buz about the Beds and mean Retirements of poor Mortals, in what part of the World soever they be; and that when they find any of them snoring, they should present them with troublesome, dubious and obscure Visions to fright them, and to oblige them the next Morning to run and consult the Soothsayer? Is not this a natural Effect that our active Spirits having been lately disturb'd should fancy to see sleeping what they had seen when awake? Which of these is most becoming a Philosopher, to Interpret things by the Superstion of Fortune-tellers and Conjurers, or by the Explication of Natural

tural Cauſes; and the leſs we are to heed them, becauſe they who exerciſe this Profeſſion, are Fellows made up of the Dregs of the People, and very Ignorant. 'One that was to run in the '*Olypick* Games dreamt as he was a ſleeping, that 'he was carried away upon a Chariot with four 'Horſes. In the Morning he went and conſulted 'the Soothſayers; they told him you will infallibly 'carry away the Prize, the ſwiftneſs and the ſtrength 'of the Horſes intimate as much. The ſame Per-'ſon went to adviſe with *Antiphon*, who aſſured him 'that of Neceſſity he would be overcome; Don't 'you ſee that four ran before you? A married Wo-'man that deſires to have a Child, and queſtions 'whether ſhe is Pregnant; and fancies that her 'Womb is ſhut up: The Soothſayer that ſhe went to 'adviſe with in the Morning, told her that ſhe could 'not poſſibly Conceive, becauſe her Womb was 'cloſed up: Another tells her that doubtleſs ſhe was 'with Child; becauſe nothing is ſealed or cloſed up 'in vain, and without cauſe. What ought we to 'think of that Conjectural Art which is to no other 'end but to delude and deceive us by the ſubtilty of 'Wit? Is it that the great number of Obſervations 'and Precepts that the Stoicks have gathered con-'cerning this matter, ſignifies any thing elſe but a 'little Cunning and Subtilty, which from ſome like-'lyhood carries its Conjecture, now this way, than a-'nother? Suppoſe one ſhould now find a Serpent 'twin'd about the young *Roſcius* yet in his Cradle, 'which perhaps was falſe; but if there ſhould be 'found one in the Cradle, there is no great won-'der, becauſe the Serpents are very common and 'numerous at *Celoin*, they being often found by 'the Fire-ſide.

I know that theſe Soothſayers pretend that there is nothing more Illuſtrious; nothing more Noble, more Excellent, than their Art. I wonder why the Immortal Gods ſhould be willing to ſhew ſuch ſtrange and miraculous Thing, in favour of a *Charlatan*, and that they would never ſhew ſo much Favour to a *Scipio Africanus*.

For as to that Divination which is without Art, we might juſtly take for Fabulous; ſuch as that related amongſt the Heathens of certain Spirits that appeared openly, and familiarly diſcourſed and foretold things that were to come: For to mention ſomething of that of *Brutus* that told him that he ſhould loſe the Day at the Battel in the Fields of *Philippi*, and that he would there appear to him: We muſt obſerve that *Brutus* having revealed this Apparition the foregoing Night to *Caſſius*, the next Morning *Caſſius* told him that this ſuppoſed Apparition or Spirit was but a Miſt before his Eyes, or of his deluded Imagination: And that this was the more probable becauſe *Brutus* was of a Melancholy Temper, as *Plutarch* obſerves, that the troubles of his Mind ſo oppreſſed him that he ſeldom ſlept; and when he conſidered in what danger the Common-wealth was, and remembred that *Pompey* had been unhappy in a like cauſe, he pondred what Reſolution he might take if things ſucceeded not well; and that which is conſiderable, ruminating and thinking upon theſe and ſuch like things, when the Night was well ſpent all his Camp very ſilent, all their Lights out, and he half aſleep, 'tis no wonder that he then thought he had ſeen and heard his Genius or Spirit, becauſe he was perſwaded by the Doctrines of his Sect, being a Stoick, that there were good and evil Spirits; beſides there are four Circumſtances that diſcover in

in what diſturbance his Mind was then in, and that we may ſuppoſe him to have been but in a Slumber, or as we ſay Dreaming, or half aſleep: The firſt is that he enquired of his Servants if they had heard nothing: This ſhews that he himſelf was doubtful whether this had happened to him awake or aſleep. The ſecond, that the Domeſticks anſwered him that they had neither ſeen nor heard any thing; nevertheleſs if it had been ſo, they could not but have ſeen that monſtrous Image or Appearance, at leaſt to have heard its Voice, which *Brutus* declared to be to this effect; *I am, O* Brutus! *thy evil Genius, thou ſhalt ſee me again at the Fields of* Philippi: The third, that his Servants ſhould have heard the Speech of *Brutus* to the Spirit, when he askt it whether it was a God or Man, and what it would have? *Ecquis tu Deorum aut hominum es? Ecquid tibi vis qui ad nos veniſti?* And that Word which he ſpake without being daunted, after the Spirit had diſcourſed with him, *Videbo:* The fourth, is that *Brutus* according to the Relation of *Plutarch*, was ſettled in his Mind after that he had heard and adviſed with *Caſſius*, by whoſe reaſoning he underſtood that all this was but a meer Dream.

But what ſhall we ſay of that famous Genius or Demon of *Socrates?* 'Tis true *Socrates* himſelf ſpeaks of it diverſly in ſeveral Places; but as this Philoſopher was altogether employed about preſcribing Precepts of good Manners; he may perhaps make uſe of this cunning to add a greater weight to his wholſome Admonitions; for we may know well enough with what authority he ſpeaks who is ſuppoſed to be divinely Inſpired: Beſides, when *Simias* in *Plutarch* made it his buſineſs to inquire of *Socrates* himſelf what this Genius was;

Socra-

Socrates never answered him a Word: This shews sufficiently that *Socrates* would not tell a lie by confirming it, nor would deny it by answering, for fear that his wholsome and good Councils should lose thereby their Authority and Influence.

So that we may suppose that the Genius of *Socrates* was nothing else but his Reason, his Wisdom, and Natural Prudence, which had been empowered by a constant and continual Study of Philosophy, and which discover'd to him what was best to be done, and furnished him with those good Counsels which he imparted to his Auditors; and this is so much the more probable because *Xenocrates*, one of the Disciples and Successors of *Plato*, and who consequently ought to know the Thoughts of *Plato* and of *Socrates*, saith, *That he is happy who is inriched with a good Soul, and that such a Soul is to every one of us a Genius or advising Spirit.* And *Plato* speaks in this manner of that most excellent part, our Soul, *That God hath bestowed it upon us to be as our Demon that inhabits in the highest and loftiest Fortress of our Bodies; and that he who takes care of that divine Spark within him, and who improves well his familiar Spirit, becomes extraordinary Happy. Clemens Alexandrius* speaks almost to the same Purpose, when he teaches, *That Happiness is nothing else but to improve well our Spirit or Genius, and that the principal part of our Souls is called by the name of Demon.*

As to what concerns that supposed Agitation by which the Spirit being as it were out of it self, and seperated from all Matter, foretold things to come; this supposeth that the Spirit is a Particle of God, or of the Soul of the World, and by that means knows all things, as being of the same Nature with God, who is present in all Actions, and every where, and therefore is ignorant of nothing.

Now

Now the Diſciples of *Plato*, and generally all thoſe who are perſwaded that our Soul is part of the Soul of the World, fancy that when the Soul is ingaged in the Body, it ſees not plainly all things as that Soul doth whereof it is a Particle; but nevertheleſs, that it is in a poſſibility to ſee and know them; firſt when it is ſtirred up by the ſtrength of certain Diſeaſes; for *Ariſtotle* acknowledgeth, that in thoſe Perſons who are troubled with Melancholy, there ſeems ſomething Divine, which predicts the time to come.

Secondly, when it withdraws its ſelf in its own Being, and is in a perfect Tranquility, and Sequeſtring it ſelf at the ſame moment from the Thoughts and Incumbrances of Corporeal Matters; and is if we may ſo ſay, altogether in its own Power, which happens as they ſay, chiefly in Dreams, or when we are ready to die, and when it begins to free it ſelf from the Clog of the Body; for theſe be the very Words of *Plato*, cited by *Cicero*. Plato *therefore appoints us to prepare and diſpoſe in ſuch a manner our Bodies for ſleep, that there may be nothing to cauſe a miſtake or diſturbance; for this cauſe the Diſciples of* Pythagoras *were forbidden to eat Beans, becauſe this Food cauſeth the the Stomach to ſwell, and begets Wind and Vapors that diſturb the Tranquility of the Mind; when therefore in our ſleep the Spirit is diſengaged from theſe hindrances of the Body, it calls to Mind the time paſt, ſees the preſent, and foreſees the time to come; for the Body of a ſleeping Perſon is like that of a dead Man; but his Spirit is living, and in its full Vigour.*

But not to ſtay here to refute this Perſuaſion; becauſe 'tis a meer Fable to ſay that our Souls are the Particles of the Divine Subſtance, and that there are ſome who can Prophecy in their Madneſs, in their

their Melancholy, or in their Sleep: Let us only conclude with *Cicero*'s Words, That 'tis very absurd to believe that God sends Dreams; for that they are incident not only to Men of Sense and Honour and Wisdom, but even to Men of meanest and lowest Degree.

Of the Oracles.

LAstly, for the Oracles and those Predictions that are ascribed to the Sybils and to the Prophets, when they were possess'd with a divine Fury that disturb'd them, caused their Colour and Countenance to change, their Head and Breast to swell in such a manner that they were quite out of breath, and as it were ready to expire, as *Virgil* excellently represents it:

——Thus while she laid,
And shivering at the sacred Entrance staid,
Her Colour chang'd, her Face was not the same
And hollow Groans from her deep Spirit came:
Her Hair stood up; convulsive Rage possess'd
Her trembling Limbs, and heav'd her labouring Breast;
Greater than Human Kind she seem'd to look,
And with an Accent more than Mortal spoke:
Her staring Eyes with sparkling Fury roul,
When all the Gods came rushing on her Soul.

I shall not say that this kind of Fury seems not becoming the Divine Majesty, and therefore *Cicero* hath great cause to speak of it in these words; What Reason or Authority can you produce for this Divine Fury? Can it be suppos'd, that what a wise Man cannot foresee, a Fool or a Man depriv'd of his Senses should be able to discover? I shall only observe some Particulars that will discover to us the Vanity and Folly of the thing: The first is the affectation of delivering their Oracles in Verse and not in Prose. We have already observed that the Disciples of *Epicurus* made but a

ſport of thoſe Verſes, as being ridiculous and unworthy of the Divinity: In this manner *Cicero* ſpeaks of them, 'Theſe Verſes which they ſay the 'Sybil in her fury made and pronouc'd, favour 'more of Cunning and Subtilty, than of Tranſport 'and Diſturbance of Mind; for the Author who 'compos'd them, hath artificially contrived, that 'whatſoever happen'd, it will ſeem to be thereby 'foretold, for they expreſs nothing preciſely nor 'plainly, neither of Men nor Times; but have de-'ſignedly made them obſcure, that they might ſeem 'at another time to be fit for other purpoſes; all which 'does not denote a Perſon in furious Tranſports, 'but one who is ſenſible and cautious of what he 'doth or ſaith.

The Second particular is this *Amphibologia*, or manner of delivering theſe Oracles with a double Signification, which Savours of a Subtilty that is no greater than what belongs to Man. Beſides among many of thoſe who are moſt Famous, there are ſeveral that are forged and invented meerly for Pleaſure. For Example in relation to theſe.

Crœſus, *the* Halys *paſſing, ſhall deſtroy,*
A mighty Maſs of Wealth——
Pyrrhus, *thy Force the* Romans *ſhall deſtroy.*

Cicero informs us that the Firſt was never given to *Crœſus*, and that *Herodotus* may have invented it of his own Head, as *Ennius* contrived the latter. And eſpecially as to the latter, for that it was certainly forged at pleaſure, and that it was never delivered to *Pyrrhus*, becauſe *Apollo* never ſpoke in *Latin*, and that in the Days of *Pyrrhus*, *Apollo* had left off making Verſes.

The third particular is the Juggling or Forgeries related at large by *Euſebius*, which prove that the Oracles were never delivered by the Gods or by the Demons, but that they were contrived by cunning Knaves, Cheats and Impoſtors; as *Lucian* very well obſerved, when he tells us by what means he

he himſelf diſcovered all the Subtilty by which the falſe Prophet, *Alexander*, had made himſelf ſo famous in the Oracle. He ſaith moreover, that this falſe Prophet hated very much the Chriſtians and the Epicureans, becauſe they maintained, that the Oracles were nothing but meer Lies. In this manner *Euſebius* ſpeaks of them; 'They have among 'them Promoters and Miniſters of their Cheats and 'Tricks, who walk up and down and round about 'to inquire diligently, and ask thoſe who came, 'for what purpoſe and upon what occaſion every 'one comes to conſult the Oracle: They have in 'their Temples a great many dark Corners and 'Places to retreat and hide, where the People are 'not to enter, and where they place themſelves 'to hear what is ſpoken, without being ſeen. So 'that the Darkneſs of the place, the Precaution, 'the Superſtition of thoſe that come, and the Au'thority of the Ancients who have believed in 'theſe Oracles, are of great uſe to 'em: We might 'add alſo the Folly and Stupidity of the People, 'who never try nor examin things, and the Dex'terity, the Cunning and Subtilty of thoſe who 'manage the Buſineſs, and who promiſe to every 'one pleaſing Things, and entertain all the World 'with fair Hopes, *&c.*

He relates afterwards their ambiguous manner of ſpeaking, their unuſual and barbarous Words, and the affected compoſure of their Expreſſions, how often the Oracles have been proved guilty of Falſhood, and how often thoſe who by their Advice have undertaken Wars, and have met with very ill Succeſs; how many Perſons they have deluded, unto whom they promiſed Health and Proſperity: And after his Concluſion from hence, that they were no Gods but Impoſtors, who uttered theſe Oracles, he continues and goes on thus, 'But why 'do you think it is that they thus court Strangers, 'and give them ſuch great Encouragments, more

'than the Inhabitants of the Place, who are their 'Friends or Fellow-Citizens, unto whom they ſhould 'conſequently endeavour to render the Gods more 'Propitious than to others who are no ways related 'to them? The Reaſon is plain; for it is much 'more eaſy to deceive Strangers, who underſtand 'not their Jugglings, than Neighbours who are ac-'quainted with all their ſlights and cunning. This 'ſhews ſufficiently that there is nothing here Di-'vine, nothing that is above the Reach and Con-'trivance of Man.

Afterwards he reckons up ſeveral Oracles that have faltred, and divers of their Temples that have been burned; and then argues from thence, 'If 'theſe wonderful Utterers of Oracles are not able 'to protect their own Temples nor defend them-'ſelves in time of Danger, how can they defend 'others? But the ſtrongeſt Reaſon of all is, that 'many of theſe Diviners, Sooth-ſayers and For-'tune-tellers having been by the Ancients examin-'ed, and more lately by the *Romans*, have plainly 'diſcovered the Truth, and declared that the Mi-'ſtake proceeded from the too eaſie credulity of 'Men, and that all was nothing but Subtilty and 'Cheat. We are not here to forget, that after *Euſebius* had made mention of the Diſciples of *Ari-ſtotle*, and of the Cynicks, ſays as to the Epicu-reans, 'That he wonder'd at them, becauſe being 'bred from their Cradle, after the manner of the 'Greeks, and inſtructed by their Parents in the 'Belief and Doctrins of the Gods; they neverthe-'leſs would not ſuffer themſelves to be cheated by 'Miſtakes, but have boldly declared their Senti-'ments againſt ſuch Oracles, tho' they were then 'very famous and much frequented from all parts 'of the World, proteſting that they were meer 'Cheats and Impoſtures, and making it appear that 'they were not only fooliſh, idle, and vain, but alſo 'wicked.

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GASSENDI's MORALS.

A

THREE DISCOURSES OF HAPPINESS, VIRTUE, AND LIBERTY.

Collected from the WORKS of the

Learn'd *GASSENDI*,

By Monsieur *Bernier*.

Translated out of French.

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THE PREFACE.

THE Epicurean Philoſophers placing the Happineſs of Man in the Satisfaction of the Mind, and Health of the Body, aſſure us that thoſe two are no otherwiſe to be procured than by a conſtant Practice of Virtue: And becauſe they have had the hard Fate to be miſrepreſented by moſt of the other Sects, as well Ancient as Modern, and their Principles traduced as favouring the moſt brutal Senſuality; the Learned Gaſſendi, *who had either examined their Doctrin with more Diligence, or interpreted their Sentiments with more Candour and Juſtice, thought he could not employ his Time better, than to vindicate the Morals of* Epicurus

and his Followers, from the Slanders of Miſtake and Malice, and to ſhew that their principal Deſign was, to lead Men by ſmooth and eaſie Paths to a juſt, ſober, wiſe and virtuous Behaviour, as the only way to true Happineſs. This he proved at large, and illuſtrated with the Sentiments of many great and excellent Men among the Greeks *and* Romans. *But becauſe theſe Things were diffuſed through the voluminous Works of that Great Man, Monſieur* Bernier, *whoſe Name is a ſufficient Commendation in the Common-wealth of Learning, took the Pains to put them together, and to form them into ſeveral intire Diſcourſes; which on account of their great importance to Mankind, are here preſented to the Publick.*

OF

OF

Moral Philoſophy

IN GENERAL

MAnkind having a natural Inclination to be happy, the main bent and deſign of all his Actions and Endeavours tend chiefly that way. It is therefore an undeniable Truth, that Happineſs, or a Life free from Pain and Miſery, are ſuch things as influence and direct all our Actions and Purpoſes to the obtaining of them. And tho' ſeveral Perſons, who neither want the Neceſſities nor Conveniences of Life, poſſeſſing great Riches, promoted to Dignites and Honours, bleſſed with a beautiful and hopeful Off-ſpring in a word, who want nothing, that may ſeem requiſite to compleat their preſent Happineſs; tho' I ſay, we find many, who have all theſe Advantages, yet they lead an anxious and uneaſy Life, diſquieted with Cares, Troubles and perpetual Diſturbances. From whence the wiſer ſort of Mankind have concluded, That the Source of this Evil proceeds from the Ignorance of the Cauſe, wherein our true Happineſs conſiſts, and of the laſt end, which every one ſhould propoſe to himſelf in all his Actions, which being neglected we are led blind-fold by our Paſſions, and forſake Honeſty, Vertue and good Manners, without which it is impoſſible to live happily. For this Reaſon they have therefore undertaken to inſtruct us wherein true

Happineſs conſiſts; and to propoſe ſuch uſeful Precepts for the due regulation of our Paſſions, whereby our Minds may be leſs liable to be diſturb'd. This Collection of Precepts, Reflections and Reaſonings, they name *The Art of Living*; or, *The Art of leading an happy Life.* And which they commonly call, *Moral Philoſophy*; becauſe it comprehends ſuch Doctrins as relate to the Manners of Men; that is to ſay, the accuſtomed and habitual Actions of Life.

From hence we may underſtand, That this part of Philoſophy is not only ſpeculative, and reſts in the bare Contemplation of its Object, but proceeds to Action, and that it is, as we uſually ſay, active and practical; for it directs and governs our Manners, rendring them regular, and agreeable with the Rules of Juſtice and Honeſty. So that in this reſpect, it may be ſaid to be *The Science*, or if this Term be ſcrupled at, we may call it, *The Art of doing well.* I only make this Suppoſition; for let it be ſtiled Art or Science, 'tis a difference only in Name, which depends upon the manner of underſtanding thoſe two Words, and therefore requires no further Scrutiny into the matter.

We will rather take notice, that *Democritus*, *Epicurus*, and divers others of no ſmall Eminency, have had ſo high an eſteem for *Moral Philoſophy*, that they have judged the *Natural* to be no further regarded, than only as it was found uſeful in freeing us from certain Errors and Miſtakes in our Underſtanding, which might diſturb the Repoſe and Tranquility of our Life, and wherein it might be ſerviceable to *Moral Philoſophy*, or to the better obtaining of that Knowledge, which teaches us to live happily and comfortably. I ſhall not mention the Followers of *Socrates*, *Ariſtippius*, *Anthiſtenes*, with the *Cyrenaicks* and *Cynicks*, who altogether neglecting the *Natural*, gave themſelves entirely over to the ſtudy of *Moral Philoſophy*, conſidering with *Socrates*, what might make for

for the Good or Ill of Families, and what might contribute to the Grief and Diſturbance of Man's Life.

Quid ſiet in domibus fortaſſe malumve bonumve.

We may alſo here obſerve, That tho' *Socrates* is ſuppoſed to be the Inventer of *Moral Philoſophy*, this is only to be underſtood, ſo far as he did cultivate and improve a new and conſiderable part, not that he laid the firſt and Original Precepts of it; for it is certain that before him, *Pythagoras* had much improved this ſort of Knowledge. And 'tis well known, that he commonly aſſerted, *That the Diſcourſe of a Philoſopher, that cures not the Mind of ſome Paſſion, is vain and uſeleſs; as the Phyſick that drives not away the Diſtemper from the Body, is inſignificant.* It is likewiſe very certain, That the wiſe Men of *Greece*, who lived a little before *Pythagoras*, were named wiſe, only becauſe they addicted themſelves to the Study of Moral Wiſdom. Therefore at this preſent time, their famous Sentences, that relate to Mens Manners, are generally known all over the World. We might add, if we would make farther ſearch into the Antiquity of the Heroes, that we ſhall find *Orpheus*, by this ſame Study of *Moral Philoſophy*, drawing the Men of his time off from their barbarous and ſavage way of Living; which gave occaſion of that Saying of him, *That he tamed the Tygers and the Lions*, as *Horace* deſcribes;

Orpheus *inſpir'd by more than human Power,*
Did not (as Poets feign) tame ſavage Beaſts,
But Men as lawleſs and as wild as they,
And firſt diſſwaded them from Rage and Blood.
Thus when Amphion *built the* Theban *Wall,*
They feign'd the Stones obey'd his Magick Lute.

In a word, it was Morality that firſt ſet a Mark of Diſtinction between publick and private Good, ſettled our Rights and Authority, and gave Laws and Rules for regulating Societies; as the ſame Poet expreſſes:

——When Man yet new,
No Rule but uncorrupted Reaſon knew;
And with a native bent did Good purſue,
Unforc'd by Puniſhment, unaw'd by Fear,
His Words were ſimple, and his Soul ſincere.
No ſuppliant Crowds before the Judge appear'd,
No Court erected yet, no Cauſe was heard;
But all was ſafe, for Conſcience was their Guard.

However, we muſt acknowledge our ſelves much indebted to *Socrates*, as to *Moral Philoſophy*, ſince by his applying himſelf to the ſtudy thereof, it hath given us Opportunity of great Improvement, by reducing it to a more diſtinct and eaſy method than formerly; and we find, that the Diſciples of the great *Plato*, and of *Xenophon* alſo, have left behind them curious and excellent Monuments; nor have thoſe who ſucceeded them, as *Ariſtotle*, and the *Stoicks*, come ſhort of handling it more methodically, and at large.

THE

THE First BOOK CONCERNING HAPPINESS.

CHAP. I.

What Happineſs is.

THo' *Felicity* or *Happineſs* be properly the enjoyment of the Sovereign or Chief Good; and therefore the moſt bleſſed Eſtate that can be deſired; yet becauſe this Eſtate of Enjoyment comprehends this Sovereign Good, it is for that Reaſon called by this Name. It is alſo termed the Chief or the Ultimate Happineſs, the End of all Ends, or *The End*, for its Excellency, becauſe all other things are deſired and ſought after for it's ſake. And laſtly, that it is deſired alone for it's own ſake. To this purpoſe *Ariſtotle* tells us, *That amongſt the things that are deſirable, there muſt be*

ſomething at laſt which is moſt deſirable, that ſo we might avoid an Infinity. But here we may make two conſiderable Remarks.

The Firſt is, That we don't concern our ſelves here with that Happineſs mentioned by the Sacred Pen-Men, when they tell us how happy that Man is, who being aſſiſted with the Divine Influences, betakes himſelf entirely to the Service of God; and being filled with Faith and Hope, and inflamed with Charity, ſpends his Life in Peace and Tranquility. Nor ſhall we Treat of that which may be called Natural Happineſs, becauſe it may be obtained by the ſtrength of Nature, being ſuch as the ancient Philoſophers did not doubt but to enjoy here on Earth.

The Second is, That by this Natural Felicity that we here Treat of, is not to be underſtood ſuch a ſtate of Life as we can't imagin a better, a more pleaſant, and more deſirable; in the which we cannot apprehend any evil, nor think of any good thing which we ſhall not poſſeſs; nor of any thing that we have a deſire to do, but we ſhall be able to accompliſh it, and that it ſhall remain fix'd and unchangeable. But we underſtand ſuch a certain ſtate of Life, in which we may be as happy as is poſſible; in which there are abundance of good things, and very few of any ſort of evil; and in which conſequently we may lead as eaſie, quiet and undiſturbed a Life as the Condition of the Country, the Society we Converſe with, the Conſtitution of our Bodies, the manner of our Life, our Age and other Circumſtances will permit: For to propoſe to our ſelves more than this, or to affect during the Courſe of our Natural Life the higheſt Felicity, is not to acknowledge, but rather forget our ſelves to be Men; that is to ſay, weak and feeble Animals, who by the Laws of Nature are ſubject to an infinite number of Miſchiefs and Evils.

And in this ſenſe it is that we uſually ſay, a Wiſe Man, tho' tormented with exquiſite Pains, may nevertheleſs be happy; not in a perfect and compleat ſenſe, but he may attain to that degree that we call Human Happineſs, which the Wiſe Man always enjoys in that meaſure that the Circumſtances will permit, becauſe he don't increaſe his Miſery, either by Impatience, or Deſpair, but rather abates it by his Conſtancy. And by this means he is happier, or to ſpeak more properly, he is leſs miſerable than if he ſuffered himſelf to be dejected, as others in like Caſes, who bear not their Misfortunes with the ſame patience and conſtancy of Mind, and who beſides are not ſupplied with the ſame Encouragements from Wiſdom as he hath; ſuch I mean as an innocent Life, and a good Conſcience void of offence, which always afford great quiet and ſatisfaction to the Mind.

Wherefore 'tis improper to uſe this kind of Expreſſion; *That it is the ſame thing for a Wiſe Man to be burning in* Phalaris's *Bull, as to be ſolacing himſelf upon a Bed of Roſes*; for it is of ſuch things as Fire and Torments that he deſires to be exempt, and wiſhes much rather that they were not, or that he might not ſuffer by them; but when they come upon him, he conſiders them as unavoidable Evils, and ſuffers them with Courage; ſo that he may ſay, *Uror, ſed invictus*; I burn, it is true, and ſuffer, and ſometimes I ſigh and weep, but for all this I am not vanquiſh'd, nor overcome, nor do I ſuffer my ſelf to be tranſported with Deſpair, which would render my Condition much more miſerable.

Several Opinions concerning the efficient Cauſe of Happineſs.

AT our firſt entring upon this Diſcourſe, we may obſerve, that the efficient Cauſes of Happineſs being nothing elſe but the Goods of the Soul, of the Body, or of Fortune, ſome of the Philoſophers have highly extolled the firſt, ſome the ſecond, and others have included them all. Thoſe who chiefly recommend the Riches of the Mind, as *Anaxagoras*, propoſe for the obtaining of Happineſs, *A Contemplative Life, together with ſuch a kind of Freedom which proceeds from profound Knowledge.* Poſſidonius requires *Contemplation, with a Dominion over the irrational part of Man. Herillus*, generally and ſimply, *Learning*, or *Knowledge. Apollodorus* and *Lycus* generally, *the Pleaſures of the Mind.* Leucinus *the Pleaſures that proceed from honeſt things.* The Stoicks, *Zenon, Cleanthes, Ariſtus*, and the reſt, require *Vertue.* Therefore theſe laſt proceeded ſo far as to ſay, *That if a Man poſſeſs'd Vertue, it matter'd not whether he were ſick or well.* All the reſt by common Conſent maintain'd, *that to live happily, was nothing elſe but to live a Vertuous Life*, or as they expreſs it, *according to Nature.*

As for thoſe who prefer the Riches and advantages of the Body, and who chiefly aim at ſenſual Pleaſures, they were for that Reaſon Named the Voluptuous, *Voluptuarii Philoſophi*, of whom we ſhall have occaſion to diſcourſe hereafter, when we ſhall compare them with *Epicurus.*

At preſent we ſhall only take notice that they have had *Ariſtippus* for their Leader, and with him the *Cyrenaïcks*, of whom we ſhall make mention afterwards; and that the *Annicerians*, who proceed from the *Cyrenaicks*, aimed at no certain end of Life, but

at

at the Pleaſure of every particular Action, of what kind or Nature ſoever.

Laſtly, amongſt ſuch as prefer the Goods of Fortune, they are generally the vulgar ſort of People, who look with a greedy deſire, ſome upon Riches, ſome upon Honours, ſome upon other things: But amongſt the Philoſophers none are mention'd, but ſuch as joyn to theſe outward Advantages the perfections alſo both of the Mind and Body; for this hath given occaſion to the Poets to make theſe excellent repreſentations of Happineſs, which they have borrowed from ſeveral Opinions of the Philoſophers, ſuch as this, which requires that good Fortune might accompany Vertue.

Virtus colenda; Sors petenda a Diis bona:
Hæc quippe duo cui ſuppetunt, is vivere
Et vir beatus, & bonus ſimul poteſt.

Another deſires to enjoy perfect Health, and a ſound Conſtitution of Body, Riches purchaſed without Fraud, and in ſhort, to ſpend his Life amongſt his Friends.

Fragili viro optima res bene valere,
Atque indolem bonam eſſe ſortitum;
Tum & poſſidere opes dolo haud partas;
Tandem & cum amicis exigere vitam.

Another Deſcription we find in *Martial*, who among many other things, deſires to enjoy a Paternal Eſtate, acquir'd without Labour, to be free from the vexation of Law-Suits, *&c.*

Since Deareſt Friend 'tis your deſire to ſee
A true Receipt of Happineſs from me;
Theſe are the Chief Ingredients, if not all,
Take an Eſtate neither too great, nor ſmall,
Which Quantum ſufficit *the Doctors call.*

Let

Let this Eſtate from Parents Care deſcend,
The getting it too much of Life does ſpend.
Take ſuch a Ground, whoſe gratitude may be
A fair Encouragement for Induſtry:
Let conſtant Fires the Winter's Fury tame,
And let thy Kitchins be a Veſtal Flame:
Thee to the Town let never Suits at Law,
And rarely, very rarely Buſineſs draw;
Thy active Mind in equal Temper keep,
In undiſturbed Peace, yet not in ſleep;
Let Exerciſe a vigorous Health maintain,
Without which, all the Compoſition's vain:
In the ſame weight Prudence and Innocence take,
Ana *of each does the juſt Mixture make:*
But a few Friendſhips wear, and let them be
By Nature and by Fortune fit for thee:
Inſtead of Art and Luxury in Food,
Let Mirth and Freedom make thy Table good.
If any Cares into the Day-time creep,
At Night without Wine's Opium, let them ſleep.
Let Reſt, which Nature does to Darkneſs wed,
And not Luſt, recommend to thee thy Bed.
Be ſatisfied, and pleas'd with what thou art,
Act chearfully and well th' allotted Part:
Enjoy the preſent hour, be thankful for the paſt,
And neither fear nor wiſh th' approaches of the laſt.

Here we may firſt obſerve, as *Horace* according to *Ariſtotle* tells us, that many are often diſappointed in their ſearch after Happineſs, imagining that it conſiks chiefly in ſuch things as they want, and which they admire in others; as the Ignorant ſuppoſe it in Knowledge, the Poor in Riches, the Sick in Health; which *Horace* very well expreſſeth, ſpeaking of the Merchant, of the Soldier, and of the Husbandman; the one envies and admires the other's Condition.

O happy

O happy Seamen! cries th' Old Son of War,
With batter'd Limbs, and half his Face a Scar.
The reſtleſs Seaman, when inſulting Gales
Toſs the light Bark, and Conquer all his Sails:
(If fear allows one diſtant thought, or word,)
Trembling applauds the Brother of the Sword.
The Man of Law when pondring at the Door,
His wakeful Client knocks him up at four
Wou'd leave the Bar, to lie ſecurely warm,
And part with all his Practice for a Farm.
The clumſy Peaſant, if when Harveſt's done,
A kind Subpœna call's him up to Town;
'Tis odds, but raviſh'd with the gaudy Scene,
He ſells his Team, ſets up for Citizen.

Secondly, To admire nothing, as *Horace* again ſays, is almoſt the only thing capable of rendring a Man happy, and continuing him ſo.

Not to admire, as moſt are wont to do,
It is the only Method that I know,
To make Men happy, and to keep them ſo.

And this does not only ſhew the Tranquility of mind unto which he hath attained; who perceiving the Vanity of all Human things, does not admire nor any way ſeek after, but rather deſpiſes the Glory of Power, Honours, and Riches, which generally dazle Mens Eyes; but it alſo ſhews that other ſort of Tranquility, which he hath attained, who hath arrived to the knowledge of Natural Cauſes; ſo that he neither wonders, nor fears, nor is any way diſquieted, as the Vulgar uſually are.

Happy the Man who ſtudying Nature's Laws,
Thro' known Effects can trace the ſecret Cauſe;

His

His Mind poſſeſſing in a quiet State,
Fearleſs of Fortune, and reſign'd to Fate.

Thirdly, That the ſweet Repoſe and Quiet which we meet with in a retired ſtate, void of the Incumbrances of the World, contributes not a little to our Happineſs; for he that aſpires to the true Felicity of Life, which conſiſts chiefly in the Tranquility of Mind, muſt not, as *Democritus* tells us, incumber himſelf in much Buſineſs, either Private, or Publick. And it is generally known, that the Oracle eſteem'd not the Great King *Gyges* ſo Happy as the Old Father *Aglaus Pſophidius*, who in a little Corner of *Arcadia*, Husbanded a ſmall Eſtate, from which he reapt plentifully the Neceſſaries of Life, and never departing thence, ſpent his time comfortably, free from Ambition, and without the leaſt ſenſe of the Evils which torment the greateſt part of Mankind.

'Tis this ſweet Retirement that *Horace* hath ſo much commended in his Praiſe of a Country Life.

Happy the Man, whom bounteous Gods allow,
With his own hands Paternal Grounds to Plough!
Like the firſt Golden Mortal happy he
From Buſineſs and the Cares of Many free!
No Human Storms break off at Land his Sleep,
No loud Alarms of Nature on the Deep.
From all the Cheats of Law, he lives ſecure,
Nor do's th' Affronts of Palaces endure.

The ſame ſtate *Virgil* deſcribes in his 2d *Georgic*.

O Happy (if his Happineſs he knows)
The Country Swain! on whom kind Heav'n beſtows,
At home all Riches, that wiſe Nature needs,
Whom the juſt Earth with Eaſe and Plenty feeds.
'Tis true, no Morning Tide of Clients comes,
And fills the Painted Channels of his Rooms;

Adoring

Adoring the rich Figures as they paſs;
In Tapeſtry wrought, or cut in living Braſs;
Nor is his Wool ſuperfluouſly dy'd
With the dear Poiſon of Aſſyrian *Pride;*
Nor do Arabian *Perfumes vainly ſpoil*
The native Uſe and Sweetneſs of his Oyl;
Inſtead of theſe his calm and harmleſs Life,
Free from th' Alarms of Fear and Storm of Striſe
Do's with ſubſtantial Bleſſedneſs abound,
And the ſoft Wings of Peace cover him round.
Through Artleſs Grates the murmuring Waters glide,
Thick Trees both againſt Heat and Cold provide,
From whence the Birds ſalute him, and his Ground
With lowing Herds and bleating Sheep do's ſound;
And all the Rivers and the Foreſts nigh,
Do Food and Game and Exerciſe ſupply.

As to *Epicurus* we ſhall ſpeak more at large, that he makes Happineſs to conſiſt in the Eaſe of the Body, and the Tranquility of the Mind, teaching at the ſame time, and maintaining, That the efficient Cauſes of this Felicity, are neither the delicious Wines, nor the delicate Meats, nor any ſuch thing; *but a ſound, juſt and enlightned Reaſon aſſiſted by Vertue, from which it is not to be ſeparated, and which duly weighs and examines the Cauſes and Motives that induce us, either to embrace or ſhun any thing.* Therefore deſigning to treat afterwards of Happineſs, he earneſtly exhorts, to conſider throughly of the things that conduce to it; and becauſe amongſt thoſe things the chief is, That the Mind may be diſengaged from certain Miſtakes, which cauſe continual Diſturbances and vain Fears, he mentions ſeveral Particulars, which he believes to be of that Importance, that when well examin'd, will ſettle the Mind, and procure to it a real and ſolid Happineſs.

Some

Some Particulars needful to be examin'd, and conſider'd, which will contribute very much to the Repoſe and Happineſs of the Mind.

THE Firſt Particular, is the Knowledge and Fear of God. And certainly this Philoſopher had good Reaſon to recommend to us in the firſt place, the right Ideas that we are to entertain of this Sovereign Being; becauſe he that hath a right Notion of him, is ſo much inflamed with Love and Affection for God, that he conſtantly endeavours to pleaſe him by an honeſt and a vertuous Life, always truſting in his infinite Goodneſs, and expecting all things from him, who is the Fountain of all good: By this means he ſpends his Life ſweetly, peaceably, and pleaſantly. We ſhall not concern our ſelves here to ſhew the Exiſtence of this Being, ſeeing we have already done it elſewhere: But ſhall only take notice, that tho' *Epicurus* delivers ſome Notions that are very juſt and reaſonable, yet he hath others that are not to be entertained by pious Men, tho' he interprets 'em after his own Faſhion; ſuch are to be look'd upon as impious; for he believes, That God hath a Being, as *Lucretius* makes him acknowledge in his firſt Book.

For whatſoe'er's Divine muſt live in Peace,
In undiſturb'd and everlaſting Eaſe;
Not care for us; from Fears and Dangers free,
Sufficient to it's own Felicity:
Nought here below, nought in our Power it needs,
Ne'er ſmiles at good, ne'er frowns at wicked deeds.

Now I ſay, to believe ſuch a ſupreme Being, that exiſts to all Eternity, is immortal and infinitely happy in it's own Nature, enjoying all things within it ſelf,

ſelf, and ſtands in no need of us, nor hath any Cauſe to fear; that is not ſubject to Pain, Anger, nor other Paſſions, are undeniable Truths, and an Opinion that is Praiſe-worthy, eſpecially in a Heathen Philoſopher; but when he denies Providence, as theſe Verſes do intimate, and when he thinks that it is not conſiſting with the higheſt Felicity, as if God had no particular Care of Men; That the Juſt are to expect nothing from his Goodneſs, nor the Wicked are not to dread his Juſtice, are ſuch Opinions, that our Reaſon and Religion will not permit us to entertain.

The ſecond Particular relates to *Death*. For as *Ariſtotle* obſerves, Death is look'd upon as the moſt dreadful Evil, becauſe none is exempted, being unavoidable. Therefore *Epicurus* judges, That we ought to accuſtom our ſelves to think upon it, that we might learn by that means as much as is poſſible to free our ſelves from ſuch Fears of Death, as might diſturb our Tranquility, and conſequently the Happineſs of our Life; and for that Reaſon, he endeavours to perſwade us, that it is ſo far from being the moſt dreadful of all Evils, that in it ſelf it is no Evil at all: And thus he argues; *Death*, ſaith he, *don't affect us, and by conſequence in reſpect of us, is not to be judged an Evil; for what affects us is attended by ſome but, now Death is the privation of Senſe.* He tells us alſo, with *Anaxagoras*, *That as before we were capable of Senſe, it was not grievous to us to have no Senſe; ſo likewiſe when we ſhall have loſt it, we ſhall not be troubled at the want of it. As when we are aſleep, we are not concerned, becauſe we are not awake: So when we ſhall be dead, it will not trouble us, that we are not living.* He concludes with *Archeſilas*, *That Death, which is ſaid to be an Evil, hath this belonging to it, that when it hath been preſent, it hath never troubled any body. And that it is through the Weakneſs of the Mind, and the diſmal Apprehenſions that we have of Death, that*

makes

makes it ſeem ſo terrible to us when abſent, inſomuch that ſome are ſtruck dead with the very Fear of dying.

We may very well acknowledge, That Death is the Privation of our External Senſe, or of Senſe, properly ſo called. And *Epicurus* hath very good Reaſon to ſay, That in Death there is nothing to be feared, that may injure the Sight, the Hearing, the Smell, the Taſt, or the Senſe of Feeling; for all theſe Senſes cannot be without the Body, and then the Body ceaſes to be, or is diſſolved. But that which we are not to allow is, what he affirms elſewhere, That Death is alſo the Privation or Extinction of the Spirit, or Underſtanding, which is an internal Senſe; a Senſe according to his Notion. Therefore, that we may not be hindred, by this Impiety, which has been ſufficiently refuted in treating of the Immortality of the Soul; let us proceed to give a Check to the extraordinary Apprehenſions of Death, and to thoſe Fears that frequently diſturb all the Peace and Quiet of our Life, and with a ſullen Blackneſs infect and poiſon all our moſt innocent Pleaſures, as *Lucretius* ſaith,

——————— *Thoſe idle Fears,*
That ſpoil our Lives with Jealouſies and Cares,
Diſturb our Joys with dread of Pains beneath,
And ſully them with the black Fears of Death.

Let us therefore in the firſt place, remember to give a Check to that fond Deſire of prolonging our days without bounds. Let us, I ſay, ſo remember this frail and infirm Condition of our Nature, as not to deſire any thing above it's Reach and Capacity. Let us calmly and quietly, without repining, enjoy this Gift of Life, whether it be beſtowed upon us for a longer or a ſhorter time. It is certain, that our Maker may deprive us of it without doing us any wrong. Let us thankfully acknowledge his Liberality, from whom

whom we have received it, and add this to the number of those Benefits, which we daily draw from his Bounty.

Nature favours us for a while with the use of the Prospect of those Enjoyments: Be not angry, that we must withdraw when the time is expired; for we were admitted upon no other Terms, but to yield our places to others, as our Ancestors have done to us. Our Bodies are naturally inclinable to Corruption, and the manner of our Nativity renders our Death unavoidable. *If to be Born is pleasant, let not our Dissolution be grievous to us*, to make use of *Seneca*'s Words. If the striving against this Fatality could any ways advantage us, we should then perhaps approve of the Endeavours that are made, but all our Strugglings are to no purpose, we do but add to our pain.

The number of our Days is so appointed, that the time of our Life slides away, and is not to be recovered; and we run our Race in such a manner, that whether we will or not, we are brought at last to the end.

As many Days as we pass over, so many are cut off from that Life that Nature hath alotted to us. So that Death being the Privation of Life, we are dying continually, as long as we live, and that by a Death that carries not all at once, but by degrees one step after another, tho' the last is that unto which the Name of Death is assigned. So true it is, that the end of our Life depends upon the first Moment.

Let us therefore moderate our Desires according to the Rule that Nature hath prescribed; and if the Destinies (to speak according to the ancient Poets) cannot be prevail'd upon, so that against our Wills, we are hurried away; let us at least alleviate our Trouble by suffering our selves to be carried off willingly.

The beſt and only Remedy to paſs our Life free and void of Trouble, is to ſuit our ſelves to our Nature, to deſire nothing but what it requires, and to eſteem the laſt Moment of our Life as a free Gift of Providence, and to diſpoſe and prepare our ſelves in ſuch a manner, that when Death approaches, we may ſay, I have lived, and I have finiſhed the Race that Nature hath appointed me.

Vixi & quem dederas curſum Natura peregi.

She calls away, but I come of mine own accord. Nature requires of me what I am intruſted with, I yield it willingly: I am commanded to die, I expire without Regret. We might alſo very well make uſe of the Advice of *Lucretius*, and ſpeak thus to our ſelves. The greateſt and moſt mighty Monarchs of the World are dead; and *Scipio*, that Thunderbolt of War, and Terror of *Carthage*, hath left his Bones in the Earth, like as the vileſt Slave: *Anchiſes*, the moſt Religious of all men, and *Homer* the Prince of the Poets, are dead; and ſhall we murmur to die?

But more to comfort thee——
Conſider, Ancus *periſh'd long ago*;
Ancus, *a better Man by much than thou.*
Conſider, mighty Kings in pamper'd State
Fall, and ingloriouſly ſubmit to Fate.
Scipio *that Scourge of* Carthage, *now the Grave*
Keeps Priſoner like the meaneſt common Slave;
Nay, the great Wits and Poets too, that give
Eternity to others, ceaſe to live.
Homer *their Prince, the Darling of the Nine*
(What Troy *would at a ſecond fall repine*
To be thus ſung?) is nothing now but Fame,
A laſting, far diffus'd, but empty Name.

Let

Let us ſay moreover, *Gaſſendus* himſelf is dead, and that great Man hath finiſhed his Courſe like other Mortals; he who in profound Learning and Wiſdom excell'd the reſt of Mankind, and who riſing like a Sun, darkned the Light of all the Stars.

Nay Great Gaſſendi's *Race of Life is run,*
That Man of Wit, who other Men out-ſhone,
As far as meaner Stars the mid-day Sun.

And can'ſt not thou, O Wretch, reſolve to die?

Then how dar'ſt thou repine to die and grieve,
Thou meaner Soul, thou dead ev'n whilſt alive?
That ſleep'ſt and dream'ſt the moſt of Life away,
Thy Night is full as rational as thy Day.
Still vext with Cares, who never underſtood
The Principles of ill, nor uſe of good,
Nor whence thy Cares proceed, but reel'ſt about,
In vain unſettled Thoughts, condemn'd to doubt.

Thou whoſe Life is as half dead; thou who ſpendeſt above half thy time in Sleep; who ſnoreſt, (as I may ſay) waking and feedeſt upon Fancies, and who liveſt in the midſt of Fears and continual Troubles. It is what our famous *Malherbe* had in his Thoughts, when he bewails the unhappy Fate of great Men, who are ſubject to the ſame Laws of Death as the meaneſt Beggars.

Yet theſe are turn'd to Duſt, and Fate
Rules with ſuch Arbitrary Sway,
So binds its Laws on every State,
That all their Equal's Doom Obey.
With none e'er yet Impartial Deſtiny
Of all it's num'rous Subjects wou'd diſpenſe,
Hear this ye Vulgar Souls, and hence
Unrepining Learn to Die.

But here ſome will object, we ſhall be depriv'd of all the Bleſſings of Life, as *Lucretius* Elegantly Expreſſes it, *Lib.* 3.

Ay, but he now is ſnatcht from all his Joys;
No more ſhall his Chaſt Wife, and Pratling Boys
Run to their Dad, with eager haſt, and ſtrive
Which ſhall have the firſt Kiſs, as when alive.
Ay, but he now no more from Wars ſhall come,
Bring Peace and Safety to his Friends at home;
Wretched, O Wretched Man! one Fatal Day
Has ſnatch'd the vaſt Delights of Life away.

It is true, that this is commonly objected, but they ſeldom Conſider that this ſuppoſed Unhappy Man ſhall then have no deſire at all for ſuch things; and that when he ſhall be really Dead, he ſhall not ſee any like himſelf ſtanding near his Tomb, beating the Breaſt, and languiſhing with Grief, as the ſame Author Deſcribes.

Thus they bewail, but go no further on,
And add, that his Deſires and Wants are gone.
But the fond Fool n'er thinks, that when kind Death
Shall cloſe his Eyes in Night, and ſtop his Breath;
Then nothing of this thinking thing remains,
To mourn his Fate, and feel ſharp Grief and Pains.

May not we likewiſe thus Argue, as *Plutarch* Obſerves, and which often occurs in our Thoughts? If our Life, which we eſteem very long, when it extends to an Hundred Years, were naturally but of one Days continuance, as ſome Animals mention'd by *Ariſtotle*, in the Kingdom of *Pontus* are; And if like them in the Morning we were in our Youth, at Noon in our Strength and full Growth, and at Night in our Old Age; It is certain, in this Caſe we ſhould be as well pleas'd to live one Day till Night, as we are now to live an hundred years. And on the contrary,

trary, if our Life did now extend to a thouſand years, as did that of our firſt Fathers, in that Caſe it would grieve us as much to Die at the end of ſix hundred years, as to depart now at the expiration of threeſcore. It is the ſame in reſpect of thoſe, who firſt came into the World, if they had continued till this preſent time, it would trouble them as much to Die now, as it does us.

Theſe Conſiderations therefore ought to teach us, that our Life of what ſort ſoever, is to be computed, not by its length, but by the good Qualifications and Pleaſures that attend it. In the ſame manner (ſaith *Seneca*) *As the Perfection of a Circle ought to be computed, not by the Greatneſs, but by the exact Roundneſs of the Figure. O Vain and Indiſcreet Diligence*, ſaith *Pliny*, *Men compute the number of their Days, where they ſhould only ſeek their true Worth.*

Heu vana, & imprudens diligentia, numerus dierum
Computatur ubi quæritur pondus!

We don't Conſider, that as the Maſs of this Earth, and all the World beſide, and a thouſand other ſuch Worlds, if you pleaſe, are but as a Point, if compared with the vaſt extended ſpace of the Heavens: Thus the longeſt Life of Man, were it as long as that of the *Hamadryades*, or a thouſand thouſand times more, is but a Moment, if compared with Eternity. *This Life*, ſaith *Seneca*, is *but a Point, How can we extend this Point?*

In hoc punctum conjectus es,
Quod ut extendas, quouſque extendes?

Know, ſaith Lucretius, *That by the prolonging of our Days we diminiſh nothing from the time and long continuance of Death*; and that he who dies to day, ſhall not be dead a leſs time than he who died a thouſand years ago.

What tho' a thouſand years prolong thy breath,
How can this ſhorten the long ſtate of Death?
For tho' thy Life ſhall numerous Ages fill,
The State of Death ſhall be Eternal ſtill;
And he that dies to day, ſhall be no more,
As long as thoſe who periſh'd long before.

If Nature, ſaith he again, ſhould in anger ſpeak to us in this manner? 'What Cauſe haſt thou, O Mortal to Weep, and to Complain of Death? If thy former Life hath been eaſie and pleaſant, and if thou haſt known how to make uſe of the good things and delights that I have afforded thee, why doſt thou not as a Gueſt, depart when thou art full, and ſatisfied with Life? and why doſt thou not accept, fond Creature, of the agreeable Repoſe that is offered thee? But if otherwiſe, thy Life hath been to thee a burthen, and if thou haſt ſuffered my Bounties to periſh, why deſirſt thou more to miſpend them after the ſame manner? for I can give thee no new thing. And if thou ſhouldſt live thouſands of years, thou wilt but ſtill ſee the ſame things repeated over again. If Nature ſhould ſpeak to us in this Language, ſhould we not have reaſon to approve of this Diſcourſe, and own that it hath cauſe to Reproach us in this manner?

Fond Mortal, what's the matter thou doſt ſigh?
Why all theſe Tears, becauſe thou once muſt die,
And once ſubmit to ſtrong Neceſſity?
For if the Race thou haſt already run
Was pleaſant, if with joy thou ſaws't the Sun:
If all thy Pleaſures did not paſs thy Mind,
As thro' a Sieve, but left ſome Sweets behind;
Why doſt thou not then like a thankful Gueſt,
Riſe cheerfully from Life's abundant Feaſt,
And with a quiet Mind go take thy Reſt?

But

But if all those Delights are lost and gone,
Spent idly all, and Life a burthen grown;
Then why, fond Mortal, dost thou ask for more?
Why still desire t'increase thy wretched store?
And wish for what must wast like those before?
Not rather free thy self from Pains and Fear,
And end thy Life, and necessary care?
My Pleasures always in a Circle run,
The same returning with the yearly Sun:
And thus, tho' thou dost still enjoy thy Prime,
And tho' thy Limbs feel not the rage of Time;
Yet I can find no new, no fresh Delight,
The same dull Joys must vex thy Appetite:
Altho' thou coud'st prolong thy wretched Breath
For numerous Years; much more if free from Death.

At least we must acknowledge that a Wise Man who hath lived long enough to consider the World, ought of his own accord to submit himself to the Course of Nature, when he perceives that his time is come, and cannot but suppose that his Race is Run, and that the Circle that he hath finish'd is compleat; and if this Circle is not to be compared to Eternity, it is however with the continuance of the World.

As to what relates to the whole Prospect of Nature, he hath often beheld the Heavens, the Earth, and other things included in the World; He hath often seen the rising and the setting of the Cœlestial Bodies; He hath taken notice of several Eclipses, and many other Phænomenas or unusual Appearances in the Skye, the constant succession of the Seasons, and in a word, many particular Generations, many Corruptions and Transmutations. And as to those things which relate to Mankind, he hath seen, or at least hath heard and understood from History the Transactions that have happen'd from the beginning; of Peace, and of War, of Faith kept, and violated; of a Polite Life, and of a rude and barbarous Behaviour;

viour; of Laws Eſtabliſh'd, and Aboliſh'd, of Kingdoms and Commonwealths in their firſt Birth and Declenſion, and generally all other things that he hath any knowledge of, or which have been told him, and with which he is in any wiſe acquainted, as if he had been preſent when they firſt happen'd. So that he ought to conſider, that all the time that is gone before him relates to him, as if his Life were begun with the things themſelves. And becauſe we muſt judge of the future by the time paſt, he ought alſo to think that all the ſubſequent time relates to him in the ſame manner; and that there ſhall be nothing hereafter, but what hath been already; that there is nothing but the Circumſtances of things that alter, and that all things in general ſteer the ſame common Courſe, and make the like appearances; ſo that Holy Writ hath reaſon to ſay, *The thing that hath been, it is that which ſhall be, and that which is done, is that which ſhall be done again, and there is no new thing under the Sun.* Is there any thing whereof it may be ſaid, ſee this is new? From whence we may conclude, that a Wiſe Man ought not to fancy his Life ſhort; for by caſting his eye upon the time paſt, and foreſeeing the time to come, he may extend it to as great a length as the duration of the Univerſe.

Moreover, tho' *Epicurus* had cauſe to ſay, *That it is ridiculous to aſſert that there is no evil in Death when it is preſent, and yet to dread it, and be troubled when it muſt come; as if there were any reaſon to be diſturbed for that which is abſent, which when preſent never gives us the leaſt ſorrow:* Nevertheleſs, becauſe other Conſiderations repreſent Death dreadful, as the Evils and Pains that Uſher it, and thoſe that we think will be its neceſſary Attendants; *Seneca* therefore makes it his buſineſs to recommend divers Conſiderations, wherein he ſhews, that tho' Death in it ſelf is no Evil, yet it appears ſo much in that Notion, that it ought not

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to be lookt upon as an indifferent thing; for as he expresseth himself; *Death is not indifferent in the same manner as it is indifferent whether the Hairs of my head be of one length, or not; for Death is to be reckon'd amongst those things, which tho' they be no real Evils, yet they appear to be so; for we love our selves; and naturally desire to subsist and preserve our selves, and we have an innate aversion from a dissolution, because it seems to deprive us of many advantages, and draws us away from that plenty of Enjoyments unto which we are accustomed.* There is yet one thing more which causeth us to dread Death. *We know the things present, but we are altogether Strangers to those unto which we are a going; and therefore we fear that which is unknown. Besides, we have a natural dread of Darkness, into which we imagin that Death is leading us: So that tho' Death is indifferent, yet it is not of the number of those things that are easily to be despised; we ought to inure and harden our Minds by a long accustomed Habit, to enable us the more willingly to undergo and encounter with the dismal approaches of Death.*

The Third Particular relates to the abominable Opinion of the Stoicks, who were perswaded that in some Cases Men had the liberty to kill themselves; for thus you see *Seneca* represents them arguing. *It is certainly a great affliction to live in want; but there is nothing that obliges us absolutely to continue in it; for which way soever we glance our eyes, we may see the end of our Sufferings, and our Deliverance, either in a Precipice, in a River, by a Dagger, by a Tree, by opening a Vein, or by Abstinence. We ought to give God thanks that none of us is detained against his Will in this present Life. The Eternal Decree hath admirably well appointed that there should be but one kind of entrance into the World, but many out of it. Death, say they, is to be met with in every place; God hath very wisely contrived, that there is none but may take away*

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